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Preface 
Although it is a primary connector in the long, linear "syntag­matic" dimension of stories, causation in fiction has attracted only passing attention from theorists. Despite the illuminating pages 
on the subject by Genette, Todorov, Prince, and others which enrich this 
study, no attempt has yet been made to construct a unified theory of the 
causal concept in narrative. Among the many reasons for the dearth of 
etiological theories, two, I think, deserve mention at the outset. First, the 
causal dynamic remained largely invisible to the relatively static visions of 
literary structuralism, which dominated early theoretical exploration. Sec­
ond, well-founded contemporary doubts about the real-world truth value of 
the causal concept raise questions about the validity of causal statements 
concerning fiction. 
The pages that follow are organized partly in response to these prob­
lems. A brief introductory summary of philosophical views of "real-life" 
causation, from Hume and Kant, through Nietzsche, Bergson, and Rus­
sell, to Mackie and Anscombe, leads among other things to the observation 
that causation is indeed not a truth but a hypothesis, not an entity to be 
found in nature, but rather a useful perceptual grid in the minds of human 
observers. This finding leads me to postulate that the reader serves as the 
"human observer" of fiction, and that causation arises most basically in 
stories from readerly perception. Thus the principles of reader-response 
criticism open doors that were closed to structuralist poetics. Chapter one 
then evokes briefly the notions of causal "functions" in narrative as developed 
by modern narratologists and seeks to show how this approach, eliminating 
the human observer (reader) from analyses, erroneously seeks "true" logical 
connections between events. Yet causes are present only in the discourse of a 
text, in the unavoidable causal implications of language, not in the events of 
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the story itself. This long-established distinction between "story" and 
"discourse" leads me to adapt for analytical purposes Genettes three-tier 
model of narrative, which includes a "narration" level as well, referring to 
the inferred authors "production" of the text. 
Inductive analysis of four relatively traditional French novels serves to 
demonstrate how causality—or readerly inference thereof—operates on all 
three levels, each of which assumes a dynamic role. At this early stage of 
causal research, it seems both prudent and honest to derive elements of 
causal theory chiefly by induction, through observation of existing fiction, 
rather than to propose a system apparently ex nihilo and to attempt to show 
subsequently that real texts exemplify it. Near the end of part I, I advance a 
three-level provisional model of the causal dynamic in "standard" novels 
and seek to demonstrate that the levels of narrative are actually definable by 
causal operations. 
Part II of this study attempts to apply this matrix, no longer to 
traditional fiction, but to a series of French modernist narratives. These 
further inductive analyses suggest that the twentieth-century French novel­
ists in question have become increasingly unsure of the objective existence 
of real-world causality, or at least of human ability to observe it. They are 
less likely than traditional writers to seek to imply its existence between 
events of their stories, but they must nonetheless use language, with all the 
causal expression that entails. They employ therefore various strategies of 
blocking and indeterminacy to eliminate from readers' constitution of the 
"story" level whatever causation may remain operative in the discourse. In 
the most recent Robbe-Grillet text analyzed, all "real-world" referentiality 
is effectively eliminated, thus making it impossible for readers to draw 
causal inferences about the story. On the basis of strengths and limitations 
now apparent in the provisional three-tier model, my conclusion proposes a 
more complex and uncertain one as applicable within limits to both tradi­
tional and modernist texts. 
Thus my response to the first problem—the inability of theory to 
observe causality in fiction—is an approach founded upon readerly response 
to texts. To the second problem, I reply that causal statements are not 
intended to be true: they are hypotheses. But they are inferences of such 
power that they inform the metonymical dimension of traditional stories 
and require those modern texts that would prefer to banish causal connec­
tions to adopt strategies of particular sophistication. 
In an effort to make these pages readily accessible to all readers of 
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English, I have provided translations for the substantive quotations in other 
languages. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are, for better or worse, 
my own. 
To Anita, for her patience, help, and unfailing support; to my Univer­
sity of Michigan colleagues, for their interest and longanimity; among 
whom to Marcel Muller, for his numerous useful references; and among 
whom especially to Ross Chambers, who read the penultimate version, for 
his uncommonly valuable insights, suggestions, and encouragement: my 
warmest thanks. 

Introduction 
There are neither causes nor effects. Linguistically we do not know how to 
rid ourselves of them. But that does not matter. 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 
(trans. Kaufmann & Hollingdale) 
Tu causes, tu causes, c'est tout ce que tu sais faire. 
—Queneaus "Laverdure" 
Causality is fundamental to human thought and activity. Our every action implies a grasp of its practical application, and elements of its principles are inherent in all our decisions. From traffic lights to 
birth control devices, our precautions affirm our belief that causation is not 
simply a notion, but a reality. The affirmation is hardly new. The first 
human fire builders were obviously aware of a predictable relationship 
between their actions and the results thereof, and early hominids, chipping 
away to sharpen one stone with another, must have envisioned the potential 
utility for the hunt of the spearhead in the making. Why stop with human 
beings? Some great apes select and wield tools. And who is to say that the 
osprey, diving upon a shallow-swimming fish, has not chosen its prey and 
fixed the angle of its dive with a conscious eye to the effects of its decisions? 
Everything points to causality as a conatus, a virtually instinctual link 
between mind and matter. Yet it has eluded objective observation and 
description, and no philosopher to date has provided a completely workable 
analysis of it, nor even an entirely satisfactory definition. 
Undefined, it remains interesting. The coexistence of reasonable yet 
differing views on the subject signifies the coexistence of reasonable yet dif­
fering worlds. And in fact a multiple cosmos awaits us in novels, each a 
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"universe" with its own harmony arising from the character of the codes 
which inform it. The concept and the code of causality evolved over the 
period here under study (approximately the 1870s to the 1970s), and with 
them—perhaps because of them—evolved the structure of fiction. 
Yet define we must, for the sake of minimal clarity. Causality is the 
name of the relationship between causes and their effects. {Causation desig­
nates the same thing, but it also admits of more particular application: one 
may speak of the causation of a specific event, as the "act of causing" it or as 
the complex of its causes.) But what is a cause? A primary difficulty in 
defining is the multiplicity and diversity of relationships subsumed in this 
most general of terms. The relationships we perceive between the gravita­
tional force and "falling," between the presence of certain bacteria and 
"disease," and between a house fire and the flight of the occupants belong to 
different orders of reality and thought, their very distinctness militating 
against the choice of a common designation. Still, a most unscientific 
instinct persists in telling us they indeed have something in common. 
Present-day philosophers still find the term meaningful enough to 
pursue debates about what cause signifies. But contemporary formulations, 
and my own definition for the purposes of this study, are best deferred, in 
favor of a rapid survey of selected historical philosophical opinion, which 
forms the context of current approaches. 
Not surprisingly, a common factor in post-Enlightenment theories 
of causality is the required presence of a human observer. David Hume 
launched the "modern" arguments in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), a 
book whose suspiciously anthropocentric title suggests the turn etiological 
analysis was to take. The first part of one of his two-part definitions (book I, 
part III, section XIV) affirms that we may define a cause to be 
. . . an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects 
resembling the formerare plac 'din a like relation of priority and contiguity to 
xthose objects, that resemble the latter. . . . 
From this, and from the reasoning from which it emerged, we may judge 
that, for Hume, a cause must be (a) temporally prior to its effect, (b) spa­
tially contiguous, in some way or other, to its effect, and (c) part of a class of 
similar pairs of events, in which the prior ones resemble each other and the 
subsequent ones also resemble one another. This definition astutely avoids 
the assumption of any discernible connection between cause and effect; we 
simply note that actual event A, is followed by actual event B, in con­
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tiguity, that a similar A2 is followed by a similar B2, and A3 by B3, until we 
begin to suspect that causation is at work. Then we may predict that, for 
any AB, we will observe a following BH in the vicinity. Thus, without 
denying the potential "reality" of causation, Hume has nonetheless situated 
it in the mind of an implied human observer, endowed with memory and 
the ability to learn from experience, capable of classifying events, of dis­
cerning which are similar enough, and similar in pertinent ways, for cate­
gorization as examples of causality. If a tree falls in the forest, in the absence 
of a human observer, are there any causes for it? One may suppose there 
certainly will have been, when a human being discovers its demise. "Upon 
the whole," says Hume, "necessity is something, that exists in the mind, 
not in objects" (Treatise, p. 165). 
In the second segment of the definition quoted above, Hume adds 
"imagination" to memory as a human faculty capable of discerning causes. 
If we avoid plunging headlong into rivers without knowing how to swim, 
he indicates, it is not because we necessarily have previous experience with 
drowning. General experience—with solids and liquids, and with breath-
ing—allows us to form a mental image of the outcome. In no case, how­
ever, is causation for Hume objectively observable, for it is not an entity 
(situated perhaps between A and B, where one would have to explain how it 
connects to A on the one hand and to B on the other): it is a mental 
classification of events. As for the possibility that some "power" or "energy" 
or "efficacity" is transmitted from A to B, that too escapes objective obser­
vation; indeed the use of such terms as synonyms of "cause," for Hume, is 
purely tautological. 
Hume cautions that, in making causal judgments, one must take care 
to remove from consideration "all foreign and superfluous circumstances," 
although he fails to explain how we are to distinguish them. Furthermore, 
his formulation fails to filter out "sibling" effects, sequential effects of a 
common cause; his argument would allow one to reason, for example, that 
day causes night. But his principles remain influential, and certain of them 
are particularly useful for the study of fiction: that causation exists in the 
mind of an observer, and that it involves memory or imagination and 
classificatory judgment. For if causation exists in stories, it exists in the 
mind of the reader. Readers are the observers and final arbiters of causal 
relationships among narrated events. Even when a narrative text tells us 
that one event caused another, we are aware of the subjective, judgmental 
nature of the affirmation and may compare our notions of plausible causa­
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tion to that of the voice of the text. While most fictional information must 
be taken on faith—the heroines age, the color of her skirt—causal state­
ments are all subject to doubt. 
Kant never defined causality in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 
1787), where the subject is little more than a detour on his road to other 
destinations, but his comments about our perception of causation in time 
are a source of critically useful principles. He sought to reestablish 
an "objective" link between cause and effect, but, because of his inher­
ent idealism, his notion of objectivity actually posits a limited subjectivity, 
one unable to see sunny skies when it is raining, but able to draw the cur­
tains and refuse to see anything meteorological at all. He describes our 
knowledge of phenomena in terms of a mental image or representation 
{Vorstellung): again the human "observer." He notes (first division, book II, 
chapter II, section 3, second analogy)2 that these impressions occur in 
temporal succession, and that the order of succession is frequently de­
termined {bestimmt). If the observer, however, selects the order, it is not 
determined. When we look at a house from top to bottom, no necessity 
causes the roof to preexist the foundation, for we might as well have 
observed the house from bottom to top or from side to side. But if we watch 
a boat drift down a river, we see it first upstream then further down; these 
mental images, according to Kant, could not have been received in the 
opposite order, and the change is therefore determined. In this sense, all our 
mental images derived from the reading of fiction are determined. But the 
Kantian distinction between "subjective" and "objective" succession pre­
supposes perception of the distinction between present-future and past: 
what our Vorstellung tells us did in fact happen "objectively" is the only 
thing that could have happened. At the moment of mental image A (boat 
upstream), the future is indeterminate (p. 215), but when B occurs (boat 
downstream), it is the only possible outcome of A. Each present refers us to 
a correlative past from which it must, according to the "rule" that estab­
lishes its place in the succession, have sprung. 
Obviously, this Kantian principle defines the reader's, as well as the 
observers, present. What has been read in a given novel appears deter­
mined, while what remains to read appears indeterminate, whence the 
suspense, surprise, and so on we perceive as part of the reading experience. 
Readers know, of course, in fact that the story is determined all the way 
through, in the pages as yet unturned, but, at the watershed between 
"apparently determined" and "apparently indeterminate," the reader de­
fines his or her separateness from the story and its narrator. When a nar­
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rative voice recounts a tale of events which supposedly occurred at some 
earlier time, it may be assumed that it knows the outcome when it delivers 
the first sentence: for the voice of the text, then, everything is determined. 
This dialectic establishes in large measure the readers relationship of sepa­
rateness with respect to the narrative voice: causal principles, once posited, 
work to determine the levels on which narratives exist, as textual evidence 
will reveal later on. On the other hand, if a narrator stands in médias res as 
she or he speaks, as in diary or epistolary novels, the relationship with the 
reader is profoundly altered. The future for the narrator remains indetermi­
nate, just as for us, yet the unscanned pages lie immutable before us: to 
another consciousness, on a level beyond the narrator and us, causality 
seems to have played out its determining role. And the words stretch on 
toward the end, syntactically "determined" by their predecessors, often 
connected by (names for) action: the transitivity of linguistic narrative 
flashes across our minds, from the fluidity of the possible to the solidity of 
the "real," in Kantian time. 
Causality is thus a quasi-instinctual perceptual grid that our minds, 
in reading as in living, may impose upon events, or mental representa­
tions thereof, for the purpose of explaining or perhaps predicting them. 
Nietzsche, therefore, attacks its validity as an intellectual tool, and it is 
with Nietzsche that the deconstructionists begin to take an interest in the 
history of etiological theory.3 In the collection of fragments and notes 
published under the title The Will to Power (1883-88) , 4 the philosopher 
maintains that there are no such things as causes and effects, that these 
terms designate a falsely perceived relationship, anthropocentric in origin, 
whereby we attribute intentionality to nature, seeing things as agents and 
patients. Furthermore, he sees our own perceptions, including pleasure 
and pain, as terminal phenomena, disconnected, atomistic, and causes of 
nothing. In this general context (if there can be context in an assemblage of 
fragments), one note5 evokes a chronological inversion (chronologische Um­
drehung), by which causes reach our consciousness after their effects, despite 
their presumed chronological precedence. Feeling a pain in my leg, I reach 
down and discover a pin in my chair (Jonathan Culler's example): the 
perception of the effect has caused me to seek and discover the cause. The 
deconstructive neatness of the example resides in the disconnecting of 
causal logic (before-after) for the purpose of reinstating it, reinvesting it 
with the power to operate in the reverse order (after-before). Having denied 
the existence of causality to begin with, Nietzsche seems less eager than 
Culler to revitalize it. He merely observes that some fragment of the "real" 
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world of which we are conscious "is born" after an effect has impressed itself 
upon us and is thus projected as its "cause." He does suggest that casting 
about for causes is a memory-based habit, the construction of a fiction that 
is familiar to us: that of an interprétable and explainable world in which we 
may feel more secure. Could this habit—or a perceived need for it—be a 
reinstated cause, which has crept in despite Nietzsche's efforts? He con­
cludes: "to be able to read off a text as a text without interposing an 
interpretation is the last-developed form of inner experience—perhaps one 
that is hardly possible—" (here the note breaks off).6 Can it be that our 
linguistic habits, acquired in reading, tend to spread to the interpretation 
of "reality"? 
The metaphor binding a sequence of sense impressions to the reading 
of a text cannot fail to interest us in other ways. Most obviously, we are 
seeking a heuristic device for the interpretation of texts—a bad habit, but a 
tempting one, a delicious forbidden fruit that it is "hardly possible" to 
refuse, a habit that causality may make it possible for us to indulge "under 
erasure." Then too, "cause" is a word, an element of texts, subject to the 
limitations of language. A "cause" is "that which produces an effect" (one of 
those remarkable definitions which owe their richness to the fact that they 
explain nothing), and nothing can therefore be called, truly or falsely, a 
"cause" until it has produced what we perceive as an "effect." While we may 
seek to predict what will be a cause ("If you drop that glass, it will break!") 
or propose a counterfactual ("If you had dropped that glass, it would have 
broken"), on the semantic level causes are radically simultaneous with their 
effects. And vice versa: the "pain" in the Culler example was an event, but it 
did not become an "effect" until its cause was perceived, unless we admit to 
the instinctual habit of seeing all events as caused. In any case, the semantic 
simultaneity, and the chronologiscbe Umdrebung, define the reason why a 
narrative event, like the shooting of Madame de Rénal, creating causes out 
of what had been simply (antecedent) events, leads readers to reevaluate and 
restructure the readerly "past." 
Finally, the word "cause," while masquerading often as the name of a 
particular relationship, in reality designates, as we have observed, a class of 
supposedly similar relationships. In an oft-quoted little essay, On Truth and 
Falsehood in the Extramoral Sense (1873),7 Nietzsche uses language to subvert 
language, calling particular attention to the problematics of the general and 
particular in words. Language is, he says, a metaphor for our sense impres­
sions, yet we make of it the repository of truth. In fact, although no two 
leaves are alike, we apply the word leaf to them all, conveniently forgetting 
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the individual differences. Language thus leads us to believe that there is a 
fundamental Urform of leaf of which all leaves are but inept copies. And so 
the leaves, which gave rise to the leaf seem to us to be caused by it ("das 
Blatt ist die Ursache der Blatter" p. 313). Cause could, of course, mutatis 
mutandis', be substituted for leaf in the example. Does the existence of the 
abstraction cause lead us to infer the myriad of specific causes we perceive 
about us? I will argue rather that the unwieldy abstraction itself fills a need. 
If the perception of causes serves, as Nietzsche suggests, to aid in satisfying 
our craving for an explainable and partly predictable world, the generality 
called "causality" provides the essential unifying factor: not only does the 
world appear explainable, but it provides explanations according to the 
same, universal law. 
No claim will be made here that causal reasoning is valid (on the 
contrary, its hypothetical nature is what makes it interesting), nor that the 
"universal law" is true. Across the period we will be studying, roughly from 
Zola to Robbe-Grillet, suspicions about the "universal law" begin to per­
vade the consciousness not only of philosophers, but of writers and readers 
of fiction. All are left with a language whose every transitive verb implies 
causation, in a world in which causation has become suspect. How chang­
ing narrative structures managed to weaken and ultimately eliminate the 
causal stranglehold of language over fiction will be explored in part II. Some 
of the reasons for the means chosen spring, in France, from the poetic and 
philosophical revolt of the late nineteenth century, which deserves brief 
mention here. 
An important inhibitor to general public acceptance of Nietzschean 
attacks on causality was the perception that science—notably the experi­
mental sciences, but also Darwinian biology—was moving from triumph 
to triumph with causality as its foundation. Denial of the causal relation­
ship as a false mental construct seemed to fly in the face of sound empirical 
data. But the revolt occurred when the scientific principle was expanded to 
explain and predict the human personality. Hippolyte Taine was both the 
flagstaff and the lightning rod of the expansion, writing, for example: 
Que les faits soient physiques ou moraux, il n'importe, ils ont toujours 
des causes; il y en a pour l'ambition, pour le courage, pour la véracité, 
comme pour la digestion, pour le mouvement musculaire, pour la 
chaleur animale. Le vice et la vertu sont des produits comme le vitriol 
et le sucre, et toute donnée complexe naît de la rencontre d'autres 
données plus simples dont elle dépend.8 
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(No matter whether the facts are physical or mental, they always have 
causes; there are causes for ambition, for courage, for veracity, just as 
there are for digestion, muscular movement, and animal warmth. 
Vice and virtue are products, like vitriol and sugar, and every complex 
datum arises from the conjunction of simpler data on which it 
depends.) 
The fact that Zola chose the "vitriol and sugar" part of the famous quotation 
as an epigraph for the second edition of Thérèse Raquin is indicative of the 
infusion of belief in the "universal law" in the general culture of the period. 
Taines view that we are all the result of la race, le milieu, and le moment, both 
physically and psychologically products of environment and heredity,9 was 
to be long influential and exemplifies the dominance of causal structures in 
the popular mentality. 
Rimbaud, of course, objected, in his "lettre du Voyant"10 (a letter to 
Paul Demeny dated May 15, 1871), in which he refers to Taine, that poets 
could avoid being part of the causal chain by disrupting the functioning of 
their senses, through "all the forms of love, of suffering, of madness," as 
well as "poisons"—doubtless alcohol and other narcotics. Environmental 
influences upon the mind must first pass through the senses; by untracking 
the sensory filter, Rimbaud declares, we attain that "monstrous" soul, in 
which the effects of external stimuli are no longer predictable. 
The philosopher Henri Bergson, whose approach, though frustrat­
ingly intuitive, is often on the mark (it was he who, long before E. O. 
Wilson and the sociobiologists, described organisms as mechanisms in­
vented by genes for the production of other genes),11 saw no need for such 
drastic measures. Each individual from birth is already differentiated in 
heredity and/or environment from all others, with a unique sensory appa­
ratus; no external cause can produce the same effect in two individuals: we 
are unpredictable (pp. 131, 499). Bergsons primary arguments against the 
mechanistic application of causal laws to the human mind may be summa­
rized as follows: (1) The physical laws applicable to matter cannot 
be extended to the human consciousness, which is qualitatively different. 
(2) The human psyche is alive, dynamic, and spontaneous, not merely a 
measurable accretion of experience. (3) Language, which is essential to 
causal analysis, is inadequate to the description of states of consciousness, 
because words, at once too specific (my "jealousy" cannot be clearly dissoci­
ated from all the other emotions I feel concurrently) and too general ("my" 
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jealousy is not the same as "yours"), are unsuited to the task. (4) Causal 
diagrams are inadequate to the description of human consciousness, because 
they suppose that human time is comparable to space; space, in a diagram, 
preexists in its entirety, while time is constantly becoming. (5) While it is 
possible to guess an individuals behavior in specific circumstances, it is 
impossible to predict it with certainty, for one cannot "know" another's 
psychic state: of the two ways to seek to know it (intellectually, by words or 
diagrams—see 3 and 4 above—and experientially, by having lived the 
others life), neither is feasible. (6) Causal logic is flawed, even in predic­
tions about inert matter, insofar as it tends toward a relationship of identity 
between past and present (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, in 
Oeuvres; see especially pp. 93—145). 
Bergsons distinction between mechanistic, quantifiable causality, 
valid for the physics of the period (which I will term "rectilinear"), and 
psychological causation, unquantifiable, undefinable, and unpredictable 
(which I will try to show as surfacing in "nonrectilinear" forms) was to 
evolve. For Bergson, it was obviously joyous liberation; later, the essential 
difference between mind and matter was to be perceived as alienating the 
human consciousness from knowledge of material reality. Imprisoned at 
first in the machinery of material causality, humankind is more inclined 
of late to see itself as prisoner in the lonely recesses of entirely separate 
consciousnesses. 
Science, meanwhile, went its own way. By 1913, Bertrand Russell 
was already pointing out that, insofar as causality is the "thought or percep­
tion" of an observer and not a property of matter, it is of no scientific value.12 
Indeed, if experiments are replicable, that demonstrates the relative unifor­
mity of nature, an inductive probability, rather than the existence of a "law" 
of cause and effect. He asserted that scientific observations and experiments 
made no use of causal concepts, that the relationships among phenomena 
are scientifically described in terms of differential equations, each reduced 
to its simplest terms, but without omitting any significant variable. Thus, 
while a particular occurrence may be a "function" of another variable or set 
of variables, it is improper to hold that such variables are its "cause. " And so 
Russell called for the "extrusion" of the word cause from philosophical 
vocabulary. 
The noun function, together with some of its mathematical under­
pinnings, made its way into critical vocabulary with the Russian formalists, 
as the name of a "variable" narrative unit. With some redefinition, it has 
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become a mainstay of structuralist terminology, where it designates those 
units that exist in consecutive and logical correlation, a close approximation 
of what I will be calling "causality." Like Russell, however, the struc­
turalists have as their valuable and fruitful aim the discovery and descrip­
tion of the properties of matter (i.e., of the properties of narrative, sub specie 
realitatis), and not the thought or perception of an observer. Thus Barthes 
and other structuralists, eschewing the term "causality" for excellent 
Nietzschean and Russellian reasons, must seek on theoretical principle to 
factor the reader out of their calculations. Yet, for practical purposes, there 
he or she remains: a unit is not an énoncé ("utterance") itself, but "what it 
means";I3 the connecting logic presupposes an observing and reasoning 
consciousness. An example from Barthes reveals the logic at work: 
. .  . si, dans Un coeur simple, Flaubert nous apprend à un certain 
moment, apparemment sans y insister, que les filles du sous-préfet de 
Pont-L'Evêque possédaient un perroquet, c'est parce que ce perroquet 
va avoir ensuite une grande importance dans la vie de Félicité: l'énoncé 
de ce détail (quelle qu'en soit la forme linguistique) constitue donc une 
fonction, ou unité narrative. (P. 176) 
(. . . if, in Un coeur simple, Flaubert informs us at a given moment, 
apparently without stressing the point, that the daughters of the 
assistant administrator of Pont-L'Evêque owned a parrot, it is because 
that parrot is going to be, later on, of great importance in Félicités 
life: the expression of this detail [whatever linguistic form it may take] 
thus constitutes a function, or narrative unit.) 
The revelatory "it is because" involves a readerly hypothesis about Flaubert, 
which, although it doubtless comes close to certainty once the story is read, 
remains dubious on first reading for some time after the initial reference to 
the parrot. 
I shall examine a similar case in greater detail later, with respect to 
Zola's La Bête humaine and the levels of narrative. I shall work consistently 
from concepts that incorporate an observing mentality, since one perforce is 
present, to see whether it might not be possible, by observing the ways 
in which narratives allow for readers' logic, to succeed after all in mak­
ing a relatively objective statement or two about the properties of narra­
tive per se. 
Russell also criticizes the notion of "events," on which causal theories 
are based, as elusive. An event is traditionally defined as a change, but 
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Russell sees change as process, with no finite boundaries. Where does the 
cause end and the effect begin? If we set arbitrary boundaries, declaring that 
the cause begins here and ends there, it will have no identifying unity, since 
between here and there some progression, some change, will already have 
taken place. Besides, for Russell as for Nietzsche, if events can somehow 
be arbitrarily defined, no two will be alike, so that subsumption under 
the headings of cause and effect contains an inherent error. In response to 
Russell's first objection, this study will seek to remove change arbitrarily 
from those fictional events called effects, by simply selecting a point in the 
narrative and terming the state of affairs at that point an effect. Anything 
prior to that point in narrative time which fulfills the other criteria of 
causation may be called here a cause. As for the nature of those criteria and 
for Russell's second objection, I will call on two more recent philosophers 
for help. 
Causal vocabulary has continued to serve, of course, despite Nietzsche 
and Russell, in both philosophical and everyday discourse, and attempts 
continue to be made to define its practical meaning. When an expert 
testifies that a short circuit caused a fire in a house, what does she or he 
mean? Certainly not that, in the absence of the short circuit, the house 
could not burn, nor that every short circuit in it would lead to conflagra­
tion. J. L. Mackie (1965) devised an analysis of causation that purported to 
explain the use of causal vocabulary in such specific instances.14 A cause, he 
says, is an insufficient but necessary component ofa condition which is itself 
unnecessary but sufficient for the production of the effect. In the example, 
the short circuit was not of itself sufficient to cause thefire: it had to occur in 
the presence of combustible material and in the absence of such precautions 
as a working system of fuses or an adequate sprinkler system. But it was a 
necessary part of the complex condition, since the other elements—nearby 
combustibles, inadequate fuses or sprinklers—could not of themselves 
have produced the blaze. The complex condition itself is unnecessary, since 
it need not have existed (if nothing else, the short circuit might not have 
occurred); when it did exist, however, it sufficed to produce the fire. Mackie 
terms this set of circumstances an "INUS condition," from the initials of 
the key words: insufficient, necessary, unnecessary, sufficient. This system, 
which includes a mechanism for screening out other minimally sufficient 
causes that were present in a given instance but which did not, in fact, come 
into play, approaches a realistic definition of what most people mean when 
they say, "X caused Y." Despite the generality of the term "cause," it is used 
xxiv • Introduction 
with specific application {this house at this time), by a speaker whose 
identity and purpose for speaking are understood. This semantic approach 
includes quite properly the observer-reporter and evokes a kind of causal 
reporting more frequent in daily life and in fiction than the more general 
theories. 
G. E. M. Anscombe, in a Cambridge lecture15 that does not mention 
Nietzsche, draws a concept of causality even more directly from language. 
"Causality," she says, "consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its 
causes." Thus she seeks to separate causation from the notion of "laws," of 
necessity, and of universality. Even in human reproduction ("everyone will 
grant that physical parenthood is a causal relation"), she points to the 
derivation of the effect, by cellular fission, from the cause, rather than to a 
general principle based on repeated observation. For her, to say that B 
comes from A does not imply that every B-like thing comes from an A-like 
thing or set of circumstances, nor that, given B, there had to be an A for it 
to come from. In this way, she detaches causality from the Humean logic of 
comparison and brings it to rest among Nietzsche's leaves. Without deny­
ing that general laws can sometimes be formulated, she nonetheless dis­
covers the apprehension of causation in the isolated example; individual 
causes would exist, one supposes, whether consistent principles could be 
uncovered or not. As for Hume's contention that causing itself is not 
objectively observable, she suggests that he has merely misdefined "observ­
able." We are unable to perceive the "efficacy" of causation? "Nothing 
easier: is cutting, is drinking, is purring not 'efficacy'?" Causality as deriva­
tiveness is plainly discoverable by the senses. The senses may be mistaken, 
"false" causes assigned, but the (apparent) derivativeness of effect from 
cause remains obvious to the observer. 
Anscombe hints that words are at the origin of the observers capacity 
to observe: 
The truthful—though unhelpful—answer to the question: How did 
we come by our primary knowledge of causality? is that in learning to 
speak we learned the linguistic representation and application of a host 
of causal concepts. Very many of them were represented by transitive 
and other verbs of action used in reporting what is observed. Others— 
a good example is "infect"—form, not observation statements, but 
rather expressions of causal hypotheses.16 
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Her assertion that our concepts of causality have their source in language 
returns us, perhaps closer than she would like, to Humean comparison with 
previous experience. For many of us derive most of our previous experience 
from words, some of it indeed from novels. The appearance of deriva­
tiveness comes aided by comparison. But her reference to causal hypotheses 
is of capital importance. I would insist further, if the senses are capable of 
assigning "false" causes, that all causal statements are hypotheses, for their 
truth value is relative. 
Whether language is the origin of our causal perceptions or whether 
our causal perceptions, stemming from more primitive needs, are at the 
origin of language (I prefer this latter stance), there can be no doubt that our 
natural codes are infused with causality, notably in those "transitive and 
other verbs of action" which express cause. Such verbs are in part the 
language (if they did not exist, a natural language would not be a "lan­
guage" as we understand it to be), and they require observer/reporters (and 
narrators in fiction) to express causation whether they "perceive" it or not. 
"She drank my wine" declares the derivativeness of the result: "She caused 
my wine to be drunk (with herself as agent)." Causality inheres in language. 
The element of naïveté in such philosophical analyses as we have pursued 
from Hume onward lies in the expectation that causal statements are in­
tended to be "true." With causality locked into our discourse, however, in 
nonphilosophical, nonscientific parlance, observers, speakers, listeners, 
writers, and readers all perform their functions with far greater flexibility, 
remaining, more or less, on the near side of certainty, in the realm of the 
hypothetical. 
While laying the groundwork for what is to come, the foregoing 
dialectic has brought us to the point at which we can attempt a definition of 
the central concepts. My approach to the notion of "events" has already 
been expressed. As for causality in fiction, for the purposes of this study, it is 
a readerly hypothesis about a relationship of derivativeness between two observed 
phenomena. Some might have expected or preferred that I close the definition 
with a narrower phrase, such as "between two narrated events." But readers 
may obviously perceive causation on other levels than that of the "events" of 
a story, and I hope exploration of these levels too will be useful in construct­
ing a general theory. 
More specialized terms, such as necessary, sufficient, and probable cause, 
will generally be avoided here. Of the three, only necessary cause has an 
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agreed-upon définition in the literature, and that is so restrictive as to make 
such causes rare indeed.17 A condition is those circumstances or sets of 
circumstances that allow a state of affairs to come into existence. (The causes 
for making a statement in French may be many and varied, but ability to 
speak French will always be a condition of the utterance.) I will include 
conditions among causes, making the distinction explicit whenever logic 
requires it. 
Causal reasoning serves two practical purposes: predicting and ex­
plaining. Ability to foresee the consequences of a given course of action 
helps us calculate and select our behavior and achieve desired ends or avoid 
pitfalls. Explanations—causes perceived, according to the Nietzschean 
reversal, after the effect—tend to make us feel secure in a familiar, ordered 
world, as Nietzsche himself points out, and they may fill our memory with 
data (Hume) on which to found future predictions. If we can find no 
explanation for an event, we will doubtless prefer to presume nonetheless 
that one exists, somewhere beyond our powers of perception or intellection, 
rather than to envisage the possibility of a causeless event, whose very 
existence would threaten not only our power to predict but human foresight 
in general. Even "miraculous" remissions of incurable diseases may be 
explained by scientists as resulting from such statistically vague "events" as 
the patients "positive attitude" or "will to live." 
Philosophers and physicists make careful distinctions between causal 
"laws" and statistical "probabilities." In everyday speech, the distinction 
is, quite rightly, more blurred. Hume himself provides a general treatment 
of probability {Treatise, pp. 124—55), anc^ s e e  s causality only as the end­
point of a "gradation" of probability. In our more relativistic world, that 
endpoint itself remains hypothetical. 
Though scientifically difficult to verify, the whole notion of human 
motivation, of which we all make constant use, is essentially causal in 
nature. With the exceptions of psychomotor reflexes and of the autonomous 
nervous system, however, there are no necessary causes in human behavior. 
Still, we make frequent predictions on the basis of what we deem to be 
probable causes (i.e., on the basis of hypotheses) in our decisions about how 
to treat others, guessing how large a salary offer will be required to entice 
someone to come and work for us, deciding whether jealousy games will 
attract our lovers to return or alienate them forever, or simply judging how 
another will react to a suggestion. Most of us are wrong often enough to 
make us wary, but without a causal assumption, based on learning and 
Introduction • xxvii 
other past experience, we would have no grounds whatever for choosing one 
line of conduct over another, all forms of behavior appearing to offer an 
equal chance of success in attainment of our goals. Ability to predict 
accurately from a causal assessment of probabilities may be a primary 
determinant in our success in business, courtship, childrearing, and other 
activities requiring us to base our actions on a prediction of their "effect" on 
others. It is also possible to assume that success is a matter of luck, ran­
domly distributed. But that assumption would endow us with the frighten­
ing total freedom of the mad. 
Why the causal concept is a useful device for textual analysis in fiction 
should now be apparent: it is a prime juncture between stories and people, 
between novels and readers, across most of the period here under discussion. 
Inherent in language, it inheres also in naïve human reactions to the 
environment, a comforting habit that can operate in reading as in other 
phases of life. Furthermore, causation, when it is imagined, appears as a 
temporal bond, connecting events in time; it also functions as an element of 
metonymy in certain fictional texts, thus marking a junction between the 
perceived linearity of human time and that of fiction, as well as between the 
grammar of stories and of language. Finally, the truth value of the causal 
concept has been placed in increasing doubt, as we have seen, across the 
period of this study. The response of textual strategies to this loss of faith 
evokes clearly the curious trail of the evolution of novel structure in France; 
application of the perceptual grid of causality uncovers that trail. 
As a reader living at the end of the period in question, I see causation as 
a subjective pattern, as a model of some practical utility in the specific 
situations of everyday life, but meaningless as a scientific or philosophical 
generality. Earlier readers did not share this outlook, however, and the texts 
of their times reflect cultural codes that differ from ours. By revealing which 
texts accommodate it well or poorly, and why, the causal model helps 
describe the evolution of novel form between the 1870s and the 1970s. 
Causal statements are not, as I have pointed out, intended to be "true"; they 
are hypotheses. This study functions therefore as a hypothesis, with causa­
tion accepted "under erasure," until contemporary texts find ways at last, 
despite the ingrained strictures of language, to do it in. 
In part I, I demonstrate how causality, as readerly hypothesis, func­
tions on the standard levels of narrative. Chapters one and five present the 
principles of analysis, in relation to certain previous studies, and the con­
clusions. The intervening chapters are illustrative analyses of relatively 
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"traditional" novels, whose texts allow causation to operate, with a few 
exceptions, in a straightforward and mechanistic way (the exceptions re­
vealing the cracks already appearing in the causal edifice). The choice of 
such generally "rectilinear" examples simplifies the initial task. But it also 
provides for a diachronic comparison with the texts examined in part II. 
There, in a series of essays on more "modern" novels, I undertake to show 
through application of the same heuristic device how texts reveal increasing 
skepticism about causality, through new ways of facilitating, and especially 
of inhibiting, readers' causal inferences. Chapter ten includes a theoretical 
component on the role of causality in those Vorstellungen I am calling 
"mental representations," as they occur in characters and readers, in prepa­
ration for the general conclusion on the interaction of reader and text in the 
creative act. 
In the search for "typical" causal strategies, my corpus has become 
highly—perhaps excessively—"canonical. " It therefore reflects the heedless 
male-dominance bias of the period it treats and leaves unanalyzed the rich 
French-language literatures of Africa and the Antilles (where the dual 
narratee—colonizer/colonized—provides a differing reaction to the causal 
grid), and the important francophone texts of Canada. It also neglects the 
anticausal strategies of Céline, Bernanos, Duras, Queneau, and numerous 
others equally worthy of study. What it does provide is a minimal basis for 
comparison: with respect to it, future causal analyses can describe, explain, 
and extol fruitful etiological differences. This is, then, an introduction, in 
need of completion, if completeness is possible in a typological problem of 
this magnitude. 
It is inevitable, as we approach the study of fictional causality, that 
someone will ask the metacausal question: why? Three of my purposes are 
straightforward; the fourth is more personal and diffuse. 
First, these pages are intended to describe and illustrate a general 
theory of the operation (or nonoperation) of cause and effect in fiction. 
Second, through analysis of novels for the most part well established in the 
French canon, I seek to present a typology of standard causal structures, for 
future comparison with other literatures, and with other French texts. 
Little that is new can be said here about the "meaning" of the works in my 
oft-treated corpus, but the role causality plays in these texts as the armature 
of the plot, and sometimes too as theme, makes of them a worthy and 
interesting standard of comparison. Third, a description of the evolution of 
causal structures in French fiction from the mid-1870s to the mid-1970s 
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provides some measure of the relationship between changing ideas, notably 
concerning the truth value of causal assertions, and the changing tech­
niques for organizing stories. 
My fourth incentive has to do with lines and spaces. So much has been 
accomplished through the study of literature as space, as area, that an 
introductory approach to an element of the linear nature of stories seemed 
enticing. Peter Brooks, Gerald Prince, and others18 have broken important 
ground. But the paradigmatic axis, projecting the syntagmatic line onto 
a plane, was providing the primary basis for our understanding of prose 
fiction. Synecdochic comparisons of narrative units to the whole text in 
which they occur, as well as comparisons of narrative texts to a common 
matrix or model, were providing not only the finest insights into fiction as 
genre and into individual novels, but also creating our concept of what 
"understanding" is. A series as such seems to offer little to be understood: i, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, io, n  , 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. Beyond the potential 
discovery of a "law" making it possible to predict the next term, and aside 
from an apparent openness on both ends, what does a linear series hold out 
for discovery? A spatial figure, however, with its inherent comparisons, 
provides instant meaning: 
1 2 3 4 
5 6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 
13 14 15 16 
Now there is a "whole," to serve as the sum of its "parts," and the under­
standing of internal comparabilities (e.g., 1:4: :2 :8  : : 3 : i 2  : .4:16) leads 
to a meaningful abstraction: 16 = 42. As Lucien Dàllenbachs Le Récit 
spéculaire illustrates, perception of specularity is in itself understanding.19 
Metaphor appears analyzable; metonymy does not. If nothing else, 
sympathy for the underdog moves me to point out that metaphoric expres­
sion itself is subject to the chronological linearity of language, and to 
attempt to show, in what follows, the importance of that fact. Spatial 
criticism often (not always) tends to describe books that have been read, 
thus annulling a critical distinction between reader and narrator in Kantian 
time, and forgetting that these books may differ in decisive ways from the 
same texts in the highly temporal act of being read.20 Is it possible, in 
criticism, to adhere entirely to a métonymie viewpoint? Probably not. Even 
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Peter Brooks evokes, for comparison, a Freudian transference model. But if 
comparison reveals what is "significant" in prose fiction, a linear approach 
uncovers what is "consequential," and therefore fictionally "important." 
Meaningfulness includes both significance and consequentiality, and the 
second attribute is not unworthy of discussion. So I try to hew to the line. It 
is tempting, for example, in describing causality, to allow diagrams to 
proliferate, replete with significant arrows. I have resisted the temptation as 
unwholesome (for my purposes) spatialization. But my resistance has not 
been completely successful; in that and in other matters, comparison gains 
its revenge in my text. Its subject thus does not complete the polysémie 
shift to become a truly championed Cause. But even as we pursue causality 
in its very absence, perhaps another more fundamental notion of "under­
standing" will emerge for the reader as an unstated aim. 
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Parti 
Rectilinear Causality in Narrative 

I 
Causality in Fiction 
La similitude relie un terme métaphorique au terme auquel il se substitue. 
En conséquence, quand le chercheur construit un métalangage pour inter­
préter les tropes, il possède des moyens plus homogènes pour manier la 
métaphore, alors que la métonymie, fondée sur un principe différent, défie 
facilement l'interprétation. C'est pourquoi rien de comparable à la riche 
littérature écrite sur la métaphore ne peut être cité en ce qui concerne la 
théorie de la métonymie. Pour la même raison, si on a généralement aperçu 
les liens étroits qui unissent le romantisme à la métaphore, on a le plus 
souvent méconnu l'affinité profonde qui lie le réalisme à la métonymie. 
(Similarity binds a metaphorical term to the term for which it is sub­
stituted. As a result, when the scholar constructs a metalanguage for 
interpretation of tropes, he has more homogeneous means for dealing with 
metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle, readily defies 
interpretation. That is why nothing comparable to the rich literature on 
metaphor can be cited with respect to metonymy. For the same reason, if 
the close bonds linking romanticism to metaphor have been widely per­
ceived, the profound affinity connecting realism to metonymy has most 
often gone unrecognized.) 
ROMAN JAKOBSON 
Modern references to the structural role of causality in fiction commence with E. M. Forster, who pointed out in the 1920s that, if a "story" is a narrative of events in temporal sequence, to 
build a "plot," one must emphasize causality. "The king died and then the 
queen died," he told us, is a story; "The king died and then the queen died 
of grief " is a plot. ' But the concept of "plot" becomes increasingly undefin­
able the more closely one looks at the multilayered way in which causal 
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relationships develop in readers' minds. Forster's simplistic example sug­
gests that a story can gain a plot through the mere addition of words, a 
notion on which he himself would scarcely have staked his reputation. 
Indeed, he indicates in the same context that it is the reader's question 
"why?" (for a plot), rather than "and then?" (for a story), which charac­
terizes the distinction. For "why?" is always a matter of inference, even in 
the presence of explicit explanations: are they to be believed or not? Still, 
given the vagueness of the term, on the rare occasions when I speak of "plot" 
here, it will be rather as a synonym for the more recent concept of histoire. 
We all recall how Roland Barthes situated causal relationships in the 
empirical "proairetic code" he uncovered in S/Z2 (Aristotelian "proaïresis" 
being the "faculty of deliberating upon the outcome ofa course of conduct," 
p. 25). He correctly saw them as branching, interconnecting relationships, 
forming the strongest armature of the readerly text and the basis for a kind 
of structural analysis. He also stresses in S/Z the importance of readers' past 
experience, for Humean comparison, in inferring the causal connections: 
the proairetic is the "déjà-écrit," "déjà-lu," "déjà-vu," "déjà-fait" ("already­
written, -read, -seen, -done"). But the Aristotelian stricture, limiting the 
code to psychological causes (of physical and/or psychological efFects), tends 
to screen out physical causes; yet, as we shall see, from infectious diseases, 
to a broken drive rod, to a blazing sun on the beach, these can be prime 
determinants of the way events turn. 
As the structuralist approach developed, following the principle of 
objective description we have noted, it sought to derive functional relation­
ships rather than "causes." This critical stance has produced sound general 
theories about the connecting devices that hold narratives together. Start­
ing from his famous linguistic, semantic model, A.-J. Greimas derives an 
impressive set of formulae for the interaction of characters.3 His "modèles 
actantiels" ("actantial models"), devised to describe types of connections, 
tend to define characters ("actants," "patients," etc.) as functions of the 
narrative energy, mechanisms for the production or experience of actions. 
Perhaps constructed to avoid limiting the definition of characters to their 
deeds, Gerald Princes grammar of stories is founded on the principle of 
connections between "events."4 He develops the case for logical or defini­
tive necessity, positing that stories are the caused reversal of an initial 
stative event, with the stated implication that narrative may take other 
forms, but that, without the caused reversal, the term "story" is inappli­
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cable. (One persons story is, I suppose, as Forster might say, another's plot.) 
Princes theory describes causation as a connective between narrative units, 
as a conjunctive feature reducible by transformation to the formulation: "as 
a result." But in his Grammaire du Decameron, Tzvetan Todorov had already 
evoked a kind of pragmatic necessity for expressed causality, since, with the 
exception of narrative units which are related by repetition ("emphasis" or 
"inversion"), he finds all relations between units in these stories to be, in 
one way or another, causal.5 Whereas for Prince the expression of cause is 
conjunctive in nature and thus optional (even though the negative option 
may not yield stories), for Todorov it is fundamentally related to the trans­
itivity of narrative, to the ongoing modification which is the story, and 
hence to the function of verbs. The relationship of this critical position to 
Anscombes philosophical argument is self evident: it underlies much of 
what follows in this study. 
Claude Bremond marks, I think, an important advance in Logique du 
récit? by defining causation as a relationship of implication, thus beginning 
to imply, at the same time, readers and their inferences, their hypotheses. 
While, like Greimas, he focuses on the relationships of characters to ac­
tions, he highlights characters' choices, thus neatly balancing actions as 
definers of characters against character traits as definers of action. But it was 
Todorov who came to see the relationship of character to action and the 
question of which defines the other as a causal problem: do characters 
produce actions, or vice versa?7 Grasping what I have called the "radical 
simultaneity" of the perceived cause-effect relationship, he wonders 
whether the directionality of the causal connection is not, perhaps de-
constructively, bivalent. I shall attempt a "reconstruction" in response to 
that, but not before the whole analytical apparatus is in place, at the end of 
this volume. 
Underlying the structuralist positions is the question of whether 
causation is expressed or implied in fiction. Obviously, the causal idea 
reaches readers in both ways; the distinction is indeed constitutive of the 
narrative levels we shall consider presently. But one major study, which is 
not about causation at all, describes an approach to fiction that opens the 
way to the discovery of causation, not as an objective function to be discov­
ered in the text, but as a readerly hypothesis. This study is Wolfgang Iser's 
The Act of Reading.9 It describes how readers "constitute" the text, connect 
narrative units in groups or G estalien, and fill the gaps, where necessary, in 
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the narrative logic. The gaps themselves are absences, objectively present in 
texts, which call forth the readers participation in the esthetic act. Iser's 
insights will be seen to have clearly conditioned my concept of reading. 
When Nietzsche speaks, as we have seen, of the ability to read off a 
text as text, without interposing an interpretation, one is inclined to ask 
what sort of text this could be, and especially what kind of reading. For, if a 
text remains text, it may perhaps be "read off" (that is, "pronounced," as 
one can learn to sing a foreign-language song, by imitating a recorded 
version of it, with no idea of the sense expressed by the lyrics), but it can 
hardly be said to have been "read." For to read is to combine fragments, an 
activity necessarily subtended by interpretation. 
The notion of the word as a unit of speech has long been taken by 
writers (quite rightly) for granted, by virtue of words' permutability and 
substitutability for one another, in divers contexts. Yet readers can scarcely 
perform their task at the level of the word: reading is, in large measure, an 
interlexical activity. Traditional grammatical parlance holds that adjectives 
"modify" the nouns they accompany, and the metaphor needs to be taken 
seriously, for they can indeed transform or recreate a mental image. As 
Greimas demonstrates, in blending the lexical data in a given context to 
form a mental picture, the reader obliterates the spaces between words.9 
In Allegories of Reading, Paul de Man affirms: 
There can be no text without grammar: the logic of grammar gener­
ates texts only in the absence of referential meaning, but every text 
generates a referent that subverts the grammatical principle to which 
it owed its constitution.10 
This distinction, part of a larger set of parallels de Man develops, separates 
writing neatly from reading. The writer, before the blank page, resides in 
the pre-text: grammar is the law which will constitute her or his discourse; 
the reader comes into existence only in the post-text and is, in envision­
ing the referent, a party to the subversion of grammar. Reading unites, in 
ways often highly individual to the particular reader, what grammar 
separates. 
The word "green," surrounded by spaces, may evoke images ranging 
from chartreuse to ultramarine. But invent a banal sentence and limitations 
intrude: "He had no choice but to send green troops against the armored 
battalion." "Green" is totally meaningful, and therefore meaningless, until 
"troops" strikes the eye, determining the mental selection of a branch of 
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signifieds springing from "unripe": "immature," "inexperienced," "un­
tested." Thus, the space between "green" and "troops" becomes an absent 
absence on the semantic level.11 Likewise, the distance separating "He" 
from its supposed antecedent disappears in context, and the meaning of 
"He" is further determined by the verbal components of the sentence, 
of which it is the subject. The "no . . . but" structure is an abstraction, 
suggesting selection of one unit within a set, all others being rejected: it 
requires union with "choice . .  . to send" in order to evoke an imaginary 
"sense." The definite article before "armored battalion" indicates that the 
sense of that term has been partially predetermined in the context, and 
"send . . . troops against" suggests the possibility, if not the necessity, of 
further bellicose developments in succeeding sentences. Like most sen­
tences with transitive verbs, this one designates a change and therefore 
affirms causation. 
As soon as causality enters the picture, we are in the presence of a 
hypothesis, and readers will wish to know, as a condition of belief, to whom 
the text attributes it. The reading is not complete unless the reader knows 
who, according to the text, is making the inference that "He had no choice 
but. . . ," and on what grounds. Is it some inferable "author" or narrator, 
or is it the "He" of the sentence? Such information, of course, further unites 
the quoted words to their verbal surroundings. If the text hints that its 
writer (in the tradition of Wayne Booth's "implied author") has reached the 
conclusion, thus valorizing "His" decision, to what extent do we trust him 
or her? This query makes of the total text a context, for our judgment will 
surely depend on our knowledge of everything the text attributes to this 
"writer," as well as on the reasoning elicited in this instance, if any. On the 
other hand, if "He" arrived at the conclusion given, we will read the 
sentence in another manner, as a figure ("free indirect style"), and perhaps 
wonder whether the absence of options is not mere rationalization. While 
the antecedent of "He" and its context may have provided us data upon 
which to base our determination, some readers may react empathetically 
("What would I have done in his situation?"), and others ideologically 
("How does the military mind work?"). Then the context becomes an 
extratext of indeterminate but surely enormous proportions, limited only 
by the experience and psychological propensities of each reader. 
Despite certain simplistic uses that have been made of his algorithm 
for meaning (signifier/signified), Saussure was well aware of the importance 
of the syntagmatic axis in the production of meaning.12 For the notion of 
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"meaning" with respect to a sentence or other syntagm occupies a funda­
mentally different realm from that of the "meaning" of a word. Words are 
understood by definitions, lists of denotations and connotations, so that 
"understanding" a word is a function of synonymity (as "bachelor" equals 
"unmarried man" in Jakobson's famous example),13 which implies the men­
tal substitution of "equivalent" terms. Understanding a syntagm, while it 
also involves substitution of mental images and concepts for terms, requires 
extensive combinatory activity, often ranging far afield within the text and 
into the readers individual experience. This association of nonequivalent 
terms is, of course, métonymie in character: since the labor of combination 
must, in thefinal analysis, extend to the entire text (more essentially: to the 
memory thereof), and to the relevant extratext of experience, the "meaning" 
of complete texts, the largest of syntagma, derives as well from metonymy. 
Even metaphors, which function essentially by substitution (comparison), 
are contingent upon metonymy, as elements of expressed syntagma, for 
their meaning:14 Eluard s oft-analyzed "blue earth" metaphor would not 
achieve its celebrated effect, of course, if "bleue comme" ("blue like/as") 
did not signal a métonymie ellipsis: "comme une orange {est bleue]" ("as an 
orange [is blue]"). 
Now whenever the readers combinatory activity is causal in nature, 
it takes the form of an inference (or hypothesis—with respect to fiction I 
use the terms interchangeably). And if all causes are hypothetical, all hy­
potheses are causal, at least in the first degree: "because of A, I infer B." A, 
in this paradigm, is an example of those special cases of causation termed 
"conditions. " The prime cause of my inference is of course my desire to draw 
it; A is that condition which validates the hypothesis in my eyes. Since 
without such validation I should refuse, despite desire, to infer, the condi­
tion is itself a causal element. If ^  means "is a necessary condition of," and 
if R means "reader," a readers hypothesis can be expressed like this: A ^ 
R(B). Most hypotheses of interest for this study are also causal in the second 
degree, for they concern supposed cause-and-effect relationships in stories. 
They may be stated, "because of C, I infer that A causes B." If —> means 
"causes," one may write: C ^  R(A —» B), or, for inferred conditions, C =^ 
R(A ^ B). But where shall we go to look for C, that necessary condition 
that encourages inferences by tending to validate them? Is it to be found in 
the timeline of the narrative, where A and B reside, or in the timeline of the 
reader's own existence? Essentially, C is a point of juncture, situated at once 
infiction and in life; as derivativeness, it belongs to the timeline ofA and B, 
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and as perception of derivativeness, based upon comparisons with readers' 
previous experience, with fiction and with life, it arises in the timeline of 
readers' existence. It is at such intersections of human experience and texts 
that reading, as such, takes place. Still higher degrees of causal inference are 
possible, although we shall not have need for them until the end of our 
analyses, when we face the question of imagined "authors'" inferred hy­
potheses about readers' potential causal inferences. If X stands for a hypo­
thetical "author," one might write, for example, D =£> X[C ^ R(A —» B)}. 
But since such an "author" is entirely the product of dispositions within the 
text itself, our knowledge of X and D is limited to the data of A and B, and 
to the textual components of C. 
Because notions of "authorship" are enforced upon us by our heuristic 
device of causation in texts, it is time for a disclaimer. First, our term in no 
sense refers to a real social or legal persona. It is the name for those 
dispositions within a text which provide a sense of purpose or intention; it 
seems to me no more bizarre to speak of an inferred author's intentions than 
to speak of the intentions of the text (I do both). Second, the inferred 
author, or the narrator (we shall distinguish between them shortly), as a 
product of readerly inference, can have only inferred intentions. Still, the 
inference is necessary and implied by texts: as with our example about 
sending green troops into battle, it is often useful for the readers to know 
who is speaking, and to infer why, as a condition of grasping the import of 
certain utterances. Finally, by definition, no hypothesis, including those 
about intentions and "sources" of utterances, is "true." Our "inferred au­
thors" and narrators are devices, selected "under erasure," for describing the 
ways in which readers and many texts interact. As literature changes and 
interaction assumes new modalities, the device will "self-destruct." 
At the more basic level of the sentence, it is often syntax that furnishes 
the conditions for inference. When the narrator affirms, in Camus's La 
Peste,1* "Les bagarres aux portes, pendant lesquelles les gendarmes avaient 
dû faire usage de leurs armes, créèrent une sourde agitation" ("The riots at 
the gates, during which the police had had to use their weapons, created an 
undercurrent of agitation"), he institutes a cause ("riots"); he states, as 
Anscombe might say, its "efficacy" ("created"); and he names its effect 
("undercurrent of agitation"). Standard syntax in both French and English 
alots, of course, temporal priority to the subject, so that subject stands in 
temporal relation to predicate as cause does to effect. The Nietzschean 
reversal is just as applicable: it is only when we reach the verb that we can 
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think back and redefine the earlier noun as "subject." In simple observation 
statements like that of the main clause, the only hypothesis springs from 
our knowledge of life and of the narrator: whether we will infer that the 
affirmation is correct. For, like all statements of cause, it expresses after all 
an opinion. In the subordinate clause, the narrator chooses to highlight 
causation—and therefore the judgmental character of his inference—by 
the use of the verb "avaient dû" ("had had to"): the linguistic option, "firent 
usage de leurs armes" ("used their weapons") exists and would require no 
inference on his part. The narrator is electing to judge that circumstances 
made violent repression necessary and inviting readers by that choice to 
judge him: we may or may not believe that other police behavior might have 
been equally or more appropriate to the desired ends. On the whole, the 
encouragement to infer that the statement is true appears particularly 
strong, since the syntax reflects a classic INUS condition. The "riots" were 
necessary for the creation of the "undercurrent of agitation," but themselves 
were insufficient to produce it; the subordinate clause adduces the addi­
tional information for the larger condition, unnecessary (the riots might 
not have occurred, or the police might not have fired), but sufficient to 
produce the effect. Thus one might almost begin to suspect that the syn­
tactic structures that create the métonymie associations were invented 
as vehicles for the linguistic transmission of causality, as much of the 
metalanguage of grammar suggests: "object," "subordinate," "condi­
tional," etc.16 
So far, the relationship of language to reality appears, with respect to 
causality, disturbingly unproblematical: syntax requires writers to imply 
causation and encourages readers to infer it. (It is to be expected that, in an 
age in which causality itself is viewed as suspect, there will be attempts to 
subvert its expression, as we shall see.) Metaphor may appear frequently in 
narrative, but it comes as a gratuitous enlightenment, exterior to the series 
of events which make up this story. Metonymy, on the other hand, is an 
integral part of individual syntagma and a constant connection between 
them. That which is gratuitous, of course, calls attention to itself by its 
presence; that which is necessary is evoked by its absence. We think (if I 
may be permitted to exaggerate for the sake of illustration) of tear gas only 
when it is present in our immediate environment, and of oxygen only when 
it is absent. Metaphors are striking in narration in that they are present 
when no need for them exists. Since they appear to be the product of a 
choice, they imply an intention beyond the initial decision to "tell a tale." 
The intentions of a story teller are highly valorized: it is through them that 
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we know her or him. Indeed, it is only with the optional elements of 
discourse that an author (implied) or a story teller standing before us (real), 
can communicate with us; for the rest, linguistic conventions are speaking. 
For the expression of cause and effect, two areas of optionality exist, 
two zones of "difference" from the norm (from the readers standpoint), or of 
"difference" (from the writer's position). One is the area of absence, when 
causality is valorized by its abnormal disappearance. The causal chain 
breaks (by indétermination or underdetermination), weakens (through im­
plausibility or relegation to a peripheral role), or is subverted (by means of 
paradox and contradiction). The other zone of difference is overdetermina­
tion. In addition to métonymie association, an impressively large vocabu­
lary exists, in French as in other Western languages, to explain how and 
why events occur. Use of this vocabulary appears as a matter of choice, and 
it provides information about causation over and beyond syntactic norms. 
Examination of this second area of optionality should eventually lead us 
back to the first. 
The specialized vocabulary of causation in French includes a meta­
language of causality (cause, causer) and a group of explicitly causal verbs, 
such as laisser and faire (plus infinitive), and frequently devoir. A number of 
prepositions,frompour (to express either intent or result) to the unobtrusive 
use of à ("A l'entendre bavarder, déjà je m'ennuyais") and of de ("II la gâtait 
de mille soins") can explain purpose, result, or agency. As in English, 
French participles and adjectives can have causal force ("Ainsi coiffée, elle 
attirait tous les regards" ["Her hair thus arranged, she attracted all eyes"]). 
Nouns themselves, as Anscombe points out,17 are often expressive of cause: 
if we learn that "l'incendie rageait" ("the fire was raging"), and later dis­
cover that objects have been burned, we will know why. Causal conjunc­
tions (parce que, car, d'autant plus que, etc.) obviously introduce explana­
tions. And, in addition to such terms, the mere juxtaposition of certain 
propositions can suggest, by parataxis, that a cause-and-effect relationship 
exists between them. I shall exemplify the functioning of this vocabulary in 
greater detail in the next chapter, with respect to specific texts, but basic 
inferences may be drawn at once from its existence. 
As an optional mode of expression, this vocabulary is by nature judg­
mental. It implies not only a speaker, but one who is providing explana­
tions of events, which, since they are perforce subjective, we may accept or 
reject. But at the same time it is informing us about the narrator. Such 
vocabulary reveals how (and if) narrators explain their worlds, and that 
revelation contains much of what we call "narratorial identity." It is based 
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on two postulates, which are a part of the narrative pact we make with the 
novels we read (at least the traditional ones), the basis of which is the 
"willing suspension of disbelief." 
The first postulate is that the narrator has a world. The exercise of 
causal judgment implies the experience of the "realities" to be judged. The 
narrator of a tale, intradiegetic or no, is perceived by the traditional reader, 
not as the inventor of the story (even if, like Scheherezade, she or he claims 
to be), but as its encoder and interpreter. Behind the narrative voice lies 
another entity, which has presented the events to the narrator's conscious­
ness directly and without interpretation. The choice to provide causal 
explanation suggests a belief that it is needed, and the "need" implies the 
existence of unexplained data. These data are the narrators "world," and 
efforts to explain it point to (i) the notion that the story's events "occurred" 
prior to their narration, (2) the principle that the events are foreign to the 
narrator, exterior to the narrator's mind, and difficult, in his or her opinion, 
to comprehend without explanation, and (3) the presence of an inferable 
author, inventor, or source of information, who or which provides the raw 
data to the narrator. 
The second postulate is this: if an explanation is given, it is not the 
only possible one. Its very presence implies an absence. "Le discours mani­
feste ne serait en fin de compte," Foucault points out, "que la présence 
répressive de ce qu'il ne dit pas; et ce non-dit serait un creux qui mine de 
l'intérieur tout ce qui se dit"18 ("The manifest discourse is doubtless, in the 
last analysis, only the repressive presence of what it does not say, and this 
unsaid seems a cavity, undermining from within all that is said"). Foucault's 
remark has far wider implications, but it expresses the basis of potential 
skepticism on the readers part with respect to narrators' causal judgments. 
The word "potential" needs perhaps some underscoring: readers need not 
question such judgments, but merely remain aware of their freedom to 
do so, for that "cavity" marks their basic separateness from the narra­
tive voice. 
It is the notions of "narrator" and "inferred author" (since our stance is 
rigorously with the reader rather than the author, our concern with reading 
rather than with "poetics," this term appears more apt than Wayne Booth's 
"implied author")19 that produce the levels of narrative around which we 
will group all our arguments. These levels are a standard in textual analysis, 
although they do not derive from the venerable tradition in which Wayne 
Booth's work is a landmark. Gérard Genette's definition of them is most 
interesting: 
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Je propose . .  . de nommer histoire le signifié ou contenu narratif 
(même si ce contenu se trouve être, en l'occurrence, d'une faible 
intensité dramatique ou teneur événementielle), récit proprement dit 
le signifiant, énoncé, discours ou texte narratif lui-même, et narration 
l'acte narratif producteur et, par extension, l'ensemble de la situation 
réelle ou fictive dans laquelle il prend place.20 
(I propose . .  . to call "histoire" the signified or narrative content [even 
if this content happens to be, in a given instance, relatively uneventful 
or lacking in dramatic intensity], to name "récit" properly so called the 
signifier, utterance, discourse, or narrative text itself, and to term 
"narration" the productive narrative act, and, by extension, the total­
ity of the real or fictive situation in which it takes its place.) 
Despite Genette's reference, in speaking of narration, to an "act" with 
possible relationship to a "real" situation (and despite his evocation of a 
narrative content which sounds more like a referent than a signified), it is 
surely unlikely, in light of the context, that he is alluding here to a real and 
causative authorial presence. The "alliance" I am developing here between 
the Boothian tradition (with more recent echoes in Seymour Chatman's 
work)21 and the principles of textual analysis is thus not a representation of 
the views of either, but a hypothetical device for uncovering relationships 
between readers and texts. Here are its basic assumptions. 
The récit will be for us the domain of the narrator: the words he or she 
chooses to tell the story and their ordering on the page. The histoire belongs 
to the inferred author; it is the raw data, the series of events which he or she 
provides, as "content" for the narrator's pen. In general, one might say that 
there are no causal connections in any histoire, since events are not causally 
related unless someone—a narrator or a reader—perceives them to be. 
Still, verbatim conversations, interior monologues, characters' explicit 
thoughts, etc., are "facts" of the histoire, which the narrator can "quote," 
but not interpret in so doing. In such elements of the histoire, characters 
may evoke causation or explain their motivations. In this way, causation can 
enter the histoire, although readers retain, as always, their freedom to accept 
or reject, for cause, characters' causal explanations. The narration, as the 
productive act per se, is the realm of the author. Again, the "author" is not a 
persona but rather those elements of a supposed authorial thought process 
or intention which can be inferred from the existence and nature of texts 
themselves. Thus, the "author" is just as inferred as the "inferred author"; 
in rare instances, if I must mark the different kinds of inference involved, I 
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shall call the "author" (of the narration) the "indexic author," for the text is a 
semiological index of her or him, just as smoke is of fire. All these inferences 
point to the presence of causation; indeed, just as (in my terminology) the 
histoire, supposedly preexisting, purports to be one of the conditions of its 
récit, so the narration (in my sense) is inferred as a cause of them both: the 
author invents the inferred author, creator of the story's content, and the 
narrator, with choice of words and syntax, as well. A few examples should 
suffice to clarify the distinctions.22 
Detective fiction perhaps exemplifies the distinction between récit and 
histoire most clearly, for its form arises from the interplay of these levels. 
When the sleuth as narrator presents at last the explanation of the crime, 
perfect accord is supposed to exist between all the known data provided by 
the inferred author and the detectives récit of the reconstructed crime. 
Because we have willingly suspended disbelief, we cannot question the 
data, but narrative remains potentially suspect, since different verbal chains 
can express various causal bonds linking the same "facts." Thus detective 
stories will frequently introduce a confession from the accused, who will 
assure us that the investigator has described the causal links correctly. San-
Antonio's hero-narrator is not averse to the use of violence to unite the causal 
strands of the two levels: 
—Regarde-moi, insisté-je en lui filant une beigne, c'est pas 
ça, dis? 
—Si, souffle le truand. . . . 
Je le chope par les revers. Je le tiens plaqué contre moi et, mon 
nez touchant le sien, je lui crache: 
—Ose dire que ça n'est pas ça? 
Il a peur, ses dents font un bruit de noix trimbalées dans un 
sac . .  . 
—Oui, avoue-t-il. . . C'est bien ça . .  . 
J'ai le trait de génie.23 
("Look me in the eye," I insist, swatting him across the chops. 
"That's the way it was, right?" 
"Yeah," whispers the crook. . . . 
I grab him by the lapels; holding him smack up against me, nose 
to nose, I spit out the words: 
"I dare you to tell me that's not how it was! " 
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He's scared; his teeth are making noises like unshelled walnuts 
bouncing around in a bag. 
"Yeah," he admits, "that's how it was all r i g h t . . .  " 
I'm a natural genius.) 
The reported conversation is a part of the histoire, fictive "fact" from the 
inferred author, which the narrator, if he is to uphold in traditional fashion 
his part of the narrative pact, cannot change. But it serves to confirm 
("that's how it was all right") the causal explanation of the hero-sleuth-
narrator: "Tu as cramponné le magot et tu t'es apprêté à filer, ne voulant pas 
te mouiller. . . Et puis tu as pris peur. . . . Alors, sans penser plus loin, tu 
l'as balancé par la fenêtre," etc. ("You copped the wad and were all set to 
beat it, since you didn't want to get in any deeper . . . And then you got 
scared. . . .So  , without another thought, you tossed it out the window," 
etc.) This explanation, given as part of the conversation, belongs in that 
sense to the histoire as well. But as a verbal reconstruction of earlier events, it 
constitutes a kind of récit itself, embedded in the longer récit which is the 
text of the novel. Indeed, it enters that récit in the expression "trait de 
génie," which summarizes it. Yet the narrator's comic arrogance and pro­
pensity for violence (would the "crook" dare contradict him, even if he were 
wrong?) leave him ironically suspect. These elements constitute a condition 
for reader inference that the confession is perhaps a lie, caused by fear. (The 
story contains conditions for inferring that the confession is true, too; the 
question can be resolved only on the level of the narration, after a more 
detailed analysis.) Thus the reader's inference about causal relationships in 
the histoire—Violence =£> R (Violence —> Confession)—can contradict the 
narrator's version in the récit: Confession ^ Narrator (Explanation = 
Truth). 
Authors have long been conscious of the distinction between récit and 
histoire,24 and numerous kinds of encouragement are to be found in texts for 
readers to perceive the separation. The narrator in Stendhal's Le Rouge et le 
Noir, for example, often distinguishes himself from the story he is telling by 
commenting upon it. He may express the opinion that "Julien avait raison 
de s'applaudir de son courage"25 ("Julien was right to congratulate himself 
on his courage"); he may even compare Julien's provincial reactions in the 
histoire to those of an imaginary young Parisian, imagined by the narrator in 
the récit as a sort of "potential" hero in an alternative novel, that could be  — 
but was not—written (p. 78). He selects epigraphs for many chapters that 
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comment on the action of the histoire. Perhaps the most famous of these 
epigraphs comments on the narration itself (and the narration upon it): "Un 
roman: c'est un miroir qu'on promène le long d'un chemin," (p. 82); "A 
novel: it's a mirror trundled along a road." 
Sometimes, narrators even criticize inferred authors (the récit may 
attack the histoire); Gide s narrators are not averse to marking such distinc­
tions, although generally on esthetic rather than causal grounds.26 In the 
famous central chapter of Les Faux-monnayeurs however (part II, chapter 7), 
the inferred author supplants the narrator, to admit the fictionality of his 
enterprise ("S'il m'arrive jamais d'inventer encore une histoire, . . .  " 
[p. 284}; "If it ever happens to me to invent another story . . ."), and to 
call its causal basis into question. He suggests that, at this point, the future 
events of his histoire are as indeterminate for him as for the reader, but he 
seems to foresee that little Boris is doomed. Indeed, he pretends that he, as 
inventor of events, is limited by a conception of causality: 
Je crains qu'en confiant le petit Boris aux Azaïs, Edouard ne commette 
une imprudence. Comment l'en empêcher? Chaque être agit selon sa 
loi, et celle d'Edouard le porte à expérimenter sans cesse. (P. 280) 
(I fear that Edouard, in entrusting little Boris to the Azaïses, is acting 
imprudently. How to prevent him? Each being behaves according to 
its law, and Edouard s law impels him to ceaseless experimentation.) 
Thus, the inferred author abandons his "inferred" status. His inventiveness 
remains unfettered, yet he seems to accept the constraints of a supposed 
causal verisimilitude which subtend the proposition that each being acts in 
accordance with its own law. This proposition, which affirms the causal 
predictability of characters, is however immediately subverted by the ob­
servation that Edouard s "law" is to experiment continually with something 
new: he is predictably unpredictable. But the purpose of experimentation is 
the discovery of causal laws and thus the revalorization of causal determin­
ism: Boris's fate. By taking center stage, the (formerly) inferred author 
points up the inability of his narrator or narrators to reveal how the novel is 
balancing between determinism and absurdity: he accuses the weakness of 
the récit. 
While freedom to judge the narrator's assessments is inherent in the 
novel reader's stance, passing judgment on the histoire is only occasionally 
permissible within the traditional narrative pact. To cast doubt on the 
veracity of the inferred author is to refuse to suspend disbelief, to challenge 
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fictional "reality" itself. Still, an uncaused event in fiction may lead us to 
stand aside from its inventor, not merely by interpreting the data, but by 
adopting a skeptical position toward them. Uncaused events are those for 
which not only does the narrator provide no definitive and convinc­
ing explanation, but for which our life experience provides none either. 
They fall within the other area of optionality: the weakness or break in the 
causal chain. 
Bernard, in Les Faux-monnayeurs, meets an angel in the Luxembourg 
Gardens, accompanies him to a political rally, talks to him, wrestles with 
him (pp. 438 -44 )  . Except for the fact other characters see Bernard but fail 
to see his angelic companion, the "angel" is no less a reality in the histoire 
than "Bernard." N o hint of a credible explanation, founded in life experi­
ence, is provided (so much for the inferred authors causal fetters!), no 
suggestion that Bernard is, for example, hallucinating, or fantasizing about 
a lover. Although the metaphorical sense of the episode is readily apparent 
in context—the allusion to Jacob s struggle with the angel in Genesis is 
obvious—the appearance of a real angel in a novel otherwise devoid of the 
supernatural fits into no causal chain either in the récit or in the histoire. 
Since the narrative voice has no hesitation in commenting on the plau­
sibility of events, it is difficult to believe in simple narrative reticence, in 
mere omission of some verb such as s'imaginer (to imagine) in the statement: 
"il vit s'approcher de lui . .  . un ange" ("he saw approaching him . .  . an 
angel"). With a causal void on the level of the récit, we can now move to the 
level of the histoire, but there no contextual event can have given rise to an 
angel. We are thus pushed back to our third level, that of narration, for an 
answer to the question: why? And our question is, "Why did the author 
include this episode in the novel?" Textual analysts would doubtless prefer 
to ask, "How do I read the angel in this text?" but our question implies 
more—the notion of textual elements indicative of intention or purpose 
which can guide our reading. We might ask: "What signs of intentionality 
are present in the text to inhibit or encourage specific readings of the 
angel?"; our "author" question is shorthand for that. Having thus advanced 
to the level of narration because of what is absent on the other levels, we are 
now aware of metacausality, the perception of which can transform the 
reading process into a questioning of our relationship to fiction in general. 
It should now be apparent that a connection exists between the two 
types of causal expression we have observed (métonymie linking and over­
determination through special causal vocabulary) on the one hand and the 
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two most basic levels of narrative {histoire and récit) on the other. All 
narrative discourse belongs to the narrator. But an observation statement 
narrating an event, in which the subject causes the predicate (as in the main 
clause of our example from Camus), places the reader somewhat closer to the 
inferred author, to the raw data of the histoire. The use of special causal 
vocabulary, by valorizing the judgmental role of the narrator, situates us 
clearly in the récit. From this arises a peculiar temporal ambiguity in the 
readers position with respect to narrative. The fictional events appear to be 
occurring as we read them, in a kind of sequential present, regardless of 
verb tenses. Yet the narrator can normally assess the causes only of events 
which have already occurred, so that events thus assessed seem "past." In 
this sense, reading an histoire is creating it "now"; reading a récit is learning 
why and how it happened in the past. We read by uniting fragments, by 
obliterating spaces, on both levels at once, thus seeking, at times unsuc­
cessfully, to obliterate another gap: between past and present, between 
completed and incomplete. 
When any of the gaps to which we have referred remains unbridge­
able, when the spaces obstinately intrude between the words or events, 
narrativity becomes problematical, and therefore interesting. Analysis of 
causation in fiction provides a relatively precise way of discovering the gaps, 
for, as I have indicated, it is the breaks in the causal chain, rather than the 
chain itself, which attract attention. Subsequent chapters will seek to 
uncover such points of rupture in specific texts and to trace the evolution of 
their function in modern narrative. 
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Causal Options in the 
Récit: Gide 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said . . . , "it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so 
many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master— 
that's all." 
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a minute 
Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a temper, some of them—par-
ticularly verbs: they're the proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, 
but not verbs—however, / can manage the whole lot of them! Impen­
etrability! That's what / say!" 
LEWIS CARROLL 
From the perspective of Taine and the determinists,1 authors of par­ables, like compilers of laboratory reports, must believe in the rep­licability of the cause-effect relationship; moralists and scientists 
both describe a procedure and indicate the results obtained; both suppose 
that, under similar conditions, the same operation produces virtually iden­
tical results. According to this mechanistic outlook, our ability to learn 
from others' experience depends upon our belief that similar deeds have 
similar consequences: causal replicability is thus a moral as well as a scien­
tific notion. 
That André Gide was aware of this dubious double role of rectilinear 
causality is evident in the parallel verve with which he mocks, in Les Caves 
du Vatican, Anthime's early confidence in the scientific method and his later 
faith in papal infallibility and in the ethical doctrines of the Church. Gide's 
1914 satire stigmatizes, of course, not the principle of causation but, as he 
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made clear,2 the naïve belief in obvious, mechanistic causes and in the 
predictability of human behavior which lay at the base of some social 
sciences and of literature with ethical pretensions. Yet Gide was himself an 
author of moral tales, notably of L'Immoraliste, in which the causal chain 
seems to lead so directly from the beginning to the end that Pierre Laurens 
could offer this succinct analysis of the work shortly after its appearance in 
1902: "Je suis malade, tant pis pour moi. Je suis guéri, tant pis pour elle!"3 
("I'm sick: too bad for me. I'm cured: too bad for her!"). More recent critics 
agree: "Marceline must 'decrease' so that Michel may 'increase'"4 and "le 
principal personnage de L'lmmoraliste ne pouvait recouvrer sa santé qu'au 
prix de celle de sa femme"5 ("LImmoraliste s main character could regain his 
health only at the expense of his wife's"). How then did Gide move from the 
confident affirmation of causality as a didactic device in L'lmmoraliste to 
ridicule by exaggeration of this "ragoût de logique" ("logical potpourri"), 
also for didactic purposes, in Les Caves} A comparison of the causal vocabu­
lary and relationships in L'lmmoraliste and in the companion work, La Porte 
étroite (completed 1908; published 1909), indicates the central position 
occupied by perceived causation in Gide's thought, as well as his equivocal 
attitude toward it. 
Comparisons will also shed light on the relationship of reader to 
narrator. Both tales are told by intradiegetic narrators; indeed each is the 
central figure in his own récit. The double reference of the narrative "je" (I 
who speak/I who acted)6 already marks a sharp distinction between reader 
and narrator, for, while we remain in direct communication with "I who 
speak," we are as far removed from his acting alter ego as from any other 
character: "I who acted" has his actions mediated and explained by the récit. 
"I who acted" belongs to the narrative past, and his actions to the inferred 
author; "I who speak" is the encoder and mediator of these actions in a 
narrative present. Encoding involves reporting of the "raw data" of the 
histoire, in which causation appears immediate, passing directly from sub­
ject to predicate. This is the sort of ubiquitous narrative causality to which 
Todorov refers in his Grammaire du Décaméron. Mediation includes the 
explanations, the causal judgments passed by the narrator upon the events 
of the histoire. This expression of causality is optional and resides in the use 
of explicit causal vocabulary in the récit, overdetermining the generalized 
causality inherent in the recounting of any histoire. As both levels of ex­
pressed causation exist in both Gidean texts herein examined (as in virtually 
all narrative fiction), filtered through the double "je," possibilities for 
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contradiction, or at least for suspicion, arise. That is to say, the reader may 
doubt, on the basis of the histoire, the causal explanations of the récit. 
It will be a simple matter to keep the post-boc-propter-hoc fallacy in 
proper perspective, for the fundamental question, on the level of the récit, is 
not whether A caused B, but whether the narrator says or implies that it 
did.7 Causal vocabulary results from the perception, attributed to a nar­
rator, of a causal relationship, independent of the objective existence of any 
causation. Indeed, studies have shown that in real life subjects frequently 
make erroneous assertions of causation, either because they are mistaken in 
their perceptions (e.g., primitive tribes who do not associate copulation 
and procreation), or because language itself encourages affirmations of 
causation even when none is perceived. Thus subjects will speak of a point 
of light "bumping," "pushing aside," or "pulling along" another point of 
light on a screen, even when they are aware that the laws of motion are not 
operable in such a situation,8 so that the very existence of causal vocabulary 
seems to call forth a causal description of events. Again, it is the transitivity 
of verbs, the "causal" relationship of subject to predicate associated with 
the histoire, that can make us express causality in spite of ourselves. 
A survey of causal vocabulary from sample pages of L'lmmoraliste and 
La Porte étroite is described in appendix A. It reveals both the remarkable 
ubiquitousness of causal expression in language and some fundamental 
specific differences in technique between Michel and Jérôme as narrators. 
First, the general remarks. Any reference to causal vocabulary calls to 
mind the standard metalanguage: cause, to cause, because {of). But such 
terms are relatively rare; if we think a bit harder, we may realize that 
conjunctions such as for, since, and as often express causation, as do so that, 
so as to, etc. Adverbs of logical conclusion also come readily to mind: thus, 
so, and so forth. But it is with verbs that we note the tremendous expansion 
of the causal lexicon, for all transitive verbs that designate a modification 
affirm causality. In addition, there are a number of relatively common 
special verbs of etiological significance: to allow, to permit, and to make (plus 
infinitive or adjective: to make them do it; to make them happy). Causal 
verbs account for about half the expressed causation in our sample, and 
neither narrator can do much to eliminate them from his style. 
But causation is also lurking in prepositions, adjectives, and present 
participles. Among the prepositions, one might think of by (agency) and to 
(motivation: she rose to speak). Yet cause can also be implied by with 
(overcome with joy), from (suffering from catarrh), according to (we fasted, 
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according to family custom), or even of (died of grief) in English, and 
French prepositions, quite frequent in the sample, are at least equally 
capable of simple, naïve, almost invisible attribution of cause. As for 
participles and adjectives, they commonly are substituted for because plus 
clause in English (she tore a tendon lifting weights; discontent with my lot, 
I took to gambling) and for parce que plus clause in French, as the sample 
reveals. 
Furthermore, whether we realize it or not, we express causation in 
certain expressions of degree (usually based upon so . . . that: so moved was 
he that he began to cry) which indicate that attainment of a vague threshold 
was a necessary condition of a triggered effect. With similar subtlety, causal 
expressions can be masked as spatial (e.g., in my office, no one shouts) or 
temporal (when I saw him, I blanched). 
Finally, while narrators can impute causes explicitly with expressions 
such as to blame it on or toput it down to, they can also imply them by the mere 
juxtaposition of two logically related events, leaving out all causal vocabu­
lary (parataxis). At times, and {et) may link such events (e.g., he tripped 
and fell), but causation remains implied. A special subcategory of causal 
parataxis operates in all reported conversations: even though there is seldom 
a lexical indication that one characters words come as the result of the 
preceding words or gesture of another, without a sign to the contrary it is 
obviously implied causality that forms the transitivity of reported dialogue. 
In his analysis of Little Red Riding Hood, Gerald Prince appears ambivalent 
on the matter; he notes a causal connective between the mothers command 
and Little Red Riding Hood s departure, as well as between two elements of 
the Wolf's dialogue with the grandmother,9 but his transformational rules 
turn up no causal relationship between the Wolf's tap on the door and the 
grandmother's "Who is there?" Nor do they reveal one between elements of 
the famous dialbgue of the Wolf and Red Riding Hood, such as "Grand­
mother, you have such big teeth!" and "Its to eat you!" Still, considering 
that answers presuppose questions, and that accusations, reflections, opin­
ions (and knocks on doors) are encouragements, if not implied commands, 
to respond, readers are justified in finding a relationship of implication 
between elements of a dialogue. Since reported dialogue is, however, essen­
tially an encoding of the histoire with little noticeable mediation by the 
narrator, this sort of parataxis provides implied causation coming from the 
inferred author, rather than from the narrator. 
This rather tedious general survey has demonstrated, I hope, that 
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language has resources for etiological expression far beyond those usually 
considered, and that all of them need to be taken into account in causal 
analysis of récits. When we do so for L'Immoraliste and La Porte étroite, 
striking differences begin to appear between the texts and between the two 
narrators, Michel and Jérôme. 
The distinction is not to be found in the transitive verbs of modifica­
tion (e.g., avait aggravé in "Mon deuil n'avait pas assombri, mais comme 
aggravé notre amour," [p. 515]; "My mourning had not darkened our love, 
but rendered it, as it were, more serious"), for language obliges both 
narrators to employ them, and they do so with nearly equal frequency. But 
when there is a choice, Michel expresses cause more frequently than Jérôme 
in those ways which are naïve, direct and straightforward. He selects causal 
faire ("to make" plus infinitive) more frequently, and causation surfaces far 
more often in his prepositions. This is particularly noteworthy with causal 
d?(for which there is no consistent English equivalent; it is often translated 
of, with, or from), a simple and unobtrusive locution connecting effects to 
their causes almost as if the latter possessed the former. Since a certain effort 
is required to avoid use of this common connective, it is all the more 
significant that, in the sample for La Porte étroite, where Jeromes prose 
predominates, only eight occurrences of causal de are from his pen, while 15 
come from Alissa (letters and diary) and two from Abel. Michel, in the 
sample from "his" novel, uses the locution 42 times; Jérôme is obviously 
more wary of simple causal connectives than he—more even than Alissa. 
Michel also uses adjectives and participles in a causal sense more frequently 
than Jérôme, and he chooses many more causal nouns for the straight­
forward naming of motivations (intention, résolution, sentiment, élan, influ­
ence, désir), physical forces, and states of being which produce an effect. He 
employs the obvious ritual vocabulary of logical conclusion more often as 
well, and, perhaps less straightforwardly, he outdoes Jérôme in implying 
causation through standard parataxis. In general, then, Michel's tale is a 
series of events causally linked by their narrator. 
But Jérôme surpasses Michel in four categories of causal expression. 
First, he uses a few more causal conjunctions than his counterpart (his 
numerical advantage here stems primarily from his more frequent use of 
car, which serves to introduce explanations after the fact). Then too, he 
predominates in his selection of more subtle causal expressions: those of 
degree (the vague causal "threshold") and those which mask causation as a 
merely temporal relationship. These techniques express causality while 
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concealing it. Finally, far more conversational parataxis appears in the 
sample for La Porte étroite; the fact that Jérôme often quotes conversations 
verbatim underscores the importance for him of reporting (rather than 
interpreting) events. Jérôme-as-narrator is less a mediating presence in his 
tale than Michel in his, and when Jérôme does provide causal mediation he 
proffers it in the least apparent ways. 
This comparison leads to an obvious conclusion. LImmoraliste is an 
interpretive summary of events, mediated by Michel. It expresses causality 
more frequently than La Porte étroite, according to our sample, often choos­
ing, when a choice exists, direct and naïve terms, as though cause and effect 
were elements of a single reality. La Porte étroite reports a series of events, but 
Jérôme, and to some extent Alissa as well, is less able or willing to infer 
causal relations among them. Here, we find a greater number of less forth­
right causal expressions—those especially of temporality—as if the nar­
rator were consciously eluding the post-hoc-propter-hoc peril. The sample 
suggests that things happen more frequently across the subject-predicate 
relationship than in L'lmmoraliste and that more verbatim replies are cited 
(conversational parataxis), so that causation subsists in the histoire, where it 
is the reader who must infer it, while fewer explanations of causality are 
provided on the level of the récit. 
Michel, it must be remembered, is telling his story to intradiegetic 
narratees, friends to whom he has called out for help. It would seemingly be 
in his interest to bring them to understand his perception of the consequen­
tial nature of events in his life. Unless one believes that "one thing led to 
another," Michel's cruelty toward Marceline appears gratuitous and there­
fore all the more blameworthy. Furthermore, since Michel's oral tale has 
been enclosed in a letter, it must have been transcribed by someone (one of 
the narratees?), who could have (unwittingly?) selected certain causal 
terms. But for whom is Jérôme writing? For the general public? If he, like 
Michel, feels some guilt about the outcome, it would be important that the 
causes of that result remain hidden. Michel says, in essence, "Understand 
the causes of my reprehensible acts"; Jérôme might well be saying, "I 
caused nothing and am therefore not reprehensible." The relationship be­
tween narrator and narratee is thus in part defined by the use of causal 
vocabulary. 
The subtle reduction in the special terminology of causal expression in 
La Porte étroite is often combined with the clustering of explanations around 
a particular event, so that the reader may know all the immediate causes of 
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an action, as the narrator sees them, without being able to connect it to any 
other important action or to a causal chain.10 The result is a partial loss of 
transitivity in the 1909 work, with a corresponding increase in Barthes's 
scriptible. At least three readings of the histoire of La Porte étroite seem 
pertinent to the data, and, with some exaggeration, may be summarized in 
this manner: (1) Alissa s puritanical, ascetic tendencies gradually destroy all 
hope of the earthly happiness which Jérôme seeks to offer her with his 
love;n (2) Jérôme—insensitive if not secretly sadistic—drives Alissa to her 
death by offering physical love on the one hand while constantly suggest­
ing, on the other, that for Alissa to accept it would be a betrayal of religious 
principle and a debasement of herself;12 (3) both Jérôme and Alissa enter­
tain a Cornelian notion of honor or merit and institute if not a sadistic at 
least a "Cidistic" rivalry between them to determine which can become the 
more worthy of the other by exhibiting a greater capacity to sacrifice their 
earthly relationship,13 a little game Alissa wins hands down—by dying. 
The existence of a plurality of readings would seem to leave us without a 
positive ethical clue: if, as Gide suggested,14 this is an ironical and critical 
work like L'Immoraliste, what sort of conduct is criticized? 
The fact that Gide stressed the similarity of these two texts, even 
calling them "twin" works,15 that he seems to have taken pains to construct 
them in parallel, invites a structuralist reading: perhaps if taken together 
the works affirm something they cannot declare singly. If the timelines of 
the two récits are juxtaposed, the principal common features become appar­
ent, revealing in their very similarity the nature of the essential differences. 
Each narrator chooses his fathers death as a starting point; each presents 
three crises capable of influencing the course of his life; and each provides a 
thrice-repeated testing event, three similar occurrences which allow us to 
judge the progress of the changes taking place in the characters. In both 
stories, these features occur in the same order (fathers death, first crisis, first 
test, second crisis, second test, third test, third crisis), and with nearly 
equivalent spacing along both timelines. Comparison and contrast of these 
features reveal the role of causal links in determining the function of specific 
narrative sequences. 
In Michel's story, the narrator marks causal connections between 
major events. For this reason, his father's death constitutes a true begin­
ning: obedience to his father's deathbed wish leads him to marry Marceline 
and thus gives rise to the central moral question of the tale; an inheritance 
from his father brings Michel La Morinière and other possessions, which 
28 • Rectilinear Causality in Narrative 
will serve as touchstones to his attitude toward property and liberty 
throughout the story. On the other hand, although Jérôme indicates three 
times that his histoire begins with his fathers demise (pp. 495, 497), this 
death has little direct bearing on subsequent events. Jérôme appears to 
suggest two reasons for seeing it as a beginning. First, he alludes to his new 
awareness, at this date, that he and Alissa were no longer children, with a 
hint that "perhaps" the sight of his mothers grief might have precociously 
awakened his sexuality. Here, we may either score one point for those who 
see in Jérôme a sadist, or we may question the explanation on grounds of our 
own experience, on the belief for example that biological processes and not 
periods of mourning determine the onset of puberty. The use of the du­
bitative "peut-être" ("perhaps"), not unusual in Jeromes style, undermines 
the assertion of causation and encourages our questioning. In the second 
place, Jérôme points to his fathers death as a beginning because it allows 
Lucile to demonstrate her character by failing to remain in mourning, yet 
this is an obvious artifice: Lucile will show far greater resources for illustrat­
ing her individuality. Thus, Jeromes explanations—ever so cautiously 
expressed and patently incomplete—begin to subvert our confidence in the 
causal bond between events; while the death of Michel's father starts a true 
chain reaction, Jeromes loss remains a vaguely associated early memory 
without recognizable consequences. 
Both histoires show further similarity in the presentation of three 
crises. The first appears to determine the basic direction of the tales, since 
both narrators make "resolutions" about the course of their conduct imme­
diately thereafter. The second seems to be a turning point, occurring near 
the midpoint of the texts and marked as similar by the proximity of 
Christmas in both narratives. The third is ostensibly the tragic outcome: a 
woman's death. But if these crises are indeed what they seem in L'lmmor-
aliste, they are something quite different in La Porte étroite, because of breaks 
in the causal chain of the récit. 
Michel's initial crisis is carefully prepared: his weak constitution— 
further enfeebled by precocious adoption of a sedentary life, debilitated 
again by mourning for his father, the excitement of a wedding, and the 
fatigue of the honeymoon trip, and finally assailed by the chill of the 
African night—is an obvious receptacle for that "initial stative event" 
which is the presence of the bacillus in his lungs. On the verge of death, 
Michel faces his first crucial moment, and the results are stated as explicitly 
as the causes: on the one hand, desire to get well leads to self-discipline in 
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diet and exercise, tending to fortify the body, while on the other, preoc­
cupation with his own corporality brings Michel to discover the "old man" 
within him. 
But such precise causes and effects do not surround Lucile Bucolin's 
flight, the initial crisis evoked by Jérôme. We are not even told why Lucile 
leaves hearth and home. Jeromes portrayal of her as evilly sensual depends 
in part on our acceptance of the righteousness of his point of view. When, 
for example, she tickled him under his blouse, to his great embarrassment, 
was she wantonly arousing an adolescent, or did she believe she was playing 
with a cute little boy in a sailor suit? The narrators vagueness about dates 
makes it difficult to guess. She received a lieutenant in her room, without 
her husband's knowledge according to Alissa, but still in the presence of her 
two younger children, a procedure seldom recommended for those seeking 
to preserve secrecy.16 She suffered from apparently neurotic "crises," which 
Jerome's mother believed to be feigned (p. 501), although the reason for 
play-acting is difficult to discover; they are hardly a "cover" for a love affair, 
since they seem to require the presence of her husband, not his absence. 
Perhaps they (and even the lieutenant s playful visits) are intended to break 
what might have been for her the monotony of her Bucolin existence, 
although objective certainty is impossible. That she eventually leaves home 
is, of course, a fictional reality, but the reasons are surprisingly obscure. 
When Jérôme asks if she had left "with someone," Miss Ashburton replies: 
"Mon enfant, tu demanderas cela à ta mère; moi je ne peux rien te répondre" 
(p. 504); "Ask your mother, child; / can't give you any answer." The first 
clause smacks of the traditional evasion for a child, but the second is 
ambiguous: indeed it does seem unlikely that she could provide informa­
tion on this subject on the mere basis of the telegram from Le Havre. Since 
Jérôme makes it a point never to ask his mother, we cannot know. Depar­
ture with a lover is plausible, but so is flight to escape the insidious 
boredom of Le Havre and Fongueusemare, or even to avoid recrimination, 
now that the secret is out (p. 504) of the possibly unadulterous but surely 
suspicious rendezvous. Considering the ease with which we could have been 
informed of Lucile s purposes and ultimate fate—two or three well-placed 
words would have left no doubts—one begins to suspect that there is 
conscious suppression of causal connectives. Scarcely clearer is the effect of 
the desertion on the protagonists, for Jérôme seldom mentions Lucile in 
what follows. Alissa appears conscious of her father's suffering, and she 
seems to fear that her own nature is contaminated with her mother's sen­
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suality (pp. 585-86)  . Still, causation is not explicit. Nor is it suggested 
(indeed there is a hint to the contrary) that such a fear would of itself suffice 
to make Alissa refuse Jérôme s repeated proposal of marriage. 
These crises lead directly, in both works, to the formulation of resolu­
tions by the narrators. Michel declares, "I had made resolutions" (p. 384, 
"j'avais pris des résolutions"), and we are told precisely what they are: deep 
breathing, exercise, proper diet. After the account of the "strait gate" 
sermon, Jérôme too uses the word "résolutions," surrounded by a cluster of 
causal vocabulary of extraordinary density: 
J'étais parvenu vers la fin du sermon à un tel état de tension morale 
que, sitôt le culte fini, je m'enfuis sans chercher à voir ma cousine— 
par fierté, voulant déjà mettre mes résolutions (car j'en avais pris) à 
l'épreuve, et pensant la mieux mériter en m'éloignant d'elle [aus]-
sitôt. (P. 506) 
(I had reached such a state of moral tension toward the end of the 
sermon that, as soon as the service was over, I fled without seeking to 
see my cousin—out of pride, already desirous of putting my resolu­
tions [for I had made some] to the test, and believing I became more 
worthy of her by distancing myself from her at once.) 
Seldom have so many reasons explained so little. The parenthetical "car," 
for example, calls our attention to the resolutions, but gives such a literal-
minded cause as to be virtually redundant. All the causes alleged (threshold 
of moral tension, resolutions, pride, desire for a test of strength, belief that 
immediate separation is a means to worthiness) tend to explain the individ­
ual act of leaving the church without a word to Alissa, but they leave us 
in the dark as to the nature of the continuing resolutions. We are thus im­
pelled to determine the nature of these vows inductively; we may note 
perhaps that long separations characterize the relationship of these lovers, 
and that poor verbal communication is typical of their moments together. 
We may suppose as a result that Jérôme has resolved to deserve Alissa more 
by communicating with her less. Whether such a reading is accurate or not, 
the essential notion is that we must read La Porte étroite inductively on this 
question, while we can follow Michel's conduct deductively, watching his 
theory become its application. Michel provides satisfactory explanations of 
direct causation, while causes are so diffuse in Jerome's récit as to drive the 
reader to attempt his own causal analysis of the histoire. Jerome's clustered 
causal vocabulary, "explaining" the immediate at the expense of the long 
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term, subverts our belief in his perception and reporting of the causal 
relationship: where causal terms abound and yet provide no answers to the 
fundamental questions, we can entertain doubts about their worth. 
Further on, both works evoke a Christmastime crisis. Marceline loses 
her baby, with phlebitic complications leading to cardiac and pulmonary 
embolisms (pp. 437—39). This major turn of events is carefully prepared, 
with credible medical data linking each illness to the preceding one. The 
source of the initial fever is unexplained, like the source of Michel's tuber­
culosis; the prescription of quinine for it might suggest a late-appearing 
malaria, perhaps contracted in North Africa, an interesting idea sym­
bolically, but quite inductive. Still, from the fever on, the causal chain 
is clearly marked, as Marceline becomes, for her husband, "une chose 
abîmée"—"damaged goods." In La Porte étroite, Juliette's traumatic en­
gagement to Teissières, beside Aunt Planner's Christmas tree, is well ex­
plained in terms of immediate causes (Abel adduces them for us, pp. 537, 
539), but major questions remain. Has Jérôme, knowingly or unwittingly, 
encouraged Juliette's love for him? Why does he make no attempt to 
prevent the engagement when Alissa begs him to, even though he says he 
would have "given his life" to ease Alissa s anguish at this moment? Even if, 
to explain such things, we attribute to Jérôme a blind and bungling nature, 
there is no easy way to connect this incident to what follows. Its conse­
quences seem to melt away; Juliette's sacrificial marriage becomes a normal 
and rather happy one; Alissa, freed at last to marry Jérôme, continues to 
refuse just as before, so that the story of Juliette appears as an episode, with 
roots and branches barely touching the central, Jérôme-Alissa relationship. 
Connections may be induced (did Juliette's capacity for self-sacrifice spur 
Alissa on to greater abnegation?), but the explicit causal links, of the sort 
we find in L'Immoraliste, are absent.17 
The same contrast is apparent in the death that ends each story. The 
succession of carefully interconnected maladies that weaken Marceline, and 
Michel's all too well-considered conduct that brings her to her grave, are 
clearly set forth in Michel's narrative, with more than sufficient causal 
vocabulary to justify the word "crime" (p. 471). The cause of Alissa's death, 
however, must be inferred, and the wealth of evidence provided makes 
inference difficult rather than easy. We have Jerome's declaration that, when 
he last saw her, less than a month before her death, she was alarmingly pale 
and thin (p. 579). We have Juliette's opinion that Alissa, without being 
precisely ill, was simply dying away. We have medical opinion, from 
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Dr. A.. . in Le Havre, that there was nothing seriously wrong with her, and, 
from Alissa's Parisian doctor, that she needed an operation (p. 593). We also 
have Alissas conduct (flight to Paris carefully incognito, unwillingness to 
see the doctor there, ruse to delay the operation) and her symptoms (con­
sciousness that death was near, vomiting, weakness). Is this death from a 
broken heart? Novels evoking such things seldom list vomiting as a symp­
tom, and operations are rarely prescribed. Can it be death from self-
abnegation, including perhaps starvation? That might not be inconsistent 
with Alissas secretive flight from Le Havre, where she was known, but the 
prescribed operation scarcely fits that diagnosis. Why not cancer?18 That 
disease fits all our information rather well, except for poor Dr. A.. . s opin­
ion. If we allow ourselves some skepticism about provincial doctors of the 
period, cancer, with Alissa seeking to avoid treatment and thus collaborat­
ing (for reasons of self-abnegation, or out of despair?) in her own death, fits 
everything, except her age—and the rest of the book. If Alissa is one of 
those rare individuals to be stricken with cancer in their early twenties, at a 
time when cancer was virtually incurable, it makes little sense, whether she 
avoids treatment or not, to suggest she died of excessive asceticism, or that 
Jérôme killed her. Her death, if from cancer, is simply absurd, without 
direct causal connection to any other element of the work. The narrator of 
Le Rouge et le noir states no cause for Madame de Renais death either, at the 
close of his récit, but readers can readily intuit one from the histoire. Where 
inductive analysis of the histoire leads to nothing but further disconnec­
tions, we are clearly in a different sort of fictional world. 
Finally, in both Gidean tales, the narrator provides a repeated event 
(the first occurrence falling before the Christmas crisis) which serves as a test 
of progression, much as a chemist might test the progress of a complex 
chemical reaction at intermediate stages, to ascertain whether the expected 
transformations are taking place. In L'Immoraliste, the tests are purely 
anecdotal and as much exterior to the causal chain as litmus paper is to a 
chemical solution. Three times (pp. 404, 445, 462)1 9 unruly drivers ap­
pear, testing the progress of Michel's growing "immoralism" by the pro-
tagonist's reaction to them (first: violent rage; second: curiosity; third: 
complicity). The test for progress in La Porte étroite is Jerome's repeated 
proposal of marriage to Alissa, which recurs in the timeline with a rhythm, 
analogous to Michel's unruly drivers (pp. 521, 563, 578). No anecdote 
this, for Jérôme is asking a question that has become uppermost in readers' 
minds. With the weakening of the linear causal chain, repetition, rather 
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than causality, begins to carry the narrative. Reversal, of course, does not 
occur: Alissa's answer is always "no." Jérôme makes no progress toward the 
altar, if indeed that was where he sought to go. 
The presence in the narrative of Alissa's point of view can give us few 
additional certainties. One can scarcely imagine a less rectilinear mode for 
the presentation of her version of events than the few selected letters we are 
allowed to read, than the fragmentary entries of her partially destroyed 
journal—and she is nearly as cautious as Jérôme with causal terms. Indeed, 
in this ill-joined world, there would be some impertinence in asking why 
Lucileflees, or from what Alissa dies, in invoking thus expectations which 
are exterior to the story, were it not for L'Immoraliste, which, between 
analogous structural building blocks, supplies the mortar20 and fulfills the 
expectations. Comparative reading shows a weakening of causal connec­
tions from L'lmmoraliste to La Porte étroite, with resultant opening of the 
second work to multiple interpretations and a corresponding reduction of 
useful didactic content. 
At the very heart of his tale, Michel provides us with a paradigm of it, 
in his summary of his first Parisian lecture (p. 424). Replete with causal 
connectives, this passage explains how Culture, a spontaneous product of 
human life, in order to perpetuate itself becomes restrictive and thus de­
structive of life. Likewise, Michel's personal liberation—rising spon­
taneously from his instinctive being—when it is transformed into a course 
of conduct with rules necessary to keep it intact, becomes destructive of life 
and of the vital nature from which it springs: "l'ardu, c'est savoir être libre," 
(p. 372); "the hard part is managing to live free." The implication is that, if 
anyone seeks liberty, as Michel does, it will be impossible to maintain it, for 
the price of maintenance is loss of liberty. The possibility of such a para­
digm and of its moral implications rests firmly on the underlying causal 
links. As Michel's lecture was didactic, so is his tale. 
Obviously, one might suggest as well that Alissa's perseverance in 
pursuit of virtue contains in similar fashion the seeds of its own destruction, 
for the quest for moral perfection removes us unvirtuously ever farther from 
our ordinary fellow mortals. Thus perseverance in a single direction might 
be the moral evil denounced in both stories. Yet, in La Porte étroite, per­
severance loses its essential aspect: continuity. Is it pursuit of virtue, flight 
from sensuality, a contest with Jérôme, or now one, now another? The 
second work seems, in its mode of narration, to sacrifice didactic certainty 
to the beauty and interest of a less predictable world. Because of this very 
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unpredictability, Jérôme and Alissa appear somehow sadly freer to be them­
selves, to evade responsibility for each other's earthly happiness. Certainly 
the didactic and critical sense of the two works taken together includes the 
notion that real freedom, unfortunately, springs less from the rebellious 
gesture than from one s outlook, from a world view in which events have no 
simple, deterministic, causal relationships. And herein lies the irony of our 
two texts: it is L'lmmoraliste that provides the strait gate, through which 
readers must pass in the single file of general exegetic agreement, while La 
Porte étroite opens the spacious road of multiple interpretations. Indeed, as 
the paucity of replicable causation tends to destroy its potential for moral 
instruction, the 1909 work becomes the truly "immoralistic" one. 
Causal expression, in its presence or its absence, is the basic métonymie 
structure of these stories, as of nearly all narrative fiction, essential not 
only to the intelligence of the themes, but also to the reader's manipulation 
of the story. The optional expression of causation sets the narrator apart 
from the inferred author. It is a touchstone by which the reader determines 
the narrator's credibility—a trait far more important than narrator "person­
ality" (neither Michel nor Jérôme is especially likable or admirable) in 
establishing the reader s involvement with the narrator. It provides a system 
of links and gaps, which readers use in the mental (re)creation of the 
narrative. The links may be plausible or implausible, strong (providing 
desired explanation) or weak (offering unneeded or useless explanations). 
When weak links are numerous, readers may suspect the narrator of sub­
verting causality to his own ends, of creating a "cover up." Gaps in the 
causal chain send readers back to the inferred author, to seek to infer causes 
for themselves from the basic "facts" of the histoire, just as unsatisfactory 
links do. In either case, the reader will try to fill the gaps or strengthen the 
links, creating as she or he does so a personal mental récit, in competition 
with that of the narrator. As biological cells have exterior receptors for 
bonding with other organisms, so the gaps in the chain of causality bond 
the reader to the tale.21 
One might suspect as well that causality and its expression could 
change from decade to decade, that causal analysis might yield diachronic 
results of interest. Gide seems to be balancing on a tightrope between a 
world of clear causes and effects and a more modern, more absurd, world, in 
which credible explanations are harder to come by. On the one hand he 
gives us the causally plausible Immoraliste, and much later the equally direct 
causality of Thésée (1944); on the other, with La Porte étroite, we find the 
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ambiguous Faux-monnayeurs, and the all too explicit Caves du Vatican, 
where simplistic causality is ironically reinstated, only to self destruct.22 A 
look backward to a simpler time of more naive faith in causation, before 
Nietzsche's message had begun to sink in, may illuminate the pre-Gidean 
world and provide contrast with the post-Gidean outlook. We return, then, 
to the "scientific" causation of Emile Zola (to which the word "naive" is not 
always applicable!), before observing more recent texts. 
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Causal Options in 
Histoire and Narration: 
Zolas L'Assommoir 
On voit également que cette description du discours s'oppose à l'histoire de 
la pensée. Là encore, on ne peut reconstituer un système de pensée qu'à 
partir d'un ensemble défini de discours. Mais cet ensemble est traité de telle 
manière qu'on essaie de retrouver par-delà les énoncés eux-mêmes l'inten-
tion du sujet parlant, son activité consciente, ce qu'il a voulu dire, ou 
encore le jeu inconscient qui s'est fait jour malgré lui dans ce qu'il a dit ou 
dans la presque imperceptible cassure de ses paroles manifestes. . . . 
(It is also apparent that this description of discourse works against the 
history of thought. There again, a system of thought can be reconstituted 
only on the basis of a defined total body of discourse. But that body is so 
treated that we try to rediscover, behind the utterances themselves, the 
intention of the speaking subject, his conscious activity, what he meant to 
say, or also the subconscious interplay that came to light in spite of him in 
what he said or in the almost imperceptible crack in his actual words. . . .) 
MICHEL FOUCAULT 
If Gide is capable of having his narrators muddy the causal waters by selective use of specific vocabulary, surely Zola, with his penchant for impartial narrators ("le romancier n'est plus qu'un greffier qui se dé­
fend de juger et de conclure"—"nowadays the novelist is merely a scribe, 
who refuses to judge and to conclude")* and for mechanistic determinism 
("Un même déterminisme doit régir la pierre des chemins et la cerveau de 
l'homme"—"One same determinism must govern the stone in the road and 
the brain of man"),2 will give us a measure of how clear and direct causal 
chains can be. One senses that rigorous causal laws are at work in his novels, 
as R.-M. Albérès declares in his introduction to the Oeuvres complètes edition 
of L'Assommoir; he finds that our greatest pleasure in rereading L'Assommoir 
is in entering a literary world with its own laws, and he adds: 
37 
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La loi naturelle y est dure, la loi sociale y est cruelle, la psychologie y 
est conditionnée et laisse peu de place à la liberté ou même à la 
responsabilité. Mais ce n'est pas un monde sans lois. Ce monde est 
atroce, non pas un monde absurde. Zola est l'anti-Gide. . . .3 
(In this world natural law is hard, social law is cruel, psychology is 
conditioned, leaving little room for freedom or even for responsibility. 
But it is not a lawless world. It is an atrocious world, but not an absurd 
world. Zola is the anti-Gide. . . .) 
The atrociously lawful world of L'Assommoir, and its language, will serve 
well as our points of departure in search of pre-Gidean causal contrasts. And 
perhaps La Bête humaine, in which certain events appear to determine others 
with a rigor like that of the railroad tracks leading trains from Le Havre to 
Paris, is one of the best examples in all Zola of causal exigency: a trip down 
its ineluctible rails will provide, in chapter four, another, quite different 
view of Zola's deterministic landscape. 
Yet neither work is wholly deterministic. If the extradiegetic narrators 
are relatively objective in their causal judgments (and even there one may 
find room for argument), the inferred authors leave gaps and weaknesses in 
the causal chains of the histoires themselves, especially in L'Assommoir, 
through which critical questions can arise. Students of naturalism have long 
been pointing out that there are (at least) two Zolas—one "scientific," a 
believer in deterministic causality, and the other mythic, if not mystic.4 A 
glance, for example, at La Faute de l'abbé Mouret, in which myth absolutely 
overwhelms mimesis, is all it takes to find the eternal behind the linearly 
temporal. It lurks as well behind the "cracks" in the causal strands of 
L'Assommoir. And, while its plot is bonded by physical causation, La Bête 
humaine raises cogent, rational doubts about our ability to observe causes. 
The differences we will uncover with respect to Gide are therefore less likely 
to reveal bipolar opposition (presence/absence of causation) than differences 
of degree, differences of kind, and differences of the position of the reader in 
relation to both histoire and récit. 
The narrator of L'Assommoir (written in 1875-76, first published in 
serial form in 1876-77) exhibits bourgeois prejudices, notably with regard 
to the supposed improvidence and laziness of the poor, which critics have 
not hesitated to attribute to Zola himself.5 Yet the narrator is not Zola, not 
only for the obvious ontological reasons, but for linguistic ones: he lapses 
(or rises), with disconcerting frequency, into the vernacular of the working 
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class.6 He also slips with ease into free indirect discourse and out of it, so 
that it can be difficult to judge whether the language of the underclass is 
defining him or some character on the scene. Gervaise is planning her 
saints-day banquet: 
Cette année-là, un mois à l'avance, on causa de la fête. On cherchait 
des plats, s'en léchait les lèvres. Toute la boutique avait une sacrée 
envie de nocer. Il fallait une rigolade à la mort, quelque chose de pas 
ordinaire et de réussi. (P. 750) 
(That year, for a month in advance, they talked about the feast. They 
looked for recipes and licked their chops over them. The whole shop 
was damn well ready for a high old time. They needed to laugh 
till their sides split—not your ordinary party, but one that really 
came off.) 
The narrator speaks, but he just might be rendering in her words the 
thoughts of some laundress in the shop. Later on, the narrator describes 
the party: 
Et le vin donc, mes enfants! ça coulait de la table comme l'eau coule à 
la Seine. Un vrai ruisseau, lorsqu'il a plu et que la terre a soif. Coupeau 
versait de haut, pour voir le jet rouge écumer; et quand un litre était 
vide, il faisait la blague de retourner le goulet et de le presser, du geste 
familier aux femmes qui traient les vaches. Encore une négresse qui 
avait la gueule cassée! (P. 767) 
(And what about the wine, kids!—flowing on the table like water in 
the Seine. A real stream, after a rain, when the land is thirsty. Coupeau 
poured from high up, to watch the red jet foam, and when a liter was 
empty, he clowned around, holding the bottle upside down and 
squeezing the neck, like a milkmaid squeezing a cow's teat. One more 
dead Indian!) 
The potentially thirsty earth sounds like a narrators image, but the rest 
seems to echo the thoughts of some half-inebriated guest. On the one hand 
the indeterminacy of the narrative voice, and on the other its identification 
with the laboring class it describes, tend to create some doubt as to the 
reliability of the causal data it provides. Without calling into question the 
narrator's desire for objectivity, one may entertain questions about his 
ability to understand the forces at work. If he is identified, by his language, 
as a member of the working class, he may be limited to a working-class 
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viewpoint. This notion in no way contradicts his apparent addiction to 
bourgeois stereotypes of the poor, for the novel also suggests that members 
of the underclass have readily accepted certain middle-class attitudes, as we 
shall see. The integration of the narrator into the class he describes tends to 
reinforce the idea that the poor have assimilated a low opinion of them­
selves; it also makes the narrator more nearly intradiegetic, like Gide's. 
And, as with Gide,7 when readers can begin to suspect that their inter­
pretation of events might not coincide with the narrator's, the inferred 
author and the histoire gain increased influence over the nature of the 
interpretation. 
Appendix B is intended to facilitate further general comparison with 
Gide on the level of the récit. Most obviously, with respect to the percentage 
of occurrences of causal expressions, the two samples look remarkably alike; 
linguistic similarities far outweigh the differences. Zola's narrator does 
appear proportionately less wary in the use of causal conjunctions. Further­
more, he and (other) speaking characters mask causality in temporal terms 
even more than do Gide's. Coupeau brings Lantier home to Gervaise, for 
example, and little Etienne recognizes his long-lost father: "quand il aper­
çut Lantier, il resta tremblant et gêné," (p. 783); "when he caught sight of 
Lantier, he stood there trembling and embarrassed." Clearly the sight of 
Lantier is the cause of the trembling and embarrassment. But this construc­
tion may be less an effort to obscure causality than to reproduce the patterns 
of everyday speech, in a novel in which the working-class idiom predomi­
nates. In that sense, the "when" is to be read literally, and the reader is 
presumed to catch the causal undertones, almost as if by parataxis. Indeed, 
the relatively frequent use of parataxis in L'Assommoir suggests a kind of 
causal innuendo not uncommon in ordinary oral communication. Perhaps 
the most striking difference, though, between the Gide and Zola samples 
lies in the percentage of verbs used to express causation. The narrator of 
L'Assommoir contrives to use relatively fewer "verbs of transitivity," in 
which the subject affects a change in the predicate through an action, as 
well as fewer special verbs of causation. This is not without importance, for 
it seems attributable to his penchant for "describing" actions instead of 
"narrating" them (see the quotation from the banquet scene, above), rely­
ing heavily on the imperfect tense, expressing tendencies rather than pre­
cise effects. Even passages of detailed narration (and they are far from rare) 
tend to exist somewhat in isolation, without narrative links between them. 
The relatively elevated percentage for conversational parataxis in the Assom­
moir sample (actually, it is only slightly higher than the percentage for La 
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Porte étroite, although noticeably greater than for the Gide sample as a 
whole) may stem from the same phenomenon: we read individual scenes in 
detail, with verbatim reports of conversation, although narrative connec­
tions between scenes may be reduced or eliminated. 
Behind this sort of fragmentation in the récit, the histoire follows a 
simple curve, as it traces the rise of Gervaise Macquart (from urban poor, to 
labor, to skilled labor, to the lower fringes of the petite bourgeoisie, as she 
marries and acquires her own laundry business), and her decline (downward 
again to urban poor, to slow starvation, begging and soliciting, to death 
apparently from hunger and exposure). If Gervaise s pitiable end is to be 
seen as the result of the working of inexorable laws, we should be able to 
trace the chain of causes and effects leading to her downfall. R.-M. Albérès 
makes much of the initial event (Gervaise s abandonment by Lantier) as a 
mark of her predestination, of her ill-starred inner destiny ("fatalité inté­
rieure," p. 592). In what follows, then, we will examine the nature and 
expression of causation in this initial event; next, we will analyse the 
expressed and the inferable causal factors in Gervaise s downward slide, and 
finally we will note the remarkable reversal that links the initial events 
(through Gervaise s humiliation of Virginie) to our heroines final degrada­
tion (humiliation by Virginie). Causation is far more markedly in operation 
here than in La Porte étroite, but it is at times less mechanical in nature than 
one might suspect. 
1. The initial event. The proximate causes of Lantier s departure are 
manifest: his bad character, financial difficulties, and the absence of a 
marriage contract to bind him to Gervaise. We have ample evidence of his 
unsavory traits at the outset: he spends the night with Adèle, leaving 
Gervaise to worry at home; when he returns, he upbraids her just as brutally 
for her loving remarks as for her sarcasm, chiding her as well for her 
supposed failure to keep her person and their dingy lodging clean; he forces 
his "wife" to pawn some of her belongings, pocketing the cash himself to 
hire the carriage that will transport his own possessions as he abandons 
Gervaise for Adèle. The financial difficulties are apparent in the ugly con­
frontation over the pawning of Gervaise's clothes: this is obviously not the 
first dispute on the subject. Adèle has a steady income (from a factory job as 
a "burnisher"), possibly augmented by prostitution; since Lantier appears 
both selfish and unwilling to work, life with Adèle could be tempting for 
financial reasons. But how do such causes predestine Gervaise? 
Lantier's departure leaves Gervaise penniless with Claude and Etienne 
to raise, but she will manage remarkably well, finding work as a laundress, 
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earning promotions, marrying Coupeau, who has a steady income as a 
roofer, and finally starting her own—initially successful—laundry busi­
ness: being free of Lantier seems, if anything, beneficial. Yet Albérès notes, 
of the initial incident, that something or other tells us that she is doomed 
("Un je-ne-sais-quoi nous avertit qu'elle est perdue," p. 592). One might 
look for it in the fatal stupidity or weakness which caused her to move in 
with Lantier in the first place. But she has been with him some nine years 
(Claude is eight), and, if the relationship were inevitably destructive, the 
destruction ought to have occurred before this. Furthermore, Lantier had 
rescued her from her abusive father in the provinces and had brought her to 
Paris as soon as he could afford to, sharing with her his meager inheritance. 
She accuses him of having squandered it (pp. 606, 612), but he reminds 
her, "Tu as croqué le magot avec moi" ("you shot the wad with me"), and 
she admits to having enjoyed theater, dinners, cabs, and good clothes upon 
their arrival in Paris. Now the money is gone, and she will have to work 
in any case; Lantier s departure leaves her with three mouths to feed instead 
of four. 
The evidence presented concerning initial causes is of two sorts: nar­
rated scenes and conversations, including Gervaise s confidences to Mme 
Boche. In neither case is causation unequivocally noted: the reader must 
seek to determine the facts by inference (does Lantier leave in part because 
Gervaise is really dirty, or is his insult gratuitous cruelty?), or take the word 
of Gervaise, a fallible character with manifest self-interest in the way she 
describes the situation to a friend. Gervaise herself is obviously surprised 
and uncomprehending when told that Lantier has moved out (p. 616); if she 
fails to perceive her abandonment as probable or inevitable, the reader is 
scarcely a more privileged judge of the forces at work. 
In at least one instance, narrator and conversation are in disagreement 
about cause. Gervaise weeps when she learns that Lantier has abandoned 
her. Mme Boche sees the tears as possibly shed for a lost love: "Est-il 
possible de se faire tant de mal pour un homme! . . . Vous l'aimez donc 
toujours, hein? ma pauvre chérie" (pp. 616—17); "How can you go through 
such agony over a man! . .  . So you still love him, huh? poor dear." If the 
"done" denotes a conclusion based on evidence, the "hein?" suggests a hint 
of doubt. The narrator sounds more confident of his opinion: 
Le souvenir de sa course au mont-de-piété, en précisant un fait de la 
matinée, lui avait arraché les sanglots qui s'étranglaient dans sa gorge. 
Cette course-là, c'était une abomination, la grosse douleur dans son 
désespoir. (P. 616) 
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(The memory of her trip to the pawn shop, bringing to mind one of 
that morning's specific events, had torn loose the sobs that were 
choking in her throat. That errand was an abomination, the greatest 
pain in her despair.) 
Humiliation might well be, in context, a more accurate statement of the 
cause of the tears (Gervaise herself had just spoken of it) than love. Yet the 
fact that Gervaise will later take her lover back suggests that Mme Boche 
may not be totally in error. In this work, such little ambiguities abound, 
little gaps through which the reader enters the work. 
If we are to see Gervaise as predestined in this initial event to a life of 
suffering, our belief will have to spring not entirely from the text but from 
our own experience. We may believe, for example, that Paris is no place for 
a poor, uneducated country girl, that it is the "Sin-City" atmosphere of the 
metropolis that led the couple astray, destroying an otherwise happy union, 
or that the experience of sudden "wealth," followed by a return to poverty, 
is destructive of character. The narrator says nothing about what fatalité 
caused the separation after nine years of union; the inferred author simply 
thrusts Lantier and Gervaise onto the scene in parallel to thousands of other 
provincials arriving in Paris with a little money in their pockets, or rather, 
in parallel to prevailing beliefs about what happens to such déracinés— the 
"uprooted" country folk. If we are on our own in search of general causes, 
we will not retain the freedom to interpret we found in La Porte étroite; for 
there is a myth of underclass Paris at work in the text, and more personal 
myths as well, that will gradually limit our freedom of interpretation. But 
at this point already, Albérèss "something or other," his "je-ne-sais-quoi," 
is not in the text, but in reader interaction with the text. 
2. The "inevitable" decline. The narrator seems to recognize the begin­
ning of the fall in a scene (p. 710) which occurs while the laundry is still 
prosperous; great heaps of dirty petticoats and blouses cover the floor, while 
Gervaise's crew of laundresses work away at ironing on a large table. 
Coupeau returns home in an inebriated state, and, lurching forward to 
embrace his wife, falls face down in the soiled clothes. Gervaise helps her 
husband to rise, offering her cheek to be kissed, but he seizes her breasts, 
under the amused eyes of her workers, then kisses her passionately on the 
lips, as she abandons herself to his ardor. The narrator observes: 
. .  . le gros baiser qu'ils échangèrent à pleine bouche, au milieu des 
saletés du métier, était comme une première chute, dans le lent ava­
chissement de leur vie. 
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(. . . the big, full-mouth kiss they exchanged, in the midst of the filth 
of her trade, was like a first fall, in the gradually increasing slov­
enliness of their life.) 
Like many French nouns ending in -ment, "avachissement," with its 
connotations of debilitation, softening, loss of moral fiber, is the name of a 
result, but it also appears to be the immediate cause of Gervaise's fatal 
decline: a general lowering of the standards of quality in the laundry's work 
(leading to a loss of clientèle and the eventual collapse of the enterprise), 
disappearance of self-discipline in Gervaise (splurging, nonpayment of 
debts, self-gratification, inability to resist Lantiers advances when he re­
turns), and loss of pride (increased willingness to accept degradation and 
humiliation without a fight, a growing desire to die). Thus the stylistically 
enhanced significance of "avachissement," here used as a name of both a 
cause and an effect, seems to make of it a causal link between the first third 
of the novel and the decline that follows. 
But the early chapters hardly suggest the onset of any moral decay 
within Gervaise. She rises by hard and conscientious labor from the straits 
in which Lantier leaves her. She resists Coupeau's initial propositions and 
agrees to live with him only after marriage. In marrying him, she selects a 
hard-working, relatively well-paid skilled laborer, dependable and opposed 
to the use of alcohol; his income plus hers will provide an almost comfort­
able living for them and her two children. Residing now in a slightly more 
prosperous quartier, she wins the respect of her neighbor, Mme Goujet, and 
the tender admiration-from-afar of Mme Goujet's son; these friendships 
lead to a loan for the establishment of her own laundry: by conscientious 
application of middle-class principles, Gervaise, now herself an employer, 
enters the middle class. Her rise is marked by energy, self-respect, self-
confidence, discipline, and reasonable ambition. The birth of Nana seems 
to consecrate the bourgeois family ideal; profligacy, degeneracy, "avachisse­
ment," seem alien to the text's vocabulary. 
Reference to the drunken kiss as a "first" fall, evoking thus a primal 
cause-without-a-cause, would seem to confirm the sharp causal rupture 
between rise and decline. But the term "chute," operating as it does here as 
both vehicle (Coupeau's physical tumble in the dirty linen) and tenor (the 
Coupeaus' moral degeneration) of a metaphor, reaches out to other images 
of falling in the text. This strategem shifts the transitivity of the narrative 
from the purely syntagmatic realm of the causal link and engages it in a 
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symbolic paradigm: one might say that readers, having been fed a bite of 
the metaphoric apple, are driven from the garden of métonymie innocence. 
At any rate, the cultural myths again come into play; readers may be 
expected to conjure up visions of the biblical Fall, in which overweening 
pride and concupiscence lead to expulsion from Eden. Suddenly all "down­
ward" transformations, changes from "good" to "bad," from joy to despair, 
from prosperity to poverty, may be included in the paradigm. As descrip­
tive of the plot structure, "chute" takes on the coloration of a meta­
language, announcing prophetically the ever dwindling fortunes of the 
heroine, so that as misfortunes befall they appear prepared for, preplanned: 
their causes desert the fictional reality in which Gervaise lives to take up 
residence in the predispositions of the inferred author. Gervaise will "fall" 
because our story teller planned it that way, and the nature of the "fall" will 
be moral, emotional, social, and economic, because misfortune in these 
areas is culturally viewed as a downward movement which, once begun, can 
seldom be arrested by the victim. 
As a lexical item, the expression "première chute" ("first fall") is an 
element of the récit. It reveals on that level that the narrator is privy, as we 
might expect, to what lies ahead for Gervaise. But it also points to an intent 
for us readers to know the future as well, and to be predisposed to think of it 
as a "fall." Thus a connection is made here too on the level of the histoire, 
between the tumble in the dirty linen and the subsequent degradations, all 
"sibling" effects of a common cause: "avachissement." But what is more 
remarkable is that, in their metaphorical connotations, the words evoke the 
novels structuring, a mythic intent on the part of the "author" to portray a 
moral fault and its consequences, and to reveal them as akin to the original 
sin and its aftermath. At this juncture, we are seeking the cause of this 
"fall" in the narration itself, in the "authors" plan for the work. Making an 
histoire conform to the structure of a preexisting myth is a way of reflect­
ing what Genettes definition calls the "real or fictive situation" in which 
the narrative "act" functions—a means of representing the narration. If, 
in the récit, this incident appears as an unprepared beginning, in the 
narration it has a "cause," which is an inferable intent, borne out by the 
remainder of the novel. 
But this "première chute" is neither the first nor the principal "fall" in 
the histoire: it contains an obvious allusion to Coupeau's earlier tumble from 
a rooftop, which appears superficially to be a partial cause of his subsequent 
moral decline. That physical fall, however, has itself no necessary cause; it 
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is, on the literal level, an accident. Coupeau is soldering a bonnet to a 
rooftop stovepipe, while Gervaise and little Nana wait for him on the 
sidewalk below: 
II souda, il cria à Gervaise: 
"Voilà, c'est fini . . . Je descends." 
Le tuyau auquel il devait adapter le chapiteau se trouvait au 
milieu du toit. Gervaise, tranquillisée, continuait à sourire en suivant 
ses mouvements. Nana, amusée tout d'un coup par la vue de son père, 
tapait dans ses mains. Elle s'était assise sur le trottoir pour mieux voir 
là-haut. 
"Papa! Papa! criait-elle de toute sa force; papa! Regarde donc!" 
Le zingueur voulut se pencher, mais son pied glissa. Alors, 
brusquement, bêtement, comme un chat dont les pattes s'embrou-
illent, il roula, il descendit la pente légère de la toiture, sans pouvoir se 
rattraper. 
"Nom de Dieu!" dit-il d'une voix étouffée. 
Et il tomba. Son corps décrivit une courbe molle, tourna deux 
fois sur lui-même, vint s'écraser au milieu de la rue avec le coup sourd 
d'un paquet de linge jeté de haut. (P. 688) 
(He soldered, then called out to Gervaise: 
"There, it's done . . . I'll be right down." 
The stovepipe to which he was to fit the bonnet was in the middle 
of the roof. Gervaise, her mind at ease now, kept smiling as she 
followed his movements. Nana, suddenly amused at seeing her father, 
was clapping her hands. She had sat down on the sidewalk to get a 
better look up at the roof. 
"Daddy! Daddy!" she was shouting at the top of her lungs; 
"Daddy! Look!" 
The roofer started to lean out, but his foot slipped. Then sud­
denly, stupidly, like a cat with its feet entangled, he rolled down the 
slightly sloping roof, without managing to get a handhold. 
"God damn it!" he said in a stifled voice. 
And he fell. His body described a gentle curve, turned over twice 
upon itself, and smashed down in the middle of the street with the 
dull thud of a laundry bundle tossed from a height.) 
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Analysis of the expressions of causality in this text reveals that known causes 
are related to Gervaise and Nana. Gervaise is "tranquillisée" by Coupeau's 
words, by his position in the middle of the roof, as Nana is "amusée" by the 
sight of her father perched high above; we even know for what purpose 
Nana has sat down. Her cry is obviously caused by her amusement, al­
though the text fails to make this connection explicit (parataxis), as we 
break away from the causal chain. Coupeau's decision to lean forward ap­
pears to be the result of his daughters appeal to "look" at her (parataxis 
again), so that the child's cry itself becomes an implied cause of the fall. 
Still, the action of leaning out is not of itself a sufficient cause; to demon­
strate that, the inferred author has carefully provided an earlier incident, 
when Coupeau leans quite safely toward the edge of the same roof to chat 
with Mme Boche below (p. 686). But this time, Coupeau's foot slips for no 
expressed reason, and if that error is surprising in an experienced roofer, it is 
perhaps no more surprising than the choice of simile: doubtless no animal 
is less likely to get its feet entangled than a cat—the inferred author is 
exercising his options to make unusual things happen. Coupeau's roll down 
the roof is situated temporally rather than causally ("Alors" rather than 
"Done"), and his inability to catch hold of a chimney pipe or even a ridge in 
the roofing, while stated, is unexplained. The reason for his oath is abun­
dantly clear (parataxis), but his fall through the air is connected to the 
tumble on the roof only by "Et": the events are narrated in detail, as if they 
had been permanently inscribed on the retina of some horrified onlooker, 
but the causal sequence remains unexpressed. This technique tends to reify 
the event for the reader, like an action seen in reality or on film. But it does 
not fully "textualize" the scene, nor mediate it as an interpreted whole; the 
event merely happened, whence its "accidental" quality. The sound of 
Coupeau's body striking the pavement like a bundle of laundry tends to 
resituate the event in the mind of Gervaise, the laundress. Is it Zola's 
narrator who chose to reify the incident for us, or have we been watching 
through Gervaise's eyes all along? This additional level of indeterminacy 
separates the fall still further from any underlying causal chain. 
If the narrartor (or Gervaise?) gives us no cause for the slip, we begin to 
look once more to the inferred author, to other events in the histoire. At the 
point where the explained worlds (Gervaise and her daughter) meet the 
unexplained, in Nana's call to her father, contributory responsibility for 
the fall appears to rest on Nana's tiny shoulders. Why? Why indeed is little 
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Nana even brought to the scene? It is her first visit to a work site, and only 
the second for superstitious Gervaise. Nana will, in the course of this 
volume, evolve into a nasty brat and a rather vicious adolescent; she will 
have her own novel, Nana, in which to expose her adult depravity. Her 
innocent cry, "Regarde donc!" as a contributing cause of Coupeaus misfor­
tune, seems, on the level of the histoire, an initial repetition, a sign of the 
magical evil already present in the little girl, the "mark of the beast," which 
will make of her a constant source of suffering for others. This reading is 
partially predetermined by Gervaise s expressed intuition, almost an occult 
"precognition" (pp. 686-88), that her presence or Nana s at a work site 
would provoke a fall. The inferred author seems to be preparing us for the 
action, hinting, if not at magical, at least at nonphysical causes for the 
accident. Beyond the existential realities, "son pied glissa. . .  . Et il 
tomba," we have a hint of the uncanny, and a suggestion of Nana s evil 
nature which will later, with no apparent cause, come to the surface. Since 
Coupeau is subsequently at a loss to explain his misstep (pointing out 
particularly that he had not drunk a drop of alcohol before ascending the 
roof, p. 693), the mythic and magic underpinnings hold the story line 
together far more effectively than observed cause and effect. Repetition and 
reader comparison (of Nana s evil deeds, of recurrences of the Fall motif) 
become, at this crucial juncture, the mortar of the story, replacing 
métonymie linkage. 
As for the result of Coupeaus four-story plunge to the street below, it 
involves a remarkable and unnecessary double implausibility. First, un­
believable as it may seem, Coupeau not only survives but recovers com­
pletely from his temporary injuries, returning for a time successfully to his 
work. Second, although mentally and physically fit for work, he lapses into 
idleness and alcoholism. These implausibilities are all the more amazing 
since a change in a single "event" of the histoire would have removed them 
both. Suppose the fall had left Coupeau partially incapacitated—a "bad 
back," a twisted hand, or a simple psychological fear of heights—and the 
miracle cure is obviated on the one hand, while on the other enforced 
idleness and self-doubt provide solid explanations for the newfound drink­
ing habit. If the inferred author chooses to put a "link" in his chain that fits 
poorly at both its ends, when metonymically adaptable links were readily 
available, he calls attention to metaphoric structure at the expense of the 
métonymie: it is easier to see the symbolic parallelism between the physical 
fall and the subsequent moral tumble than to trace precise causal relation­
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ships from one to the other. By exercise of an option, the inferred author is 
determining a metaphoric reading. 
So Coupeau is cured; Gervaise cares for him at home, where her love 
works its miracle and, incidentally, begins the "avachissement" which will 
lead to the "first fall" we observed earlier. The causal chain is more apparent 
on this level, although less obvious than it might have been, and it has two 
branches. 
On the one hand, Gervaise and Nana had come to the work site to 
meet the roofer in order to inspect together a storefront suitable for a 
laundry. Even after the accident, thanks to the Goujet loan, she goes ahead 
with her project. Having her own business produces in her an optimistic 
faith in future prosperity, although her husband is still convalescing. There 
is perhaps a certain hubris in going into debt to found a business in a rented 
shop with no other income to fall back upon. Like Coupeau on the rooftop 
(reader comparison again), Gervaise feels falsely at ease in a precarious 
position and thus may be riding for a fall. If so, the inferred authors choice 
of events might be an attempt to "prove," as a law, that overconfidence leads 
to disaster. 
On the other hand, by spoiling her injured husband at home and 
providing him with extra cash when he goes out, Gervaise appears to 
destroy in Coupeau all desire to work. In a sudden about-face, the virtual 
teetotaler begins drinking with the boys at the Assommoir, and his long 
slide into alcoholic stupor originates. While Gervaise s vague gâteries seem 
to be the primary cause, it is also possible that the inferred author presup­
poses in the roofer an alcoholic heredity. Coupeaus father had suffered an 
accident after drinking; for this reason, perhaps, Coupeau has shunned 
alcohol. His fall and the opportunity to drink are thus possibly all that is 
needed to cast him over the hereditary precipice. But neither the characters 
of L'Assommoir nor the narrator himself, whose language tends to identify 
him with the underclass, has the education necessary to explain the physi­
ology of alcoholism from the "raw data" provided by the inferred author.8 
We shall see the symptoms, the effects, including description in almost 
clinical detail of delirium tremens, but the causes are not adduced for us. 
As for Gervaise, it is indolence rather than alcohol that overcomes her. 
And carelessness in her work is soon accompanied by moral slovenliness. 
When Lantier returns during the saint's-day feast, and the besotted and 
spineless Coupeau ends up inviting the still jobless hatter to move in with 
them, there is another mouth for Gervaise to feed, in addition to Coupeau's 
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mother, now also living with them. Although the text points to this as a 
cause for their weakened finances, it must be noted that the children are 
soon off working as apprentices, so that the additional expense to feed 
Lantier would scarcely be disastrous. 
However, Gervaise quickly begins sleeping with Lantier again, on 
nights when Coupeau is too drunk to fulfill her needs, and the neighbor­
hood is at once abuzz with rumors that tarnish the little laundry's image. 
The narrative voice stresses Gervaise's laxity: 
Au milieu de cette indignation publique, Gervaise vivait tranquille, 
lasse et un peu endormie. Dans les commencements, elle s'était 
trouvée bien coupable, bien sale, et elle avait eu un dégoût d'elle-
même. Quand elle sortait de la chambre de Lantier, elle se lavait les 
mains. . . . Elle aurait voulu changer de peau en changeant d'homme. 
Mais, lentement, elle s'accoutumait. C'était trop fatigant de se débar­
bouiller chaque fois. Ses paresses l'amollissaient, son besoin d'être 
heureuse lui faisait tirer tout le bonheur possible de ses embête­
ments. . . . N'est-ce pas? pourvu que son mari et son amant fussent 
contents, que la maison marchât son petit train-train régulier, qu'on 
rigolât du matin au soir, tous gras, tous satisfaits de la vie et se la 
coulant douce, il n'y avait pas de quoi se plaindre. (Pp. 814—15) 
(In the midst of this public indignation, Gervaise lived on, tranquil, 
relaxed, and somewhat sleepy. In the beginning, she had considered 
herself very guilty, very dirty, and she had been disgusted with her­
self. Whenever she left Lantier s bedroom, she washed her hands. . . . 
She would have liked to change her skin when she changed men. But, 
slowly, she got used to it. It was too much of a bother to wash up every 
time. Her laziness was making her soft, and her need to be happy 
made her extract all the happiness she could from her little mis­
eries. . .  . So long as her husband and her lover were happy— 
right?—so long as the household merrily followed its little daily 
routine, so long as they laughed from morning till night, all fat, satis­
fied with life and taking it easy, there was nothing to complain about.) 
The evolution here described is from moral conduct to immoral conduct 
with guilt, to the same behavior without guilt. The major expressed causes 
for the disappearance of guilt are habit, laziness, and "her need to be 
happy," all of which produce in Gervaise a kind of sleepy lassitude, of 
indifference to public opinion, so long as the laundress knows her men are 
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happy. So the immediate causes are clear, and, in the following paragraph, 
Gervaise advances three more basic causes to explain her conduct: (1) when 
one has a filthy, drunken husband, one looks for "cleanliness" elsewhere; 
(2) since Lantier was her first and true "husband," "natural law" authorizes 
her conduct; and (3) everyone in the neighborhood is engaged in some sort 
of sexual irregularity. These may be mere excuses, but if Gervaise believes 
them, they can structure a sound causal chain of the sort one might expect 
to find in the works of a determinist. Once readers accept the initial 
avachissement, the downward slide becomes indeed inevitable. 
Yet the first two reasons for the moral collapse contain mythic ele­
ments. The cleanliness-purity theme is ubiquitous in Zola, and, in the later 
novels, such as Le Docteur Pascal, males can play the role of purifiers and 
redeemers of women, who, in the Rougon-Macquart novels, are often natu­
rally impure.9 The return to Lantier can thus be read as a misguided search 
for salvation. And in turning to her first lover, she turns to her "true" 
husband. In an astute analysis of this phenomenon in Zola, Jean Borie 
evokes imprinting: 
La défloraison n est pas pour Zola épisode futile et sans lendemain. Elle 
est, au contraire, prise d'amour pour l'éternité; elle a valeur de mythe 
et trouve sa place dans cette anthropologie imaginaire que nous es­
sayons de définir. Lorsqu'elle "se donne" pour la première fois, la 
femme absorbe, et garde en elle à jamais, sous forme d'empreinte, la 
virilité de l'homme qui l'a pénétrée.10 
(For Zola, deflowering is not a futile, inconsequential episode. It is, on 
the contrary, capture by love for eternity; it is endowed with mythic 
value and has its place in the imaginary anthropology we are trying to 
define. When she "gives herself" for the first time, a woman absorbs 
and keeps within her forever, in the form of an imprint, the virility of 
the man who penetrated her.) 
These two reasons taken together suggest that an "imaginary anthropol­
ogy" functions indeed as the root cause of the avachissement. 
For the third excuse, Gervaise proposes a primary cause as well: "Oui, 
oui," she says sarcastically, "quelque chose de propre que l'homme et la 
femme, dans ce coin de Paris, où l'on est les uns sur les autres, à cause de la 
misère" (p. 816); "Oh, sure; men and women lead real clean lives, in this 
corner of Paris, where we live on top of each other on account of poverty." 
Here we rejoin the myth of working-class Paris: poverty causes overcrowded 
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living conditions, which lead inevitably to sexual promiscuity. Uttered in 
defense of her conduct by a character with an ax to grind, none of the three 
reasons is an objective observation of causation in the story line. Readers 
will decide for themselves what to believe. But in the absence of privileged 
explanations from the narrator, and in view of the relative plausibility of 
these reasons as statements of the way Gervaise's mind works, acceptance of 
Gervaise's causal logic is tempting. If readers acquiesce, Zola's inferred 
author will have inserted both mythic and ideological causes at the origin of 
the mechanistic chain.11 
To explain how avachissement leads to ultimate destruction, the novel 
sets a final psychological cause in place: the joyous side of self-destruction, a 
kind of financial and physical death wish. As customers begin to fall away, 
as debts mount up while Coupeau and Lantier eat (and drink) Gervaise out 
of house and home, the narrator explains that "she was virtually inebriated 
by a rage for indebtedness; she drove herself dizzy, chose the most expensive 
items, gave free rein to her appetites, now that she couldn't pay" (p. 794; 
"elle était comme grisée par la fureur de la dette; elle s'étourdissait, 
choisissait les choses les plus chères, se lâchait dans sa gourmandise, depuis 
qu'elle ne payait plus"). This clear declaration about the psychology of 
credit might function as a "law." Indeed, when nearly all is lost, Gervaise 
returns to the pawn shop, and the narrator affirms: "she was in the grip of 
pawn-shop mania and would have shorn her head if she could have gotten a 
loan on her hair" (p. 821; "elle était prise de la rage du clou, elle se serait 
tondu la tête si on avait voulu lui prêter sur ses cheveux"). "La rage du clou" 
has the ring of a ready-made expression—pawn-shop mania—as if the 
desire to transform all stable, physical possessions into liquid assets, to feed 
upon and drink up one's own physical reality, were a well-known and 
catalogued disease. Like Rimbaud's greatcoat, which, through excessive 
wear, was "becoming ideal," so Gervaise's substance is joyously transformed 
into an abstraction: avachissement becomes self-manducation, until she 
eagerly asks the neighborhood undertaker to carry her away before she is 
dead (p. 929). Gilles Deleuze perceives the death wish as underlying all 
instinctual behavior in Zola, the absent cause, the void at the center 
of being: 
. . . c'était déjà cela, la découverte de Zola: comment les "gros appétits" 
gravitent autour de l'instinct de mort, comment ils fourmillent par 
une fêlure qui est celle de l'instinct de mort, . . . comment il con­
stitue à lui seul là grande hérédité, la fêlure.12 
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(. . . and this was already Zola's big discovery: how the "major ap­
petites" gravitate around the death instinct, how they swarm through 
the crack which is the death instinct, . . . how it alone constitutes the 
principal hereditary factor, the crack.) 
The joy of self-destruction finds perhaps its clearest objective correlative in 
the Assommoir bar. Here foregathers the gang with the colorful nick-
names—Mes-Bottes, Bibi-la-Grillade, Bec-Salé, also called Boit-sans-
Soif, Cadet-Cassis (Coupeau)—false names covering true identities like 
joy covering pain, lightheartedness concealing the fear of mortality. 
The horror-masked-by-gaiety of drinking is a kind of absent cause in 
the novel. 
Absent, that is, until Gervaise, when she too at last begins to drink, 
unmasks the horrible underside of the cozy tavern, in a famous passage: 
Elle se tourna, elle aperçut l'alembic, la machine à soûler, fonction­
nant sous le vitrage de l'étroite cour, avec la trépidation de sa cuisine 
d'enfer. Le soir, les cuivres étaient plus mornes, allumés seulement sur 
leur rondeur d'une large étoile rouge; et l'ombre de l'appareil, contre 
la muraille du fond, dessinait des abominations, des figures avec des 
queues, des monstres ouvrant leurs mâchoires comme pour avaler le 
monde. (P. 867) 
(She turned and caught sight of the still, the stupor machine, shudder­
ing under the glass roof of the narrow courtyard with the vibration of 
its hellish cookery. At night, the copper parts were darker, lighted 
only on their rounded bellies with a large red star; and the shadow the 
machine cast on the back wall conjured up abominable pictures, 
figures with tails, monsters opening their jaws as if to swallow the 
world.) 
With its causal à, the expression "machine à soûler" links drunkenness to a 
very mechanical, predictable cause. Although the text says nothing of it, 
readers may be aware that behind the machine lie the greed of the brandy 
merchants and perhaps the political motivations of the ruling class; in front 
of it, the universal death-thirst, activated among the masses by poverty. 
But, since the machine itself assumes in Gervaise's mind the gigantic 
proportions of Hell itself, whose purpose is to "swallow the world," the 
sociological causes for the existence of the machine seem subsumed in it, so 
that the evil of society, whatever the reader perceives that to be, appears to 
function like a machine, predetermined by some occult, demonic force. We 
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have seen the Fall, and it has taken us straight to Hell. The linguistic 
transformation of definable sociological ills into Satanic forces leaves the 
reader free to invent plausible sociological causes, while at the same time 
that invention is determined and limited by the infernal metaphor. Zola's 
inferred author, abetted by a narrator with limited insight, leaves gaps and 
indeterminacies in the causal chain on the diegetic level, but he binds the 
story together on the exegetic plane through metaphor and symbol. Pri­
mary causes remain unexplained, but they are replaced by magic (Coupeaus 
fall from the roof as préfiguration; mythic anthropology at the origin of 
avachissement) or demonic powers (the maleficent force in Nana and the 
brandy makers hellish still). 
As if to stress the superhuman force of the demons at work in the 
narrative, the inferred author gives both to Gervaise and to Coupeau the 
means to avoid their slide to oblivion. Two incidents provide escape 
hatches; although they fail to crawl through them, the possibility to do so 
was presented, so that the downfall is inevitable only if mystical or deep 
psychological forces made it impossible for them to see and profit from their 
opportunities. 
After Coupeaus convalescence, he takes a roofing job well south of 
Paris, in Etampes: 
. . . et là il fit près de trois mois, sans se soûler, guéri un moment par 
l'air de la campagne. . . . A son retour, il était frais comme une rose, 
et il apportait quatre cents francs, avec lesquels ils payèrent les deux 
termes arriérés de la boutique . . . ainsi que d'autres petites dettes du 
quartier. . .  . (P. 844) 
(. . . and there he put in nearly three months, without getting drunk, 
cured for a time by the country air. . . . When he got back, he was 
fresh as a daisy, and he brought home four hundred francs, with which 
they made the two back payments on the shop . . . and settled other 
little debts in the neighborhood. . . .) 
This favorable sign should have sent the couple scurrying to live in the 
provinces, where the healthful conditions and a modicum of available work 
would have kept them afloat, far from the Parisian demons. 
Perhaps more surprising is Gervaises failure to accept the offer of 
young Goujet, to whom she is visibly attracted. Coupeau is drinking, 
Lantier is back, and the laundry business is poor. Goujet, a skilled, indus­
trious, and prosperous smith, one day gathers his courage and asks Gervaise 
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to run off with him (pp. 7 9 8 - 9 9 )  . He could get a job in Belgium, and they 
could make a new start together. Her refusal, essentially on moral grounds, 
seems to run counter to the avachissement which has her in its grip: 
"Ce serait très mal . .  . Je suis mariée, n'est-ce pas? J'ai des en­
fants. . . . nous aurions des remords, nous ne goûterions pas de 
plaisir. . . . Quand on reste honnête, dans notre position, on est 
joliment récompensé. . . ." (P. 799) 
("It would be a very evil thing to do . .  . I'm a married woman, you 
know. I have children. . . . we'd feel remorse; we'd get no plea­
sure. . . . When you stay honorable, in our position, you're very well 
rewarded. . . .") 
The last sentence is surely not ironic in Gervaise's mind, but one can 
question the deep-seated sincerity of her moral judgments. Perhaps she is 
being "moral" to save Goujet from going down with her: "I'm very fond of 
you too," she says, "too fond to let you do stupid things. And this would be 
a stupid thing, of course . . .  " ("Moi aussi, j'éprouve de l'amitié pour vous, 
j'en éprouve trop pour vous laisser commettre des bêtises. Et ce seraient des 
bêtises, bien sûr . . . "). Perhaps she is simply too avachie to envisage such a 
radical change in her life. It might be that a (supernaturally inspired?) 
passion for Lander is holding her back, or even that she has truly been taken 
in by the moral preachments which the rich use to keep the poor in their 
place. The indeterminacy of cause, here again arising from the fact that an 
interested character gives the only explanation, leaves thus yet another gap 
in the causal chain of the novel. Given a glimpse of a happier life, both 
Coupeau and Gervaise elect to remain in their ruinous situation. Readers 
are left to seek the reasons in demonic forces, or in their psychological 
correlative, la fêlure. 
Instead of the freedom to interpret we found behind the gaps in the 
récit of Gide s La Porte étroite, we discover here a mythic substratum with its 
own metonymy. The problem is to determine whether this mythic causal 
chain is a referent of the tale, a part of its histoire, or whether it expresses an 
intent of the narration. If Gervaise, despite her initial gumption and her 
later opportunities, is foredoomed, is it because of social ills and a psycho­
logical flaw, present in the histoire, or because of an intent in the narration to 
illustrate a theory of supernatural causation and to work through a modern 
esthetic of the tragic? Readers may reach differing conclusions, but the 
major reversal in the text points to the importance of the intent ofnarration. 
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3. The chiasmic reversal. In the rise and fall of Gervaise Macquart, the 
conjunction of mythic and esthetic causation is nowhere more obvious than 
in the reversal inherent in her relationship to Virginie, the sister of her rival 
for Lantier, Adèle. The first time we see them together, in a public laundry, 
they engage in a brutal physical combat from which Gervaise emerges 
triumphant. Virginie is mysteriously present when little Claude and 
Etienne arrive to inform their mother of Lantier's departure, and Mme 
Boche guesses at the reason: "Elle rit de vous voir pleurer, cette sans-coeur, 
là-bas. . . . Elle a emballé les deux autres et elle est venue ici leur raconter 
la tête que vous feriez," (p. 617); "She's getting a laugh out of seeing you 
cry, that heartless beast over there. . . . She got the two of them going, and 
now she's here so she can tell them all about the expression on your face." If 
Mme Boche is right, Virginie, who shares the one-room flat where Adèle 
receives Lantier, would thus act as a major contributing cause of the initial 
event, having inspired the Lantier-Adèle affair. But the transitivity that 
runs through "a emballé," as a part of a character's speech, comes from the 
inferred author; the speech itself is an "event" which could be situated in its 
own causal chain. If readers perceive Virginie as the primal urge, the evil 
force that gets the narrative moving, it is the inferred author, rather than 
the narrator, who has instigated the interpretation. 
The fight begins when Gervaise perceives Virginie's taunting stare: 
Quand elle aperçut devant elle Virginie, au milieu de trois ou quatre 
femmes, parlant bas, la dévisageant, elle fut prise d'une colère folle. 
Les bras en avant, cherchant par terre, tournant sur elle-même, dans 
un tremblement de tous ses membres, elle marcha quelques pas, 
rencontra un seau plein, le saisit à deux mains, le vida à toute volée. 
"Chameau, va!" cria la grande Virginie. (P. 617) 
(When she caught sight of Virginie standing in front of her in the 
midst of three or four other women, speaking in low tones, staring at 
her, a wild rage took hold of her. Stretching out her arms, feeling 
around on the ground, turning in circles, trembling from head to toe, 
she took a few steps, came upon a full bucket, picked it up with both 
hands, and hurled its contents with all her might. 
"You stupid ass!" cried big Virginie.) 
In an almost Gidean way, the expression of causality begins by hiding 
behind a temporal mask ("Quand" for "Parce que") and lurking in parti­
ciples ("parlant bas, la dévisageant"). The passive voice ("fut prise") avoids 
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an opportunity for direct attribution of cause. The narrativity flows through 
the inevitable causal verbs, of course, but parataxis intervenes between the 
thrown water (we will learn only later that it struck Virginie s feet) and the 
result: Virginie s insult. The links are there, but this is scarcely the style of a 
narrator seeking to express the workings of natural laws through obvious 
causal chains. Violent actions abound in the fight, which is described in 
lurid detail—clawing, drenching, ripping away of clothing—but the psy­
chological forces that engender them remain unnamed. Superficially, they 
are obvious, but upon encountering the reversal, the reader will need to 
return to this passage and infer some unexpressed relationships. 
Why does Gervaise win? Struck on the arm with a laundry paddle, she 
summons an unnamed force: her strength is suddenly multiplied "ten 
fold." Stripping her opponent, she succeeds at last in applying the paddle, 
repeatedly and vigorously, to Virginie s bare buttocks, humiliating her in 
her sex itself. The reader can infer the combination of hatred, pain, and 
frustrated sexual desire that underlies this violence, caused (supposedly, 
mysteriously) by Virginie s instigation of Lantier s departure and by her 
subsequent taunts. In the light of the later reversal, Gervaise s brutality 
here will appear to be the sadistic half of a sadomasochistic rite, of which the 
masochistic portion will be played out, with startling symmetry, near the 
end of the novel. 
Gervaise s degrading service in Virginie s fine-food grocery and sweet-
shop at the close of the work constitutes the obvious reversal. Virginie has 
acquired the very storefront in which Gervaise ran her unsuccessful laundry; 
she has taken Lantier along with the shop; and she has reduced Gervaise to 
scrubbing floors in the transformed store. It is tempting to seek a causal 
chain between the two humiliations. Quite probably, Virginie is still har­
boring a grudge when she encounters Gervaise, apparently by chance, in a 
stairway, many years after the fight, although that is never stated as fact and 
can only be inferred in light of subsequent events. Gervaise at first expects 
to be struck across the face with the mackerel her old enemy is carrying: 
Mais non. Virginie eut un mince sourire. Alors la blanchisseuse, dont 
le panier bouchait l'escalier, voulut se montrer polie. 
"Je te demande pardon, dit-elle. 
—Vous êtes toute pardonnée", répondit la grande brune. 
Et elles restèrent au milieu des marches, elles causèrent, raccom­
modées du coup, sans avoir risqué une seule allusion au passé. (P. 736) 
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(But no. Virginie gave a meager smile. Then the laundress, whose 
basket was blocking the stairway, determined to be polite. 
"I beg your pardon," she said. 
"And pardoned you are," the big brunette replied. 
And there they stood, in the middle of the stairs, chatting, 
friends again on the spot, without having risked a single allusion to 
the past.) 
No indication of ill will from Virginie, no explanation of Gervaise's sudden 
decision to be polite. This is a critical juncture, and mysterious forces are at 
work: suddenly and without explanation, the two women are fast friends. 
A frequent visitor to the laundry, Virginie apparently contrives to 
whet its proprietress's appetite for Lantier by talking of him often. Shortly 
thereafter, when Lantier reenters Gervaise's life, readers may wonder if he 
did so on Virginie's urging. It is difficult to infer that Virginie is plotting 
from the outset to take over Gervaise's storefront, since the laundry's failure 
is at this juncture far from a foregone conclusion, and since it is Lantier 
himself who, later on, encourages the brunette to take this action (p. 826). 
Yet unmentioned forces seem to be conspiring, from the meeting in the 
stairwell onward, to bring about the reversal of fortunes. The purchase of 
the lease to the shop is dependent, for example, on an "inheritance" which 
Virginie had fortuitously received from an aunt, and which is revealed only 
late in the tale (p. 826). No law of nature decrees that schemers inherit the 
wherewithal to accomplish their machinations: less natural powers are 
seemingly at work. 
And so it appears particularly noteworthy that Gervaise and the nar­
rator are in remarkable agreement about the fact that Virginie's acquisition 
of the shop and her subsequent humiliation of the former laundress therein 
constitute a "vengeance." When the brunette seeks, through Lantier, 
to acquire the store, Gervaise's hostile reaction is reported in free in­
direct style: 
Non, non, jamais! Elle avait toujour douté du coeur de Virginie: si 
Virginie ambitionnait la boutique, c'était pour l'humilier. Elle l'au-
rait cédée peut-être à la première femme dans la rue, mais pas à cette 
grande hypocrite qui attendait certainement depuis des années de lui 
voir faire le saut. Oh! ça expliquait tout. Elle comprenait à présent 
pourquoi les étincelles jaunes s'allumaient dans les yeux de chat de 
cette margot. Oui, Virginie gardait sur la conscience la fessée du 
lavoir, elle mijotait sa rancune dans la cendre. (P. 827) 
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(No, no, never! She had always doubted Virginie's affection: if Virginie 
had her eye on the shop, it was just to humiliate her. Maybe she would 
have let it go to the first woman in the street, but not to that big 
hypocrite who had surely been waiting around for years to watch her 
go off the cliff. Oh, that explained everything! Now she understood 
why the yellow sparks were glinting in that chatterbox's catlike eyes. 
Yes, Virginie Jiad never forgotten the paddling in the laundry, sim­
mering her grudge over the coals.) 
Much later, when circumstances have reduced Gervaise to scrubbing floors 
in what had been "her" shop, while Lantier and the new proprietress look 
on, the narrator describes the scene: 
Et tous les deux, le chapelier et l'épicière, se carraient davantage, 
comme sur un trône, tandis que Gervaise se traînait à leurs pieds, dans 
la boue noire. Virginie devait jouir, car ses yeux de chat s'éclairèrent 
un instant d'étincelles jaunes, et elle regarda Lantier d'un sourire 
mince. Enfin ça la vengeait de l'ancienne fessée du lavoir, qu'elle avait 
toujours gardée sur la conscience! (P. 890) 
(And both of them, the hatter and the proprietress of the sweet-shop, 
struck a still more pompous pose, as if on a throne, while Gervaise 
dragged herself around at their feet, in the black slop. Virginie must 
have been getting a thrill, for her catlike eyes gleamed for an instant 
with yellow sparks, and she looked at Lantier with a meager smile. 
This at last avenged her of the old paddling in the laundry, which she 
had never forgotten!) 
Both passages explicitly declare the existence of a causal relationship be­
tween the paddling in the laundry and Gervaise s humiliation. But both 
also put in question the competence of the speaker to make such a judg­
ment. In the first text, "elle avait toujours douté du coeur de Virginie" is 
surely one of those lies we tell ourselves to cover the shame of being taken by 
surprise: Gervaise, who "comprenait à present " appears to have been com­
pletely taken in and to have uncovered the causal connection after the fact. 
In the second text, the narrator, although potentially omniscient, admits 
his uncertainty about Virginie's emotions ("devait jouir") and his need to 
judge on the basis of exterior signs. The causal connection of a preplanned 
vengeance appears virtually certain, but its certainty resides less in the 
affirmations than in those remarkable exterior signs and in the astounding 
6o • Rectilinear Causality in Narrative 
conjunction, across 63 pages of text, between the vocabulary of Gervaise 
and of the narrator. 
The verb "jouir," used as it is without complement in the second 
passage, is invested with quasi-orgasmic connotations. The exterior signs of 
this "thrill" are given as the "yellow sparks" in Virginie's eyes and her 
"meager smile." The presence of the yellow sparks in the earlier passage 
marks the beginning of this sexual victory, which culminates in Virginie s 
seduction of Lantier, in a time anterior to the attempt to acquire the shop. 
The "meager smile" sends us all the way back to the meeting on the stairs 
(p. 736): repeated vocabulary unites the passages, preparing the reversal far 
more clearly and effectively than obvious causation. 
But the lexical coincidence ("yeux de chat," "étincelles jaunes," 
"garder sur la conscience," "fessée du lavoir") does more than unify the sec­
ond Virginie segment as a prepared vengeance. The narrators corroboration 
of Gervaise s hindsight tends to validate it, of course, to make us believe 
in a planned connection between the two humiliations. But the choice of 
identical words functions also to unite the two speakers, Gervaise—the 
creature of the inferred author—and the narrator. For Gervaise—her sud­
den strength, her later weakness, her long-term love for Lantier, her be­
lated hatreds—all are the work of the inferred author. When her language 
coincides with the narrators, inferred author and narrator unite; the nar­
rative at that point conjoins them: from a causal viewpoint, both are "the 
author," or at least all the movements and decisions in the text which we 
can read as "authorial presence." 
This is another way of saying that the vengeance, the reversal, occurs 
on the level of the narration. By itself (and despite Zola's affirmations in Le 
Roman expérimental about subservience to the laws of nature), the notion that 
a novel is what its "author" makes it is, in causal systems, a truism. But 
"authors"—whether you define them as individual human wills or pervad­
ing sociocultural megatexts—can provide in the discourse credible causes 
for their events or leave literal causation implausible or indeterminate. The 
récit of L'Assommoir does the latter, leaving the reader to seek explanations 
on other levels. 
It is thus possible, for example, to read the two Virginie segments as 
"testing events," of the sort we observed in Gide, measuring Gervaise's 
power as she is rising and her weakness as she falls. Or, structurally, we may 
infer in the text an esthetic desire for symmetry. Or the reversal, in the 
repeated evocation of Virginie's feline eyes momentarily alive with yellow 
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glints, can revive the symbolical, like the repeated "fall." Virginie has the 
traits of a sorceress who, with evil eye, can change the lives of others.13 As 
Satan's minion, she could be the dynamic behind all that happens, giving 
the novel a unified and tragic structure. Gervaise's initial flaw: sexuality, 
living with Lantier. Her punishment: abandonment. Her cardinal sin: 
rejecting the punishment, fighting against fate (the conquest of Virginie, 
rising in the social hierarchy). Whence the Fall: avachissement. The diabolic 
order of the world is restored: Virginie is re-enthroned, and Gervaise, 
converted and assenting to her fate, is hounded willingly to her death. In 
the absence of the Freudian vocabulary of sadomasochism, unavailable to 
this text, such supernatural correlatives construct a mythic chain of causa­
tion to obliterate the gaps in the mechanistic one. 
But our purpose is neither to propose nor to defend a single "co­
herent" reading of the text. It is not the doughnut but the hole, so to 
speak, that has been our focus, and the ways in which breaks and weak­
nesses in the causal chain bring the reader into contact, no longer with the 
récit, but with histoire and narration. For the text seems to expect that 
a causally coherent reading will be sought. It provides causally linked 
métonymie structures, either at the level of histoire or narration, and it 
offers gaps in the literal récit, thus inviting the readers creative participa­
tion in "constructing" the novel. If one believes that the Satanic forces 
mentioned have as their referents "real" psychological or social tendencies 
demonstrably present in Gervaise's and Coupeau's world, then causal link­
ing functions in the histoire; if they are read as "occult" references, sym­
bolic of novel structure, the métonymie linking is in the narration. Causa­
tion may be read either at the level of "story" or of "production-of-story. " 
Table 3.1 lists some of the primary options, by level, at key points where 
the gaps make them evident. 
The conjoining of fragments that is reading reflects symmetrically the 
fragmentation that is writing. One can scarcely assume on the part of a 
traditional writer an "intent" to fragment, for fragmentation is inherent in 
language {récit) and in "events" {histoire) arbitrarily perceived as such. But 
when major changes in character—from energy and ambition to avachisse-
ment—are not explicitly explained (Michel's conversations with Ménalque 
in L'lmmoraliste suggest more clearly the reasons for Michel's "downward 
slide"), when unnecessary implausibilities, like Coupeau's complete recov­
ery from a four-story fall, invade the causal chain, the reader can infer, with 
respect to reality-referential texts, that narrative options are being exercised 
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Table 3.1 
1. Lander's departure 
2. Coupeaus fall 
3. Coupeaus miracu­
lous recovery 
4. Coupeaus inability 
to profit from cure 
5. Gervaises ava­
chissement 
6. Virginies triumph 
7. Gervaises ruin and 
death 
EXPLANATION, BY LEVEL 
(explicit in récit; possible inferences for 
histoire and narration) 
Récit: Not fully explained. 
Histoire: Virginies evil machinations? 
Narration: Textual manipulation to prepare 
reversal? 
Récit: Unexplained. 
Histoire: Nanas evil nature? 
Narration: Textual manipulation for creation of 
symbol? 
Récit: Implausible. 
Histoire: Gervaise's love conquers Fate? 
Narration: Textual manipulation to reveal 
mythic substratum of Coupeaus decline? 
Récit: Questionable. 
Histoire: Satanic (psychological?) forces? 
Narration: Textual manipulation for tragic 
structure? 
Récit: Poverty, overcrowding, imprinting for 
first lover, need for pleasure. 
Histoire: Satanic (psychological?) forces? Death 
wish? 
Narration: "Hubris" for tragic structure? 
Récit: Fortuitous inheritance; Gervaise's capitu­
lation as laundry fails. 
Histoire: Virginies evil "magic"? 
Narration: Textual manipulation to achieve 
reversal? 
Récit: Avachissement, starvation, exposure. 
Histoire: Gervaises death wish? 
Narration: Textual manipulation to complete 
tragedy? 
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for extradiegetic reasons. Using causal logic, readers can then seek to infer, 
from their effects, the reasons for the choices made. 
Since causation functions across many pages in L'Assommoir (the "first 
fall" is a distant precursor of Gervaises fate, and the chiasmic reversal near 
the end imposes the rereading-as-cause of the initial Virginie segment), a 
constant dynamic appears, in retrospect, to have inhabited the story from 
one end to the other. The mythic dimension of the novel, springing from 
symbols and repetitions, also implies a permanent dynamic, an inevitable 
flow of causal forces. Reading metaphorically is a relatively static experi­
ence, viewing a highway from a high, hovering helicopter. Reading 
metonymically is seeing the same highway from a motorcycle at seventy 
miles per hour (one good crack in the pavement can be fatal). Readers tend 
where possible, I think, to take the helicopter. Thus L'Assommoir attains its 
"anti-Gidean" appearance of constant, inevitable causality. It is only an 
appearance, but when there are gaps in which we can employ our creativity, 
L'Assommoir limits more stringently, with symbols, the kinds of connec­
tions we can make than does, for example, La Porte étroite. As Michel Serres 
points out of the whole Rougon-Macquart family tree: "Le mythe . . . rend 
connexes des variétés locales déchirées. Il noue des carrefours. . .  . Il en­
jambe une faille. Il coud les lèvres des crevasses. Fait du haillon une 
tunique."14 ("Myth . . . brings broken-off local varieties into connection. 
It binds crossroads together. . .  . It straddles a fault line. It sews up the lips 
of crevasses. Makes the tattered rag a tunic") 
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Causal Chains and 
Textualization: Zola's 
La Bête humaine 
C'est pourquoi, hors le feu, j'ai tenu à la Bête humaine: construite sur un jeu 
ouvert, elle compte parmi les oeuvres qui rompent cet état cyclique et font 
éclater la clôture. Jeu de hasard et feu aléatoire, état nouveau de la 
systématique. 
(That is why, short of putting my hand in the fire, I have clung to La Bete 
humaine: constructed on an open game, it is one of the works which break 
that cyclical state and burst the bonds of closure. Game of chance and 
aleatory fire: a new state of systematics.) 
MICHEL SERRES 
Beginning, as it were, with a "gap," La Bête humaine1 (written 1888—90, published serially in 1889—90) illustrates Zola's "other side," with a most tightly linked causal system. Its protagonist, 
Jacques Lantier, is supposedly the second son of Gervaise and her good-for-
nothing hatter, although, in L'Assommoir', there is no son between Claude 
and Etienne.2 After that initial inconsistency, the novel constructs a num­
ber of tightly woven and interconnected causal chains that tie each event to 
the next explicitly—across occasional implausibilities, the role of which we 
will explore—with all the rigor of a laboratory experiment. Zola's concept 
of the "experimental novel" involves, of course, a major sophism or two, of 
which he was doubtless aware at the time of publication of Le Roman 
expérimental, if only through the critique of his friend Céard.3 Zola writes, 
for example, in his theoretical essay, after quoting Claude Bernard on 
controlled experimentation: 
Eh bien! en revenant au roman, nous voyons également que le roman­
cier est fait d'un observateur et d'un expérimentateur. L'observateur 
chez lui donne les faits tels qu'il les a observés, pose le point de départ, 
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établit le terrain solide sur lequel vont marcher les personnages et se 
développer les phénomènes. Puis l'expérimentateur paraît et institue 
l'expérience, je veux dire fait mouvoir les personnages dans une histoire 
particulière, pour y montrer que la succession des faits y sera telle que 
l'exige le déterminisme des phénomènes mis à l'étude.4 
(Well then, returning to the novel, we note that the novelist too is 
made up of an observer and an experimenter. The observer in him 
gives the facts as he has observed them, fixes the point of departure, 
and establishes the solid ground on which the characters will move and 
the phenomena develop. Then the experimenter appears and launches 
the experiment; I mean, he makes the characters move in a particular 
story, to demonstrate therein that the succession of facts will occur just 
as the determinism of the phenomena under study requires.) 
And he adds, in reference to the experimental novelist: "He has set out from 
a position of doubt in order to reach absolute knowledge; he will not cease 
doubting until the mechanism of passion, taken apart and put back to­
gether by him, functions according to the laws established by nature." ("II 
est parti du doute pour arriver à la connaissance absolue; il ne cessera de 
douter que lorsque le méchanisme de la passion, démontée et remontée par 
lui, fonctionne selon les lois fixées par la nature.")5 
The obvious logical problems posed by these declarations and others 
like them are a trifle embarrassing. First, while experimental science has 
among its goals the defining of those constant relationships that we call 
"laws of nature," and which allow us to predict and control events, a 
definition of "the laws established by nature" and of the "determinism" of 
phenomena is a precondition of the novelist's "experiment," not its conclu­
sion, for the obvious conformity of novelistic phenomena to these laws is its 
aim. "Absolute knowledge" must therefore precede the absolute knowledge 
which is the writers demonstration: not only the existence but the knowl­
edge of "causal laws" is a foregone conclusion. Second, these sentences 
express an abiding faith in the constancy of causal relationships. A remark­
able number of unchangeables conjoin in these texts, from the "solid 
ground" on which the characters walk, the environment that will interact 
with their heredity (as if a natural environment would really "hold still" 
long enough for a replicable sociological experiment), to the "determinism" 
of the phenomena themselves, to the "mechanism" of passion, so that even 
the moving parts of the experiment ("marcher," "se développer" ) achieve a 
kind of stasis, like that of immutable scientific truth. Third, of course, if it 
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is the experimenter in the novelist who "makes the characters move," it is 
not the laws of nature that do so. 
Critics have long questioned the ability of historical texts to represent 
the reality of history. Fredric Jameson has perhaps pushed the argument a 
step further; his formulation holds: 
. . . that history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but 
that, as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, 
and that our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes 
through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political 
unconscious.6 
It would be hard to find a more succinct statement of the problem: phenom­
enon and text do not belong to the same species, as it were, so that a gap 
exists between any real event and the account thereof ("absent cause," and 
the neologisms in "-ization" indicating transformation); the words "text" 
and "narrative" evoke a grammatical linking of semantic elements, while 
their negation suggests the absence of any such clear linkage among real 
phenomena; knowledge is associated with "text" and not with the real 
("inaccessible to us"), so that observation itself, as conceived by Zola in Le 
Roman expérimental, may seem a doubtful enterprise. Jamesons formulation 
further implies that, whether textualization takes the form of a history 
book, a novel, or simply a mental construct, the apparent laws of nature are 
actually a reflection of the rules of grammar. Here we may join with Valéry 
in stating that no possible formal or technical distinction can be drawn 
between written history and written mimetic fiction, and in adding that 
the "admirable causality" of which some historians (and novelists) seek to 
persuade us depends essentially on the talents of the writer and on the 
readers critical resistance.7 
La Bête humaine is a laboratory of textualization. Zola's "observer" 
plays grosso modo the role of our "narrator": his "experimenter," that of our 
"inferred author." Their interaction can tell us little about the "laws" that 
govern the physical and psychological world in which we live, but it can 
reveal with striking precision what happens to the idea of causality when it 
is expressed. The very quantity of tight causal chains (in which A causes B, 
which causes C, etc.) permits comparison of several kinds of causal logic and 
of causal problems, so that the concepts of "known" and "expressed" 
causality are put in doubt on rational grounds. Indeed, Zola's conclusion 
here seems to approach Jameson's. 
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The text raises questions about the role of an observer-explainer-
narrator when the implausible, despite all, happens. It points to the struc­
tural and formal role causal chains assume in narrative, and to the dual 
nature they thus acquire as representatives of the "real" and as fictional 
functions, exemplifying a theatrical ambiguity akin to that of the real actor 
or real prop in a fictional play. The novel shows random, aleatory events 
intervening to influence the course of causation, so that reported causality 
loses its function as a predictor. Indeed prediction is at times easier here on 
the level of narration than on the level of the histoire: causation functions as a 
predictor for the text better than it does as a predictor for the events the text 
recounts. 
Zola's sketch-notes for the preparation of this novel suggest that con­
struction of the causal chains posed serious difficulties for him.8 His first 
problem was to invent two interconnected murders. Then he expressed a 
desire to work into that fabric the notion of murder by heredity—a homi­
cidal maniac whose genes would predispose him to kill. He wished to 
include a description of the judicial system at work, and a portrayal of life 
on the railroad ("l'administration du chemin de fer, le poème d'une grande 
ligne, avec le milieu de la compagnie"—"the railroad administration, the 
poetry of a main line, with the social atmosphere of the company"), all 
without distracting interest from the central notion, the hereditary killer. 
"Le besoin de tuer et de tuer une femme," he notes. "Mais comme cela 
s'arrange mal avec le reste, comme cela est difficile à s'arranger!"9 ("The 
need to kill, and to kill a woman. But how poorly that jibes with the rest, 
how hard that is to jibe!"). These difficulties led perhaps to the emphasis on 
causality in the work, to the discovery of the complexities of causal systems, 
in which the same apparent cause can produce, in several instances, several 
different results. Zola's approach to the problems led him as well to the 
construction of an inside-out detective story, in which we see the crimes 
from the standpoint of the perpetrators, only to discover at last the logical 
reasons why the detective, in possession of all the physical evidence, must 
nonetheless reconstruct the causal chains all wrong. Denizet's erroneous 
reconstruction of the crimes provides the clearest definition in the work of 
the distinction between real and textualized causation. 
When readers set out to trace a causal chain, they must begin with a 
state of affairs they select as a final effect. One may write that A causes B 
causes C causes D, but, since no logic leads ineluctably from A to D , one 
will have to begin with D and work backward to construct the chain. 
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Denizet, like us, faces this difficulty; as Nietzsche pointed out, in this sense 
the eflFect precedes the cause. The corollary holds that authors must work in 
the same way: to construct a causally coherent sequence, one must plan 
from effect to cause in antichronological order. Then, for mimetic value, 
since life seems to evolve from cause to effect without such preplanning, the 
narrator must "perceive" and relate the events in reverse (i.e., chronologi­
cal) order.10 The ambiguity of "to relate" ("to narrate" and "to connect") was 
never more evident: events can only be related backward, so that they can 
subsequently be related forward.u 
Furthermore, in an uncontrolled, open system, it is usually reductive 
to speak of A as the cause of B. Observation of reality suggests a multitude 
of interrelated conditions, INUS or not, that allow for and produce B. 
Criminal justice traditionally proposes three conditions for willed human 
actions: means, motive, and opportunity. (This system is also reductive: 
what constitutes means for one person does not for another, does not for 
the same person at another time. And, since the three must coexist at the 
moment of the action, timing is a factor; while means and motive may or 
may not persist, opportunity is usually presumed to be momentary, al­
though that is not always so.) If we assume these three conditions as 
cause, each condition may be the result of an action itself having three (or 
more) conditions, so that reasoning backward from "effect" to "cause" 
should produce, not a chain, but a branching tree, in whose foliage an 
observer would soon be lost. As narrator, his situation would be hopeless, 
for language is not suited to tracing simultaneous, sinuous interconnec­
tions, as twigs move to branches to trunk: there is perhaps no better 
demonstration of these limits of causal narration than Michel Butors De­
gré. In addition to the distinction created by the fact that logical order is 
antichronological, textualization of cause and effect requires simplifica­
tion. To construct a causal chain, rather than a causal "tree," one must 
eliminate all but the most important conditions of an event. The narrator 
of La Bête humaine performs such reductive judgments about what is im­
portant, which brings him at last, theoretically at least, into conflict with 
the author: how hard indeed all that is to "jibe"! To examine Zola's "de­
construction" of causal logic, we shall observe its workings in the follow­
ing examples: the special case of the Misard chain; a typical linear chain 
(Flore); chains constructed in parallel, by character (Lantier, Séverine, Rou­
baud), and by primary conditions (love triangles); and finally the Denizet 
reconstruction. 
70 • Rectilinear Causality in Narrative 
i. The Misard chain. Phasie s inheritance is the initial stative event, 
and her decision to hide the money somewhere in the house or yard, rather 
than to share it with Misard, her sniveling, little second husband, sets the 
chain in motion. His attempt at extortion, slowly poisoning Phasie by 
secret means, turns the action back upon itself to form a remarkably "cir­
cular" or "reciprocal" chain between two secrets: old Phasie growing ever 
sicker, seeking the source of the poison in her diet, and old Misard, fran­
tically searching every cranny of the house to find a thousand francs. But 
fear and greed are only the initial motive force: it soon becomes a classic test 
of wills, in which the obstinacy of one partner feeds the stubbornness of the 
other, until desire to "win" completely replaces the money as the systems 
dynamic. The pair is bonded in a life-and-death struggle fueled by a petty 
but almost superhuman determination. 
The transitivity of the chain flows back and forth, from Phasie to 
Misard, from Misard to Phasie, in a closed causal system. None of this 
energy can escape directly to drive the central plots of the novel. What then 
is the function of this chain in the economy of the story? First, as a special 
case of causation, it points, in contrast to the more open, linear chains, to 
the existence of different kinds of causal relationships, thus designating 
causality as a theme of the novel. Second, as an example of pair bonding 
through exchange, it reflects by similarity other relationships based on 
exchange—the central Séverine-Lantier bonding, for example. Passion can 
feed upon passion as determination upon determination. 
Third, without providing direct energy to other causal chains, the Mi-
sard system stands in tangential relationship to the major lines of narrative 
force. Living at la Croix-de-Maufras, the Misards are located right on the 
main-line railroad tracks between Paris and Le Havre, on which Misard 
works as a signalman, while Phasie s daughter Flore is a crossing guard. 
Indeed, as we are learning of the circular chain through Phasie's explanation 
to Jacques of her hideous marital situation, the narrator often interrupts her 
tale (pp. 49-53) with descriptions of Misard and Flore performing their 
duties just outside the window. The circularity of the two opposing obstina­
cies that define the ménage is juxtaposed to the linearity of the tracks and of 
the trains that thunder straight down them. Insofar as the trains themselves 
may be taken as symbolic for the causal forces, social and political, driving 
the anonymous masses ("flots de foule," p. 52) of French society toward war 
(p. 297), the circular and the linear can be taken as models for the tangential 
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relationship of personal to social realities. At the end of her account of Mi-
sard s murderous cruelty, Phasie unites her conception of human bestiality 
with the marvelous invention of the steam-powered locomotive: "Oh, it's a 
fine invention, there's no denying. We're going fast, getting smarter. . . . 
But savage beasts are still savage beasts; even if they invent still fancier 
machines, there'll still be savage beasts on board" (p. 53; "Ah! c'est une 
belle invention, il n'y a pas à dire. On va vite, on est plus savant. . . . Mais 
les bêtes sauvages restent des bêtes sauvages, et on aura beau inventer des 
mécaniques meilleures encore, il y aura quand même des bêtes sauvages 
dessus"). Likewise, the little circular plot is tangential to all the novel's 
linear chains. Jacques Lantier comes there because Phasie is his aunt, who 
raised him. The circumstances of the test of wills are essential conditions, as 
I shall show, in Flores chain. Séverine inherits from Grandmorin a house 
virtually next door, in which she will be murdered. Indeed all the major 
events of the novel take place within sight of la Crôix-de-Maufras. 
Finally, the Misard chain stands in a structurally symbolic relation­
ship to the rest of the novel. La Bête humaine is a story about steam 
locomotives. In these engines, the back-and-forth movement of the pistons 
is translated through the drive rods tangentially into the circular movement 
of the wheels, which again translate it into the rectilinear movement of the 
train. The reciprocal nature of the causal model represented by the Phasie-
Misard relationship is not without resemblance to the reciprocating steam 
engine. Their alternating and mutually stimulating cruelties toward one 
another, having become a continuous power-seeking circularity, drives the 
marriage in a straight line to its murderous conclusion. The self-contained 
subplot thus functions by analogy to overdetermine the symbolism of the 
locomotive. And the tangentially linear chains involving Flore and Jacques 
work, so to speak, like drive rods. As the little circular chain acquires 
contrastive, symbolic, and overdetermining formal functions in the histoire, 
the "seriousness" of events is diluted: they appear less reality-referential and 
more self-referential, causation serving a logical purpose which the récit 
attempts to mask as mimetic. Textualized causation is diverging from 
"real" causal relationships. 
Phasie s discovery of Misard's secret (the poison in the salt) cannot halt 
the destructive process; he finds a new means (the poison in Phasie's enema 
solution), and she dies, without revealing the whereabouts of the "trea­
sure." He will die without having found it, and it will remain lost for all 
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time. Reciprocating engines wear out, their energy at last dissipated: 
Serres s "law" of entropy in Zola's fiction is herein validated.12 
2. Flore's chain. Significantly, it is a cracked drive rod that brings 
Jacques Lantier to la Croix-de-Maufras. This mechanical failure in his 
"Lison" exemplifies the "chance occurrence": it is physically caused, but the 
chain of events that produce the tiny crack is too minute and too complex to 
follow. The timing and location of the breakdown were unpredictable, and 
it appears as a "random event," although one may suppose in fact that it was 
not. Such "chance" occurrences, frequent in the novel, are not a denial of 
physical causation, but rather an indication of human inability to observe, 
and hence to textualize. And, although la Croix-de-Maufras is easily acces­
sible from Le Havre, where the breakdown occurs, Jacques's decision to 
spend the two-day enforced layoff at Phasie s also appears the result of a 
whim: there may be deep-seated reasons, but they are unknown. 
What is known and clearly explained is the "fêlure héréditaire," the 
hereditary flaw or crack he brings with him (p. 61): an inherited predisposi­
tion to kill women when they arouse him sexually. The inferred author does 
not entrust this explanation to the narrator, but presents it himself in 
indirect discourse as an element of Jacques's thoughts. The engineer sees 
himself as paying, in his mental illness, for all the alcohol consumed by the 
"générations d'ivrognes dont il était le sang gâté" (the "generations of 
drunks whose tainted blood flowed in his veins"), as the product of a "slow 
poisoning" of the family blood—shades of what is happening to his aunt 
Phasie! Cumulative causation, whether the gradual accretion of metal fa­
tigue in a drive rod or of poison in the blood, lacks the apparent temporal 
boundaries of an "event"; it is therefore unobservable as cause, although the 
effect may be well delimited, sudden, and disastrous, when the fêlure 
appears. 
Like a drive rod himself, Jacques is both impellor and impelled, both 
victim (of heredity) and perpetrator (of crime), transmitting the past into 
the present like a superior link in a causal chain. It is as such that he reenters 
Flore s life. The events of the "Flore" sequence are clearly interconnected, 
from their first reunion near la Croix-de-Maufras, in the countryside at 
night. Jacques attempts to kiss her; she resists, then yields herself entirely. 
Jacques seizes her scissors, raises them to stab her, then flees, overcoming 
the homicidal impulse. But she, eyes closed in blissful submission, fails to 
see the murderous gesture: she is henceforth in love with Jacques. When 
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she later learns of his involvement with Séverine, she determines to kill the 
lovers. She drags a quarrymans loaded wagon onto the tracks in front of the 
oncoming train which Jacques is driving, and in which Séverine is a pas­
senger, off for a weekend tryst with the engineer in Paris. In the ensuing 
bloody derailment, Séverine escapes unharmed; mighty Flore herself pulls 
Jacques alive from beneath the wreckage. Then she goes off and kills 
herself. The major motivational links are self-evident: love, jealousy, mur­
der, remorse, suicide. 
But seen in detail, the chain includes two other sorts of unpredictable 
causation: the intermittent series and the coincidence. Jacques is able to 
conquer his desire to kill, and his hereditary mania is not therefore a 
necessary cause. Indeed the temptation to kill does not always even surface 
in sexual encounters: he will be able to carry on an affair of some duration 
with Séverine. (He apparently is not a man who always kills on the first 
date.) His temptation and the strength of his resistance to it are variables, 
and while events may cause their variation, it is impossible to predict when, 
in conjunction, they will produce an attack. On at least one occasion, an 
exterior force intervenes to prevent his violence, and exterior interventions 
are also variable. So the series of his sexual aggressions is an intermittent 
one, and all an observer can say is that sometimes he is dangerous to his 
partners, and sometimes not. Sleeping with Jacques might be compared to 
Russian roulette, except that with him the variables are more complex and 
the data on which to calculate chances of survival less readily available. 
Causation is functioning, but it is not observable in such a series until after 
the fact. 
In a coincidence, two or more causal chains intersect; events in each are 
observable, perhaps predictable, but the unforeseeable temporal conjunc­
tion of particular occurrences on the chains opens the door to astonishing, 
unusual happenings. The single most influential event in the novel is just 
such a coincidence: Jacques, wandering by the tracks in a daze after his 
aborted attack on Flore, catches a glimpse of Séverine and Roubaud mur­
dering Grandmorin on an express train speeding past. Flores chain involves 
several coincidences; two examples will suffice to illustrate their function. 
First, to become crazed with jealousy, Flore must confirm her suspi­
cions that Jacques and Séverine are conducting an adulterous affair, and 
indeed she catches them in an embrace. To bring about this crucial discov­
ery, the inferred author creates the following chain of events: (a) Séverine 
74 • Rectilinear Causality in Narrative 
almost always takes Jacques's train to Paris on Friday and spends the week­
end with him there; (b) one Friday, during a blizzard, the train is brought to 
a halt by huge snow drifts; (c) the train gets stuck some three hundred 
meters from the Misard home at la Croix-de-Maufras; (d) some of the 
passengers, including Séverine, take refuge there; (e) Séverine knows Phasie 
personally because of the Grandmorin property next door, and she is there­
fore ushered into Phasie's sickroom to sit down, instead of waiting in the 
kitchen with the other passengers; (f ) Jacques too comes in to greet his 
bedridden aunt while Séverine is there; (g) Phasie falls asleep before her 
visitors leave; (h) Jacques and Séverine seize this moment "alone" to ex­
change a kiss; (i) Flore happens to open the bedroom door at the right 
moment to observe the embrace. 
Most of the events are plausible, including the stolen kiss—this love 
affair is characterized by audacity. But, even allowing for nineteenth-
century railroad equipment, and presuming some difference in meteoro­
logical conditions over the past century, one could surely have travelled the 
Le Havre-Paris line every Friday for many years without becoming snow­
bound, and for several lifetimes without being trapped in the snow near a 
specific house. Since no topographical features are mentioned, like a steep 
incline or a ravine, to make enlisement more likely at this spot, the statistical 
probabilities of an impassable snowstorm on Friday morning must be mul­
tiplied by the probability of blockage at a particular, unexceptional point 
on the line. Thus causation of each event is explicit and clear; each individ­
ual event is believable and possible; yet the conjunction of events is highly 
unlikely. Whence the readers problem: to suspend disbelief because causes 
are clear and possible, or to sense manipulation of events by the inferred 
author to achieve a future result, because of the statistical improbability. 
Ambiguities of this kind may well leave our belief intact ("this is a realistic 
story") while making us aware of the inferred author ("this is not a true 
story"). Coincidence thus tells us that textualized causation is partly "real," 
partly structural, emphasizing the distinction between linguistic construc­
tion and life. 
Flores entry into the bedroom at just the right moment is similarly 
ambiguous—plausible because she is bustling about the house serving food 
and drink to the stranded passengers, implausible because of the narrowness 
of the critical time frame: the duration of a kiss. Just as she had her eyes 
closed at the right moment to avoid seeing Jacques poised to strike her, she 
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has them open just in time to learn the truth. Coincidence, even when the 
intersecting chains are themselves plausible, points to manipulation, to a 
level of narration, and thus to "textuality." 
Another coincidence in the Flore sequence brings together three im­
portant chains, Flores, Cabuches, and the Misard "circle," all to create the 
dramatic train wreck. Cabuche's arrival with a wagonload of stone blocks is 
plausible: hauling stone is one of the quarrymans tasks. His arrival at Flore s 
crossing just before the passage of Jacques s train is the coincidence: nothing 
suggests that his trips are regular or that Flore expects him at that moment. 
Flore has the motive; Cabuche brings the means. But how can Flore detain 
the wagon for several minutes until the train arrives? How can she separate 
Cabuche from his horses, so that she can pull horses and wagon onto the 
tracks? Phasie has just expired! He can scarcely refuse Flores invitation to 
stop in to pay his last respects to the deceased, leaving his rig unattended at 
the crossing. And where is the only outside force that could prevent the 
wreck, the signalman who could stop the train or halt Flores action? 
Misard, freed by Phasie s death, is not at his post, but is wildly digging for 
treasure in the back yard! Thus the Misard "reciprocating-engine" chain 
vents its last energy, throwing Flore like a broken drive rod straight into the 
spokes of the onrushing express. The fact that the inferred author had 
attributed to Flore a workable plan to wreck the train by removing a rail—a 
plan she abandons only when Cabuche comes into view—just demonstrates 
that this coincidence was "unnecessary." The indexic author is at once 
suspect: does Cabuche arrive in order to facilitate connection of the Misard 
chain to Flores, as she runs amok? 
Finally, like intermittent series, coincidences put in doubt the value of 
causal knowledge for predicting. We may be aware of all the causal forces at 
work in the two approaching chains; without precise knowledge of when 
they will intersect, we cannot predict the outcome. As soon as Flore falls in 
love with Lander, we may foresee that she will come to no good, but how 
and when we cannot imagine. Only after her suicide can we look back, 
following Nietzsche's dictum, and construct the chain that led, "inevita­
bly," to her demise. 
3. Parallel chains. From the time that Roubaud learns of his wife's 
adolescent sexual involvement with her guardian, Grandmorin, and bru­
tally forces Séverine to be his accomplice in the wealthy old man's murder, 
the couple's lives run in close parallel. From the moment Jacques observes 
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the murder, although too fleetingly to be certain of the criminals' identi­
ties, his chain is tied to theirs, most tightly after Séverine seduces him as a 
way of preventing his casting suspicion on her at the hearings. Table 4.1 
lists the principal causes and effects, vertically, in these three narrative 
lines, showing also the horizontal points of interconnection. 
Table 4.1 
Lantier Séverine Roubaud 
Hereditary illness. Reveals to Roubaud *** Learns of Séverine's 
her liaison with past liaison. 
Broken drive rod. Grandmorin. 
Visit to Misards. Beaten, forced by *s-> Wants Grandmorin 
Roubaud to be ac- dead, forces Séverine 
complice in murder. to be accomplice. 
Observes murder. <-> Takes part in **-> Kills Grandmorin. 
murder. 
Called to testify. <-> Called to testify. «*->• Called to testify. 
Seduced by Séverine. <-> Seduces Lantier to Takes to gambling 
obtain his silence. with money stolen 
Séverine's lover. <-> Lander's lover. from Grandmorin. 
Plots Roubaud's <-> Plots Roubaud's «f-> Argues over money 
murder. murder. with Séverine. 
Kills Séverine. <-> Murdered by «f-> Discovers wife's 
Lantier. body in Cabuche's 
arms. 
Philomène's lover. Arrested for com-
Discovered with plicity with 
Philomène by Cabuche in Séve-
Pecqueux. rine's and Grand-
Killed in fight with morin's murders. 
Pecqueux. Convicted. 
These narrative lines represent true causal chains, in which nearly 
every effect is the cause in turn of a subsequent effect. If we are seeking a 
Zola who is "anti-Gide," anti-absurde, it would seem that here we have 
found him. The unpredictable occurs, but it is always explainable, in 
Kantian fashion, after the fact. There is coincidence in Jacques's witnessing 
of Grandmorins murder, and a quasi-coincidence in the fact that Jacques's 
hereditary "time bomb" chooses to explode precisely when the plot to kill 
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Roubaud has given him means and opportunity—and a skillfully pre­
arranged alibi. One may argue that the very circumstances of the planned 
crime—waiting alone in complicity with Séverine, knife in hand, for the 
victim to walk into their bloody trap—were the trigger of Jacques s latent 
violence. But this is not the first time they had plotted to waylay Roubaud. 
And if present circumstances have major causal force, then the causal role of 
the genetic impulse is somewhat diminished. Still, causes, if not timing, 
are generally assessable in retrospect. One could scarcely predict, for ex­
ample, that Jacques would begin sleeping with Philomène, his fireman's 
mistress, shortly after slaying Séverine; in hindsight, however, it is easy to 
accept the explicit notion that he needed to test himself, to see whether his 
crime had purged him of the hereditary curse: curiosity about his own 
intermittence becomes itself a cumulative causal force. That Cabuche 
should find Séverines body is well prepared by the narrator: adoring Séve­
rine with almost canine fidelity, he is always "hanging about." Roubaud s 
arrival to find Cabuche with the corpse (their joint presence on the scene is 
one cause of their arrest) is an impeccable link in the causal chain: he is the 
intended victim, arriving, as prearranged, for his own murder. A primary 
effect of such carefully structured causation is the comparison it permits 
with Denizets version of these events as the magistrate reconstructs them. 
Reduced to their simplest terms for later comparison with the Denizet 
explanation, the major causal chains link the states or conditions of the 
characters as shown in diagram 4.1  . The notion of "love" (" + ") in the 
diagram receives its broadest meaning, ranging from the most ethereal and 
idealistic adoration, represented by Cabuches worship of Séverine (not 
causally related to anything in the novel except his own subsequent convic­
tion for murder), to simple sexual relations (Lantier and Philomène), to 
brutal possessiveness (Roubaud and Séverine). The multiple meanings sub­
sumed under the idea of "love" evoke another sort of parallelism indicative 
of the "laboratory" study of causality being carried out in the novel. 
As the diagram shows, jealousy is the prime mover, the underlying 
dynamic of action in the text. The inferred author sets up no fewer than five 
love triangles, resolving the potential instability they represent each time 
in a different way. Nothing suggests more clearly that the novel is experi­
menting with the notion of causal laws. (1) Roubaud and Grandmorin love 
(have loved) Séverine. (2) Flore and Séverine love Lantier. (3) Lantier and 
Roubaud love (have loved) Séverine. (4) Pecqueux and Lantier love Phi­
lomène. (5) Lantier and Cabuche love Séverine. Instability is triggered by 
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P(+Phi) G(+S) 
F(+L) 
C(+S) 
L(d) P(d) 
Diagram 4.1 Capital letters are characters' initials ("Pha" = Phasie; "Phi" = 
Philomène), and other symbols designate the conditions: " + " = "loves," "d" = 
dead, "i" = mentally ill, " j  " = jealous, "o" = obsessive gambler, "p" = power-
seeking. 
perception: one of the lovers becomes aware that he or she has a rival for the 
affections of the beloved. Triangle 1 illustrates what might be called the 
standard or traditional mechanism for resolving instability: the husband 
punishes both the lover and the beloved, as Roubaud beats Séverine and 
kills Grandmorin. If this is the "law" of the jealousy reaction, the other 
triangles demonstrate that it can often fail to work. In triangle 2, the 
"aggrieved" party strikes out at rival and beloved according to the "law," 
but the event fails through a series of doubtless caused, but apparently 
random, occurrences. Flore's clumsy choice of means, a train wreck, kills 
and maims unpredictably a number of unrelated persons, while leaving 
Jacques and Séverine fortuitously alive. Thereupon, in remorse, the "ag­
grieved" party kills herself. The mechanism of the "law" may thus be 
readily derailed by chance. 
Triangle 3 illustrates a potential instability that is never triggered. 
One rival (Lantier) knows from the start that his love is married; he has 
obviously won her affections, and jealousy does not occur. The other rival 
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(Roubaud) undergoes perception, learns that Séverine and Lantier are 
lovers. But, having apparently lost all desire for his wife through participa­
tion in triangle 1 and having thereafter substituted gambling for sex as his 
principal obsession, Roubaud feels no jealousy. Once his bomb has gone off, 
so to speak, it cannot explode again. This triangle has every possibility for 
stability, and it is Séverine of course who destabilizes it by seeking her 
freedom to marry Jacques. When Roubaud refuses a divorce, needing her 
inheritance from Grandmorin to gamble, she draws Lantier into the murder 
plot. Thus we would have the "aggrieved" party (Roubaud) slain by the two 
others. But this solution to the triangle also goes awry, when Jacques's 
genetic fêlure breaks at last. This interference of series changes the character 
of the situation, and this time it is the beloved who dies. Triangle 3, had the 
standard mechanism been set in motion, would have furnished a neat and 
balanced ending to the novel (clôture): Roubaud, discovering Séverine and 
Lantier together, kills them both and goes to the scaffold for his crimes. But 
the inferred author has other things in mind; Lantiers genetic flaw must 
play a role in Séverine s causal chain, and it must go unobserved, to prepare 
the Denizet explanation. 
Triangle 4 brings us back to the basic mechanism: Pecqueux strikes 
out at his rival and kills him. But circumstances again influence the out­
come: having chosen to fight Jacques on the platform of a moving loco­
motive, Pecqueux puts himself in jeopardy, and both fall to their deaths, 
leaving a driverless train speeding off, symbolically, with its passengers into 
the night. As for triangle 5, it engenders no violence, for Cabuches love is 
both pure and unrequited. All three survive in this stable situation, al­
though Séverine will die through participation in triangle 3, which seems 
to ignite Lantiers hereditary predisposition. 
Of the eight possible mortal outcomes of triangles, the inferred author 
has used five, which can be summarized like this (A = aggrieved party, B = 
rival, C = beloved; capital letters indicate survivors): (1) AbC; (2) aBC; (3) 
ABc; (4) abC; (5) ABC. Of the three remaining possibilities—aBc, Abe, 
and abc—the first is difficult to arrange in context. The second and third 
would be quite plausible, but were not selected as outcomes for triangle 3, 
when the genetic flaw intervenes: Roubaud never has the chance or the 
desire to eliminate Jacques and Séverine. Besides, to arrange all twelve 
deaths necessitated by the eight possible solutions, writer and readers alike 
would have to expend a great deal of emotional energy on an exceptionally 
large cast of characters. The five examples suffice to show that, from parallel 
initial causes, very different effects may ensue, either as a result of poor 
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planning (Roubaud is better at arranging murder than is Flore) or of unpre­
dictable influences, elements either unknowable (Pecqueux cannot foresee 
his death) or unknown (Séverine is unaware of Jacques s fêlure). What this 
experiment "proves," then, is that, while we may be able to spot a motive 
force, such as raging jealousy, in an individual, or recognize an unstable 
situation, such observations cannot serve as predictors of the outcome: 
causality involves an interplay of forces too hidden and too complex to be 
observed except (perhaps) after the fact. It also attests that genetically 
acquired homicidal mania, if there is such a thing, is only one type of 
hidden cause; without such hereditary baggage, Roubaud, Flore, and Pec­
queux launch similar sex-related violence, of equal or greater brutality, on 
the simple basis of jealousy. By wrecking trains, Flore, and probably Pec­
queux, intervene unpredictably in the causal chains of the lives of many 
otherwise unrelated passengers. A crack in a drive rod, if it goes un­
detected, can destroy the orderly succession of numerous lives. And such 
cracks are often impossible to detect until it is too late. 
4. Denizet's explanation. But what about after the fact? Even if it is too 
late to avoid damage, can we not at least look back and construct causal 
chains in our minds and thus "make sense," if not of the future, at least of 
the past? The inclusion of Denizet's explanation in the novel provides an 
answer to these questions, no longer about causality as a real, if often 
unobservable, phenomenon, but about cause and effect as mental constructs. 
Denizet's hypotheses form a kind of embedded narrative in the novel, a 
structure Todorov compares to the imbrication of subordinate clauses in 
longer sentences.13 As such, it forms a part of the histoire; it has a cause 
(society's desire to find and punish the guilty) and an effect (the convictions 
of Cabuche and Roubaud). It occupies a precise position on the timeline of 
the story and is thus contingent upon the causal forces then operative. It is 
an "event" created by the inferred author. But it is also ^«/o/>g-referential, a 
recasting of many of the same events we find in the rest of the novel, but 
recombined and reconnected in new and different causal chains. The in­
ferred author thus creates a narrative that is itself contingent upon events 
and places it in competition with the narrator's apparently gratuitous tale, 
so that each functions as a critique of the other. 
Denizet's analysis (pp. 277—83) develops the following points. At the 
inconclusive investigation of Grandmorins murder, Cabuche, the poor, 
unlettered quarryman, had come under suspicion for three reasons: he was 
an ex-convict; he had expressed hatred for Grandmorin (the aging lecher 
had mistreated a young girl thereafter befriended and cared for by 
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Cabuche); and Roubaud, to avoid suspicion, had claimed to have seen a man 
of Cabuche s description boarding the murder train. When the investiga­
tion is renewed following the murder of Séverine, Denizet's convictions 
about Cabuche are confirmed, for he is found blood-spattered and holding 
the corpse in his arms. The murder wound was similar in both crimes 
(Séverine had preserved the knife and planned for Jacques to use it in slaying 
Roubaud). Cabuche is therefore a prime suspect in both cases. A search of 
his cabin after the first killing had turned up nothing, but a second search, 
after Séverine s death, produces Grandmorin's gold watch (Séverine and 
Roubaud had stolen it, along with some money, to mask the motive as 
theft; Cabuche had later pilfered a handkerchief of his adored Séverine, only 
to find the watch, by coincidence, wrapped up in it), the essential link of 
evidence tying Cabuche to both crimes. 
The motive for the second crime gives Denizet pause, for Cabuche 
seems to have worshipped Séverine. This difficulty leads the magistrate to 
have Roubaud arrested. Denizet's theory holds that Roubaud coveted the 
legacy his wife was to receive from Grandmorin. A coward incapable of 
murder, Roubaud had paid Cabuche to do in the rich old man, thus 
speeding up the inheritance. Afterwards, since it was apparent to all that 
the Roubauds were on the outs, it was supposed that Séverine had refused to 
sell the house at la Croix-de-Maufras, as Roubaud wished, to stake his 
gambling. Whence the need for a second murder. Cabuche was hired again 
(a rape before the killing would surely satisfy the "adoration" of such a 
brute!) to do the deed. 
Tortured by hours of questioning in Denizet's effort to prove the 
accuracy of this construction, Roubaud at last confesses to the truth: he had 
killed Grandmorin himself in a jealous rage. This confession, part of the 
causal chain of the investigation and not of the murder itself, could well 
destroy Denizet's theory of a prearranged plot. But the magistrate resists it 
as a ruse to weaken his case for premeditated murder. Aware that Roubaud 
had tolerated Jacques's affair with his wife, he prepares to describe to the 
court a Roubaud incapable of jealousy, a man who married for money, and 
who conspired with Cabuche to kill to get it. (The proof of the veracity of 
Roubaud's confession exists. Séverine's letter to Grandmorin, written at 
Roubaud's violent insistence to ensure that the old man would be on the 
train with them, was found among Grandmorin's papers after his death. But 
the person who found it, judging that it could compromise Grandmorin's 
reputation and thereby weaken the Emperor's government—all prominent 
supporters of the government must appear irreproachable, after all—de-
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G(r)(+S) 
S(g)(+R) C(h)(g) 
S(r)(+R) 
S(d) 
Diagram 4.2 Characters are designated by their initials; " + " = cohabiting with, 
"d" = dead, "g" = motivated by greed, "h" = motivated by hatred, "r" = rich, 
"s" = motivated by sexual desire. 
stroyed it: a post-crime interference of series.) As for Séverine s true mur­
derer, the alibi Jacques established, by slipping out of, and then back into, 
his hotel room through a window, arranged to cover Roubaud's killing, 
works just as well for Séverines. Besides, from Denizets position, it is 
unreasonable to suppose a man would kill his mistress, with whom he was 
on the best of terms. 
Denizets reconstruction, with which he wins his case, is represented 
in diagram 4.2. Comparison with diagram 4.1  , the narrators construction 
of events, will bring essential discrepancies to the surface. 
Differences between Denizets mental construct and "reality," as best 
we know it from the récit, have three primary sources: (1) Denizets sub­
jective predispositions, which are a major subset of (2) the causal depen­
dency of the explanation itself, as an effect of the causes within its own time 
frame, and (3) the necessity to construct it logically, which is to say, 
counterchronologically. 
As for his predispositions, Denizet is arrogant, materialistic, and 
bigoted. His arrogance is apparent in his own self-assessments, reported by 
the narrator: "As he used to say, he had a nose for truths" (p. 279; "Comme 
il le disait, il flairait des vérités"); "in one of those moments of inspiration 
when he believed in the genius of his perspicacity" (p. 280; "dans une de ces 
minutes d'inspiration où il croyait au génie de sa perspicacité"); "Never had 
he delved so deeply, he said, into human nature" (p. 283; "Jamais, disait-il, 
il n'était descendu si à fond dans la nature humaine"). His own materialism 
emerges from his imputation of greed to others. Indeed, as the diagram 
shows, greed has replaced jealousy in his causal system as the primary 
dynamic of the action. From his standpoint, acquiring wealth is a most 
Causal Chains and Textualization « 8  3 
understandable motivation. His prejudice against the poor, who have failed 
to acquire material possessions, is evident in his judgment of Cabuche. 
Uneducated, untrained in self-expression, doubtless ill-clothed and un­
prepossessing, he is in difficulty with Denizet from the outset. It is reason­
able, on these grounds, to read Denizet s explanation as a satire of the 
judicial system, run by the well-to-do for the well-to-do, at the expense of 
the poor. Certainly perception of cause and effect can be twisted by class 
values. But there is more. 
Events occurring during the investigation influence its course. Rou­
bauds initial lies implicating Cabuche in the Grandmorin murder (cause: 
Roubauds desire to save his own skin; effect: Cabuches inculpation); Rou­
bauds later confession (cause: fatigue, discouragement; effect nullified by 
Denizet s predispositions); discovery of Grandmorins watch in Cabuche s 
cabin (cause: Denizet s determination to convict Cabuche, whence the sec­
ond search, and Cabuches fetishistic thefts from Séverine; effect: Cabuches 
conviction): all such events belong to causal chains exterior to the murders, 
yet they influence the explanation. Denizet s prejudices are a part of this 
subsequent influence, including one tendency we have not mentioned: the 
inclination to preserve a preestablished theory in the face of new evidence 
(such as Roubaud s confession), to read the evidence so that it fits the theory, 
rather than to change the hypothesis to accommodate the facts. Yet despite 
all the personal criticism we can address to the magistrate on the basis of the 
text, an epistemological problem remains: if the search for causes of previ­
ous events is contingent upon a causal chain inherent in its own time frame, 
it cannot uncover what it purports to seek, except by coincidence. This 
places the very principle of a posteriori causal explanations in doubt. De­
nizet cannot be blamed for that. 
Finally, the antichronological logic required to construct explanations 
differs by nature from the chronology of causality and therefore fails to 
explain it. When Roubaud admits to having killed Grandmorin in a jealous 
rage, Denizet reasons backward: Roubaud was quite tolerant of Lander's 
long affair with Séverine; therefore he is either not sexually possessive by 
nature or not sexually possessive of his wife. In either case, jealousy could 
not therefore be the motive for killing Grandmorin. If he married Séverine 
for her inheritance, however, it is possible to explain Grandmorins murder 
(greed) and the absence of jealousy when Roubaud learns that Jacques is 
bedding his wife. Thus he establishes a causal system which explains two 
events, but which omits an intermediary cause present in reality: psycho­
logical change in Roubaud after the first murder. Unobservable causes— 
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causes which are not "events" but evolutions, slow accretions—can find no 
place in a logical structure built backward from event to event. Asked about 
the apparent discrepancy, Roubaud can only state the facts: "J'ai tué l'autre, 
je n'ai pas tué celui-ci" (p. 282); "I killed the other one, I didn't kill this 
one." In an explanation, however, it is not the facts that matter but their 
causal interrelation. For these facts, a posteriori, none can be found. As 
Roubaud will conclude at the trial, "what good was it to tell the truth, since 
it was the lie that was logical?" (p. 288; "à quoi bon dire la vérité, puisque 
c'était le mensonge qui était logique?"). 
Likewise, explanations lose their logical rigor if they reject an over­
determined hypothesis in favor of an implausible coincidence. Cabuche is a 
rough and boorish ex-convict, present at the site of the second murder and 
probably at the site of the first. It would be logically easier (and not only for 
Denizet) to believe that he killed Grandmorin and stole his watch than to 
believe that he took a handkerchief as a keepsake from his beloved and 
found, by chance, the watch inside. As for Jacques's intermittent urge to 
kill, if that is unobservable to all those who knew him well in the present, it 
is totally undiscoverable in hindsight. "Backward" reasoning connects only 
visible events and prefers the simplicity of broad, general causes to the 
complexity of interfering series (coincidence) and of irrational, unpredict­
able behavior. In these ways, causal analysis is foreign to the reality it 
pretends to explain. Here again, the problem lies not with Denizet or a 
particular judicial system, but in the realm of epistemology: logic can 
neither see nor reconstruct causation after the fact. In this instance, the 
primary error is a belief in inertia: once a condition exists, it will persist 
until an "event" intervenes to change it. If Cabuche was once a criminal, he 
still is; if Roubaud once failed to be jealous of Séverine, he never was. Yet 
the basic principle of causal logic, that states of being are the result of events 
that cause them, rests upon this belief in inertia. 
The diagram of Denizet's explanation thus appears far simpler than the 
one we have constructed on the basis of the narrator's récit. The cast of 
characters is smaller. Lantier is erroneously omitted, for he is invisible to 
logic. With him go a number of "extraneous" characters: the Misards, 
Flore. (But are they extraneous? Without Phasie, Jacques would never have 
become involved in the chain of events at la Croix-de-Maufras. And if Flore 
had kept her eyes open, Jacques's mania might have become public knowl­
edge in time to save Séverine.) And for the characters retained, Denizet 
makes far fewer vertical connections, since his logic sees only events and not 
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evolutions and coincidences. He prefers instead horizontal connections, 
indicative of conspiracy, thus pulling Cabuche into the action. 
The narrators tale, then, is critical of Denizets, which the inferred 
author requires him to include in it. Denizets explanation is "false." But if 
Denizet is in error partly for epistemological reasons, how can the narrators 
tale be "true"? How can we believe anyone who explains in the past tense? 
In this work, the narrator is reduced to an objective observer, a simple 
"scribe."14 Causal connections are expressed by the characters themselves, 
for the most part, even if that requires understanding doubtless beyond 
their capacities (i.e., Jacques's comprehension of the genetic origins of his 
mania).15 Thus causation appears to the reader to come in the form of 
"visible" events—characters' thoughts, actions which we and the per­
petrators alone perceive. The narrator lacks even the class identity his 
language patterns gave him in L'Assommoir, and the inferred author domi­
nates throughout this novel. His dominance reveals an intent of narration, 
and it produces a text in which the "gaps" require no creativity or symbolic 
activity on the part of the reader. 
Why read a work in which our own creative activity is thus reduced? 
The function of La Bête humaine appears essentially didactic. The inferred 
author instructs by example, and the lesson is the weakness of causal theory. 
In this inside-out detective story, where we "know" the causal chains from 
the point of view of the criminals and can thus make sport of the wildly 
erroneous explanation of the "detective," the implausibilities serve less to 
liberate us from the inferred author than to accomplish his ends: making life 
difficult for Denizet. Ripoll points out, on the basis of Zola's preparatory 
notes, that the author was intentionally breaking the structural code of the 
detective story;16 Serres notes that the intervention of random occurrences 
produces a new state of systematics.17 For the "system" persists: everything 
in La Bête humaine has a clearly inferable cause. The questions are: In an 
open and uncontrolled system, can causation be observed? Can it serve as a 
useful predictor? Can it be textualized, reconstructed linguistically after 
the fact? The answers are all essentially negative. 
Were the deaths of specific passengers on the train wrecked by Flore in 
any useful sense "determined"? N o one—not even Flore—could have pre­
dicted them. And Zola leaves the reader in a similar situation at the close of 
the novel: who, if anyone, will die on the driverless train? The causes are all 
in place, but the precise results remain unpredictable. Séverine could not 
foresee her own death as she made love with Jacques while waiting to kill 
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Roubaud, nor could Jacques himself predict her murder, as he slipped out 
of his hotel and made his way to the lonely house by the tracks. But there are 
surely few readers who fail to predict it. For readers ask questions not only 
about jfictional events, but also about the narration. Why create a homicidal 
maniac, unless he is going to kill? Why create such a beautiful, trusting, 
and evil character as Séverine, if she is not to be a victim? Why establish 
means, opportunity, and alibi for Jacques, unless he is to kill now} 
The ability to ask such metacausal questions puts readers in contact 
with the narration. It is not gaps or weaknesses in the causal chain that send 
us there this time, however, in search of explanations. In the excitement of 
this adventure, where the past seems self-explanatory, we are interested 
rather in foresight. If we can often be, as readers, more prescient than the 
characters of this narrative, it is precisely because we have recourse to a level 
of narration, with its novelistic conventions, which is unavailable to the 
characters, visibly unaware of their fictional status. Our privileged knowl­
edge, our "reason for inference," is that nothing is included in traditional 
mimetic fiction which does not, sooner or later, have a bearing on events. A 
second impulsion for readers to look to the intent of narration is a gap—not 
a break in the causal chain, but a crack in the logic. The logical abyss that 
separates the two competing narratives of the crimes, the narrator's and 
Denizets, points to a more general intent of narration, which we have just 
observed. Why present two competing récits of the same histoire! This time, 
our reason for inference resides in the differences between the two récits, the 
inferred causes of those differences, and the privileging of the narrator's tale. 
Even behind the intricate, densely woven histoire of La Bête humaine, a level 
of narration is manifest, defining the distinction between "text" and 
"reality." 
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Inference, Causality, 
and the Levels of Narrative 
Histoire et narration n'existent donc pour nous que par le truchement du 
récit. Mais réciproquement le récit, le discours narratif ne peut être tel 
qu'en tant qu'il raconte une histoire, faute de quoi il ne serait pas narra­
tif . . . , et en tant qu'il est proféré par quelqu'un, faute de quoi. . . il ne 
serait pas en lui-même un discours. Comme narratif, il vit de son rapport à 
l'histoire qu'il raconte; comme discours, il vit de son rapport à la narration 
qui le profère. 
(Thus histoire and narration exist for us only through the intermediary of the 
récit. But reciprocally the récit assumes its identity as narrative discourse 
only insofar as it tells an histoire [otherwise it would not be narrative . . . ]  , 
and only insofar as it is proffered by someone {otherwise . . . it would not 
of itself be a discourse}. It owes its existence as narrative to its relation to 
the histoire it tells; it owes its existence as discourse to the narration that 
proffers it.) 
GÉRARD GENETTE 
Suppose—erasing for a moment what we have written under era-sure—that we return to our initial position: there is no causality as such in fiction. There may be words, credible or not, referring to it, 
but causation remains invisible: nothing causes anything in novels unless a 
reader infers it. 
What then are those "gaps" and "weaknesses" we have uncovered in 
"causal chains"? A gap does not depend upon the presence or absence of 
inference, but on the degree of assurance with which a reader hypothesizes. 
Consider two potential gaps in L'Assommoir. Coupeau falls four stories to 
the street below, and then he is found to have injuries; Gervaise is energetic 
and self-disciplined, and then she demonstrates traits of slovenliness and 
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laxity. A relationship of implication, based on life experience (or on news­
paper accounts thereof) makes us confident in supposing that Coupeau s fall 
caused (or explains) his injuries, while Gervaises apparent transformation 
provides little ground for inference. Hubris theories, notions that success 
leads to failure, may fit the récif, but they are highly speculative, espoused 
with misgivings on the basis of meager evidence. The gap lies not in the 
inference as such, but in the relative doubt that surrounds it. Texts may or 
may not allow for ready inference. 
"Weakness" in a "causal chain" is characterized by implausibility, but 
not all implausibilities weaken our inferred connections. Here, it is perhaps 
less life experience than the story itself which determines how weak an 
implausibility appears. Again, two contrastive examples illustrate the prin­
ciple: Coupeau s survival and complete recovery from a four-story plunge; 
and the incredible sequence of events we have already described leading, in 
La Bête humaine, to Flores discovery of Jacques's and Séverine s mutual 
passion. The implausibility in L'Assommoir appears unnecessary to the 
causality of the histoire, since Coupeau is cured and ends up working in 
Etampes as if nothing had happened. Thus the fall could, for all its surface 
consequences, have been eliminated from the histoire. It could also have 
been used to explain (had there been lasting physical or psychic damage) 
Coupeau s drunken decline, but the text eschews that function. The appar­
ent gratuitousness of the implausibility makes of it a "weakness" and sends 
us looking for writerly reasons, for the intent of narration. On the other 
hand, Flores wrecking of Jacques's train and her subsequent suicide seem 
integral parts of a causal histoire, implied by jealousy. Readers may be more 
willing to accept a most unlikely series of events when they are linked 
together by plentiful reasons for inference to achieve an obvious purpose. 
Refusing to believe in a specific train becoming snowbound near Phasies 
house, or in Flores opening the door just in time, means rejecting all the 
rest, all the dramatic consequences of these events. Flore s discovery and the 
excitement that follows make it easier to "swallow" the causally incredible 
preparation. Our foresight ("when Flore finds out, there'll be Hell to 
pay!"), based on inferred understanding of the intent of narration at this 
point, keeps us going, accepting the implausible as possible. 
Thus implausibility is not of itself a "weakness." Again it is a matter of 
the ease of readerly inference: if we can readily infer the narrative necessity 
for an event, i( we can easily see why, for the purposes of narration, it is 
required, we are more likely to suspend disbelief; the alternative is rejecting 
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the story as a whole. When we have doubts about narrative purpose and the 
incredible event's place in it, the implausibility appears as a "weakness" in 
the "chain." Whether we perceive a gap or a weakness, the plane of narra­
tion has a crucial role: if we are confident we understand its purpose, we can 
fill the gap, accept the implausibility; if we are unsure of the intent of 
narration, we are impelled to look ever more closely to uncover it, in 
extratextual allusions, metaphors, and other elements of comparison. 
Ease of readerly inference and intent of narration are thus prime deter­
miners of the nature offictional texts. Brief examination of each will help us 
begin to define the nature of the changes that have arisen in twentieth-
century fiction. 
Creation or obliteration of readerly uncertainty in inference is a classi­
fying characteristic of novels. Devices that create uncertainty—absence of 
inferable causes in the histoire (Gervaise's unexpected avachissement) or in the 
narration (Coupeaus "gratuitous" and "inconsequential" fall)—represent a 
lack or "ungrammatically" in the chain of textually inspired causal in­
ferences. I borrow the term Michael Riffaterre has so masterfully applied 
with respect to poetry1 with some hesitation: it implies a "grammar" of 
implied causation; it implies a "norm," although none exists. But if gram­
mar is defined as presence of causal implication, then its absence, like an 
ungrammaticality, provides an entry into, or reason for recourse to, the 
narration. 
It should be obvious that dozens if not hundreds of minor gaps (not all 
causal) appear on each page of traditional novels, all of which are open to 
reader inference. Most of these surmises are doubtless made without reflec­
tion, on the basis of personal experience. We infer that, if a character steps 
off a sidewalk, she or he is in a street, where there may be carriages 
(horsedrawn or automobile, according to place and time), other people 
about, buildings on either side, and a sky above; we assume that a character 
called "Marceline" has at least the same genetic makeup as a character by 
that name mentioned forty pages earlier. Although they are individually of 
minor importance, the sheer numbers of these small hypotheses required by 
texts produce a wider range of indeterminacy than is often recognized. 
Indeterminacy goes unnoticed precisely because, in mimetic fiction, it is 
mostly inconsequential. One of the times we become aware of the essen­
tially hypothetical nature of fictional reality is when a minor inference 
proves unsound: we suddenly learn, perhaps, that the busy thoroughfare we 
had created in imagination is "at this hour deserted." But the "realistic" 
Inference, Causality, and Levels of Narrative « 9  1 
tradition usually contrives to spare us such shocks: the essential (i.e., 
causally consequential) details are provided in advance, a technique remi­
niscent of the now outmoded cinematic convention according to which a 
scenic space is filmed in its entirety before the cameras move in to show 
characters acting within that space, so that viewers may integrate them 
mentally into their surroundings. The avoidance of shock by elimination of 
the potential for erroneous hypotheses in fiction might be termed, in our 
"grammar," the "rule of prepared consequentially." Not only must conse­
quential details be provided in traditional novels, but they must be prof­
fered sufficiently in advance to forestall incorrect inferences. 
The operation of this rule points to an effort in mimetic fiction to 
conceal from readers the degree to which the fictional world they enter is 
open to inference. Our little hypotheses must be automatic, obvious, and 
apparently error-free, so that our imaginary scenes will seem firm, familiar, 
and safe for us as readers, no matter how dangerous they may be for the 
characters. When we imagine fictional people in settings, whether it be 
Gervaise in her laundry or Jérôme and Alissa in the symmetrical garden at 
Fongueusemare, there are two areas of potential inference: those elements of 
the scene which will have a function in events, and those which will not. For 
the second area, our imagination is relatively free: Jérôme may be imag­
ined, for example, with or without a mustache, for that detail remains 
inconsequential. But, for a familiar-seeming fictional world, prior presen­
tation of consequential details is a requisite, whether it be explicitly in the 
récit, implicitly in the histoire (characters out-of-doors may be presumed to 
be under a sky), or by convention (fictional "existents" such as characters 
and settings are assumed to remain the same unless we are made aware of the 
intervention of a force to change them, for example). If Virginie s fortuitous 
inheritance may appear to be a weakness in the structure of L'Assommoir, it 
is because it forces readers to revise the scenario; they have no reason to infer 
early on that she might be related to anyone who could accumulate a nest 
egg. Such shocks require us not simply to reevaluate past events, but to 
redefine the parameters of the possible and the probable in a preestablished 
situation. They are a standard part of the fictional esthetic nowadays, as we 
shall see, but destroying readerly inferences after the fact, on the level of the 
histoire, breaks the rule of prepared consequentiality, a fundamental méto­
nymie dictate of "realism." This rule for guiding readerly inference in 
matters of consequence is a primary basis of what Roman Jakobson calls the 
"profound affinity" binding realism to metonymy.2 
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As for the "inconsequential" inferences, they constitute the readers 
freest creative participation in traditional novels. Through them, we insert 
ourselves and our life experience into texts, possibly recreating our own 
identities and injecting our psychological defenses, as Norman Holland 
suggests,3 into the background of the action, thus coloring the reading of 
the text as a whole. 
The notions of "textually conditioned" and "free" inferences are, of 
course, not absolute, but a matter of degree. As I have noted, hypotheses are 
by definition conditioned: X is a necessary condition that I infer Y. Without 
the condition, we are in the realm of fancy or guesswork. Even "free" 
inferences are limited by our experience and conditioned to some extent by 
the text (in a novel of the 1870s, a "voiture" must be imagined as horse-
drawn; there are no blue horses; etc.).4 Likewise, textually conditioned 
inferences are partially free: our imaginary visual image of a character may 
acquire far more detail than a text gives us. Thus the condition of inference 
is the point at which readers' experience and propensities on one hand, and 
textual data on the other, conjoin. 
If hypotheses are limited on one end by the requirement that there be a 
condition of inference, they are constrained on the other by the necessity for 
at least some doubt. By definition, no hypothesis is, as yet, proven "true." 
A proven hypothesis about a story would be truth itself. Where causal 
relationships are concerned, such truth is never totally obtainable. 
When inferences concern causes and effects in fiction, they rest upon 
that other set of hypotheses we call the levels of narrative. The histoire itself, 
as a preexisting series of events, is inferred; the récit is a condition of that 
inference, although our experiences and penchants also participate in the 
condition. The idea of an "author" is also inferred from the existence of a 
narrative text; in addition to the voice speaking to us from the page, there is 
an inventor of events for the voice to relate. And the final inference is that of 
intent: if things happen as they do in a story, there is, so we infer, a purpose 
behind it. Like all hypotheses, this one is of unassured veracity. As a text-
based assumption, it cannot claim to reveal the "true" intentions of any 
"real" author. It presumes merely that what indeed happens in a novel 
fulfills an inferable purpose, which we have called the "intent of narration" 
This inference is conditioned by the existence of récit and histoire taken 
together, as well as by readerly experience. In this instance, however, it is 
our acquaintance with literary and other texts which will doubtless provide 
our personal conditions for inference, rather than our general knowledge of 
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"life." We infer the intent of narration more from what we know about texts 
than from what we know about living. 
In discovering these levels, as if they lay one above the other, we are 
engaged in making what might be termed "vertical" hypotheses. The 
causes and effects we infer on any one of the levels lie in "horizontal" 
relationship to each other. Thus, the levels appear to mask one another, to 
impede our vertical inference. Believable causal statements in the récit 
obviate the search for possible hidden causes in the histoire, and strong, 
plausibly inferable chains of cause and effect in the histoire tend to reduce our 
questioning of the narration. Insofar as the mimetic tradition follows the 
rule of prepared consequentiality, providing creditable conditions for satis­
factory inference in advance, the "author" seems to disappear from the text, 
in casual reading; the histoire itself seems to be the only "intention." 
In his essay on verisimilitude and motivation in Figures / / ,5 Gérard 
Genette calls attention to the contrarieties of causal logic inherent in fiction 
of mimetic tendency. While he is not really discussing cause and effect as 
such, but rather relationships of implication among functional narrative 
units, he brings causal vocabulary into the discussion by evoking the causal 
logic of a seventeenth-century critic (Valincour) to explore the chronologi­
cal direction of such logic in La Princesse de Clèves: 
. . . M. de Clèves ne meurt pas parce que son gentilhomme se conduit 
comme un sot, mais le gentilhomme se conduit comme un sot pour que 
M. de Clèves meure, ou encore, comme le dit Valincour, parce que 
l'auteur veut faire mourir M. de Clèves et que cette finalité du récit de 
fiction est Y ultima ratio de chacun de ses éléments.6 
(. . . M. de Clèves does not die because his gentleman,behaves like a 
fool, but the gentleman behaves like a fool so that M. de Clèves may 
die, or even, as Valincour says, because the author wishes to have M. de 
Clèves die, and because that intention of the fictional narrative is the 
ultima ratio of each of its elements.) 
What the Genette-Valincour argument points to is the difference in causal 
direction, by narrative levels, which we have observed. If the rule of pre­
pared consequentiality impels "realistic" fiction to provide the causes before 
revealing the effects in the récit and the histoire, the narration has the effect 
"in mind," and invents the cause afterward so that the effect may occur. As 
Sartre's Roquentin discovers (before Genette, but long after Valincour: see 
chapter nine, below), the beginning of a story implies a purpose, an "end": 
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it is the effects that have given rise to the causes. Why does the text of La 
Bête humaine inform us (p. 61) of Jacques s hereditary flaw? The answer is to 
be found in the murder of Séverine (p. 270). On the plane of narration, the 
plan for Séverine 's death "causes" the insertion early on of a reference to 
Jacques's mania. It is of course possible for a real author to create a homi­
cidal maniac and to decide later how to use him or her, but limits of 
potential use in mimetic fiction are already inherent in the character. We 
have encountered other examples of the narrations reverse logic. The cause 
of Virginie s humiliation near the start of L'Assommoir may be inferred to be 
the symmetrical humiliation of Gervaise by Virginie near the end. Cou­
peau s fall from the rooftop subsequently appears symbolic of his moral 
decline. By inference, readers may conclude that the planned moral decline 
caused a "desire" for a prefigurative symbol. Coupeaus miraculous recovery 
separates the incident from all causal chains: with no explicit causes or 
effects, the incident appears relevant only if it serves a metaphoric function. 
Just as, for example, in the case of a homicidal maniac who never kills, 
readers would be faced, if it were not for potential symbolism, with an 
irrelevancy, and irrelevance is never an assumption in conventional fiction. 
A causal relationship, at least on the level of narration, is assumed for 
all details. 
Genette calls the anterior details ("caused" by a plan for ulterior 
events) the "motivation." It is a "false" causality inserted in the histoire to 
mask the "true" causality, which I situate in the narration, and which is 
antichronological and based on intent. The function of such masking, for 
Genette, is verisimilitude.7 If we know the reasons for an event before it 
happens, if it is "motivated," it appears more plausible, verisimilar: pre­
pared consequentiality is in operation. But I would suggest, based upon 
what we have seen about reader assurance in inference, that the relationship 
has reciprocal elements. For if a world described in a fiction is familiar, 
verisimilar, readers will be all the more confident in their ability to draw 
causal assumptions. Thus verisimilitude helps us perceive tightly knit 
causal chains, gives us assurance in filling the myriad little gaps (and the 
larger ones, too) between events. Causation is always to be inferred, and 
familiar worlds reduce the uncertainty in inference. Thus verisimilitude 
facilitates histoire-levei causal inference, just as, reciprocally, ready in­
ference may give an impression of the verisimilar. 
But while forward logic in the histoire gives an impression of "reality," 
it is the backward logic of the narration (which is also, lest we forget, 
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Denizets logic) which sets texts apart from the verisimilar reality they 
pretend to describe. We infer (on solid grounds) that the future-of-text is 
known on the plane of narration; it is difficult to infer such exterior fore­
knowledge in our real lives. The inferred causality of the narration is by 
nature indexic,8 as smoke is an index of fire, as a photograph is an index of a 
camera. Coupeau's fall is, on the level of narration, indexic of a project to 
symbolize; on the level of the histoire, it is, in literary transmutation, iconic 
of the moral fall to follow. Cabuches fortuitous theft of Grandmorins watch 
is indexic of a project in the narration to have him falsely accused of murder; 
in the histoirf, it is exemplary (perhaps iconic) of coincidence: the "inter­
ference of series," the intersection of two otherwise unrelated causal chains. 
In each case, the apparent structuring of the past by the future in order to 
bring itself into existence, to justify its existence, marks a divergence from 
the "real." Textualization, as the result of an inferred intention, can create 
only a pseudoreality; the hidden inverse logic of the narration undermines 
the realism of the most realistic histoire. 
Always inferred as in the narration, causality in the histoire may seem at 
times explicit, when words referring to it spring up in conversations, 
interior monologues, etc. But these are themselves histoire-level events: the 
credibility of such language, as we have seen with Gide s Jérôme, is a matter 
for reader inference in context. In realistic histoires, cause normally precedes 
effect. Although we have seen no examples of it, narrators can obviously, in 
the récit, give the effect before the cause, which appears in a flashback; thus, 
in Mauriac s Thérèse Desqueyroux for example, the judge gives his verdict of 
"non-lieu," the reasons for which we will learn half a novel later, at the end 
of a long analepsis. But analepsis, whether it occurs in the memory of an 
intradiegetic character as in the Mauriac novel or through another device, is 
really a strategy of the récit. Readers end up reconstituting a chronological 
histoire, presumably with cause before effect if it is realistic. 
That is not to say the analeptic (or proleptic) option is of no effect once 
readers have mentally reestablished chronology; questions concerning why 
it was selected simply concern the narration, while the notion of "how" is to 
be found in the récit. But for purposes of normalization, I will describe 
analepsis as a divergent form: the "standard" traditional novel is recounted 
in chronological order of events. Causal elements in the récit are explicit 
and, as such, they call for no direct inference on the part of readers. Indeed, 
they express inferences of the text, whether they are opinions of the nar­
rative voice or causal assumptions inherent in the linguistic code. The 
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readers task at this level is thus to attempt to provide explanations where 
they are lacking and to determine whether the explanations given are to be 
believed. Belief, for example, in Jérôme is not essential to the comprehen­
sion of his story; statements about it by Juliette, Abel, and Alissa tend to 
confirm his facts. But his interpretation of events may be put in question, 
and so his intermittent, clustered explanatory vocabulary is an instrument 
for judging him rather than for making sense of the histoire. In contrast, the 
narrator of La Bête humaine must be believed in all he says, or the histoire is 
senseless: Denizets récit must appear erroneous (based as it is upon anti-
chronological logic, which the narrator seems magically able to eschew) in 
light of it. The narrators uncanny, apparent ability to "discover" the past as 
it happens constitutes a virtually invisible subversion of mimesis—invis-
ible because it is based on absence. 
Thus the inference that we are referring to here as causality not only 
exists on the traditional levels of narrative, but it characterizes and consti­
tutes those levels. Whether our causal hypothesizing is in search of an idea 
as the ultima ratio of a text (narration), or proposing relationships of implica­
tion among incidents (histoire), or gauging the credibility of words (récit), it is 
the readerly quest for causes that brings narrative levels into existence. As 
inferences about the text, they do not precede it nor belong in essence to the 
writerly world. Table 5.1, particularly in columns three and four, summa­
rizes the causal distinction among levels. 
Table 5.1's typology is "normalized" essentially in that it does not 
allow for nonchronological récits (analepsis, etc.), to which I accord special 
status, and in that it does not admit of causation explicit in the histoire 
through conversations and verbalized thoughts. These latter are not abnor­
malities in traditional fiction, but as "events" in the histoire they are read 
rather as actions; their linguistic component shares the characteristics of the 
récit, like small récits embedded in the narrators larger one. What nor­
malization brings to light, particularly in the "cognition" and "direction" 
columns, are the fundamental distinctions among levels arising from causal 
analysis. 
If the inferable existence of narration, with its counterchronological 
logic, separates the fictional text neatly from "reality," what may we infer as 
its source? The "indexic author" is not real. All we can say is that he, she, or 
it is the sum of linguistic, social, cultural, psychological, and anthropolog­
ical codes funneled through the mind and the pen of "someone": as Genette 
affirms in Figures / / / , a text is "proffered by someone," who is also the 
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Table 5.1 Normalized Typology of Construed Causation 
Level Expression Cognition Direction 
narration ideal inferred antichronological 
histoire incidental inferred chronological 
récit linguistic explicit chronological 
narration ("proféré par quelqu'un . .  . la narration qui le profère").9 Both 
the proffering {qua event) and the codes are place- and time-specific: fic­
tional texts are a part of history. 
But if history is to be significant, differences in causal strategy should 
be apparent across the years. In what sense, for example, are Zola's texts 
causally anterior to Gide s ? Obviously, the narrator in Zola has not yet 
acquired the importance as causal interpreter which he or she will attain in 
later fiction. Zola's récit is most often transparent, a slightly tinted glass 
through which we look directly on the facts and the events of the tale. 
Causal relationships are usually readily inferred, almost self-evident, or 
characters explain their motivations in honest conversation or in interior 
monologues. If, on occasion, a narrator appears only partially reliable, 
readers are all the more encouraged to seek out causal relationships in the 
chain of events itself, in the histoire. In the canon of modern fiction, from 
Proust to the new novel, the récit, linked by narrators' perceptions of 
causality, will be powerfully interposed between reader and histoire. (Tastes 
change, and therefore so do "canons." But what has been viewed as "typi­
cally best" of early twentieth-century French fiction has a strong récit, 
usually by an intradiegetic narrator who provides her or his own causal 
explanation of events—or who, like Jérôme, fails to do so—events whose 
causes are often not self evident.) Zola might well be seen as the culmina­
tion of the histoire-dominant tradition. Récits with narrowly limited per­
spective have existed all along—notably in the eighteenth century, with 
the epistolary Liaisons dangereuses or Candide as prime examples, but also in 
nineteenth-century France (one thinks inevitably of Fabrice at Waterloo)— 
but ease of causal inference at the level of the histoire is characteristic of the 
mimetic tradition from Balzac to Zola. Denizet is a quasi exception. Aris­
ing out of the histoire, he serves as a substitute narrator, providing a 
competing explanation of events to the one we receive from the narrative 
voice. In La Bête humaine, his circumscribed reconstruction loses in context; 
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but historically he wins. From Michel and Jérôme to Marcel, Roquentin, 
and Rieux, the circumscribed, intradiegetic voice dominates, and without 
competition from a transparent récit. Thus the narrators magic capacity, 
bestowed by the narration to achieve its ultima ratio, by which he "discovers 
the past as it happens," begins to disappear. In this sense, Zola's successors 
may be more "realistic" than he. 
Then too, prepared consequentiality will diminish. Narrators limited 
to normal, human capacities often discover and relate causes, in Nietz­
schean fashion, after the effects. Jérôme (apparently) discovers the reasons 
for Juliette's engagement to Teissières after the fact (although some astute 
readers may suspect them in advance), and he presents Alissas diary near 
the close of his récit, at the point in the timeline of the story when it entered 
his life, although it may provide some causal explanations (or aid in infer­
ring them) for elements of his foregoing récit. With certain exceptions, of 
which I shall evoke an example or two, stories will tend to admit to the 
inverse logic of narration, instead of seeking to conceal it. 
Furthermore, Zola appears willing to allow for confident inference of 
causation within narrative sequences. Typically, major gaps in the causal 
chain occur between sequences; the long, explicitly connected chains of La 
Bête humaine are doubtless the exception.10 Readers are free to surmise 
relationships that would unite the fragments, but Zola's texts provide a 
mythic, metaphoric substratum, which guides our choices and tends to 
limit readerly interpretation. Indeed, the vocabulary of the "mythical an­
thropology" Jean Borie uncovers so convincingly in the Rougon-Macquart 
novels can be read as a lexicon of pre-Freudian psychology: mythic motiva­
tions are, in any case, "causes," although their expression is metaphoric 
rather than métonymie. Causes can, in this sense, be readily inferred for 
most of the events in the Rougon-Macquart series: "Satanic forces" is perhaps 
as reality-referential as a metaphor for human motivations as is "Oedipus 
complex." Even La Bête humaine appears to accept the principle of causa­
tion, while raising doubts about human ability to observe and textualize it 
in open systems, either before or after the effect. Obviously aware of the loss 
of truth value in tendentious explanations (Denizet), Zola's texts are not 
above using causation to mask (in the manner described by Genette) as 
mimetic certain plot deviations developed apparently for structural effect: 
the Gervaise-Virginie reversal, the Misard chain. The underlying presump­
tion in this practice is clear: readily inferable causation works hand in hand 
with verisimilitude. The assumption that the verisimilar illusion is "real­
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istic" has less currency in the twentieth century, as the circumscribed 
narrator replaces the omniscient one. Truth value will gain in importance at 
the expense of an illusory mimesis. 
If we view novels as devised solely for our entertainment, concealment 
of the narrations manipulations behind the chronological causality of the 
histoire is perhaps less than crucial. But if we see the text as providing a 
"lesson in life," truth value reasserts itself and the problematics of tex­
tualization acquire a new seriousness. When novels appear to convey epis­
temological, ontological, or ethical knowledge, as we saw with Gide, 
readers become wary: the "age of suspicion," as Nathalie Sarraute called it, 
has arrived. 
Notes 
1. Michael Riffaterre, Semiotics of Poetry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1978), pp. 1-2 2 and passim. 
2. Roman Jakobson, Essais de linguistique générale, tr. Nicolas Ruwet (Paris: Editions 
de Minuit, 1963), pp. 6 1 - 6 7  . 
3. Norman N. Holland, "Unity Identity Text Self'," in Reader Response Criticism, 
Jane P. Tompkins, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 118-33  . 
4. For reciprocal constraints on the verisimilar text, see Gérard Genette, Figures II 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969), p. 93. 
5. Genette, pp. 7 1 - 9 9  . 
6. Genette, p. 94. 
7. Genette, p. 97. He concludes by defining the "value" or "profitability" (rende­
ment) of a narrative unit as its function minus its motivation. Thus Cabuche's theft of the 
kerchief (cum watch) would seem relatively "profitable," since it has a simple motivation 
(easily acquired adoration for Séverine) and an important function (the irony of his conviction 
for murder). On the other hand, Flore's suicide serves no bistoire-lcvel function at all, causes 
io  o • Rectilinear Causality in Narrative 
(implies) nothing; yet it is motivated by a long and extraordinarily complex chain of events. 
The suicide would appear to be a total loss as a unit, unless its "profit" derives from the very 
drama surrounding it. 
8. According to the definition of C. S Peirce, in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 
Justus Buchler, ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 1 0 2 - 3  . 
9. Gérard Genette, Figures HI (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972), p. 74. 
10. Néide de Faria, in his Structures et unité dans "les Rougon-Macquart" (Paris: Nizet, 
1977), p. 217, affirms the predominance of spatially distributed, described scenes over 
narrated events in Zola. This strategy is, of course, productive of causal gaps. 
Part II

Nonrectilinear Causal Strategies 

6 
Track and Sidetrack 
Thus the story of the Odyssey can be stated briefly. A certain man is absent 
from home for many years; he is jealously watched by Poseidon, and left 
desolate. Meanwhile his home is in a wretched plight—suitors wasting his 
substance and plotting against his son. At length, tempest-tost, he himself 
arrives; he makes certain persons acquainted with him; he attacks the 
suitors with his own hand, and is himself preserved while he destroys 
them. This is the essence of the plot; the rest is episode. 
ARISTOTLE 
(trans. S. H. Butcher) 
Paul Bourget's novel Le Disciple (1889) t e  ^ s t n  e story of Adrien Sixte, a mild-mannered psychology professor of deterministic convictions who leads a sheltered, well-ordered life, and of Robert Greslou, a 
young, self-appointed "disciple" of his, to whom he has provided counsel in 
his approach to graduate study. Greslou sends his former mentor a disturb­
ing communication, a kind of clinical study of his own psychology. In it he 
reports that, obliged to work for a living, he had found employment as a 
tutor in a well-to-do noble family. Having taken a dislike to the proud and 
athletic eldest son and heir, André de Jussat, he determines to seduce his 
sister Charlotte, using the mechanistic causal principles he had so avidly 
gleaned from Professor Sixtes writings. Man's animal nature, conditioned 
response, total dominance of environmental and hereditary forces in deter­
mining the course of human lives: such notions form the theoretical basis of 
his plan to seduce the daughter of the aristocratic family with whom he now 
lives. Ever the scientist, Greslou describes his strategy in terms of a psycho­
logical experiment, something of a novelty at the time, when psychology 
was little more than a philosophical theory. At last, Charlotte yields herself 
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and her honor to the young tutor, but for one night only, with the under­
standing that she and her lover will both commit suicide thereafter. 
Charlotte eventually carries out her part of the suicide pact, but Greslou 
quickly discovers he has lost interest in suicide, and he fails to keep the 
bargain. Profiting from circumstantial evidence, André de Jussat has 
Greslou indicted for murder, even though he knows the truth of Charlottes 
suicide (she had written him a deathbed confession), for he hopes to conceal 
her dishonor. Awaiting trial in jail, Greslou has drafted his report and sent 
it off to Sixte. Having learned that Sixte also knows the facts, André at last 
tells the truth, and Greslou is released—only to be shot dead by André. 
The power of causal chains is evident here on two levels. First, 
Greslou s successful seduction demonstrates the dominance of psychological 
forces over will: Charlottes fears, sympathies, and animal desires have 
combined with the environmental influences of her upbringing and the 
wiles of the young tutor to produce, not only her moral downfall, but her 
"inevitable" suicide. Second, Robert Greslou is likewise the product of his 
hereditary nature and environmental influences, notably that of his middle-
class origins (whence his inability to grasp Charlotte s aristocratic concept 
of honor), and particularly that of the kindly professor with the deter­
ministic doctrine. But the text is constantly working to undermine its own 
causal structure. Obviously, it paints Charlotte as delightful and admi­
rable, while Robert Greslou appears as a self-centered and calculating 
scoundrel. If readers are morally outraged by Greslou s conduct (and it is the 
"point" of the story that they should be), it is because they are insufficiently 
convinced of the inevitability of Charlotte s fate to absolve him from respon­
sibility for his calculated actions. It is difficult to believe that, despite his 
influences, he could not have turned back, could not have done otherwise. 
Then too, Robert, in his own embedded, first-person "report," is surprised 
to discover that he feels remorse after Charlotte's death; if he is merely the 
plaything of determining causal forces, why should he feel responsibility? 
And Sixte, in his free-indirect-style reflections, wrestles with a parallel 
problem: why should he feel guilty for the influence of his books on a young 
man's life? Greslou failed to understand Charlotte (he understood her well 
enough to seduce her, but not well enough to forestall her suicide) or 
himself; Sixte had no notion of Greslou's dangerous potentialities, nor of his 
own capacity for guilt. Thus the basic question to be asked of the narration 
("Why is the 'author' telling us this?") brings to light the conflict between 
the inferred author's view and that of Greslou's récit and Sixte's thoughts. For 
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the inferred author, psychological causation, while apparently similar 
to the laws of cause and effect in the material world, has other, spiritual 
dimensions that render it far more complex. Notions of morality and honor 
escape the determinist s grasp. 
While the quasi-religious and perhaps anti-intellectual underpin­
nings of this tale may make its message suspect, it uses causal chains in an 
interesting way to undermine causation as applied to the human psyche. 
The problem is that, with its traditional linear form, it must use what it 
condemns and understand what it presents as beyond understanding. It 
reveals the causes of the characters' failure to grasp certain causes, and 
precisely what causes they were unable to comprehend. 
If the human psyche is to be portrayed as a world apart, with respect to 
causal influences, from the material world in which a cue ball imparts 
specific impetus and direction to a billiard ball, in which effects are predict­
able and quantifiable, then other sorts of novels, with different causal 
structures, are required for the task. From the Bergsonian-Saussurian era 
on, forms have been discovered (and rediscovered) which allow for the 
separation of the psyche from "everything else." Many of them are peri-
causal, in that they seek to elude or "go around" the problems imposed by 
linear causal structure, particularly in portraying the human mind and 
emotions. Some are structured to evoke kinds of causation specific to the 
psyche and different from physical causation. In this and the chapters to 
follow, I will illustrate six primary strategies that alter the rectilinear causal 
chains associated with psychological causation in traditional fiction, and 
with language itself. 
Episodic structure has been around at least since the Odyssey, and it is 
still thriving. In the simplest terms, it provides a unifying central track, 
along which a number of sidetracks branch off. These may or may not lead 
back to the main line; when they do not, the reader is required to leap across 
a causal gap to find the central track, before setting off down the next 
branch. The branches are not causally connected to each other, except 
insofar as each has some causal bond to the main line. Many novels include 
the odd episode, but in truly episodic fictions they occupy far more space 
than do the elements of the unifying track. 
In standard analysis, the main line is referred to as the plot. According 
to E. M. Forsters time-honored definition in Aspects of the Novel, a plot 
consists of those events that are interconnected by a causal chain. But, as we 
have seen, such interconnections can be made on all three levels of narrative, 
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and the notion of plot has thus become a highly complex one. Furthermore, 
Forster's definition contains an implied expectation of stasis: things would 
remain the same, he seems to say, unless causation intervened to change 
them. Causation is that which makes the "beginning" change to become 
the "end." But one can just as well start from an underlying expectation 
of change and see causation intervening to produce constancy. Our main 
line may involve change or constancy, and causation may be inferred as 
much for one as for the other. Its primary structural function is to provide 
an explicit or inferred basis for the sidetracks, which make up most (or even 
all) of the récit. 
Since our subject is the strategies used to weaken or subvert linear 
causality, the particular structure under consideration here is that in which 
the sidetracks lead to dead ends. Indeed, insofar as any episode can be 
defined as distinct from plot, it must have an ending of its own, from which 
we leap back into the main course of events, or ahead into another distinct 
episode. These dead ends are breaks in the causal chain, but breaks of a 
specific kind, far different from the fragmentation we will examine in later 
chapters. 
J.-K. Huysmanss A rebours,l a standard roman à tiroirs, provides a clear 
example of a traditional linear plot dominated by multiple episodes. In it, 
Jean des Esseintes, ultimate scion of a degenerated aristocratic family, 
withdraws, fleeing the turbulence of Parisian life, to a thébatde raffinée in 
Fontenay, where he leads a hermits existence, until neurosis and disease 
force him to return, on doctors orders, to a more social existence in Paris. 
The elements of the plot are few. The initial cause is the effete young man's 
extreme sensitivity, doubtless of hereditary origins, which produces in him 
a neurotic fear of disorder, and an equally neurotic desire to see himself as 
different from the common horde. The first event is the withdrawal to 
Fontenay. The second "event" is the establishment of a style of life which is 
at once ordered and different. He lives by night and sleeps by day, thus 
avoiding contact with his servants; with strict punctuality, he eats the 
simple meals set out for him according to menus established four times a 
year. His surroundings are both unusual and thematically organized: one 
room of his apartments is decorated like a ship's cabin; his bedroom imitates 
a (remarkably luxurious) monk's cell; his library, done in blue and orange, 
offers him the company of his exquisitely decadent collection of books; he 
steeps himself in rare wines and liqueurs, surrounds himself with ex­
otic plants and perfume-making equipment. The third event is the actual 
Track and Sidetrack • 107 
physical illness and exasperated neurosis arising from solitary nights passed 
in such surroundings. The final event is his decision to return to Paris, 
taken with a prayer on his lips: "Seigneur, prenez pitié du chrétien qui 
doute . . ."(p. 269); "Lord, take pity on the Christian who doubts . . ."— 
suggesting a rebirth of faith. From the initial stative event onward, the 
story is that of a problem and an attempted solution which merely aggra­
vates the situation, leading to admission of failure. The events just listed 
are the noyaux or "kernels" of the "plot," as Chatman calls them, and 
readers perceive them as "important," for the primary meaning of "impor­
tant," with respect to traditional fiction, is "consequential," i.e., "belong­
ing to a causal chain."2 
The episodes are examples of ways in which des Esseintes spends his 
time while ensconced at Fontenay. That these occupations contribute in 
some measure to his worsening health, there can be little doubt. But their 
contribution could easily have been summarized in a single chapter, if 
demonstrating their importance were the only aim, instead of the thirteen 
chapters (III through XV) that they actually fill. As examples, some of them 
at random could have been omitted, or they could be rearranged in a 
different order without altering the central track of the story. But they are 
more than examples: that the episodes dominate the central track is appar­
ent, not only from their sheer volume, but also from their power. At one 
point, to illustrate that travel is a matter of perception rather than of action 
(the distinction between psyche and reality mentioned above), the inferred 
author has des Esseintes undertake a voyage to London; he gets no farther 
than the Gare Saint-Lazare—by that time he has seen enough fog and 
Englishmen, and eaten enough English food, to satisfy his craving for 
foreign travel. In order to insert this illustrative episode (chapter XI), the 
inferred author is obliged to postulate a sudden and causeless amelioration 
in des Esseintes s health, so that he is mentally and physically able to travel. 
Thus the linear direction of the main line—from bad to worse—is tempo­
rarily altered for the sake of an interesting episode. The main line will be 
moved, if necessary, to switch us onto a sidetrack. 
Despite the frequent transitions, sidetracks are not causally interre­
lated. One of them begins, for example, with des Esseintes selecting plants 
to ornament his seclusion. He chooses bizarre hybrids which simulate 
metals or human flesh in leaves and petals. These choices, made as a 
consequence of his neurosis, lead to fevered sexual imaginings and finally to 
what we would call today a highly Freudian nightmare. The following 
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chapter (IX) begins: "These nightmares recurred: he grew fearful of going 
to sleep" (p. 136; "Ces cauchemars se renouvelèrent: il craignit de s'endor-
mir"). To fill the sleepless hours, he decides to reorganize his collection of 
Goya prints. At this point, we have reached a dead end and started offdown 
another sidetrack. The causal chain does not continue, for the fear of sleep 
furnishes the condition for reexamining the Goyas, but not the cause: any 
one of numerous other activities could have been selected. When he dis­
cards the offending plants before turning to the prints (p. 137), we have 
reached a causal block. As for the new Goya branch, organizing the prints 
turns out to be purposeless, since des Esseintes fears to hang them: some 
fool might see and admire them, thus ruining the egocentric pleasure they 
hold for our hero. Here we reach another causal block and return to evoca­
tions of the feverish restlessness characteristic of the neurosis. The next 
branch begins with a decision to read "emolient" literature, to "refrigerate" 
his overheated brain: Dickens! But the chaste and blushing maidens he 
finds there, instead of calming his nerves, end up by reminding him of his 
own, less virginal loves—an American acrobat named Miss Urania, a 
female ventriloquist, and a young man who had sought directions of him in 
the street. 
Thus the episodes, separated by causal blocks, form a series rather than 
a sequence; superficially connected at times by transitions, they are also 
often attached at their beginning to the main line, to show that they are 
causally born of the malady itself. Indeed, of the sixteen chapters, seven 
(VII, IX, X, XI, XIV, XV, XVI) leap back from a dead end to reconnect in 
this way at the beginning to the central track. The movement within the 
episodes is typically caused, however, and the direction of causation is 
usually from "real" stimulus to psychic state. Hideous houseplants evoke 
nightmares; readings (Dickens, medieval Latin texts) provide memories; 
the neighborhood of the Gare Saint-Lazare creates a mental image of Lon­
don; perfumes resurrect the past. It is these psychic states—dreams, mem­
ories, hallucinations—which constitute the essential dead ends of the side­
tracks. This particular causal organization is worth examining in both its 
structural and its thematic effects. 
Structurally, this track-and-sidetrack mechanism establishes potential 
parallelism among the branches. Part of what the text loses in linear unity, 
it recaptures in unity-by-resemblance. The movements from present physi­
cal reality to psychic states create a pattern that sets repetition up as a 
competitor with causation for the "honor" of satisfying the readers' quest for 
Track and Sidetrack « 1 0  9 
unity in the novel. Repetition encourages reading of the text not as line but 
as space, an activity calling forth all manner of similarities: between the pet 
tortoise, whose shell des Esseintes gilds and bejewels to enliven the rug on 
which it crawls (thus caparisoned, it promptly dies), and our hero himself 
(also dying, in splendid isolation); between des Esseintes's taste in house­
plants and Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal, which he admires; between the 
blending of liqueurs in the famous "mouth organ" and the blending of 
perfumes; among underlying similarities in all des Esseintes s preferences in 
art and literature. Indeed, the ubiquitous references to artistic expression— 
prose, poetry, painting, music, interior decoration—establish the récit, by 
repetition, as highly "specular."3 The description of the Gustave Moreau 
paintings of Salomes dance (chapter V), as a vision of the undermining of 
rational authority by the animal appetites, can be read as a model or matrix 
for Huysmanss novel, where life (corporal needs) destroys order (the per­
fectly regulated thébatde): "Tel que le vieux roi, des Esseintes demeurait 
écrasé, anéanti, pris de vertige devant cette danseuse. . . .  " (p. 89); "Like 
the old king, des Esseintes was left crushed, destroyed, overcome with 
vertigo as he beheld this dancer. . . .  " John the Baptists head, shining 
terrifyingly upon the platter in the watercolor, seems to prefigure the 
temptation of faith in the Lamb of the last page of the novel: will return to 
faith in Christ be still another dead-end hallucination or at last a truly 
liberating vision? The very creation by des Esseintes of the rarified atmo­
sphere of his hermitage coincides with Huysmanss creation of the text, as it 
in turn becomes the readers tbébaïde. It is toward such fundamental connec­
tions that readers are guided by the parallelism of the sidetracks, and con­
nection by comparison undermines the linear concatenations of causality. 
Since causation is both potential structure and potential theme, when 
causal structures are nonrectilinear as in this novel, texts are weakened in 
their capacity for expressing, on the thematic level, the deterministic power 
of causation. But weakened or not, the determining forces here are far from 
powerless. The strong central chain, along which neurosis becomes psycho­
somatic illness, drives des Esseintes ineluctably to Fontenay, and just as 
ineluctably drives him out again. Causation does, however, tend to dissi­
pate in the branches. His is then, in the Bergsonian sense, an interiorly 
undifferentiated psyche (one could not say what element of his conscious­
ness led him, for example, to his Goya prints in particular), and at the same 
time an exteriorly differentiated one (a reader could scarcely predict that, by 
turning to Dickens, our hero would revive memories of his earlier exotic 
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lusts and moments of impotence, for the reader is not des Esseintes). But 
absence of clear causation here on the level of the histoire raises questions, as 
in Zola, on the level of the narration: why is the author breaking the chain? 
Since many sidetracks end in psychic states, it is apparent that the branches 
treat mental deterioration, while the central track, with its linear causa­
tion, has as its destination the physical degeneration of des Esseintes s body. 
Arrival, along the sidetracks, at various psychic states is effected primarily 
by the mechanism of psychological association. While I will explore this 
special type of causation more fully in subsequent chapters, it is essential to 
note here that this sort of causal connection (associations between plants and 
women, between Dickenss heroines and certain memories) is functional 
only in the mind; it is explainable but unpredictable. Odd hours, diet, and 
inactivity, on the other hand, are predictably ruinous to the body. One 
answer to our question is thus that the "author" is breaking the chain in 
order to distinguish between psychic causation on the sidetracks and physi­
cal causation on the main line of his story. 
A second plausible answer is that the "author" wishes his character to 
have moments of unpredictability, moments when his reactions cannot be 
foreseen. Thematically, des Esseintes makes common cause with Taine (and 
"Adrien Sixte") in deploring the unpredictable and the spontaneous in his 
surroundings. He finds the inanimate more desirable than the animate, 
preferring locomotives to women and requiring that his live houseplants 
appear artificial. The famous tortoise with the gilded carapace soon oblig­
ingly becomes the decorative object it was purchased to be, when it dies; 
and the ornamental artifice of Fontenay is killing its master's body just as 
surely. Des Esseintes is delighted to recall that, by a psychological ploy, he 
was able to destroy a young marriage, and he is troubled by the thought that 
a similar deterministic experiment of his was apparently unsuccessful in 
transforming an indigent and abused lad into a thief and a cutthroat (chap­
ter VI). Our former dandy adores the predictability of rigid, mechanistic 
physical causality, but the application of such unwavering order to living 
things has its dangers. Either the unpredictable disorder of life will break 
through in hallucinations and dreams (psychological causation), or the 
unrelenting forces of physical causality will kill. 
There is something of Rimbaud in des Esseintes s "visions," and both 
had tried nearly "all forms of love, of suffering, of madness." But Rimbaud 
was seeking freedom from determinism in poetry; des Esseintes is unpro­
ductive, and his visions are abortive dead ends. Indeed, in their very dead­
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endedness, they doubtless contribute to his physical deterioration and the 
collapse of the noble experiment in Fontenay. Unless the last, religious 
"vision" is productive, des Esseintes belongs to the inevitable. 
Huysmans, in his own life, was already on the way to selecting the 
religious sidetrack and making it his main line when Zola upbraided him 
for publishing A rebours: "with somber glance," as Huysmans recalled, "he 
criticized me for the book, saying that I was dealing a terrible blow to 
naturalism, leading the school astray . . .  " ("l'oeil devenu noir, il me 
reprocha le livre, disant que je portais un coup terrible au naturalisme, que 
je faisais dévier l'école . . .").4The track-and-sidetrack structure is indeed 
more than a different way to organize the histoire of a novel. It is another sort 
of causal strategy, distinguishing between causation of the mind and of 
matter, exemplifying the richness of numerous parallel structures, and thus 
attacking as insufficient the mechanistic, rectilinear causality on which 
many of the most admired nineteenth-century novels had been plotted. 
But after A rebours, how far could such a counterstructure go? The 
surrealist novel is perhaps the extreme example of the sidetrack approach. 
These novels are characterized by the fact that the psychic causation exists 
on the main line, while physical causes, such as there are, reside in the 
branches; by the strongly reality-referential character of the branches (these 
texts treat primarily real people and real places); and by the fact that the 
main line itself is present but scarcely explicit. Psychic causation still runs 
on a track separate from the physical in both our examples, Aragon's Le 
Paysan de Paris (1926) and Bretons Nadja (1928),5 but its new position on 
the central track gives it the upper hand. 
Le Paysan de Paris, which Pfromm calls felicitously "fiktionale Auto-
biographie,"6 consists of two itineraries; first the narrative voice takes us on 
a stroll through the Passage de l'Opéra (since destroyed to make way for the 
boulevard Haussmann), and then we follow a walk, taken by Aragon with 
Marcel Noll and André Breton in the Parc des Buttes-Chaumont. The 
commercial establishments in the covered pedestrian walkways that made 
up the Passage are described in the order in which one would come upon 
them if one followed a specific course through the mall. If some mysterious 
or long-forgotten causal chains determined which shops should be neigh­
bors, no allusion is made to that here: the establishments simply pop into 
the text in the order foreordained by reality itself, and without causal 
connection to one another. What makes this one come "before" that one and 
"after" that other one is the movement of the narrators itinerant psyche, as 
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he passes along the walkways. The timeline, which here makes up the 
central track, is that of the moving, observing, narrating mind; each 
commercial establishment it passes, it expounds upon, thus producing a 
series of dead-end sidetracks. The narrator here has the same name, and 
presumably the same personality traits, as the author who signed the manu­
script. If the narrator is "real" and the Passage is "real," where is the fiction? 
It lies precisely in that double distortion which comes from seeing first, and 
then from writing. The narrators vision is conditioned by all of his past 
experience and by his mood and preoccupations of the moment; his choice 
of words is influenced by everything from his vast cultural baggage to the 
reader he is imagining for his text. Narrator and author conjoin in this work 
to make up the implied author, who is himself the fiction. 
The transformation of things into language through the medium of a 
reacting psyche is the fictional mechanism. Aragon is well aware that, as 
narrator, his vision is at all times fictionalizing reality, projecting the 
workings of his psyche upon it: "la nature est mon inconscient" (p. 153); 
"nature is my unconscious." Under his mythologizing eye/pen, gasoline 
pumps acquire, for example, the identity of one-armed divinities or idols 
(p. 145). Aragons narrative is at once his world and his text: 
II y a dans le monde un désordre impensable, et l'extraordinaire est 
qu'à leur ordinaire les hommes aient recherché sous l'apparence du 
désordre, un ordre mystérieux, qui leur est si naturel, qui n'exprime 
qu'un désir qui est en eux, un ordre qu'ils n'ont pas plus tôt introduit 
dans les choses qu'on les voit s'émerveiller de cet ordre, et impliquer 
cet ordre à une idée, et expliquer cet ordre par une idée. (P. 234) 
(There is an unreasonable disorder in the world, and the extraordinary 
part is that ordinarily men have sought, beneath the appearance of 
disorder, a mysterious order, which is so natural to them, which 
expresses nothing but a desire which lies within them; and no sooner 
have they projected that order into things than you see them marvel at 
that order, and implicate that order into an idea, and explicate that 
order by an idea.) 
One of the primary pleasures of reading this text is the discovery of the 
identity of the narrative voice through its linguistic reflection in things, 
seen and described. If the Parc des Buttes-Chaumont is henceforth for me 
vaguely vulviform, it is because the Aragonian psyche/text reflects it that 
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way. Aragon and his two companions "attendent de ces bosquets perdus 
sous les feux du risque une femme qui n'y soit pas tombée" (p. 166); "dans 
les jardins publics, le plus compact de l'ombre se confond avec une sorte de 
baiser désespéré de l'amour et de la révolte" (p. 174); "Dans les plis du 
terrain où tout les sollicite, ils sont les jouets de la nuit" (p. 175); "il y a cette 
femme dans chaque idée qu'enfin je cerne" (p. 208); "Ainsi l'univers peu à 
peu pour moi s'efface, fond, tandis que de ses profondeurs s'élève un fan­
tôme adorable, monte une grande femme enfin profilée, qui apparaît par-
tout" (p. 209); "Ainsi retrouvant l'inflexion heureuse de ta hanche ou, le 
détour ensorceleur de tes bras dans le plus divers des lieux, . . . je ne puis 
plus parler de rien que de toi-même" (p. 211); "tu t'es levée sur ce parc" 
(p. 212).7 In this evolving feminization of the park, if causation enters the 
process, it is on the level of the narration: why is the author/narrator 
seeing/writing the world this way? The origin of the constant "desire which 
lies within" him, of the order that he has "projected . . . into things," is 
nowhere explicit. But some velitation between id and superego is being 
mediated on the page. 
Thus a vast domain is opened to reader inference. Two places in Paris 
of which readers supposedly have some memory form the matter of the récit. 
Comparison of our vision of the places to the Aragonian description sug­
gests the nature of the difference between each of us and the inferred author. 
That difference will lie in the kinds of mental connections he and we tend to 
invent among the multifarious realities—that "unreasonable disorder"— 
in order to reason the inherently meaningless chaos. And since there are two 
quite separate walks (the Passage and the Pare), we have two fictional 
Aragons, two inferred authors, to compare to each other and to ourselves. 
What such inference—doubtless different for each reader—yields is a set of 
psychic causes conditioned by a linguistic code; for, as the nature of the 
psyche itself is the cause of its reflection in the world of things, so the limits 
of textualization determine how that reflection becomes text. 
In Nadja as well, André Breton's "je" is virtually the only referent to a 
continuous central track from which the branches spring. The sidetracks are 
a series of anecdotes from which the narrator (who is "André Breton"—what 
that name means is a central question) not only omits much causal vocabu­
lary, but in which he also adopts the strategy of denying explicitly the role 
of human intentions in events. Consider the way he prepares, in this 
supposedly autobiographical text, the account of his first encounter with 
Nadja in the street: 
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Le 4 octobre dernier, à la fin d'un de ces après-midis tout à fait dés 
oeuvres et très mornes, comme j'ai le secret d'en passer, je me trouvais 
rue Lafayette: après m'être arrêté quelques minutes devant la vitrine de 
la librairie de L'Humanité et avoir fait l'acquisition du dernier ouvrage 
de Trotsky, sans but je poursuivais ma route dans la direction de 
l'Opéra. Les bureaux, les ateliers commençaient à se vider, du haut en 
bas des maisons des portes se fermaient, des gens sur le trottoir se 
serraient la main, il commençait tout de même à y avoir plus de 
monde. J'observais sans le vouloir des visages, des accoutrements, des 
allures. Allons, ce n'étaient pas encore ceux-là qu'on trouverait prêts à 
faire la Révolution. (Pp. 57-58) 
(Last October 4th, at the end of one of those completely idle and very 
dull afternoons I have the secret of spending, I found myself in the rue 
Lafayette: after stopping for a few minutes in front of the display 
window in the bookstore of L'Humanité and acquiring Trotsky's latest 
work, I was continuing aimlessly toward the Opera. Offices and facto­
ries were beginning to empty; from top to bottom in the buildings 
doors were closing; on the sidewalk people were shaking hands; any­
way there were beginning to be more people about. Unintentionally I 
was observing faces, clothing, ways of walking. Come now, those still 
weren't the folks we'd find ready to launch the Revolution.) 
The initial date (Breton later specified the year: 1926), like the place names, 
is a phenomenological marker, denoting the nonfictional character of the 
events to follow. In reality, where events occur wordlessly, causation is never 
explicit; we observe what happens, but the "why" remains a matter for 
interpretation. As narrator, Breton appears to strive to keep his text "phe­
nomenological," devoid of causal interpretation. But he goes farther: had he 
said nothing, readers might well infer, on the level of the histoirey that he 
had gone to the rue Lafayette to pick up a copy of the latest Trotsky. But 
Breton specifically blocks the inference: he was spending idle time and 
simply "found himself" there. Afterward, he walked "aimlessly," observ­
ing passersby "unintentionally." The people about him seem scarcely more 
capable of willed actions: it is the inanimate offices and workshops that are 
closing, as if without human intervention. It is difficult to avoid the 
transitive verbs that imply causality, but Breton manages: simply and 
impersonally, "there were beginning to be more people about." Even the 
causation inherent in "faire la Révolution" is negated. 
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One may perhaps infer the causes of the negative conclusion: these 
workers are too satisfied with their milieu ("se serraient la main"), or too 
prosperous ("accoutrements"), or too mechanized by the routine that gov­
erns their lives (daily "rush-hour" events) to be ready to rebel. But the 
conclusion, like the purchase of the Trotsky text, is itself an event and 
therefore a potential cause. It is clear that serious political preoccupations 
are dominating the narrators mind, so strongly that he carries out a politi­
cal analysis of the crowd in spite of himself. But here again, a causal block 
falls in place. These events are not preparatory to the composition of a 
political tract: the narrator is about to "pick up" a young woman in the 
street. These then are noncauses, a narrative dead end; why give these 
details at all if they are not relevant to what follows? Their relevancy lies, of 
course, precisely in their stressed irrelevance: "There I was, thinking about 
the liberation of the working class, when this woman walked by. . . .  " The 
inferable intent of the narration is to demonstrate the discontinuous, non­
linear, noncausal character, both of real phenomena and of the conscious­
ness that observes them. If there is to be any linear constant in this anec­
dotal text, it will have to reside in the omnipresent "I," but below the level 
of the consciousness. Gaps here, just as in Zola, send the reader to the 
level of the narration, in search of unifying links; that the inferred author 
knows of and seeks this reaction is apparent in his careful presentation of 
"extraneous" details in the context of a preparation, and in the strategy of 
causal blocks it conditions. If readers eventually conclude that subconscious 
forces were at work in Bretons life, it will be largely because explanations 
were available neither on the level of the récit, where the paucity of causal 
vocabulary eliminates them, nor on the level of the histoire, where blocking 
strategies deny them. 
We will later learn that Nadja too was walking quite at random ("sans 
but aucun," p. 59), so that this first meeting seems to be a chance occur­
rence, an effect of le hasard objectif. Nadja is, of course, "l'âme errante" 
(p. 69)—"the wandering soul"—the very essence of movement without 
conscious cause. She invites Breton to make up a story of random elements, 
carefully underscoring the relationship of life to text: 
Ferme les yeux et dis quelque chose. N'importe, un chiffre, un pré­
nom. Comme ceci (elle ferme les yeux): Deux, deux quoi? Deux 
femmes. Comment sont ces femmes? En noir. Où se trouvent-elles? 
Dans un parc. . .  . Et puis, que font-elles? Allons, c'est si facile, 
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pourquoi ne veux-tu pas jouer? Eh bien moi, c'est ainsi que je me parle 
quand je suis seule, que je me raconte toutes sortes d'histoires. Et pas 
seulement de vaines histoires: c'est même entièrement de cette façon 
que je vis. (Pp. 7 3 - 7 4  ) 
(Close your eyes and say something. It doesn't matter, a number, a first 
name. Like this [she closes her eyes]: Two, two what? Two women. 
What do they look like? They're in black. Where are they? In a 
park. . . . Then what are they doing? Come on, it's so easy; why wont 
you play? Well me, that's the way I talk to myself when I'm alone and 
tell myself all sorts of stories. And not just useless stories: that's even 
completely the way I live.) 
With a new and spontaneous "choice" to be made for each word or phrase, 
the story comes to life more vertically (movement at each "choice" from 
subconscious to consciousness) than horizontally (movement from preced­
ing words to following words). As a sample matrix or model for this 
fictional autobiography as a whole, Nadja's text simulates, in its interrup­
tive questions, the causal blockers of Bretons prose; his apparently random 
selection of anecdotes mirrors her spontaneous choice of words. But the very 
surface fragmentation sets one searching for a deeper cause: in a novel, we 
seek it in the narration; in life ("that's even completely the way I live"), we 
look toward the subconscious. These surrealist texts conjoin narration, 
narrator's subconscious, and main line in a single entity. 
Another model for Nadja is to be found in the story of Les Détraquées, a 
play which had so greatly impressed Breton that he saw it three or four 
times. In it, two deranged women, both teachers in girls' schools, do away 
with a student in the boarding school that one of them administers. The 
victim is drawn into the murderesses' clutches by a chance occurrence: a ball 
the little girls are playing with in the courtyard happens to bounce through 
a window into the office where the two women are, and their intended 
victim enters to retrieve it. As Breton tells the story, there is a suggestion 
that the teachers had killed another pupil the year before, but the evidence 
is purely inferential, as is indeed the explanation of this year's murder: 
spectators do not see the crime, only the girl's entrance and the subsequent 
discovery of the body. We may be certain, on the level of the histoire, that 
the women did her in, but Breton's interest is drawn precisely to the absence 
of explicit causal links: 
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Le manque d'indices suffisants sur ce qui se passe après la chute du 
ballon, sur ce dont Solange et sa partenaire peuvent exactement être la 
proie pour devenir ces superbes bêtes de proie, demeure par excellence 
ce qui me confond. (P. 45) 
(The lack of sufficient clues about what goes on after the ball bounces, 
about just what Solange and her partner may be prey to in order to 
have become such superb beasts of prey, is what supremely leaves me 
perplexed.) 
What is missing is not causation (Breton indeed infers that the women are 
prey to some diseased desire), but "indices" of its existence. That the 
authors analysis of the play points out the importance of causal gaps reveals 
the use he makes of causality in his own text: profiting from readers' need for 
it in the absence of all "indices," he employs a lack to make them discover or 
generate a profound psychic causation for what happens. Blocking in­
ferences on the level of the histoire, he sends readers directly to the narration. 
The relationship of this causal strategy to psychoanalytic dream analy­
sis is obvious and explicit in the novel. In a rare causal link, the narrator 
recounts a dream he had, partly inspired by certain episodes of Les Détra­
quées, partly by his recent observation of a mother bird stuffing insects into 
the craws of its young. Conscious, waking impressions provide the vocabu­
lary of our dream language, which the subconscious of course restructures, 
juxtaposing remembered impressions to fit a psychic syntax. Breton re­
marks on the "eminently revealing" role, "in the highest degree 'overdeter­
mining' in the Freudian sense," which conscious images play in dream 
formation (p. 47). It is the search for the "revelation" in the psychic syntax, 
for the cause of the particular selection and structuring of dream images, 
that constitutes the groundwork of Freudian dream analysis. The logic 
applicable to psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams applies as well to the 
reading of this novel. 
A markedly heterogeneous series of events, noted and remarked upon 
by a "same" psyche: for reading such a text, the logic required is simple 
abstraction—comparison of anecdotes, retention of those factors common 
to most episodes as representative of the informing psyche, and elimination 
of heterogeneous factors as related to dream vocabulary rather than syntax. 
Comparison of the sidetracks in Nadja hints at the presence of certain 
constants, a common preoccupation, a possible reason why these things 
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should, in particular, stimulate the narrator's interest. A likely psychic 
state behind the selection of these episodes might be the tension between 
physical attraction toward women and fear of them, leading to fear of 
intercourse and possible impotence. (The dream just mentioned includes 
the "particularly reprehensible" fraud of inserting one sou in the slot of an 
automatic machine, where two were called for.) Although Nadja s vertically 
constructed, highly spontaneous style of life is strongly valorized in the 
text, the inferred author also perceives it as dangerous: 
. .  . un soir que je conduisais une automobile sur la route de Versailles 
à Paris, une femme à mon côté qui était Nadja, mais qui eût pu, n'est-
ce pas, être toute autre, et même telle autre, son pied maintenant le 
mien pressé sur l'accélérateur, ses mains cherchant à se poser sur mes 
yeux, dans l'oubli que procure un baiser sans fin, voulait que nous 
n'existassions plus, sans doute à tout jamais, que l'un pour l'autre, 
qu'ainsi à toute allure nous nous portassions à la rencontre des beaux 
arbres. Quelle épreuve pour l'amour, en effet. (P. 143) 
(. . . one evening as I was driving an automobile on the road from 
Versailles to Paris, a woman beside me who was Nadja, but who could 
have been any other—right?—and even that other, with her foot 
holding mine pressed down on the accelerator, and her hands seeking 
to cover my eyes in the forgetfulness an endless kiss procures, desired 
that we cease existing, doubtless forever, except for each other, and 
that we be borne thus at top speed to a meeting with the lovely trees. 
What a test for love, indeed.) 
Whether this sexual tension truly subtends the text, whether it is discov­
ered there or generated by my own propensities, are less important ques­
tions in this context than the logic used to reveal it. For that logic implies a 
parallel tension, between the unique (and therefore heterogeneous) and the 
comparable (and therefore repeated). Nadja herself signifies radical differ­
ence and the impossibility of repetition ("Les Pas perdus? Mais il n'y en a 
pas," [p. 70]; "Wasted Steps? Why there aren't any").8 Yet the inferred 
author is constantly comparing, noting for example a perceived similarity 
between Nadja's eyes and those of the actress playing Solange in Les Détra­
quées (p. 58). Even in the automobile anecdote he keeps comparing—"any 
other," "that other"—in the narrative midst of what could have been for 
him a genuinely unique experience! Love and fear, he seems to say, the 
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unique, the differentiated, the heterogeneous, but seek security in the 
repeatable, the constant. 
What is disconcerting about reading surrealist novels as avatars of the 
plot-and-episode structure is that, in the plot, nothing happens. But that 
"nothing" is, precisely, an event. The real world, as we consciously perceive 
it, is multifarious, disconnected, inexplicable—a heterogeneous collection 
of unrelated existents. One should expect, in these conditions, that the 
perceiving mechanism, bombarded on all sides by multiple, radically dif­
ferentiated phenomena, would itself be transformed from moment to mo­
ment. The astonishing thing is that, instead, it organizes, unifies, connects 
the flood of differentiated impressions that assail it, selecting for memory 
the most useful and making a mental language of them. This unexpected 
changelessness of the observer has a cause, in theory: the ineluctable func­
tioning of the subconscious according to the Freudian system. The power of 
causation, of explicability and predictability, lies therefore on the main line 
just as much in Aragon and Breton as in Huysmans. 
For the earlier novelist, the psyche is unpredictable, while the physical 
world is subject to relatively foreseeable causal factors. The surrealists have 
turned that around, while retaining similar structures. The central track 
(explicit in A rebours, inferable in the surrealist texts) is essential to an 
understanding of all three texts; it also plays a unifying role and generates 
the required contrasts: psyche/reality and unity/diversity. 
And yet, what is this "understanding," this constant, unifying 
psyche, if not one more inference, by definition unproven? Is a changeless 
psyche behind it all, or have I, like Aragons human observers, been intro­
ducing my own "natural" order into these texts, only to discover it there 
and marvel at it? The prime difference between Aragons observers and 
readers is that the latter confront texts rather than universal chaos. Insofar 
as textuality is a condition of writing, texts are bounded by linguistic limits, 
which insinuate conceptuality (exemplified by the merger of "seeing" and 
"writing" we observed in Aragon) and intentionality into them, as surely as 
they consist of "discourse." For while it is theoretically possible to write 
without conceptualizing or intending, discourse, narrative discourse, 
would hardly be the result. The resources of language, of textualiza­
tion, thus play a causal role, as a condition of our inferences. One can point 
to a "unifying textuality" (e.g., recurring words, metaphors, the gradual 
feminization of the landscape in Aragon's picture of the Parc des Buttes­
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Chaumont) just as accurately as to a unifying unconscious: the intent of 
narration is intent of text, as well as intent of "author." 
The purely inferential character of the main line in Aragon and Breton 
makes their structures easy to confuse with the absurdist fragmentation 
strategies and with the structures of mental representation, both of which 
we will consider later. This is perhaps the place to underscore the basic 
distinctions. Like episodic tales, absurdist fragmented stories include radi­
cal causal breaks and blockers, assemblages in the histoire of apparently 
unrelated events, and generally homodiegetic narrators. But the frag­
mented stories call into serious question causal explanations in general, 
including notions of a structuring or structured psyche; and despite the 
breakdown in causality (or perhaps because of it) chronological order re­
acquires significance. Even though events are unrelated in the récit and un-
relatable in the histoire, it is inferably important to the narration that they 
occur in a given order: there can be little question of interchanging epi­
sodes, as in our three track-and-branches novels. 
Novels of mental representations, common in France since the 1950s, 
string together a series of "mental images" as perceived by a psyche 
(whether in perception or memory, by hypothesis or imagination) and 
textualized. Des Esseintess dream qualifies as an "imagination" of this sort, 
while subjective perceptions and recollections characterize the surrealist 
texts. But des Esseintess nightmare, embedded as it is in a clearly refer­
ential third-person récit of specific detail, is obviously connected to a 
fictionally "real" world. The surrealists also rely heavily on objective real-
ity—real people, places the reader knows. Breton provides numerous 
photographs with his text, perhaps as a means of marking the causally 
unrelated or (in the modern sense) "contingent" nature of reality, as it 
stands in contrast to the unifying subconscious of the narration. Recontex­
tualized, the photographic images are also textualized, but they retain their 
differences from words. The more recent "novels of mental representation" 
tend to abandon their reality-referential components (even when they al­
lude to historical places or events): the contrast psyche/reality is gone, and 
only the psyche (or the text . . .) remains. Reality, if we seek it in such 
texts, will be neither causally related nor "contingent," but what it is 
perceived to be; in the most extreme cases, referentiality will elude us, and 
with it the causal model, leaving only a text. Surrealism still pretends to an 
inferable intent, lurking beneath the seemingly disparate episodes. 
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6. Riidiger Pfromm, Revolution im Zeichen des Mythos: Eine wirkungsgeschichtliche 
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7. Aragon and his two companions "are expecting from these groves, lost beneath 
the fires of risk, a woman who is not there by chance"; "in the public parks, the densest of 
shade blends into a kind of desperate kiss of love and rebellion"; "In the folds of the terrain, 
where everything calls out to them, they are the playthings of the night"; "in each idea that 
at last I grasp, there is this woman"; "Thus the universe fades away for me and melts, while 
from its depths an adorable phantom ascends, an immense woman arises at last clearly 
outlined, appearing on all sides"; "Thus rediscovering the pleasant curve of your thigh or the 
bewitching bend of your arms in the most diverse of places . . . , I can speak of nothing but 
you"; "you have risen upon this park." 
8. Nadja refers to the title of Breton's 1924 work, Les Pas perdus, which contains 
(among other things) an allusion to the term "salle des pas perdus"—"waiting room" ("room 
of wasted steps"). 
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Associating with Proust 
Proust wrote at length in order to create within the frame of his novel an 
interval of oubli, the forgetting which would allow the reader a true experi­
ence of remembering and recognizing. 
ROGER SHATTUCK 
Le plus troublant de la métalepse est bien dans cette hypothèse inacceptable 
et insistante, que l'extradiégétique est peut-être toujours déjà diégétique, 
et que le narrateur et ses narrataires, c'est-à-dire vous et moi, appartenons 
peut-être encore à quelque récit. 
(The most disturbing thing about metalepsis really lies in that unaccept­
able but insistent hypothesis, that the extradiegetic is maybe always al­
ready diegetic, and that the narrator and his narratees, that is to say you and 
I, are perhaps a part of some still other récit.) 
GERARD GENETTE 
Causal analysis of A la recherche du temps perdu1 reveals little new meaning in Proust's monumental novel that has not already been uncovered by the thousands of extant analyses, but it yields insight 
into Proustian strategies involving causation to relate the reader to the text. 
We have already seen how gaps in causal chains can condition reader reac­
tions, allowing readers' needs for explicability and predictability to cause us 
to pose questions on other levels of the narrative; with Proust, we can 
observe strategies at work tending to cause reader reaction directly. Nearly 
all stories employ to this end the well-catalogued techniques of otherness, 
which set the reader up in competition with the text: curiosity, suspense, 
surprise, seduction.2 Proust chooses techniques of similarity, which reveal 
the dynamic, narrative, causal substratum of metaphor itself. 
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At first glance, Proust's magnum opus seems to offer a brachiate, plot-
and-episode structure: a linear temporal existence with occasional escape 
into "epiphanic" involuntary memories. Like des Esseintes, the narrator 
(who might as well be called "Marcel") suffers from a "disease," the inexo­
rable progression of which forms the causal main line of the text: the bio­
logical and psychological aging process. We follow the narrator from child­
hood in the 1870s well into middle age. Just as maturation is programmed 
in the child, so physical deterioration inheres in the adult. Furthermore, 
with every mental change we undergo—new experiences, changing health, 
transient states of mind—the being that we were before slips away from us, 
so that a series of psychological "deaths" marks our relentless pathway to the 
physical tomb. That the narrator perceives these elements of his story as 
forming a causal chain is apparent in his references to the genetic and 
psychological "laws" of death (III, 850). By remaining youthful in appear­
ance and attitude, Odette de Crécy strikes the narrator as having defied 
miraculously the "laws of chronology" (III, 984). It is of course against the 
ineluctable series of changes that lead to death that the narrators text, with 
its astounding branching structures, is arrayed in battle. 
The frequent recurrence of the words "law" and "laws" in the novel 
emphasizes the causal constraints that channel the irreversible course of 
characters' lives. Proustian "laws" tend to be more organic than mechanis­
tic, allowing for some individual variation (Odettes apparent defiance of 
the aging process), functioning more nearly like laws of probability than 
like mechanical constraints. Yet they constitute codifiable tendencies, 
operative for the majority, aphoristic principles of the type: "Chacun voit en 
plus beau ce qu'il voit à distance, ce qu'il voit chez les autres" (II, 235); 
"What we see at a distance, what we see in others, looks more beautiful." 
Sexual orientation is a primary and influential example of such constraints, 
according to Marcel, although hefinds homosexual and heterosexual attrac­
tions to follow the same "general laws of love" (III, 820): the tendency to 
select successive sexual partners who resemble one another, for example, or 
the predisposition, on the part of nervous, intense lovers, to pass from the 
search for love as pleasure to the addiction to love for the avoidance of pain. 
Marcel is acutely aware that no lover can ever possess the beloved (though 
that is the lover's desire), but only a perception thereof, a creation of the 
mind. This causal limit, and the inevitable "intermittences of the heart" 
(II, 756 ff.) which arise from it, influence both Swann (I, 300, for example) 
and the narrator (II, 831). Stupid people, Marcel suggests, are less apt to 
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evade the organic laws that tend to govern their lives because they are 
unaware of them, although they reveal them in their gestures and their 
actions, where intelligent authors observe them at work (III, 901). Thus, 
without being crudely deterministic, the narrator creates a causal chain to 
be the central track of the novel, moving inexorably from life to death, from 
joy to pain (to joy again), each new emotional period owing its life only to 
the death of the preceding one. 
The branching structures of the involuntary memories are obviously 
parallel, each beginning from a precise, physical occurrence on the central 
track and expanding into a mental representation, complete with emotions, 
of an earlier period on the chronological main track. The parallelism sug­
gests that there is a "law" at work here too, and the récit provides a causal 
paradigm: 
Je trouve très raisonnable la croyance celtique que les âmes de ceux 
que nous avons perdus sont captives dans quelque être inférieur, dans 
une bête, un végétal, une chose inanimée, perdues en effet pour nous 
jusqu'au jour, qui pour beaucoup ne vient jamais, où nous nous 
trouvons passer près de l'arbre, entrer en possession de l'object qui est 
leur prison. Alors elles tressaillent, nous appellent, et sitôt que nous 
les avons reconnues, l'enchantement est brisé. Délivrées par nous, elles 
ont vaincu la mort et reviennent vivre avec nous. (I, 44) 
(The Celtic belief seems very reasonable to me whereby the souls of 
those we have lost are captive in some inferior being—an animal, a 
plant, an inanimate object—lost indeed to us until that day, which for 
many people never comes, when we happen to pass near the tree, gain 
possession of the object, which is their prison. Then they tremble, call 
out to us; and as soon as we have recognized them, the enchantment is 
broken. Freed by us, they have conquered death and return to live 
with us.) 
In relating this myth to involuntary memories, the narrator is not compar­
ing objects or states of being, but rather movements. The passage is verb-
like, transitive, and causal. The "effect" is that the souls of the departed 
return to live with us; the "cause" is a twofold condition: physical proximity 
to the enchanted object, and recognition therein of the imprisoned soul. 
This is not a specific incident, but a general rule of Celtic belief and of 
involuntary memory as well ("II en est ainsi de notre passé," [I, 44]; "So it is 
with our past"): if AB, then always C. The double cause (make contact with 
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an object; recognize its relationship to the past) is inevitably followed by its 
effect: the past is resurrected. 
The magical quality of causation in the legend (this is an example of 
causation making an event predictable though unexplainable) reflects the 
mystery of psychological association in the novel. The movement from 
recognized object to memory touches the chronological, unidirectional 
timeline of the main track in two places (the moment of recognition and the 
period remembered), but at each of these junctures it is disjoined from the 
irreversible linearity of causation. On the one hand, the contact-recognition 
event is consistently presented as fortuitous ("qui pour beaucoup ne vient 
jamais," "nous nous trouvons passer," etc., here), the recognition phase 
being sometimes arduous, as with the madeleine, even when one has the 
good fortune of random contact with the object. On the other hand, Marcel 
provides no explanation why, in the first place, the psyche selected a par­
ticular mental representation—image, odor, savor, position—as symbolic 
of the particular context, with all its emotional and sensory richness, in 
which it was first experienced. Why the taste of a petite madeleine dipped 
in linden tea should have become the effective synecdoche for all the sum­
mers at Combray is unexplained. Perhaps other sensations of the period 
were stored up in the memory as potential triggers for the same involuntary 
memories, but random contact was never made with those. The triggering 
sensation must be a rare one, for oft-repeated experiences quickly lose their 
association with the context. But the mystery of association remains. The 
triggering of Marcels involuntary memories represents a particular kind of 
mental causation, not unrelated to certain of des Esseintes s experiences, but 
it remains apart, through chance and unexplained selection, from the 
central tracks causal chain. 
What lives in memory, of course, is not the object, nor even a mental 
representation thereof, but the experience of earlier contact with it: the self 
that the narrator was when he experienced it. The branches therefore all 
coexist in potential, running together in parallel to the central track, 
waiting for Marcel to find the talisman and become again one of his former 
selves, to leap out onto a parallel track. Readers' awareness of this temporal 
parallelism is awakened in Du côté de chez Swann with the description of the 
childhood walks Marcel took almost daily with his family along two invari­
able paths: "Swann's way" and "Guermantes' way." Instead of recounting 
what happens on several individual walks, the récit takes the form of a single 
outing in each direction.3 The landmarks are presented in order of their 
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appearance to those who follow the prescribed routes; as with Aragons 
presentation of a walk in the Parc des Buttes-Chaumont, the order of 
succession has no apparent basis in physical causality. But the single walk, 
in the linear récit, from landmark to landmark, is composed of multiple 
promenades coexisting in the narrators memory. The reader follows the 
walk as if it were a staff on a page of music, where each note (landmark) has 
the power to echo simultaneously on other lines of the staff, to become a 
chord. The hawthorns, for example, can evoke early childhood, when 
Marcel, arrayed by his mother in his infantile finery for the return trip to 
Paris, weeps out beneath their blossoms his despair at the thought of 
leaving them (I, 145). Or they can call up his pubescent surprise at the 
discovery of the awe-inspiring female (Gilberte) staring at him through 
their branches (I, 141—42). These two events did not occur on the same 
walk, could not have occurred in the same year, yet they are connected in a 
single narrative segment by a common landmark, the hawthorns of Tanson­
ville. This is the "vertical" causation of association: the madeleine calls up 
the self-taking-walks; the walks evoke their landmarks; these in turn, 
contacted, recognized, give birth to other selves: self-weeping, self-seeing-
Gilberte-for-the-first-time. All the selves so rediscovered are "horizontal"; 
they exist through chronological time, continuous and unchanged. Thus 
through the parallel structures of what Genette calls the "récit itératif," and 
the notion of causative association, the inferred author transforms linear 
prose into an active branching structure. 
During the Balbec "epiphany" (II, 756—57), the narrator makes ex­
plicit the notion of multiple selves existing in parallel. Bending down to 
remove his shoes in his hotel room, Marcel rediscovers in a surge of involun­
tary memory the tenderness and solicitude of his grandmother, now dead, 
who had comforted him there years before. It is not she herself his memory 
revives, but a perception of her, another Marcel receiving her love, a Marcel 
who has since disappeared, replaced for a time by an "ungrateful, selfish, 
and cruel" young man, who had not suffered too much at her death. Now, 
bending down, he changes "sans solution de continuité" into the vulnerable 
and tender receiver of his grandmothers affection he had been before: it was, 
he remarks, "as if there were different and parallel series in time" ("comme 
s'il y avait dans le temps des séries différentes et parallèles"). 
But if he is to conquer the unidirectional flow of time, it will be 
necessary to reverse the one-way movement from cause to effect. In Balbec 
the vital pivot, which begins turning everything around, becomes most 
apparent. Just as an event on the central track can project the narrator into 
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another, extratemporal self, so the rediscovery of the other self can cause 
events to happen on the central track, for the narrator can feel, as a result, 
present joy or pain, can weep, as he does in the Balbec hotel room, very 
material and obviously caused tears. The causal bond between the main 
"plot" and the remembered "episode" is thus a two-way street: event trig­
gers memory, which in turn triggers event. The tears themselves are of 
(

short duration and apparently cause nothing further, as des Esseintess 
nightmares caused a merely temporary fear of sleeping. But the sum of these 
pivotal experiences—the madeleine, bending down in a Balbec hotel room, 
uneven paving stones in Paris, etc.—will become the cause, the creative 
origin of the text itself, intended to vanquish time and death. Thus the epi­
sodes will impinge upon and inflect by causation the main line of the plot. 
The notion of parallel selves coexisting in time provides a spatialized 
vision of life, although one moves about in the space in a caused linear 
progression. This is also the vision of itself the text encourages the reader to 
adopt. The simplified graph in diagram 7.1 does not reveal the inflection of 
the central track, for which one would need, as we shall see, an additional 
dimension, but it summarizes the rest. A, B, C, D represent lived events in 
irreversible time. The branches they generate are extratemporal memories, 
constant and unchanging. E is a random event in time stimulating the 
reliving of event B, as the parallel self that originally lived it, and the return 
influence of track B upon the central track. F is an element of the events 
relived on B that triggers a memory of A (like Swanns hawthorns), which in 
turn enriches B. That movement in this space is linear, sequential, and 
causal there can be little doubt: the narrator must become an anterior self on 
A, B, C, or D before he can shed tears about it on the central track. But this 
linear movement in space is not only a theme of the novel; it is also a 
constituent of its lexical and thematic structure, which seeks to involve the 
reader in the game. 
Comparable to the physical entities Marcel encounters that trigger his 
extratemporal excursions, lexical markers arise in the text capable of evok­
r
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ing readers' memories. In Combray, for example, the narrator notes that, 
with the exception of the recurring traumas surrounding the ritual of his 
mother's good-night kiss, he had forgotten nearly everything of his child­
hood summers in Combray, that this part of his life was dead for him. Then 
he asks: "Mort à jamais?" (I, 44; "Dead forever?"). The sentence is memo­
rable for several reasons: it is a question in an overwhelmingly declarative 
text; it is a short sentence in a context of exceptionally long ones; the vehicle 
of the metaphor (forgotten = dead) may seem at this point to carry an 
exaggerated emotional charge in relation to the tenor; it is a verbless, 
elliptical fragment in a text remarkable for rigorous grammatical com­
pleteness. Finally, it is so situated that the striking madeleine "epiphany" 
provides the answer to its question. The brevity, interrogativity, and in­
completeness of the phrase impress upon our minds not only the questions 
meaning but the words used to express it; the glorious answer it receives 
binds it in our memory to its context. So it is that, when "Mort à jamais?" 
returns several volumes later in La Prisonnière (III, 187), as a question asked 
this time about the novelist Bergotte, recently deceased, it can trigger in 
readers a leap into the other selves that they were when, some 2200 Pléiade 
pages earlier, they had first encountered the tiny query. 
Thus repetition in Proust's text serves a causal function, helping us to 
move about in our (reading) lives as the narrator does in his life as actant. For 
repetition belongs at once to the temporal linguistic track that is the 
physical text (in this sense it is not quite repetition; among other reasons, in 
the first instance of our example, "mort" was the vehicle of a metaphor, 
while in the second, it denotes a "real" human demise, Bergotte himself 
having become metaphoric), and to the extratemporal branches of memory. 
Memories can, of course, be called "extratemporal" precisely because causa­
tion cannot intervene to change the course of events contained in them, nor 
the mood and predisposition of the self that lived them. But in the De­
leuzian sense, repetition is always difference, for the same reason that one 
never uses the word "same" without having in mind at least two distinct 
entities.4 Living consciousness, however, admits no difference: we can only 
be conscious as one self at a time. So the discovery of repetitions and 
similarities among parts of this text, or between part and whole, begins by a 
readers leap from present self into another, a leap occasioned by linguistico­
thematic phenomena. The words of the text function semiotically as an icon 
of the intent of narration, while they operate semantically in the récit. The 
interpénétration of levels thus achieved institutes a veritable metalepsis, as 
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Genette defines the term,5 a crossing of boundaries between the act of 
telling and the thing one tells. So readers may begin to discover that they 
are characters, after all! 
Bergotte's death is related not only to the potential death of childhood 
memories. It recalls for the reader the grandmothers demise as well, for she, 
like him, had been diagnosed as uremic (II, 318) and, like him, had gone 
out imprudently (on the advice ofa doctor recommended by Bergotte) when 
she should have stayed in bed. The story of his death and the narrators 
perception of it can thus trigger in the reader a number of branching, 
anterior selves. 
Even the model of involuntary memory by association, the "Celtic 
belief" of souls imprisoned in objects, returns in A l'ombre des jeunesfillesen 
fleurs. Out of friendship for the madam, Marcel had donated some inherited 
furniture, notably a sofa from Aunt Léonies bedroom in Combray, to a 
house of ill repute. Thereafter, he could no longer frequent the establish­
ment, where he would see the use to which these sacred objects of his 
childhood were put, 
. .  . car ils me semblaient vivre et me supplier, comme ces objets en 
apparence inanimés d'un conte persan, dans lesquels sont enfermées 
des âmes qui subissent un martyre et implorent leur délivrance. 
(I. 578) 
(. . .for they seemed to me to be alive and pleading with me, like the 
apparently inanimate objects in a Persian tale, which have souls locked 
up in them suffering martyrdom and begging for their deliverance.) 
Here the "Celtic belief" has become a Persian tale, and the retelling has a 
painful, rather than a joyous, conclusion, reflecting the degeneration char­
acteristic of the main line. But the parallelism of the situation and the 
return of a complex of lexical items from the earlier passage {âme, inanimé, 
délivré-délivrance), trigger for the reader in the second instance the pleasure 
of recognition, the rediscovery of the self reading the earlier passage. Critics 
may compare the two passages, dispassionately and reflectively, but reading 
them means experiencing them in turn, and, upon reaching the second 
passage, undergoing a flash of recognition—not of words per se, but of 
oneself understanding words. The text, by providing lexical and thematic 
triggers, performs half of the causal task: creating contact with the en­
chanted object. The other element of the magic formula (recognition) is up 
to the reader—to his or her memory, predisposition, and desire. 
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The notion of the difference between the "critic s" kind of comparison, 
which is spatial, and the "readers" kind, which is chronological, serves to 
explain as well the role of causality in the Proustian conception of metaphor. 
Proust's narrator, as critic, unites the two, in a well-known passage of Le 
Temps retrouvé (previously analyzed by Genette)6 in which he seeks to define 
the nature of truth in art: 
On peut faire se succéder indéfiniment dans une description les objets 
qui figuraient dans le lieu décrit, la vérité ne commencera qu'au 
moment où l'écrivain prendra deux objets différents, posera leur rap­
port, analogue dans le monde de l'art à celui qu'est le rapport unique 
de la loi causale dans le monde de la science, et les enfermera dans les 
anneaux nécessaires d'un beau style; même, ainsi que la vie, quand, en 
rapprochant une qualité commune à deux sensations, il dégagera leur 
essence commune en les réunissant l'une et l'autre pour les soustraire 
aux contingences du temps, dans une métaphore. (III, 889) 
(In a description one can go on indefinitely enumerating the objects 
that were to be found in the place described, truth won't begin until 
the writer takes two different objects, affirms their relationship— 
analogous in the world of art to the unique relationship of causal law in 
the world of science—and binds them with the necessary links of a 
beautiful style; or even, as in life, when, by comparing a quality 
common to two sensations, he distills their common essence, by 
joining them to one another in order to free them from the contingen­
cies of time, in a metaphor.) 
In the last analysis, of course, it is not the writer who "dégagera leur 
essence," but the reader, who, discovering the substratum common to two 
images, will experience that which is neither, but a new mental reality 
made up of the overlapping semes of both.7 When Proust writes, for 
example, "La haie formait comme une suite de chapelles" (I, 138; "The 
hedge formed, as it were, a succession of chapels"), the initial comparison 
bears upon a form: the arch formed by branches of aligned shrubs; the curve 
of gothic arches forming entrances to side-aisle chapels in a cathedral. The 
common substratum is an ideal curve, a mental image, to be found in no 
real ogival arch nor in any contiguous shrubs, but which we can imagine 
belonging to both. It is this ideal image that is here called "truth" (which 
will only "begin" when the writer "posera leur rapport"—it is up to the 
reader to complete the creation). The readers' experience of "truth" is 
triggered by the arrival, in the linear chain of words, of the second term of 
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the comparison: "beau style" in the passage initiated our discovery of those 
semes of "anneaux" which signify here, and of the ideal relationship be­
tween "anneaux" and "style." In an earlier draft, Proust had ended this 
sentence, not with "dans une métaphore," but with "dans une alliance de 
mots" ("in a wedding ring [or "alliance"} of words"), a kind of meta-
metaphor in which the wedding band of words (spiritual union) joins the 
necessary ring-links of a beautiful style to suggest a double band, of sig­
nifiers and signifieds: "anneaux" and "alliance" both denote "ring" and 
connote "union" (marriage/chain). This third entity, this newly created 
"truth," is, according to the text, freed from the contingencies of time. 
The Proustian sense of "contingencies" is the etymological one, denot­
ing connection—what Chatman calls "the stricter philosophical sense, 
'depending for its existence, occurrence, character, etc. on something not 
yet certain {The American College Dictionary)."* "Time" is precisely the 
domain of causation, and everything that exists in time appears subject to 
it, although the precise causes that will come to bear are still uncertain. Yet 
the general effects of time are wearing away, breaking up, destruction. 
What is admirable about "the unique relationship of causal law in the world 
of science" is precisely its character as a "law": the fact that it is eternally 
true and thus temporally (eternally) repeatable. The law of "contingency" is 
itself not "contingent." 
Both metaphor and involuntary memory, according to the novel, 
share this characteristic of being both "contingent" in the Proustian sense 
and non-"contingent." Thus is established a threefold parallel, a métony­
mie order common to metaphor, to Marcel as character, and to the reader. 
That order may be described like this: e, —» e2 —> E. Movement passes from 
a first "real" event to a second "real" event related to it by association, which 
triggers the discovery of an extratemporal entity—a "truth" or an extra-
temporal self in memory. This movement is precisely that of diagram 7.1: 
from B to E, and out to the extratemporal parallel arising in B. Just as the 
narrator moves from madeleine-tea in Aunt Léonie s bedroom to madeleine-
tea in Paris to the resurrection of his childhood summers in Combray, just as 
the reader moves from "Mort à jamais?" in Combray to "Mort à jamais?" in 
La Prisonnière to resurrection of an earlier self, so readers also move in 
microcosm from first term of metaphor to second term of metaphor to an 
ideal, extratemporal "truth." Causality and metonymy play the same role in 
metaphor that they play, as we have observed them, in involuntary mem­
ory. Metaphor is a causal strategy, embedded in the linearity of language. 
In this sense, Marcel is one term of a metaphor for which the reader is 
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the other. Yet he is certainly different from most of us. Individualized in his 
experiences (affluent European childhood, hypersensitivity and neurotic 
propensities, aristocratic conversations in turn of the century drawing 
rooms, etc.), he is also limited in his point of view: he can only speculate on 
others' motivations (whence the famous "soit que . . .  " constructions in his 
prose, offering multiple possible causes for others' actions, and sometimes 
even for his own). His differentiation makes him a difficult character with 
whom to identify. Yet the very difference of Marcel s life from ours, the very 
limited nature of his perspective, are the guarantee (metaphor is founded on 
the difference of e, from e2) of the universality of his reported experience. 
Insofar as we understand him, learning to read his text (and eventually our 
lives) as he reads his life, we demonstrate that the specific differences that 
separate us from him are without importance. As Camus s Jean-Baptiste 
Clamence will do years later in La Chute, Proust's narrator reinforces the 
bonds by gliding imperceptibly from "je" to "nous": 
. . . cette réalité loin de laquelle nous vivons, de laquelle nous nous 
écartons de plus en plus au fur et à mesure que prend plus d'épaisseur 
et d'imperméabilité la connaissance conventionnelle que nous lui sub­
stituons. . . . (III, 895, emphasis mine) 
(. . . that reality far from which we live, and from which we are 
increasingly separated as the conventional knowledge we substitute for 
it grows ever thicker and more impermeable. . . .) 
Manifestly, this metaphoric/métonymie structure complicates and 
indeed regenerates for its purposes the simple notions of récit and histoire 
with which we have been working. While one might compare the "plot" of 
A la recherche du temps perdu to a voyage of discovery, it would be excessive to 
suggest there is a traditional quest involved, since random occurrences 
make the discoveries serendipitous, and intent to discover cannot be given 
as the initial cause or primary desire which sets the récit in motion: the 
discovery is already made before word one. Yet the discovery of the nar-
rator's multiple selves, each of which forms a branch of the central track, is 
not sterile: the branches are not dead ends, like des Esseintes's dreams, 
hallucinations, and involuntary memories; instead they succeed in inflect­
ing the central track, bending it into a kind of circle. For the final discovery 
of the "plot"—that a properly constructed narrative endows its readers 
with atemporal selves, atemporal lives (III, 895-96)—becomes the cause 
of this novel's composition: its final sentence, in this sense, causes its first 
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one. Hence its standard classification as a "roman du roman" and, a fortiori, 
as a "roman du (futur) romancier."9 
Dâllenbach has alluded to three illogicalities supposedly inherent in 
such circular novels, whose subject is their own composition: (1) causal, in 
that they present themselves as the product of their own product; (2) 
temporal, in that they refer to themselves as coming into existence in the 
future, whereas they are already completed; (3) spatial, in that they refer to 
themselves as a part of themselves, thus enclosed in what they contain.10 
But the novel seems closed in this infinitely reversible structure, echoing 
back and forth between "inside" and "outside," only until it is read. 
Even a narrowly logocentric conception of reading, in which progres­
sion is seen as movement from sign to sense, from signifier to signified, 
leads toward openness when applied to this text. For the sense of "mon 
oeuvre" in the final sentence, its signified, generates for readers the signifiers 
"Longtemps je me suis couché de bonne heure," together with all the other 
lexical building blocks of the text they can individually recall. The inflec­
tion of end toward beginning, and the twist in the relationship of signifier 
to signified in the readers mind, create a kind of narrative Mobius strip, 
along which the signifier is now relatively "on top" of the dividing bar, now 
"underneath" it (S/s). (Readers are invited to reproduce diagram 7.1 above, 
to extend the parallel lines along both sides of the paper until they join 
themselves near their beginnings, and to twist it into a Môbius strip, if they 
wish to see a diagram of the internal causal structure of the text.) The 
reversibility of the pair S/s does nothing of itself to open the apparently 
illogical circle, but it "promotes" signs to sense and makes sense a sign for 
the reader, as in the metaleptic double emploi of "Mort à jamais?" or of the 
complex "âme . . . enfermée . . . délivrance." The readerly act, which 
conditions all the reverses of which this text is susceptible (time and the 
extratemporal, metonymy and metaphor, sign and sense, etc.), transforms 
the reader into creator: the dichotomy writer/reader is thus reversible too. 
So that, while the text remains circular, it expands beyond itself in the 
transformed readers. It functions, as Genette notes, as an optical instru­
ment to help readers read within themselves.u 
The récit here, divested of "initial cause" and "final result," works a 
fundamental modification on the concept of récit as causal progression, for 
the récit becomes a closed circle. Whether the histoire is closed or not is 
another question. In the standard novel, including the Gidean stories 
analyzed herein, the histoire is a series of events, reconstructed (and re­
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ordered, if necessary) by the reader on the basis of data in the récit. Under 
the narrative pact, the histoire is presumed to have come first, to have been 
encoded in language by the narrator, and to be in turn reconstituted as 
histoire in the readers mind. A la recherche du temps perdu can be read in this 
way, and the term histoire can thus have its usual meaning as a mediated and 
interpreted series of events. But if the reader begins to move about in the 
space of the text, to set off on antichronological explorations through 
recognition of such repeated signifiers as "Mort à jamais?" just as the 
narrator moves about in his memories, then the term histoire takes on other 
meanings. For subjective ordering on the basis of association is valorized at 
least as strongly in the text as objective chronological sequence: if all of the 
past coexists in memory, what does "sequence" mean? Yet chronology is 
essential if we are to create, and then rediscover farther down the line, the 
associative symbol which, upon re-cognition, liberates us from chronology. 
Thus there could be, for Proust's text, an histoire (i), consisting of an objec­
tively determinable sequence of events, and a series of histoires (2 . . . n), 
each of which is a subjective ordering of events in the mind of a reader. 
Once the reader is taken into account, causation is seen to trigger 
expansion: from single récit to plural histoires, from single symbol (made­
leine) to multiple memories (part II of Combray), from individual signifier 
(second term of metaphor) to expanding signified (first term plus "truth"). 
In the purely métonymie associations (triggered memories of the narrator or 
of the reader), there are two caused functions: (1) association of symbol with 
contiguous context in e,, and (2) production of expansion E, of which 
recognition of the symbol in e2 is the cause. In metonymic/metaphoric 
association, the inferred author provides the contextual association; readers 
have only to recognize the ideal substratum of the metaphor, which recog­
nition will yield in E the "expansion des choses infinies": Truth. By asso­
ciating the narrator and inferred author to the reader, Proust's novel imposes 
on itself an external causation, impelling expansion outward from the 
circle. 
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Myth and Mythos 
Le mythe a ainsi une portée ontologique: il vise la relation—c'est-à-dire à 
la fois le saut et le passage, la coupure et la suture—de l'être essentiel de 
l'homme à son existence historique. 
(Thus myth has an ontological dimension: its aim is the relationship—i.e., 
both the sudden leap and the gradual passage, both the cut and the 
suture—between man's essential being and his historical existence.) 
PAUL RICOEUR 
It is difficult to justify the inclusion of a chapter on myth, one of the oldest forms of human expression, in a section devoted to modernist and postmodernist texts; it is still more difficult to argue for its inclu­
sion among "nonrectilinear causal strategies," when straight-line causation 
is almost characteristic of myth. Suffice it to say that mythic expression was 
not an unpopular vehicle in the modernist period, and that its rectilinear­
ity provides an interesting special case of that phenomenon, perhaps more 
revelatory of causal logic than of myth itself. 
Plot is the standard translation of mythos in Aristotle's Poetics; I use the 
term here rather as a synonym for histoire. The foregoing Proust chapter 
evoked the erosion of an objective concept of the histoire, as a term referring 
ever more insistently to each readers individual creation. In general, how­
ever, mythic récits can be read as exemplary, and thus as "authoritarian" in 
Susan Suleiman's sense of the term:l redundancies overdetermine the pos­
sible inferences from the récit, so that readers tend to constitute the same 
histoire—a series of causally connected events, that is, a traditional "plot." 
But if Proust's causal strategies indicate the need for redefinition of 
"histoire" the notion of "myth" raises questions, as the foregoing may 
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suggest, about the nature of"narration" The usefulness of the expressions 
we have adopted in this area—"intent of text," "intent of narration"—lies 
in the fact that they designate an underlying purpose in texts without 
suggesting that that aim is anterior to or causative of the text itself. For that 
is precisely what inference discovers: texts have an inferable purpose, but 
they are not necessarily themselves products of that purpose nor created as 
agents for its accomplishment. So long as it is understood that texts come 
first and reader inference about them afterward, ambiguity is avoided. In 
this system, texts generate, with readerly cooperation, certain meanings, 
which are in turn inferred to be their ultima ratio. The manifest circularity: 
text—» meaning—» intention—» text (or récit + histoire^ narration^ récit 
+ histoire, or story —» inferred author —» story), is useful and cleverly 
descriptive of relationships. But if texts are to be seen as productive of 
generalized essences, of meaning that lies beyond their own specificity and 
that of their readers, then it becomes interesting to know where the circle 
"begins," or where the generalized meaning arises. 
Ricoeur would seem to start with the text, when he defines myth as "a 
symbol developed in the form of a récit."2 {We might also have defined i t  — 
although he did not—as "a récit developed in the form of a symbol," or as "a 
récit read as a symbol.") Thus the symbol, with the cosmic, oneiric, and 
linguistico-poetic origins he posits for it, appears to precede its develop­
ment as a récit. But symbolization is a form of human mediation of the real, 
a verbal mediation, a "matrix of symbolic meanings as words" (p. 18), so 
that the verbal stratum would appear to mark the "beginning" of a symbol, 
although textualization in the form of a temporal récit (production of myth) 
would appear to come later. Yet, when it comes to reading mythic texts, 
Ricoeur suggests that mythic meaning is part of a temporal reading se­
quence, for he describes a "signifié primaire," a primary and literal sig­
nified, reminiscent of what we have been calling histoire, and a "signifié 
second," a second signified based upon the first, and ineffable: an emo­
tional, experiential signified. This second signified may "make us think," 
but it is not in itself a "thought." Is it the mediation of "reality" (cosmic, 
oneiric, poetic) in a text that produces myth, or is it the readerly experience, 
mediating the text to attain the "signifié second"? 
The answer is important, and it seems to arise in Ricoeur s distinction 
between myth and allegory. How one reads, he seems to say, makes all the 
difference: what distinguishes them is a way of reading rather than a textual 
structure. With allegory, he points out, the first signified, the literal sense, 
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is contingent, and the second signified is sufficiently exterior to it to be 
directly accessible. The relationship between the two of them is thus per­
ceived as one of "translation": once we have deciphered the code, translated 
the literal histoire into its more general meaning, we can discard the histoire 
as useless. But historically, he shows, allegory was less a literary procedure 
for the artifical creation of pseudosymbols than a way of reading myths, less 
a literary than a hermeneutic concept. Allegory consists, in this sense, of 
treating myths as disguised philosophy, so that, once we have pierced the 
disguise, we can recover an intellectual "sense"—a thought or idea (p. 23). 
It would seem, conversely, that for myths to be what they are, to avoid 
being "allegorized," they must be read properly, that they must receive a 
mythic reading to achieve full status as myths. 
Ricoeur points to a venerable tradition of allegorical interpretation, 
and it is with that tradition that our causal model obliges us to make 
common cause. Primed to recover inferable relationships, it is not suited to 
discovery by spontaneous intuition of essentially ineffable, experiential 
knowledge. All we can do is to infer, from the récit, the succession of specific 
events termed histoire; insofar as the histoire encourages interpretation in 
more general terms, search for the essential within the existential, we move 
toward a linear "signifié second," a series of relationships from which we can 
infer an intent behind the histoire. The second signified will have to be of a 
sort that can serve as ultima ratio for causal relationships in the histoire; our 
belief in comprehension by inference and in an authoritative narrative "act" 
thus leads us away from the spontaneity of mythic reading toward a more 
nearly stabilized, authoritarian reading. Récit conditions inference of his­
toire, which in turn conditions inference of narration: the level of narration 
now "becomes" the allegorical abstraction of myth. A method which infers 
"authors" and "intentions" will not readily admit of the direct, noninferen­
tial understanding necessary for the discovery of myth in mythos; it can, 
however, "allegorize" quite interestingly, as we shall see. 
Myth and symbol are the ultimate generalities, expressing essence by 
means of existence. But myth differs from symbol in its development "in 
the form of a récit": chronology enters the picture. With a discrete symbol, a 
relationship is established between a primary and a secondary, more ab­
stract signified. But a myth, operating in time, presents a relationship on 
the literal level of two or more events or signifieds, a relationship which 
must signify an analogous relation on the symbolic level. In order for a 
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relationship to be generalized, to be of the essence, it must be unfailingly 
repeatable, replicable at each insertion into human experience. (Creation 
stories, such as those in Genesis, the union of Uranus and Gaea, and the Big 
Bang, are the obvious exception: first causes can be first only once.) It is the 
causal bond that insures the universal applicability of allegorical truth in 
myth, and it is literal-level causation that leads to the discovery of symbolic 
causation. From Eden to Achilles s heel, the functioning of causality is the 
subject and structure of mythic exemplary tales. 
If myth is replicable in human experience, it must be also repeatable in 
texts: the same symbolic "message" may be rendered in different literal 
forms. Thus Jesus can tell us about the rejoicing in heaven caused by the 
repentance of sinners in three parables: the Lost Coin, the Lost Sheep, and 
the Prodigal Son. The myth of the Dying King (sons overthrowing fathers 
or father figures)3 has been repeated from Sophocles to Shakespeare to 
Sartre. But in noting repetition, rather than replicability, in viewing myths 
spatially, like a series of surfaces that can be stacked in the manner of 
playing cards (so that vertical lines strategically passed through the "deck" 
would find at each card an identical mark),4 we risk losing sight of the linear 
dynamics inherent in the causal links. 
Mythic novels tell specific stories that are temporally and geographi­
cally related to the real world, but each refers, on the symbolic level, to an 
extratemporal causal matrix. Works since 1870 exhibiting such relation­
ships of relationships include Camus's La Peste, Cocteaus Les Enfants 
terribles, Gides Thésée, Gionos Regain, Malraux's La Condition humaine, and 
Zola's La Faute de l'abbé Mouret? to all of which we may turn for examples of 
allegorical causation in mythic texts. 
While these texts present no direct invitation to interpret, of the kind 
included in many of Jesus s parables,6 they employ a number of allusive 
strategies (usually more than one per novel) urging readers to seek a "sig­
nifié second." Frequently one finds a direct reference to the existence of a 
more general superstructure, of a symbolic level on which the text can be 
experienced: Thésée and La Condition humaine, for example, evoke it in their 
titles, La Peste in its epigraph, and Les Enfants terribles in the text (pp. 83 , 
92). Proper names can also serve as an onomastic clue to the existence of a 
symbolic parallel: Faute de l'abbéMouret (the Edenic "Paradou," in which the 
abbéMouret "mourait"); Peste (Joseph "Grand," "insignificant and retiring 
hero," p. 1331); Thésée (proper names repeat directly those of the tradi­
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tional myth). Clear parallels to a preexisting intertext, to another incarna­
tion of the same mythic structure, encourage readers to experience the text 
on both literal and symbolic levels: Faute de l'abbé Mouret (the biblical Eden 
story); Thésée; Peste (relationship of characters' situation—notably that of 
Rambert and Rieux—to that of Sisyphus, and thus ultimately to Camus s 
Le Mythe de Sisyphe; noteworthy structural parallels to Condition humaine, 
suggesting a common myth as matrix for both); Regain (parallels to ancient 
fertility rites, to rites of passage, to cultural transformations relative to the 
passage of human societies from the condition of hunter-gatherers to agri­
culture); Enfants terribles (relationship to primitive and Freudian concepts of 
"taboo"). Novels also point to their mythic nature by metaphoric repetition 
or even by internal interpretation of their own symbols: Faute de l'abbé 
Mouret; Regain (e.g., burial of the dead described as planting of seed— 
Panturles mother, Mamèche and her husband); Enfants terribles (e.g., re­
peated theater metaphors, spheres—white snowball at the beginning, 
black ball of poison at the end); Condition humaine (Gisorss general inter­
pretations of specific realities, e.g., Kyo's failure to recognize his own 
recorded voice); Thésée (Daedaluss explanations, pp. 1430-38)  . And at 
times, causal implausibilities at the literal level suggest that the true reason 
for occurrences can be sought only on the level of the "second signified": 
Faute de l'abbé Mouret (incredible size of and unlikely flora in the walled 
garden of Paradou, an essential condition of the abbé s "fall"); Regain (un­
canny ability of Mamèche to lead Arsule to Panturle, to be his bride, by 
flitting through the trees and grasses; remarkable powers of Gauberts plow 
to produce a rich harvest in a bad year); Enfants terribles (unlikely death of 
Michael before consummation of his marriage to Elizabeth; improbable 
return of the malefic spheroid). By such means, novels alert readers to the 
existence of a second level of meaning, to a symbolic matrix implicit in the 
narration informing their literal histoire. 
This symbolic structure constitutes a second causal chain (often a 
simple, straight-line construction, although with "collective" novels such 
as Condition humaine and Peste, the organization can be quite complex), 
parallel to the caused events on the literal level. Mythic stories in which the 
literal causation appears implausible seem the most truly magical, for, to 
complete the causal chain of the literal histoire, readers must have recourse 
to the causation operative on the symbolic level, bringing myth "down," as 
it were, into mythos, where it appears to function magically, and thus 
promoting mythos itself to the level of myth. Peter Brooks describes such 
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direct interaction between narration and récit, in my sense of these terms, as 
"a perverse logic of narrative," what classic rhetoric calls "metalepsis of the 
author," in which an action is attributed to the "author," when it should 
have an agent in the récit.1 The relationship of metalepsis to magical hap­
penings has already been hinted at with respect to L'Assommoir (if one 
admits metalepsis, a "mythic" reading emerges) and alluded to in reference 
to Proust (where readers acquire "magic" powers). And in Regain, for 
example, Mamèches death remains unexplained on the literal level (is it 
from old age, starvation, overexertion?), but, since in dying she brings 
about the sexual union of Panturle and Arsule and thus the rebirth of 
Aubignane, her death appears a magically successful sacrifice, revelatory of 
the notion in narration that sacrificial death is a cause of renewed life in 
nature ("si le grain ne meurt . . ."). It seems all the more magical in that 
she foresaw it as inherent in her chosen action (laying out before departure 
her own burial sheets), and in her ultimate "burial" in the sheets in which 
Arsule and Panturle consummate their union—a random and hasty choice 
on Panturle s part, when fortuitous rats were discovered to have ruined her 
preselected shroud. What are mere odd coincidences on the literal level 
become injected with magic when causation from the matrix is imported to 
fill the void, to explain the implausible; and the histoire thus partakes of the 
atemporal, essential quality of the "second signified," inferred in the 
narration. 
Such a "promotion" of the histoire is evident in Les Enfants terribles as 
well, where an element of the matrix structure presents taboo as a source of 
masochistic pleasure. Pauls beloved Dargelos (antihomosexual taboo) for­
tuitously provides Paul with a source of pleasurable suffering in the lung-
disease-producing snowball, and at last in the ball of poison. Still more 
obviously fortuitous on the literal level is the uncanny resemblance of 
Agathe to Dargelos; she can only be understood as a socially acceptable 
(because female) reincarnation of the adorable androgyne. Her presence in 
the little coterie sets up the conflict between the anti-incest taboo (repre­
sented by Paul's dominating sister, Elizabeth) and homosexual desire, until 
Paul and Elizabeths simultaneous death becomes, in the last pages, a 
mutual orgasm. Because the double return of Dargelos, in the person of 
Agathe and in the gift of the second baneful spheroid, remains unexplained, 
mysterious, the tale is elevated from a story of adolescents growing up 
unsupervised to a representation of the universal power of taboo. 
By the same token, once the power of mythic causation is felt to be at 
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work in a given histoire, such specific explanations as may appear in the récit 
are ironically downgraded. Arsule arrives in the region of Aubignane as 
a kind of cart-pulling slave to Gédémus, a knife-and-scissors grinder. 
Elizabeth meets Agathe when she goes to work in a fashion house where the 
latter models. Such particular information serves to render plausible the 
antecedents of the implausible. For the real purpose of specific causes on 
the literal level is to be implausible, or to bespeak by their presence their 
absence elsewhere. As we have seen, particular causal vocabulary establishes 
the expectation of explanation that will impel readers, when believable 
explanation is lacking, to interrogate the narration. Such questioning, 
when the reader finds the mythic answer that explains the implausibilities 
and fills all the gaps, produces a metacommunication; the récit transforms 
the histoire from a sequence of events into a language, into that code which, 
once deciphered, suggests the "second signified." And so the mythic histoire 
is elevated toward universality insofar as it assumes elements of metacausa­
tion from the matrix structure, while the causation of the récit, when it is 
credible and specific, is depreciated. At least, in the competition between 
the two parallel causal chains, that is what usually happens. 
It is just possible, however, for the causes functioning in the histoire 
and present in the récit to win a kind of victory, ironically downgrading 
mythic causation in the narration. That is what happens in Gide's Thésée. 
When a given myth has already received a consecrated expression, retelling 
normally retains the causal matrix while changing characters and situa­
tion as well as temporal and geographical setting. Thus, in La Faute de 
l'abbé Mouret, Zola preserves the mythic causal chain of temptation-fall-
expulsion, while imposing it upon the specifics of characters different from 
the biblical Adam and Eve, in a different place and time. Thésée, on the 
other hand, retains the characters, places, and events of the classical expres­
sion of the myth; what changes in the récit and histoire is the traditional 
causation. 
Traditionally, for example, the labyrinth is a complex maze of pas­
sageways and the Minotaur a flesh-eating monster; in the Gidean text, the 
labyrinth turns out to be a palace of youthful pleasures that no one wants to 
leave (complete with a narcotic smoke, wafted on the air, to weaken the 
will), and the Minotaur a physically beautiful but stupid bovine. Thus, in 
the ancient versions, Theseus's escape is the result of strength and courage 
well used against royal power and vengeful cruelty, of cunning deployed 
against Daedalus's wise strategies; it is a conquest of youth over the power 
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and wisdom of age, the stuff traditional rites of passage are made of. In the 
Gidean récit, the hero must overcome, not obstacles imposed by others, but 
his own youthful pleasure-seeking drives; Ariadne's thread is primarily 
symbolic ("tangible figuration of duty," as Daedalus puts it—Thésée, 
p. 1433). It represents the social responsibility of Theseuss royal origins— 
which, noblesse oblige, he fulfills remarkably well later on as king of Athens. 
Like its ancient counterparts, Thésée presents a rite of passage, but it in­
volves a victory not over adult power but over the free concupiscence of 
youth. The cause of Theseus s triumph now is the sacrifice of individual 
pleasure for the eventual benefit of society. By changing the immediate and 
literal causes of struggle (complex maze becomes charming garden) and 
therefore the qualities required to win, the récit downgrades ironically the 
traditional mythic causal chain: socialization replaces strength and shrewd­
ness as the modern means to adulthood. But depreciation of the traditional 
structure obviously does not divest the story of mythic qualities. Instead, 
the new causation creates a new and highly valorized myth in place of the 
old one. Change in causality at the literal level produces a displacement of 
the traditional myth at the symbolic level; retention of the original charac­
ters and setting makes the displacement evident. 
So it is that the lesson of the myth, its allegorical "signifié second," is 
contingent upon the causal structures of the récit, rather than upon charac­
ters, times and settings. Where causation expressed in the récit is plausible 
and explicit, it appears superficial, weakened by irony. Where it is im­
plausible or absent, it is replaced, by readers, with the mythic causes from 
the same chronological position in the matrix chain, causes that often seem 
magically powerful in context. If a given allegorical matrix has been previ­
ously expressed in a text, the choice for subsequent authors would seem to 
be to retain the causal matrix and change the contingent trappings (as in La 
Faute de l'abbé Mouret), or to use the same personnages and décors in which to 
animate a new causal matrix {Thésée), in competition with that of its 
"ancestor." 
When a mythic novel seeks to unveil a matrix that has not been 
expressed before, it relies on allusive strategies like those listed above to 
awaken readers to the existence of its "signifié second." I have pointed out 
elsewhere8 the mythic matrix common to Malraux s La Condition humaine 
and Camus's La Peste. I would argue that La Condition humaine (1933) is 
the first novel to present the Absurd as a mythic matrix. It indicates by the 
universality of its title a commitment to portray all humanity through the 
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activity of individuals. The metaphysical notion of absurdity is subdivided 
in this "collective" novel into its constituent practical problems: notably 
inevitable suffering (despite our hunger for happiness), unavoidable death 
(though we wish to live), and ineluctable isolation (in spite of our longing 
to communicate with others). The récit presents a collectivity of individuals 
imprisoned in a closed city and facing a common enemy. Each character has 
his or her own story, with its literal causal chain; each one combats elements 
of the absurd dilemma. Thus the group, functioning as an individual and as 
the true "hero" of the novel, confronts the Absurd on all its levels. La Peste 
(1947) repeats the basic literal structure (closed city, collectivity, common 
"enemy") and evokes a similar matrix. 
Both novels have characters who strive to escape the absurdity of the 
human condition: Clappique {Condition humaine), and Rambert early on 
{Peste). Each has characters who would like to conquer death {Condition 
humaine: Tchen, and perhaps Kyo, by martyrdom for "the Cause" and an 
afterlife in human memory; Peste: Tarrou, and perhaps Rieux, through 
medicine) and suffering {Condition humaine: Kyo, May; Peste: Rieux, Tarrou, 
and others). Both have characters seeking to overcome their isolation and 
commune with others: Katow succeeds temporarily through a gift of 
cyanide and a handclasp in extremis {Condition humaine); Joseph Grand "gets 
through" to Rieux in a sincere and symbolic prose sentence: "Ma bien chère 
Jeanne, c'est aujourd'hui Noël" {Peste, p. 1434). But the literally expressed 
causation of these individual stories is depreciated with respect to that of the 
matrix. For example, a primary reason why Kyo, Katow, and other commu­
nists are captured by the forces of Chang Kai-Shek is Clappique's failure to 
warn them; caught up in the fever of gambling, he remains at the gaming 
tables until it is too late. But on the level of narration, the mythic cause is 
obvious: Kyo and Katow must be shown imprisoned and awaiting the 
ultimate unpleasantness (burning alive in a locomotives fire box) for the 
purpose of illustrating two possible reactions to a universal problem— 
the approach of death. Clappique's failure is a ploy on the literal level {his­
toire) to justify a symbolic segment. Such ploys are essential to mythic 
novels of the Absurd, where nothing can appear superficially implausible or 
coincidental. If indeed implausibilities or major causal gaps appeared, 
readers could infer mythic causation, as we have seen, thus importing 
potentially "magical" or "supernatural" overtones into a text that must 
deny all mystical power as antithetical to the Absurd. (But the "tragic" 
readings of Malraux—in the sense of classical poetics—that have crept in 
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suggest that some gaps do exist.)9 Thus the individual stories of the charac­
ters in these novels are set forth in generally clear and plausible causal chains 
(with historical justification in La Condition humaine), even though readers 
alert to the mythic dimension will see matrix causation as determinant and 
literal causation as a ploy. 
Traditional myths are by nature judgmental: if you do A, B will 
result, and B is good (or bad). The rebirth of Aubignane is good (Regain); 
the inability of Elizabeth and Paul to overcome or escape the constraints of 
taboo is tragic (Enfants terribles). But with absurdity, nothing is ultimately 
good or evil in a universal sense: judgments of that ilk are a matter for 
individual determination. Both La Condition humaine and La Peste are re­
markably free of judgment. Given the universal dilemma, each character 
acts in situation and faces the consequences of her or his choices. But the 
récit judges neither choices nor results. A fascist, for example, is given the 
chance to explain and defend his torturing of communists in La Condition 
humaine; neither Rambert (for seeking to flee) nor Cottard (for profiting 
from the epidemic) is condemned, in La Peste, for his decisions. The absurd 
myth impels the reader, likewise embroiled in the human condition, to 
judge which strategies against the common peril appear more nearly suc­
cessful or more admirable. 
The matrix of the absurdist myth is thus obviously not a simple, 
rectilinear causal strand. The conjoined paradigms which make it up re­
semble one another in that they have their original cause in the absurd 
paradox: on the one hand a human limitation and on the other a profound 
desire to overcome it. This tension has as its effect an action, which results, 
in the absolute sense, in failure. Some actions may be seen by readers as 
achieving partial, temporary success, or as representing, even in failure, 
more admirable attitudes. On the literal level, these "collective" texts share 
some characteristics with the "track-and-sidetrack" structure, with general 
parallelism among the branches, but pretension to universal truth estab­
lishes a "signifié second," a second level causally parallel to the literal récit 
and interacting with it. 
The causally oriented, inferential spectacles I am wearing have thus 
served to uncover the allegorical traits in mythic tales. These are hardly 
without value: allegory announces the power of the general over the spe­
cific, of permanent causal laws over the seemingly random circumstances of 
daily life. Insofar as myths have ethical and religious overtones, allegory 
repeats and reaffirms moral and spiritual values in each new histoire that 
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incarnates it. Retelling the power of mythic causation in ever different 
specific situations, as new mythic stories "repeat" old myths, constitutes a 
ritual act of renewal. La Mamèche of Regain is not Demeter, but death and 
rebirth find worthy celebration, in both human and agricultural terms, in 
Giono as in the early "Homeric" hymns. Even when mythic novels will not 
valorize religion (e.g., La Condition humaine, La Peste), they magnify the 
importance of the second signified by incarnating it in an emotion-filled 
context. 
But the ineffable, purely mythic content to which Ricoeur points is an 
understanding born of comparison, of spatial relationships foreign to 
causality, which recall the helicopter-motorcycle comparison at the close of 
chapter three. From above, every element of the landscape stands in per­
petual relation to every other; the dynamic, earth-bound motorcycle yields 
an inevitably reductive view. It is, like language itself, linear, directional, 
and temporal, while the completeness of the view from above, ineffable, 
escapes the linearity of language. For it is directionality that characterizes 
allegorical reading: there is a beginning {récit), a "primary" signified (literal 
histoire) and then a "second" one, which, once attained, supercedes its 
predecessor, thus left behind, discarded. The comparative view, the view 
from above, is nondirectional and extratemporal: all kinds of signifieds, 
regardless of the ordinal numbers that may be critically applied to them, 
coexist. Writing and reading are radically simultaneous; there is no begin­
ning, no ending of a mythmaking "process." It is rather the directional 
optic of causality that imposes linear order. Where Ricoeur can see, for 
example, fear and purification as two views of a same reality (p. 40), causal 
analysts must observe cause and consequence. They can "compare" only 
perception and memory, not simultaneous perceptions. While language 
makes Ricoeur s analysis seem at times directional (primary —> second, 
symbol —> development), it remains spatial and ultimately comparative. 
The causalist argument makes allegorical expression a part of the in­
tent of narration, so that the general causal stance of narration (e.g., sacri­
ficial death brings new life) is itself a cause of the histoire (Mamèche must die 
in Regain so that her death clearly brings about the rebirth of Aubignane), 
which allows us to infer the narration. Only readers' conditions of inference, 
springing from their own life experience, can guarantee, from the causal 
viewpoint, the "veracity," the universal applicability of the myth, for they 
are all that is outside the circular game of mirrors which is the text itself and 
its levels of narrative. Only readerly recognition of mythic qualities in texts 
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can set essence and existence in relationship. Whence, from the etiological 
position, the basic (allegorical) structure: the parallel causal strands of 
primary and secondary signifieds, interacting and competing to supplant 
one another, often with delightful irony, across the fêlure or the cut or the 
suture that (un-)separates them. 
The paradox of an absurdist "myth" lies of course with the fact that it 
must uncover the eternal and the universal despite nihilistic premises. 
Absurdist writers tend to present the Absurd as a primary cause of human 
unhappiness and revolt, while they express, on the other hand, profound 
doubts about the objective existence of causation; for them, derivation of 
causes and effects, of explanations, from observed phenomena constitutes 
subjective interpretation, in a world in which psyche and physical reality 
are irrevocably divorced. An absurdist strategy for portraying this problem­
atical causal outlook forms the subject of the next chapter. 
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The Broken Line 
Pour que soit possible une oeuvre absurde, il faut que la pensée sous sa 
forme la plus lucide y soit mêlée. Mais il faut en même temps qu'elle 
n'y paraisse point sinon comme l'intelligence qui ordonne. Ce paradoxe 
s'explique selon l'absurde. L'oeuvre d'art naît du renoncement de l'intelli-
gence à raisonner le concret. Elle marque le triomphe du charnel. C'est la 
pensée lucide qui la provoque, mais dans cet acte même elle se renonce. Elle 
ne cédera pas à la tentation de surajouter au décrit un sens plus profond 
qu'elle sait illégitime. 
(For an absurd work to be possible, the most lucid form of thought must be 
involved in it. But at the same time it must not be visible in it, except as 
the organizing intelligence. This paradox is explainable according to the 
absurd. The work of art is born of the intelligences refusal to try to reason 
concrete reality: it marks the triumph of the physical. Lucid thought 
instigates the work, but precisely in so doing it renounces itself. It will not 
yield to the temptation to add on to what is described a deeper meaning it 
knows to be illegitimate.) 
ALBERT CAMUS 
Fiction that not only takes absurdity as its subject but also seeks to mirror it in its form must elect to reveal a causally fragmented histoire. The perceived divorce between psyche and exterior reality, 
between "l'intelligence" and "le concret" in Camus s terms, presupposes 
that physical causation is problematic; the relationship between cause and 
effect in the world about us is part of the organizing grid imposed upon 
perceived reality by the organizing eye. For the contrast between psyche 
and reality to strike the reader's consciousness with convincing force, the 
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concrete reflected in the histoire must retain its causal disconnectedness 
before the narrators eye and in the narrators prose. 
We have encountered fragmentation before, in the traditional fiction 
of Zola and in the causal blockers of the "track-and-sidetrack" texts. In 
traditional fiction, breaks in the causal chain of the histoire are relatively 
infrequent, while they are, in absurdist structure, ubiquitous, often more 
common than linkage. If neither the récit nor common sense nor personal 
experience helps readers of traditional fiction tofill a given gap between two 
events in the histoire, recourse to the level of narration will suggest what the 
inferred author is up to in breaking the chain at that point. Fragmented 
absurdist fiction discourages, in one way or another, any peek behind the 
scenery to discover an author at work. Indeed, it is on the level of narration 
that the absurdist paradox is, shamefacedly, hiding out, for despite Camus, 
"lucid thought" is never quite ready to renounce itself. 
It may be useful to reiterate here as well the distinctions drawn in an 
earlier chapter between "track-and-sidetrack" fiction and "broken-line" 
texts. Episodic structure provides a break in the causal chain at the end of 
each episode (at least). Episodes are not causally related to one another; 
instead, they are usually connected by similarity—structural parallelism, 
common themes, a single dominant viewpoint. They exist as branches of a 
basic substructure or "plot," which they dominate by sheer volume. A 
digression or two does not constitute episodic structure; the sidetracks must 
take up more room in the text than the main line. Above all, episodes are 
generally interchangeable; the order in which they occur is not of the 
essence. Absurdist fragmentation, on the other hand, lacks the substruc­
ture of "plot"; the viewpoint of the narrator is not constant, but changes; 
and the segments of the récit, although not causally interconnected, must 
appear in the given order. A truly fragmented story is linear despite the 
extreme frequency of causal gaps; the linearity is determined by factors 
other than causation existing on the level of the récit or of the histoire. 
As a prototype of the fragmented tale, Sartre's La Nausée (1938) will 
serve admirably. And Cam us's partially fragmented L'Etranger (1942) can 
hardly escape analysis here, since, like a latter-day Bête humaine, it takes 
causality as its subject, and since the fascinating and voluminous scholar­
ship that surrounds it disagrees with respect to the causal function. 
While L'Etranger has elements of diarylike structure, Sartre's text 
adopts all the conventions of the fictional journal,1 including a framing 
"Avertissement des Editeurs" and dated entries. The diary novel is emi­
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nently suited to absurdist fragmentation, most obviously because the fic­
tional "time of composition" is itself fragmented. Written in a series of 
"present" moments, it reveals a narrator rooted in each one successively, 
with no knowledge of what the future then holds. The narrator cannot 
therefore construct a causal chain (an activity that requires reverse logic, 
reasoning from effect to cause) to connect beginning to end and to explain 
the dénouement. Sofictional journals as a class must be causally disconnected 
at the level of the récit. It is often possible, however, for readers to infer 
causation at the level of the histoire just as well as in a Zola novel: one has 
only to think of Gide s La Symphonie pastorale, Malraux s Les Conquérants, or 
Mauriac s Le Noeud de vipères; sometimes one can discern even the allegorical 
paradigms of a "signifié second," as in Bernanos s Journal d'un curé de cam­
pagne or in the log entries of Tournier s Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique. But 
La Nausée carefully segregates events—walks in the park, days in the 
library, conversations with the Autodidacte, meals in the café, a visit to the 
municipal museum, a trip to see Anny—grounding each in its own 
present. None of these can be said to "cause" any of the others, and such 
causal fragmentation reinforces the insight that the present alone exists: the 
"past" is present memories, present texts, and the future is at best a present 
project. 
Fictional diaries share with allfirst-person narratives a limited point of 
view: we see the fictional world from behind a single pair of eyes. We can 
enter the psyche of the narrator alone, and all we can know is what is 
registered there now, with the distortions peculiar to the individual diarist. 
There is no omniscience and no objective viewpoint: if causation appears to 
be functioning at all in the world outside the narrators mind, we can have 
no objective validation of it. When external causation appears in La Nausée, 
it often seems to have its origin in the observing psyche s distorted perspec­
tive: a pebble causing "a kind of nausea in my hands" (p. 16). 
Finally, diarists, bothfictional and real, are generally at the same time 
narrator and narratee in their texts. They write for themselves, often with 
an eye to greater self-understanding. Roquentin adopts this stance; his 
diary is not written for public consumption, but for his own edification. He 
is translating the daily events of his life to words, then reading (presumably) 
the words in order to comprehend the life. It is in the presumption that 
reading is enough like living for one to facilitate comprehension of the other 
that Roquentin's diary (along with the novel itself, in a sense) runs into 
trouble, as we shall see. 
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Like the texts of Huysmans and of Proust previously discussed, La 
Nausée traces the progress of a "disease." But the events of the story, 
apparently separate and random as they are, never function as digressions, 
never provide escape or even temporary remission from the progress of the 
symptoms. Events are ordered not by causal relationship to each other but 
to mirror the gradually increasing severity of Roquentin's suffering; as he 
becomes ever more lucid about the radical separation between his mind, in 
which his true self seems to reside, and concrete, exterior reality, horror and 
creeping psychological revulsion little by little take possession of him. The 
gradual progression, carefully arranged, of the symptoms, from initial 
anxiety to raving hallucination, to the deceptive tranquillity of the final 
pseudocure, defines the rectilinear character of the récit. The onset of this 
metaphysical disease, from which no other character in the text suffers, its 
relentlessly increasing severity, and the unrealistic "cure" all exist in the 
text without explanation: no cause is given for the rectilinear evolution of 
Roquentins particular problem. We may well infer as readers that he is the 
victim of his own lucidity, of course, but neither the reason for his special 
insight nor the cause of his peculiar, carefully graded psychological reaction 
is inferable. Nothing in the characteristic of lucidity itself determines such 
an evolution. The text is informed by degree of severity of reaction, and by 
the fact that disease precedes cure, rather than by cause and effect. 
As we are instructed at the outset, in the initial, abortive "feuillet sans 
date," the purpose of the diary is understanding ("y voir clair," [p. 5]; "to 
get a clear insight into it") and cure ("Je suis guéri, je renonce à écrire mes 
impressions," [p. 7}; "I'm cured; I'll quit writing down my impressions"). 
Thus Roquentin transforms himself, for therapeutic purposes, into a nar­
ratee, into a reader: he becomes one of us. From that transformation arises 
the persistent double meaning of the text, in its relationship to Roquentin 
for one part, and in its relationship to us (other) readers for the other. 
Reading skill, I reiterate, involves ability to draw inferences, and in 
dynamic systems, such as novels and life, inferences have their basis, on one 
level or another, in causal assumptions. This is what Roquentin soon begins 
to discover. He becomes aware (pp. 46—50) that we cannot narrate our own 
adventures, that the term "true story" is an oxymoron, because of the causal 
logic inherent in stories. Begin to relate an experience, and the listeners or 
readers will know that you begin with a particular end in view: "C'est en 
réalité par la fin," concludes Roquentin, "qu'on a commencé" ("Its really 
with the end that you began"). What our hero is discovering is the reverse 
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causal logic that functions on the level of the narration: if we are told A, it is 
in order to prepare for the subsequent occurrence of B, of which the inferred 
author, if not the narrator as well, is already cognizant. By assuming an 
authors intentions as prime cause in the narrative, we are associating text 
with mind, with psyche, as divorced from reality. Indeed, a primary dis­
tinction between life and story is that the latter has a "level of narration" 
while the former does not (unless, unlike Sartre, one envisages an inferred 
God). This discovery should already give Roquentin pause with respect to 
the therapeutic usefulness of his diary, but, situated in médias res and 
unaware of where his next entry is coming from, he can claim freedom from 
intentionality. Not so Sartre. Readers are correctly assuming a level of 
narration in La Nausée and can only read Roquentins discovery as a warning 
that the novel itself, in its supposed referentiality, is a delusion. That Sartre 
was aware of the delusion is nowhere more apparent than in his prière 
d'insérer, where he notes the narrator's discovery that "there are no ad­
ventures," only to add, "Alors commence sa véritable aventure, une méta­
morphose insinuante et doucement horrible de toutes ses sensations; c'est la 
Nausée. . . .  " {Oeuvres romanesques, p. 1695); "Then begins his real adven­
ture, an insidious and sweetly horrible metamorphosis of all his sensations: 
Nausea. . . ." Finding no cause for the disease and its gradual progession, 
nor for the "cure" in the récit, and unable to infer any in the disjointed 
histoire, readers are impelled to seek them out in the narration: to attribute 
the "véritable aventure" to authorial intent. If Roquentin knows not what 
his future holds, Sartre does (see, for example, his outline of the projected 
novel, in Oeuvres romanesques, p. 1686). 
Roquentin is perfectly aware of the uselessness of causal inference for 
explaining exterior reality, since it is on that shoal that his biography of the 
Marquis de Rollebon runs aground. The last sentence of his manuscript, the 
one upon which our hero gives up his biographic endeavor, is a causal 
explanation: "M. de Rollebon dut se laisser prendre à cette manoeuvre, 
puisqu'il écrivit à son neveu en date du 13 septembre, qu'il venait de 
rédiger son testament" (p. 116); "M. de Rollebon must have fallen for that 
maneuver, since he wrote his nephew as of September 13 that he had just 
drawn up his will." The logic of the sentence is precisely that of a reader 
constructing histoire from récit. The cause indicated by "puisque" ("since") 
is not that of an event in Rollebon's life, but the condition for Roquentins 
own inference: C =^ R (A —• B). The cause of Rollebon's reaction ("cette 
manoeuvre") is inferred ("dut"—"must have"), as is the reaction itself ("se 
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laisser prendre"—"fallen for"): Roquentin creates an histoire on the basis of 
a récit (the letter to the nephew plus circumstantial knowledge of the 
"maneuver"), using inference as readers must. His rejection of such reason­
ing as unrelated to the objective reality of the events under consideration 
ought to raise questions for him about the value of narrating the events of 
his life in a diary in order to understand them, for understanding of texts 
presupposes causal inference. For readers of the novel, this incident points 
to the unreliability of readerly inference, as if it were warning them away 
from seeking to infer what is going on at the level of narration, where the 
paradox lies. 
Despite his discovery that "you have to choose: live or narrate" (p. 48; 
"il faut choisir: vivre ou raconter") and his injunction to "Beware of litera­
ture" (p. 68; "Se méfier de la littérature"), Roquentin unfailingly "reads" 
his life. One foggy, rainy day, for example, when the proprietor of the café 
Mably did not come down to work, the idea strikes Roquentin, on a half-
joking suggestion of an employee, that M. Fasquelle might be dead in his 
bedroom upstairs. This terrifying thought haunts him all through the 
varied events of the day (pp. 85—97). Like a reader, habituated to seeking 
meaning in the narration, for whom weather is a portent, and who knows 
that no self-respecting novelist would tell us that a character failed to appear 
for work unless that fact was the result of an important cause or the cause of a 
major effect, Roquentin fictionalizes, textualizes his life. It is in the diary's 
mixture of "living" and "narrating" that the paradox filters down into the 
text. It takes the form of a straight but broken line. In the example of the 
"dead" proprietor, the day is filled with causally unconnected events: break­
fast in the café, overheard conversations, walks, morning and afternoon 
sessions at the library, a discussion with the Autodidacte, an encounter with 
a "flasher." But a constant mindset, the haunting thought of M. Fasquelle 
lying dead and undiscovered in bed, connects it all. 
In another segment, preoccupation with his body, as a part of "con­
crete reality" and therefore distinct from his true inner self, unifies the 
multiple events in which Roquentin is engaged. First, he is aware of an 
uncontrolled twitch in his shoulder. Then he becomes conscious of his 
mouth: "II y a de l'eau mousseuse dans ma bouche. Je l'avale, elle glisse dans 
ma gorge, elle me caresse . . .  " (p. 117; "There's foamy water in my 
mouth. I swallow it, it slips into my throat, it caresses me . . ."). The 
quick shift from "Je" (agent) to "me" (patient) reinforces the separation of 
the observing mind and independent matter. Next, in the famous passage, 
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his hand takes on a kind of animal life of its own. The notion of "body parts" 
unites the passage, makes it a "line," but no causal connective leads from 
one part to the next. Readers could not foresee the selection of organs nor 
the order of their presentation. But once the taxonomic principle is deter­
mined (independence of the material body from the mind), it is not hard to 
see where the line is going. It is hardly surprising therefore when, later on, 
his penis begins to operate autonomously. This leads to the horrifying 
discovery that he cannot always control his very thoughts, and that he can 
never stop them: the final line of separation fades. Progression in the 
passage is not causal but logical; the blockers of fragmentation fall between 
examples of a principle, not between a potential cause and its possible 
effect. 
Given the continuity of prose and the discontinuity of events, it is 
hardly surprising that an inveterate "reader" like Roquentin should find a 
cure for his malady in language. "Le mot d'Absurdité naît à présent sous ma 
plume" (p. 152; "Now the word Absurdity springs to life beneath my 
penpoint"): this miraculous birth (there is no definable cause for it except 
Roquentins terrible need for comfort) gives our narrator a linguistic tool, a 
name for the divorce that separates meaning from life, thought from reality, 
and narration from récit. But in this word the solipsism that has constituted 
the malady and the subject of the novel all along resurfaces, for Roquentin 
endows the word with meaning, with value, with the power to dominate 
through understanding: "je comprenais la Nausée, je la possédais" (p. 155; 
"I understood Nausea; I possessed it"). But now we other readers see what 
our hero does not: that the word "Absurdity" is no more meaningful, no 
truer in its pseudoconnection of psyche to exterior reality, than any other 
word. Like the notions of "causality" and "meaning" themselves, it is a 
mental construct: despite its capacity to name, the psyche never truly 
possesses anything, including itself. Roquentin will come to glimpse the 
problem: "Now," he notes later, "when I say 'I,' it sounds hollow to me" 
(p. 200; "A présent, quand je dis 'je', ça me semble creux"). 
But if, on the level of the histoire, the birth of the Word, with its magic 
power, appears miraculous, the event belongs to a clear causal chain on 
the level of narration. The novel is an "adventure," and, as Roquentin saw 
early on, the end causes the beginning. Our hero's initial anxiety, his 
lucid insights, and his psychological suffering, all existed in order for this 
Word, and its concommitant meaning expressed in other words, to come 
into being. 
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As I have noted, in his essay entitled "Vraisemblance et motivation,"2 
Gérard Genette evokes the conflict between the chronological causal logic 
of the récit and the antichronological causality inherent in the intentions of 
the narration. His use of the term "motivation" applies to all causal con­
catenations at the récit level: 
La motivation est donc l'apparence et l'alibi causaliste que se donne la 
détermination finaliste qui est la règle de la fiction: le parce que chargé 
de faire oublier le pour quoi}—et donc de naturaliser, ou de réaliser (au 
sens de: faire passer pour réelle) la fiction en dissimulant ce qu'elle a de 
concerté, comme dit Valincour, c'est-à-dire d'artificiel: bref de fictif. 
(P. 97) 
(So motivation is the outward appearance and the causalist alibi that 
intentionalist determination, which is the rule of fiction, establishes 
for itself: the because entrusted with driving the what for} from our 
minds, and thus with naturalizing fiction, or with realizing it [in the 
sense of "passing it off as real"], by dissimulating what is "concerted" 
about it, as Valincour says, i.e., what is artificial, in short, what is 
fictive about it.) 
Roquentin's anguish and his resulting need for comfort are, in this sense, a 
causalist alibi constructed to bring the word "Absurdity" with its full 
baggage of meaning artificially into the text. But the paucity of causal 
connections between events in the novel, and Roquentin's position as ob­
server before a succession of causally unconnected exterior happenings, 
sharply reduce the number of "alibis" in this fiction. We are constantly 
impelled to infer causation from the narration and to read at that level. But, 
as we already observed in chapter five, "motivation" in the récit is not a 
requirement for verisimilitude; La Nausées "alibi" resides rather in its 
verisimilar aspects: people, places, situations. 
Genette seems to impugn "motivation," explicit causation in the récit, 
as a coverup for the "concerted," the "artificial," and the "fictive," which 
enter fiction through the narration. But intentionalist determination un­
concealed would not be fiction (parables excepted), nor would a narrative 
without a level of narration to hide. But since the level of narration is simply 
a product of reader inference, one might suggest that Genette is using his 
own intentionalist assumptions to subvert what is fictional about fiction. It 
should be beginning to become apparent that the fictional enterprise re­
quires cooperation of narration with récit, and thus of reader with text. 
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In La Nausée, the narration is concerted, artificial, divorced from 
reality, like the psyche, so that the tension between récit and narration 
constitutes a formal example of the paradox that is its subject. To reconcile 
the irreconcilable, the text decides to incorporate the project of another 
text: Roquentin decides at last, Proust-like, to write a novel, in the hope 
that it will reflect a moment of his present being upon the future, like the 
jazz artists "immortalized" on his favorite record. Like all fictions, it will 
dissimulate; it will have a narration level (implicit in the "hope" of the 
previous sentence) inexistent in the reality it pretends to describe. It is 
therefore a pseudosolution, for the absurd tension will remain between récit 
and narration, just as in La Nausée itself. This tension bears an obvious 
relation to the interlevel irony we observed in mythic stories (chapter 
eight), the importance of which I shall discuss in the conclusion. 
While Roquentins malady alerts readers from the start to the inten­
tions of the narration (we may guess that Roquentin is headed for a "cure" or 
"death," rather than toward a linguistic pseudocure, but we know at least 
that the reverse logic of the narration warrants a guessing game), the 
narration is so eclipsed in the first part of L'Etranger* that we are nearly at 
the end of it before we realize that there is a game of causal logic afoot. 
In the histoire, the game is played for higher stakes: whether Meursault 
killed the Arab "en connaissance de cause" (p. 1196) is the question on 
which the homodiegetic narrators life hangs.4 The reader is in less jeopardy, 
but the competition between the narration we infer and the récit we read is so 
subtly waged that we grow aware of it only retrospectively. 
Part I of L'Etranger is a fragmented, diarylike presentation (although it 
lacks the diary conventions of dated entries and introspection) of certain 
events in Meursault's life during the eighteen days, more or less,5 that end 
with the murder. Part II is a straightforward narrative account of some of 
Meursault's experiences during the investigation, the trial, and his subse­
quent imprisonment while awaiting a pardon, which apparently does not 
come (the latest moments related in the novel, in the present-of-narration at 
the beginning of II, 5, suggest that Meursault has been moved to death 
row, and that execution, and the attendant final interview with the chap­
lain, appear inevitable to him). Part I thus provides no apparent causal 
chain leading directly to the murder, while part II, in the case developed by 
the investigating magistrate and the prosecutor, presents a récit connecting 
many of these events in a causal strand that attempts to demonstrate 
premeditation. We may call part I "r/a/-dominant," because it encourages 
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readers to read at that level rather than constructing a causally linked 
histoire; the prosecutors case is />/j/0/>e-dominant, since it presents most of 
the same events in a causal relationship, virtually creating retrospectively 
the histoire for the reader. The confrontation of these two modes by the 
narration points to the notion that causation in human conduct is a matter of 
mental perception, not of pragmatic fact. 
Since part I is fragmented, and since fragmentation is supposed to 
impel readers to seek causal explanations at higher levels of narrative, why 
do readers tend to accept the causal gaps in Meursaults récit unques­
tioningly? I propose three answers. First, the fragmentation is successful: 
the murder remains unpredictable until I, 6; therefore construction of a 
causal histoire remains impossible, and interrogation of the intent of narra­
tion fruitless. Second, the hero appears unthreatened until the end; our need 
to understand and predict is therefore somewhat diminished. Finally, the 
frequency of causal vocabulary in part I is extraordinarily high, giving a 
superficial impression that Meursault is indeed explaining, making the 
causal connections among the events in his life. The unusual density of 
obvious, optional causal connectives in part I has left critics at odds. 
Sartre claims, in his penetrating "Explication" (1943), that, in a style 
like that of L'Etranger, 
. .  . on n'organise pas les phrases entre elles: elles sont purement 
juxtaposées: en particulier on évite toutes les liaisons causales, qui 
introduiraient dans le récit comme un embryon d'explication et 
qui mettraient entre les instants un ordre différent de la succes­
sion pure.6 
(. . . you do not organize the sentences with respect to each other; 
they are purely juxtaposed; in particular, you avoid all causal linkings, 
which would introduce a kind of embryonic explanation into the story 
and set up between the moments an order which is different from pure 
succession.) 
Subsequent critics—Ullmann, Thody, Fitch, Simon, et al.—have also 
indicated that the text tends to avoid causal connections. Sartre adds, in a 
more ambiguous sentence we shall examine later, that the world of this 
novel is one from which "causality has been carefully eradicated" ("dont on a 
soigneusement extirpé la causalité").7 Yet Ignace Feuerlicht was able to list, 
in 1963, one hundred nine causal connectives in L'Etranger, parce que (60), 
causal comme (15), à cause <fc (13), puisque (7), car (6), c'est pour cela que (2), 
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causal ainsi (3), donc (2), par suite ( i ) . 8 There are also examples of causal de, 
of pour (accomplished intention), and of numerous transitive verbs indica­
tive of causation (not to mention parataxis) not listed by Feuerlicht. A great 
deal of this vocabulary occurs in the "fragmented" part I: thirty-five of the 
sixty uses of parce que appear in that section. The frequency of the causal 
connectives cited by Feuerlicht in L'Etranger is indeed far higher than that 
in our Gidean sample (see appendix A)—quite high, I think, in absolute 
terms.9 Our first-person narrator seems almost preoccupied with explain­
ing "why," and yet the notion that he fails to make causal connections 
persists. 
Close analysis of Feuerlicht s list (after the minor corrections indicated 
in note 8 above) suggests the reason for the contradiction. About sixty-six 
percent of the occurrences of causal terms are inconsequential or apparently 
evasive, or they involve mere inference or speculation on Meursault s part: 
such uses of the vocabulary cannot contribute to the generation of causal 
chains. Another nine percent are not part of Meursaults récit as such, but 
belong to the histoire as judgments of other characters quoted or alluded to 
by Meursault. The remaining twenty-five percent of occurrences of these 
"optional" causal terms reflect an awareness on the narrators part of working 
chains of cause and effect, although seven percent of those appear to refer to 
the narration, of which Meursault is, theoretically, unaware. (For a statis­
tical summary of my analysis of Feuerlicht s data, see appendix C.) 
A few examples of this causal vocabulary will show how it often serves 
to give the impression of explaining without really doing so. Meursault 
writes, for example, that, during his vigil beside his mothers coffin, he fell 
asleep. Then: "Je me suis réveillé parce que j'avais de plus en plus mal aux 
reins" (p. 1133; "I woke up because my back was hurting worse and 
worse"). But no long-term consequences arise, either from awakening or 
from the sore back. N o explanation at all is offered for dozing off (if one can 
ever explain such things), although it is falling asleep, rather than awaken­
ing, which will cause repercussions at the trial. The first morning after the 
return from the funeral, "J'ai eu de la peine à me lever," writes Meursault, 
"parce que j'étais fatigué de ma journée d'hier" (p. 1138; "I had a hard time 
getting up, because I was tired out from yesterday"). The cause-and-effect 
relationship is highly plausible, but the fatigue left him strong enough to 
go swimming that morning, to take Marie out that evening, and to prolong 
the date in his room into the night. Much of the causal vocabulary in this 
text explains in this way brief and inconsequential circumstances. 
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Less frequently, Meursaults causal vocabulary apparently evades a 
central issue, either by his intent or through his failure to grasp it. Two 
examples occur within three sentences when, after swimming, he and Marie 
put on their street clothes to leave the beach. She is startled, since he has 
just made a date with her, to note from his black tie and armband that he is 
in mourning, and he tells her his mother is dead. 
Comme elle voulait savoir depuis quand, j'ai répondu: "Depuis hier." 
Elle a eu un petit recul, mais n'a fait aucune remarque. J'ai eu envie de 
lui dire que ce n'était pas ma faute, mais je me suis arrêté parce que j'ai 
pensé que je l'avais déjà dit à mon patron. (P. 1139) 
(As she wanted to know since when, I answered, "Since yesterday." 
She backed off a little, but made no remark. I felt like telling her it 
wasn't my fault, but I held off, because it occurred to me I'd already 
said that to my boss.) 
The initial comme introduces the reason for his responding, but not for his 
response; yet the problem lies there, for his mother had died, at the latest, 
the day before yesterday. Did he lie or err? As for the parce que, the fact of 
having said something once is not of itself a valid reason for not repeating it 
to another interlocutor. The construction of parce que with a mental "action" 
{parce que fat pensé que, trouvé que, senti que, etc.) is not, however, atypical of 
Meursault; he has no qualms about "explaining" actions on the basis of 
momentary judgments, illogical or not. He will give, parataxically, better 
reasons for his silence in the two sentences immediately following: "That 
didn't mean anything. Any way you look at it, you're always a little at fault" 
("Cela ne voulait rien dire. De toute façon, on est toujours un peu fautif"). 
But precisely, the parataxis here, after the earlier parce que, leaves open the 
question of whether these reasons entered his mind while speaking to Marie 
or whether he thought of them later. Here again, he explains his (absence 
of) response, but not what he felt like responding. Why did he feel the need 
to disclaim responsibility for his mother's demise? Does he see her death as 
out of step with his usual style of life, rather than seeing his lifestyle as out 
of step with her recent passing? In such instances, Meursault explains the 
inconsequential—why he spoke (or did not)—while eluding the more 
crucial question of the cause behind his expressed (or unexpressed) ideas. So 
used, causal vocabulary creates no "chains of events." 
Now and then Meursault uses the terminology of causation to draw 
inferences about the reality that surrounds him. While they let us see the 
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world through his eyes, these inferences never explicitly influence his con­
duct. As he approaches the Arab he will soon kill on the beach, for example, 
he notes: "Maybe because of the shadows on his face, he looked like he was 
laughing" (p. 1165: "Peut-être à cause des ombres sur son visage, il avait 
l'air de rire"). If he took the inferred amusement on the part of the Arab as 
an aflFront, the text gives no indication of it; in the récit, the murder is caused 
by the sun, not anger. Indeed the causal term in this sentence serves to 
explain why the inference was of dubious validity. Occasionally too, our 
narrator chooses causal terms in developing hypotheses about future or 
other nonexistent "realities." Such speculations have no bearing on any 
action, and they occur essentially toward the end of the novel, as Meursault 
seeks to imagine what it will be like to be guillotined, or whether some 
other form of execution might be preferable (e.g., p. 1204, Ainsi, Car, Par 
suite). 
But Meursault does make a number of substantial causal connections. 
The primary example in part I is the relatively clear causal chain, of which 
Meursault is conscious, leading from the relationship with Raymond Sintès 
to the initial confrontations at the beach, in Raymonds company, with the 
latter s Arab antagonists. Meursault knows that Raymond enjoys his com­
pany, "because I listen to him" (p. 1145; "parce que je l'écoute"). Such 
willingness to listen entangles the protagonist in Raymond's plot to bru­
talize further his former Arab mistress, who has been unfaithful, or, if he is 
her pimp, "unremitting." When asked if he will write a letter to draw her 
into Raymond's trap, Meursault says nothing; asked if he would mind 
writing it then and there, he replies, "No." There is no explicit causal 
explanation for that decision, but Meursault notes that he wrote the best 
letter he could, to please Raymond, "parce que je n'avais pas de raison de 
ne pas le contenter" (p. 1148; "because I had no reason not to please 
him"). Passivity— listening, not minding, having "no reason" to displease 
Raymond (although "avoiding violence" might have done in a pinch)— 
characterizes the explicit explanation at this juncture. From there, the 
causal chain continues, with others (Raymond, Masson) making the deci­
sions and Meursault electing only to participate, until the first confronta­
tion with the Arabs on the beach (pp. 1164-65)  . The causal link between 
that fight and the second encounter is not explicit, but Meursault infers a 
possible motive on Raymond's part (p. 1165). At the end of the second 
confrontation, our narrator takes a more active part, apparently to prevent 
Raymond from shooting his adversary. Here the causal chain ends. The 
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third confrontation, in which Meursault returns alone to the beach and kills 
the Arab, is isolated from the preceding chain of events by the introduction 
of a new cause: "C'était le même soleil. . . . A cause de cette brûlure . . ." 
(p. i i68 ; "It was the same sun. . . . Because of that searing heat . . ."). 
Here the etiological term sets in motion a new causal chain, the most 
formidable of the novel: hearings, trial, conviction of premeditated 
murder. 
In addition to the substantial causes Meursault sees, a number of 
causal terms in the text explain his emotional and mental states (e.g., 
"J'étais un peu étourdi parce qu'il a fallu que je monte chez Emmanuel pour 
lui emprunter une cravate noire et un brassard," [p. 1127}; "I was a little 
confused because I had to go up to Emmanuel's to borrow a black tie and 
armband from him"), but for the most part such states of mind are without 
consequence. A few may be seen, however, as actual causes of Meursault s 
final enlightenment. During the trial, our narrator once notes, "I had a 
crazy desire to cry, because I felt how much I was detested by all those folks" 
(p. 1189; "j'ai eu une envie stupide de pleurer parce que j'ai senti combien 
j'étais détesté par tous ces gens-là"). After conviction, he can still imagine 
himself alive and free. "J'avais tort," he explains, "de me laisser aller à ces 
suppositions parce que, l'instant d'après, j'avais si affreusement froid que je 
me recroquevillais sous ma couverture" (p. 1203 ; "I was wrong to let myself 
make these suppositions because, the next minute, I was so horribly cold I 
curled up in a ball under my blanket"). His final decision to cherish that 
which separates him from those who judge—and thus from life and free-
dom—appears to be, at least in part, a result of such explicitly caused 
mental states. 
A few causal explanations, inconsequential in the récit, seem in retro­
spect to refer to the text itself, to what is going on at the level of narration; 
we will consider these later. The essential point is that, despite a causal 
vocabulary of exceptionally high density, the critics who see Meursault's 
account as causally fragmented are quite correct. Most of the obviously 
causal terms are "wasted" on the inconsequential or on apparently "evasive" 
explanations, particularly in part I. But the "waste" may have a dual 
purpose. First, it can give some readers at first reading the impression that 
Meursault is indeed explaining the events of his life, thus discouraging 
speculation, at the level of narration, about the indexic author's purposes. 
Secondly, it suggests a tension between words and reality, raising doubts 
about the veracity and utility of language, of linguistic "explanations." 
Of course, if Meursault were writing, diarylike, the story of his life 
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day by day as he lived it, it would be quite plausible that he might fail to 
note causal relationships that would become apparent only afterward: 
hindsight, after all, is the natural direction for causal reasoning. So it is that 
the question of when the text was composed by Meursault (present of 
narration) becomes central for analysts of causation. With it, the question of 
who is writing surfaces: is it the bereaved office clerk who writes I, 1, or the 
condemned murderer of II, 5, or both? 
As several critics have noted,10 evidence of proximate narration figures 
prominently in part I, suggesting a daily notebook or diary: in the first two 
paragraphs of I, 1 ("Aujourd'hui, maman est morte," [p. 1127}; "Today 
mama died"); in the temporal overlap of paragraphs two and three ("Je 
prendrai l'autobus. . . . J'ai pris l'autobus," [p. 1127}; "I'll take the 
bus. . .  . I took the bus"); at the beginning of I, 2 ("c'est aujourd'hui 
samedi," [p. 1138]; "today is Saturday"); in I, 3, where the whole chapter 
could, without contradiction, be read as if composed at the close of the day 
recounted; in I, 4, which purports to have been written on Sunday ("Hier, 
c'était samedi," [p. 1150]; "Yesterday was Saturday"), but which ends with 
our narrator already in bed Sunday night (when did he write?). Beginning 
with 1,5, there is apparently nothing but postponed narration until the first 
sentences of II, 5 ("en ce moment," [p. 1202]; "right now"). It is easy to 
situate the segment of postponed narration as being composed during the 
period of incarceration, but the problem posed by the proximate narration 
is that Meursault gives such a full account of his activities that it is hard to 
imagine when he finds time to write. 
Jean-Claude Pariente has proposed an ingenious solution: I, 1 through 
I, 4 constitutes a diary without indications of dates and times of entries; it 
was divided into parts and chapters by a transformed Meursault near the end 
of his life, when he also composed the long narration, I, 5 through II, 5.11 
Thanks to this latter-day textual division, breaks between moments of 
composition can occur in midchapter. Thus, for example, all of I, 1 after 
the first two paragraphs, plus the first two paragraphs of I, 2 (i.e., 
pp. 1127—39), was composed on Saturday, after the morning swim and 
before the evening date. That would allow perhaps some eight hours (minus 
time for meals) for the project: possible for a fast writer, but a grueling 
session. Meursault likes to explain his mental states, yet he never mentions 
distractions, or writer's cramp; indeed, he never alludes to work on the diary 
at all. If I raise the issue, it is to begin to suggest that no inferred solution, 
on the level of the histoire, can be completely satisfying. 
Another difficulty with the early-chapters-as-diary theories is perhaps 
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the ultimate causal question about the histoire: why, or for whom, was the 
"diary" written? Fictional diaries traditionally exist for cause, explicit or 
implicit;12 Roquentin, one will recall, explains at the outset what impels 
him to write. L'Etranger provides no such indication. Fictional diarists 
almost always write for themselves alone, and the union of narrator and 
narratee furnishes for readers a guarantee of the narrators sincerity.13 Now, 
if Meursault begins a diary for himself, he need not explain those things he 
knows full well, such as the fact that the nursing home is in Marengo, 
eighty kilometers from Algiers (p. 1127), or that his bedroom overlooks 
the main street of the faubourg (p. 1140), or even that old Salamano oc­
cupies the other lodging in hisfloor (p. 1144). Such details imply another 
reader, one who needs orientation in an unfamiliar environment. 
And, if diary there is, why does it begin precisely with the death of 
"maman"? Is it just an odd coincidence that the first event of the diarylike 
text is also the earliest element of the prosecutors case? One critic, noting 
the problem, suggests that the text pretends to be retranscribed and edited 
after Meursault s decapitation, going so far as to imagine a possible editorial 
frame, which would indicate that entries prior to Mme Meursault s demise, 
being unimportant to the case, were deleted.14 Of course, the notion of 
importance or relevancy is one of consequentiality, a causal notion whose 
adoption would presuppose an editor favorable to the prosecutors case. 
And, if there were a post mortem "transcriber," could we attribute to her or 
him the insertion of the orienting details Meursault would not have written 
for himself? If so, what else did the transcripteur add or delete, given a bias 
for "relevancy" and public clarity? And if, as J.-C. Pariente has proposed, it 
is Meursault, at last capable of seeing his story objectively, as a "stranger" to 
himself, who performed the editing (division into chapters), did he delete 
entries prior to his mothers death and add the orienting explanations at that 
time, perhaps in view of presenting "his side of the story" to a wider 
audience? In that case, might he not have deleted a crucial causal term here 
or there, or inserted one of his "je ne sais pas pourquoi" ("I-don't-know-
why" assertions) on occasion? A diary modified ex post facto by anyone 
is suspect, and one that takes account of external readers' ignorance is 
doubly so.15 
On the other hand, if Meursault composed the whole tale in prison, 
when he presumably had ample time to write, the diarylike character of 
part I, with its indices of proximate narration, is a pure fabrication. With 
such hindsight, the absence of crucial causal connections and the mislead­
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ing abundance of causal vocabulary could well be self-serving. In full 
knowledge of the prosecutors reading of events, and aware that he was 
writing for others, he could propose another version of events, whether he 
believed it to have been "true" or not, as a condemnation of the judicial 
system and as his vindication before posterity. 
So neither of these histoire-level readings is fully satisfactory; both 
leave doubts about the narrator and a suspect text. But it is precisely the 
impossibility of constructing a credible histoire that impels us to turn to the 
narration in search of an explanation. Novels that are complete and quite 
internally consistent in their histoire (like La Bête humaine, where Denizet s 
explanation fills the structural role occupied by the prosecutors analysis of 
events here), while they may hint at their level of narration, do not oblige us 
to consult it. Inconsistencies in the histoire open a novel "at the top," raising 
our consciousness of the indexic authors intentions as we infer them, and 
increasing the importance of the narration. It is time to turn, therefore, to 
the metacausality in the narration of L'Etranger. 
Meursault attends his mothers funeral, takes a mistress (in the par­
lance of the period), writes a letter for a friend, and kills an Arab. These four 
events occur in the fragmented part I, and again in the same order in the 
prosecutors demonstration of premeditation. The difference lies in words: 
the absence of crucial causal connectives in part I and their presence in the 
prosecutors reading of events. The narration presents first a récit with causal 
gaps, followed by an histoire of that récit, reconstituted by inference with 
the gaps neatly filled. The States Attorney is merely reading part I as we 
have read Zola, making all the possible connections. 
The metacausal function of part I is to make possible the prosecutors 
histoire, while putting its validity in doubt.16 The first-person narration 
throughout tends to keep readers' sympathy with Meursault. (The four final 
shots, for example, are not bullets penetrating a dying mans hide, but 
knocks on the gates of "malheur" for Meursault; the unfortunate victim 
remains nameless throughout: he is just "the Arab.") We read Meursault's 
version first, so that the subsequent, competing version must not only 
be plausible in itself (which is all we required of the first version), but 
must also overcome the established credibility of the prior account.17 And 
Meursault will narrate the trial too, telling us he is disoriented, hurt, and 
astonished to see his actions debated as if without his participation. The 
narration appears thus to be seeking to ensure that we will see in the 
prosecutor's histoire a fabrication. For the point of the narration is that all 
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causal explanations, coming, as they must, after the fact, are artificial 
constructs. Whether Meursault begins with a diary or not, whether he 
edited it or not, whether he used causal connectives innocently or to mis­
lead, whether he wrote for posterity or for himself, the narration shows that 
two plausible versions can exist for the same events, that events can "exist" 
with or without crucial causal interconnections, and thus that causation is 
not inherent in them at all, but an exterior interpretation placed upon them 
by a human mind. 
In addition to the causal terms treated earlier, there are eight examples 
of causal vocabulary in text-referential sentences. I hope to show that these 
examples, while inconsequential in the récit, point to the operation of the 
narration and thereby to the problematics of literary causation. 
The three examples at the beginning of I, 6 (p. 1160) provide a 
significant lexical and thematic link between the mothers funeral and the 
murder, in the ironic company of "useless" causal vocabulary. The first 
example looks backward toward the funeral and contains a somewhat char­
acteristic ambiguity: "Marie s'est moquée de moi parce qu'elle disait que 
j'avais 'une tête d'enterrement'" ("Marie made run of me because she said I 
'looked like I'd come from a funeral"'). The sentence can, of course, be 
understood in at least two ways: "Marie seemed to be making fun of me 
because she said . . .  " (affirmation as cause of inference), or "Marie made 
fun of me because (as she said) I 'looked like I'd come from a funeral' " (facial 
expression as cause of teasing). Thus, while we may be at something ofa loss 
about causation in the récit, the funereal mien that Meursault did not have 
when he first flirted with Marie the day after the funeral now appears, some 
two weeks later, sending symbol seekers to the narration. In the next 
paragraph, only five short sentences farther on, Meursault gives two rea­
sons, with causal terms, for the suns powerful effect on him as he left his 
building for the beach. There are no consequences, and he is soon enjoying 
the sun; but several hours later it will, he says, provoke his murderous act. 
Thus the text will organize a significant conjunction here between the 
funeral and the effects of the sun (a conjunction echoed just before the 
murder, "le même soleil"—the same sun as the day of the funeral, p. 1168). 
It will do so in the presence of three obvious causal terms; but the conjunc­
tion is by juxtaposition of naming words ("enterrement," "soleil"), while 
the words of causation ("parce que" twice, and "à cause de") are at best of 
superficial utility. Juxtaposition of events and causal interconnection of 
events are the two grids for observation of reality that the text provides. If 
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this passage contains anything of significance, it lies in the juxtaposition: 
the narration appears to privilege that mode. 
Words of causation are not, of course, the only "useless" vocabulary in 
circulation. Meursault notes that Masson's sentences are interlarded with 
"et je dirai plus" ("and I'll even go so far as to say"), although what follows 
usually adds nothing to what went before. He comments on it at the beach 
the day of the murder, adding, "je n'ai plus fait attention à ce tic parce que 
j'étais occupé à éprouver que le soleil me faisait du bien" (p. 1162; "I quit 
paying attention to this habit because I was busy feeling how much good 
the sun was doing me"). The earlier painful effects of the sun are now 
completely gone and their alleged causes of no effect. The meaningfulness of 
that causal vocabulary, through inconsequentiality, is annulled, as is the 
sense of Masson's habitual phrase, and for the same reason. Yet this sentence 
itself contains a "because": the indexic author appears to be pointing to 
causal vocabulary as a mere "tic" of our narrator's style. 
Meursault s conception of his own identity is linked to four causal 
terms in the text, as his discovery of his separateness, his étrangeté, is 
brought to light, and as the meaning of "je" in the text is called into 
question. Early in the trial, Meursault describes a young reporter, with an 
asymmetric face expressing nothing in particular, who was observing him 
intently. He adds: 
Et j'ai eu l'impression bizarre d'être regardé par moi-même. C'est 
peut-être pour cela, et aussi parce que je ne connaissais pas les usages 
du lieu, que je n'ai pas très bien compris tout ce qui s'est passé 
ensuite. . .  . (P. 1186) 
(And I had the strange impression of being looked at by myself. Maybe 
it was on account of that—and also because I was unfamiliar with the 
customs of the place—that I didn't understand too well everything 
that happened afterward. . . .) 
What Meursault fails to understand specifically is the process of jury selec­
tion and the attorneys' opening statements, but he is here beginning to 
define his own separateness from judicial procedure in general. The "cus­
toms of the place," from which he distinguishes himself, include of course 
the causal linking of events; the fact that he gives his unfamiliarity with 
such things as a cause makes this choice of words ironic, when viewed from 
the level of the narration. 
The presence of the journalist18—the other cause of the distraction— 
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evokes the startling prospect of becoming the subject ("he") of someone 
else's story; that the journalist should resemble Meursault calls up the 
notion of being the subject ("he") of one's own story ("I"). "Maybe it was on 
account of that" that Meursault feels estranged. If diary there is at this 
point, he has been (unknowingly?) dividing into a writing "I" and a written 
about "I-he" for some time. Whether he only now realizes the danger of this 
previous division, or whether he will realize it now and later assume the 
peril by writing, the estrangement from himself it implies produces here a 
failure to comprehend. "Being looked at by myself" implies distinctions 
between present self (observing) and present self (observed), between 
present self (observing) and past self (observed) and between present self 
(observed) and others (observing). Others, as strangers, cannot observe 
Meursault's past self, but only reconstruct it through inference. Yet in­
ference about past events is inaccurate, because, when the events occurred, 
they were not past (and therefore subject to causal logic), but present. The 
diary like text of part I reproduces in proximate narration, not a past self, 
but a series of present selves, none of which is inferable from any of the 
others since in the present there are no causal connectives. Meursault, for 
whom each of his selves was always already present, fails to comprehend the 
applicability of causal inferences to himself; the function in the narration of 
the juxtaposition of parts I and II is to bring readers to deconstruct the 
process of causal inference. 
As Meursault takes the stand, 
On m'a encore fait décliner mon identité, et malgré mon agacement, 
j'ai pensé qu'au fond c'était assez naturel, parce qu'il serait trop grave 
de juger un homme pour un autre. (P. 1187) 
(They made me state my full name and occupation again, and, in spite 
of my irritation, I figured basically it made sense, because it would be 
just too serious to judge one man for another.) 
But the naive faith in a permanent identité, which causes our hero to 
overcome his "irritation," is precisely at the root of the problem. The 
injustice is indeed "just too serious," for the court is about to judge a 
Meursault-past, subject to causal reasoning, for a crime committed by 
a Meursault who was, at the time, quite present. Only if he returned to the 
beach with the gun, "looked at by himself" as a future self, inferring 
a potential killer-self, can premeditation be adjudged. The text cannot 
provide objective data on that matter, leaving readers with no tool 
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but inference, and with nothing to discover but the inapplicability of 
the tool. 
During the summation of the lawyer for the defense, Meursault is 
inattentive. "At one point, however, I listened, because he was saying, 'I 
have killed, it's true'" (p. 1198; "A un moment donné, cependant, j'ai 
écouté, parce qu'il disait: 'II est vrai que j'ai tué"'). The substitution of "I" 
for "he" is the cause of Meursault's attention: he is discovering that the 
notion of consistent identity is a matter not of reality but of language 
("Meursault," "je"). If an attorney can be said to have assumed temporarily 
the role of his client on the courtroom stage by a choice of pronoun, then 
Meursault (present in court) can see himself as having assumed there the 
role of Meursault (present on the beach). Only a naive faith in the consistent 
truth value of language can cause these identities, so different in reality, to 
be perceived as one by the jury. 
Causation, so readily expressible in language, is a means of giving 
persistent continuity to events; when it disappears, all the related assump-
tions—including the notion that "I" am consistently the "same person"— 
vanish with it. Causality returns for Meursault in prison, however, where 
the condemned man is forced to share his cell with a future self, ruled by a 
causality more inexorable than that of the prosecutor's argument: he is 
constrained to plan for his own dying. From that vantage point, he writes or 
completes his text. In his remarkable narratological analysis of L'Etranger, 
Nils Soelberg points out that what becomes of vital importance for 
Meursault at the end is precisely the unimportance of his life.19 In a story, it 
is the inconsequential that is unimportant: causality defines importance. 
The episode of Salamano and his dog, while perhaps specularly revealing 
(and it involves a closed system of reciprocating causation, reminiscent of 
Phasie and Misard in La Bête humaine), is unimportant to his tale, and 
therefore highly important to its narrator. And a high density of causal 
vocabulary, used ineffectually, must be important to him too, for it demon­
strates that causation is merely linguistic, and not inherent in his life. 
Despite similarities, L'Etranger differs radically from La Bête humaine 
in that the modern work contains little true causation prior to the mag-
istrate's reconstruction. Denizet gets the causes wrong; Meursault's prose­
cutor inserts causality where there (apparently) was none. At the level of the 
histoire, then, L'Etranger has the causal structure proposed at the outset, 
fragmented in part I and rectilinear in part II (see diagram 9.1). Part I is 
truly fragmented and not episodic, since the starting point and the order of 
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Causal structure of L'Etranger, viewed as histoire: 
k 
murder 
Causal structure of L'Etranger, viewed as narration: 
k 
murder 
Diagram 9-1 
events are essentially predetermined by the need to allow the prosecutor to 
present a plausible causal explanation. But looking at the story retro­
spectively and from the level ofnarration, where the juxtaposition of the two 
versions of events sends us, the text seems to form a linear continuity: if 
Meursault did not premeditate the murder, the indexic author most surely 
did! On the other hand, the narration privileges the absence of causal chains, 
since it places the "causeless" version first. So it is that Meursault s récit 
undermines the prosecutors histoire, making it a fraudulent imposition. 
Thus the apparent causal line we perceive from murder to guillotine seems 
fraudulent as well: at first reading, conviction is not a certainty, for if the 
jury learns what we know, if the diarylike account is inserted in the trial, 
premeditation may not be convincingly proven. If we accept the notion of a 
series of disconnected presents, everything that follows the murder is dis­
connected too, and our causal chain from murder to execution is a false 
retrospective imposition. Thus in hindsight, the linear and fragmentary 
tendencies have been continuously in conflict, the narration engaging them 
in chiasmic mutual destruction.20 
Diagram 9.1 compares the causal structure of L'Etranger perceived as 
histoire and as narration. The upper half of the narration schema repeats, 
grosso modo, the causal diagram of the histoire-, the lower half reflects the 
undermining forces present only in the narration: connective structure 
before the murder, and fragmentation thereafter. 
The histoire pits two conflicting versions of events against each other. 
Criticism working on this level has sought to determine which version is 
The Broken Line «17  1 
privileged in the text by striving to unravel the enigmas of the récit: when 
Meursault wrote part I (question of sincerity), and how conscious the 
narrator was of causality (presence or absence of causal connectives). But the 
text can yield no conclusive reading of the histoire, for it is constructed to 
open upward upon the organizing intelligence of the narration. On that 
level, it sets in opposition "events" and the very idea of "versions" thereof. 
The coexistence of Meursault s diarylike récit and the prosecutors histoire 
puts the value of both in doubt, along with the ability of language to 
recount events objectively. 
This brings us back to the quotation from Sartre cited earlier; it should 
no longer seem ambiguous, for it will now be apparent that Sartre is 
analyzing neither the récit nor the histoire, but the narration: 
Mais peu à peu l'ouvrage s'organise de lui-même sous les yeux du 
lecteur, il révèle la solide substructure qui le soutient. Il n'est pas un 
détail inutile, pas un qui ne soit repris par la suite et versé au débat; et, 
le livre fermé, nous comprenons qu'il ne pouvait pas commencer 
autrement, qu'il ne pouvait pas avoir une autre fin: dans ce monde 
qu'on veut nous donner comme absurde et dont on a soigneusement 
extirpé la causalité, le plus petit incident a du poids; il n'en est pas un 
qui ne contribue à conduire le héros vers le crime et vers l'exécution 
capitale. L'Etranger est une oeuvre classique, une oeuvre d'ordre, com­
posé à propos de l'absurde et contre l'absurde.21 
(But little by little the work organizes itself before the reader's eyes; it 
reveals the solid substructure which sustains it. There is not a single 
useless detail, not one which is not taken up again later on and added 
to the debate; and, when at last we close the book, we understand that 
it could not have begun otherwise, that it could have no other ending: 
in this world that is intended to appear absurd and from which 
causality has been carefully eradicated, the slightest incident has 
weight; there is not one which does not contribute to leading the hero 
toward the crime and toward the death penalty. L'Etranger is a classical 
work, a work of order, composed about the absurd, against the 
absurd.) 
If the relationship between words and exterior reality is put in doubt, one 
might suppose that the literary enterprise that novels in general—and 
especially "classical" ones—represent is in jeopardy. Not so. Novels, with 
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the artificiality apparent in their "level ofnarration" are admirably suited to 
speak to the human, subjective perception of reality, to our mental repre­
sentations of the world about us, which are all we have. La Nausée and 
L'Etranger represent fragmented reality in paradoxically solid mental struc­
tures: the line is broken, but remains a line. 
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Mental-Representation Fiction 
. . . n'ayant eu des événements . . . que cette connaissance fragmentaire, 
incomplète, faite d'une addition de brèves images, elles-mêmes incom­
plètement appréhendées par la vision, de paroles, elles-mêmes mal sai­
sies, de sensations, elles-mêmes mal définies, et tout cela vague, plein de 
trous, de vides, auxquels l'imagination et une approximation logique s'effor-
çaient de remédier par une suite de hasardeuses déductions—hasardeuses 
mais non pas forcément fausses. . . . 
(. . . having had of events . . . only that fragmentary, incomplete knowl­
edge, made up of a sum of brief images, themselves incompletely ap­
prehended by vision, of words, themselves ill grasped, of sensations, them­
selves ill defined, and all of that vague, full of holes and voids, which 
imagination and a logical approximation strove to remedy by a series of 
hazardous deductions—hazardous but not necessarily false. . . .) 
CLAUDE SIMON 
Having discovered themselves imprisoned behind the filters of their own problematic senses, postexistentialist inferred authors and their narrators could no longer evoke with the same au­
thority and authenticity the truth about their fictional people and events. 
Fiction that recognized the difference between words and things could not 
talk without contradiction about what we used to call, with willing suspen­
sion of disbelief, "reality." Instead, the "new novel" (astutely tagged at first 
as "new realism") gradually replaced depiction of persons and events with 
descriptions of mental representations thereof, as they might appear in the 
mind of a character or narrator; in this fiction we would read less about 
things and more about mental images of things. 
It may be argued that that is what we have been reading all along. 
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Narrowly viewed, that argument appears incontrovertible. When Flaubert 
offers us, in passages of discours indirect libre, glimpses of Emma Bovary s 
inner reaction to events, he is providing a look at her mental representation 
of them. Zola's third-person narrators give us in the récit their picture of 
the histoire. When Gide s intradiegetic narrators and Camus s Meursault ex­
press themselves in the first person and limit their tales to those things 
which they as characters perceived, they are presenting simply a mental 
image of a series of events. But the primary distinction between these 
elements of traditional mental representation and the innovative French 
fiction of the 1950s and 1960s is the ever-supposed presence of an observ­
able offstage reality, of an arbiter of truth to which the mental representa­
tion could be compared. Emma Bovary s reactions will end up being in 
accord—or not—with the "reality" in which she lives. Third-person nar­
rators, especially of the omniscient kind, consistently present themselves as 
factually reliable and base their authority on "truth." "Reality" will rise up 
to judge the skewed perceptions of the pastor in Gide s La Symphonie pas­
torale. L'Etranger is more innovative: Meursault (reminiscent of Gide s 
Jérôme) gives us two versions of events—his own and the prosecutor's— 
without providing the authority of an authentic "reality" to which we can 
compare them, in order to judge between them. Yet Meursault s personal 
belief in the existence of such a reality is a constant underpinning of his 
story: when he says, for example, that, in the shadow of the rock on the 
beach, the Arab appeared to be laughing, he is suggesting that the fact of 
the matter could have been verified by a well-placed, objective observer. 
And of course he wants us to believe that what he says happened to him in 
court and in prison corresponds to an objectively verifiable reality. The 
mental representations we meet in the "new" French fiction propose, in 
general, no such comparison. 
Simons La Route des Flandres, for example, presents a flood of memo­
ries and imaginations, with the only "present reality" being Georges's 
presence in bed with Corinne, to which only a few pages are devoted 
directly, and those serve to reveal Georges's perception of his surroundings. 
Alain Robbe-Grillet's La Jalousie provides a series of ruminations based 
upon the subjective observation of "real" things by an apparently jealous 
narrator, in whose mind readers dwell throughout. Nathalie Sarraute's 
"subconversations" are interior experiences arising during verbal inter­
changes between characters; the spoken words are assumed to be verifiably 
"real," but the subjectification of them is the privileged, important end 
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product. Early "new" novels, like Robbe-Grillet's Les Gommes, still offer 
consequential and supposedly verifiable events: readers "know" that Du­
pont has survived the bungled attempt on his life, that he is in hiding to foil 
possible new efforts to kill him, and that his incontrovertible ruse to 
dissimulate the absence of a corpus delecti has successfully fostered among the 
detectives the belief that he is indeed dead. But even there, the mental 
representations of events in various characters' psyches are individually 
unverifiable subjective interpretations, with their source in personal per­
ceptions of the "real," as in other "new" fiction. 
The taxonomy of literary imitations of mental representations is 
highly complex.1 Certainly the old terms "interior monologue" and 
"stream of consciousness" are less than adequate to this analysis, because 
they emphasize flow or continuity of mental images. A primary characteris­
tic of the images we shall be examining (and they are not necessarily 
"images" either, since they need not be visual or visualizable) is their static 
quality, even when they represent action. A better metaphor for our pur­
poses might be found in the field of stop-action photography, or in cine­
matic jump cuts, which immobilize a moment in time. As we shall see, 
such moments are indeed often interconnected in these novels, but by a 
single semantic thread, like discrete elements only partially conjoined. 
Claude Simons well-catalogued discovery of the virtue of present participles 
for the expression of mental representations illustrates the unstreamlike 
character of fictional consciousness; in an imagined adultery scene, for 
example, the husband returns unexpectedly to find his wife, who has barely 
managed to bundle her lover into a closet, feigning passion for her spouse: 
. . . puis elle, là, puérile, innocente, désarmante, se frottant les yeux, 
souriant, lui tendant les bras, lui expliquant qu'elle s'enferme à clef 
par crainte des voleurs tandis qu'elle se presse contre lui, l'enlace, 
l'enveloppe, la chemise glissant par hasard sur son épaule, dénudant 
ses seins dont elle presse, froisse les tendres bouts meurtris sur la 
tunique poussiéreuse qu'elle commence déjà à dégrafer de ses mains 
fébriles, lui parlant maintenant bouche à bouche pour qu'il ne puisse 
voir ses lèvres gonflées sous les baisers d'un autre. . . .2 
(. . . then she, there, childlike, innocent, disarming, rubbing her 
eyes, smiling, holding out her arms to him, explaining to him that she 
locks herself in for fear of robbers while she presses herself against him, 
embraces him, envelops him, the nightgown slipping by chance from 
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her shoulder, baring her breasts whose tender, love-scathed tips 
she presses, rubs upon the dusty tunic she is already beginning to un­
hook with her feverish hands, speaking to him now with her mouth 
against his so that he cannot see her lips swollen from the kisses of 
another. . . .) 
As the present participles stop the action in a series of "still" images which 
flash upon the consciousness of a character, the present tense in the subordi­
nate clauses performs essentially a descriptive, not a narrative, function. 
Indeed, in the "new" French fiction, mental representations in general tend 
to be described states, as much fictional "existents" as recounted "events."3 
My primary aim in this chapter is to describe the roles that causality 
can and cannot play in novels in which such mental representations pre­
dominate. First, however, we shall need to undertake a typology of the 
various mental representations one can experience. While I plan to draw 
examples from the mental representations attributed to fictional characters 
in postwar novels, allusions to the mental projections of readers will 
emerge, here and especially in the conclusion. Representing sights, sounds, 
and other sensations in the mind is an activity, even if it seems to stop the 
"action" of represented events; mental representations are therefore sus­
ceptible to classification in the manner of verb forms in the natural lan­
guages. Specifically, I suggest that they admit of analysis by voice, mode, 
and tense. 
By voice I mean to designate the origin or stimulus of what we repre­
sent in the minds eye. Voice may be direct or indirect, depending upon 
whether it is stimulated by perception or by a coded report from someone 
else. (Whether what I "perceive" is real or not, or whether "someone else" 
really exists, is unessential to the analysis. I am personally persuaded they 
are often quite real, but I seek no quarrel with idealists!) Indirect voice is 
always accompanied by direct voice, while the reverse is not so. One may 
directly perceive persons acting; one may also indirectly perceive persons 
acting (in the mind's eye), while perceiving directly a printed page on 
which words refer to persons acting. In this instance, indirect voice yields a 
message, while direct voice offers the encoded form of the message. (When 
the code is "music" or "film," the distinction is more complicated, for the 
code itself is both iconic and indexic. In these cases, only the indexic 
elements—in film, notably camera angle, distance, and movement with 
respect to the subject—are in indirect voice. But these subtleties are of 
importance in the novel, on the level of the characters, only when characters 
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register mental impressions of music or movies.) In fiction, a character or 
represented mentality may perceive or experience an event (direct voice on 
the level of the histoire) or may know it vicariously through notification in a 
message (indirect voice on the same level); obviously, since a récit may be 
defined as a coded message to readers, at least two levels of indirectness may 
coexist. Examples of the distinction between voices in literature, as well as 
of the modal and temporal distinctions to follow, will appear later in the 
chapter. 
Regardless of the directness or indirectness with which the representa­
tions arise in the mind, one may be aware of differences in their nature or 
"mode" of being. I use the terms cognitive, hypothetical, counterfactual, and 
imaginary to describe the modes of mental representation. In addition, we 
may attribute a relative time value or tense to the representations, associat­
ing them in general with past, present, or future. 
In the cognitive mode, the tenses are memory, perception, and prediction 
or project. That is to say that, in this most common of modes, the mind may 
permit us to experience or envision again something we perceived in the 
past (past tense); it may also provide us an awareness of what we are 
experiencing now (present tense); furthermore, it may allow consciousness 
of what we intend (have already begun) to accomplish, or of what we firmly 
believe will inevitably occur (future tense). In the cognitive mode, as in all 
the others, each tense obviously admits of direct or indirect voice. We can 
be in direct contact with our own past, present, and future, and we can also 
take cognizance, through messages, or others' memories, perceptions, and 
projects. We have already examined the interrelationship between voices in 
the past cognitive with respect to Proust. When we read, for example, the 
childhood reminiscences in Combray, we are learning of Marcels fictional 
memories (past cognitive, indirect voice). But when, in retrospect, we 
remember those memories, it is because they have become a part of us: we 
remember ourselves reading, living, particular passages, experiencing asso­
ciated emotions. These memories of ours are quite direct. The reminis­
cences have reached us in indirect voice, but, as they and their narrator are 
assimilated into our own past, we transform them into past cognitive, 
direct voice. This capacity of memory to transmute indirect cognizance into 
direct experience places readers on a separate narrative level, symmetrical to 
the position of the author. For just as, for the writer, her or his narration 
includes and envelops the récit and its narrator along with the events and 
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their histoirey so there exists for the reader a level of lecture', which assimilates 
his or her (re-)creation of the narrators récit and the histoire it presents. 
The hypothetical mode is a simple causal model based on memory, 
perception, and/or project. It is in this mode that we create the mental 
images which "make sense" of our world. To discover the past, for example, 
we reason from effect to cause (e.g., he must have studied ancient Greek, 
since he can translate this passage of Aristotle). We apply the same sort of 
logic to the present (it must be cold outside; people in the street are bundled 
up and shivering), and to the future (she will probably be in an unpleasant 
mood; she always gets angry when I am late like this). In each of these 
situations, through the use of a causal hypothesis, we are creating a mental 
representation of our environment—its past, present, or future. The future 
hypothetical is sometimes not readily distinguishable from the future cog­
nitive. The difference lies in the degree of perceived inevitability: if you 
catch sight of a boulder a few feet above your head and falling, you are 
probably justified in forming a mental representation of disaster (future 
cognitive), but if you have time to envision a quick leap forward saving you, 
you are clearly in the future hypothetical. Firm intentions are future cog­
nitive (e.g., I'll go to the phone and call my friend), while mental reserva­
tions (. . . unless the doorbell rings, . . . unless I can remember the infor­
mation without bothering him) indicate rather the hypothetical mode. 
Counterfactual mental images also follow a causal model, but they 
posit at the outset the absence of the cause (if he had been more charming, 
she would have invited him in; but he wasn't, and she didn't). Counterfac­
tuals are most common in the past, where they are characterized by the 
mental image of a more successful, but alas unreal, self: I should have 
said . . . , esprit d'escalier, etc. In the present, they conjure visions of absent 
conditions (if I were rich, if I had time, if I were in London now . . .), 
pleasant or unpleasant (if I had missed this plane, I would be in serious 
trouble now). As for the future, it is, while not inherently counterfactual, 
usually not factual at all. Still, one may occasionally envisage impossible 
options to an apparently inevitable tomorrow: "If I had the wings of an 
angel, over these prison walls I would fly. . . .  " 
The final mode of mental representation is imagination or fantasy. In 
my experience of it, the time is nearly always a vague "present"—that is to 
say, any time at all. It may of course be specifically time-related, as in a 
fantasy about a particular period in the life of a person now deceased, but 
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never necessarily so. The absence of tense as a required component of this 
mode indicates that causality is not necessary to it either. Indeed, the 
absence of perceived, essential causal relationships is what distinguishes the 
imaginary mode from the counterfactual. Counterfactuals have their basis 
in perceived reality, a "fact" to which they are contrary. While the imagina­
tion may possibly be grounded in "reality" (I may imagine myself in the 
amorous embrace of a woman whom I know, even when, in "reality," she 
has no interest in me), it remains pure (or impure) imagination, unless 
causation becomes involved. I may imagine the embrace occurring on the 
leather-covered divan in the sumptuous library of the seaside estate I wish I 
owned; the imagination does not enter the counterfactual mode until 
I begin to consider the luxurious surroundings as a necessary condition for 
the seduction (if I had the estate, the library, and the divan, then she 
would . . . , and so on). While imagination may have its origin in an 
identifiable time frame, in a memory, a perception, or a project, it is not 
internally dependent upon time, nor upon a causal model. 
Robbe-Grillet's Les Gommes (1953),4 although it contains elements of 
traditional third-person narration, provides clear examples of characters' 
mental representations and their causal functioning. The first paragraph of 
I, 2 (p. 51) illustrates how the modes of a characters mental representations 
interact to determine the future course of the text. Wallas, on his first 
morning in the city, has arisen and set out on foot, before sunrise and 
without breakfast, in a direction he supposes will lead him to the center of 
town, where he plans to make contact with Commissioner Laurent at the 
central municipal police station. Dawn has come, and Wallas still has not 
reached "downtown": 
Sans s'écarter de son chemin ni ralentir son allure, Wallas marche. 
Devant lui une femme traverse la rue. Un vieil homme traîne vers une 
porte cochère une poubelle vide restée sur le bord du trottoir. Derrière 
une vitre s'étagent trois rangs de plats rectangulaires contenant toutes 
sortes d'anchois marines, sprats fumés, harengs roulés et déroulés, 
salés, assaisonnés, crus ou cuits, sauris, frits, confits, découpés et 
hachés. Un peu plus loin, un monsieur en pardessus noir et chapeau 
sort d'une maison et vient à sa rencontre; âge mûr, situation aisée, 
digestions souvent difficiles; il ne fait que quelques pas et pénètre 
immédiatement dans un café d'aspect très hygiénique, plus ac­
cueillant certainement que cet autre où lui-même a passé la nuit. 
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Wallas se rappelle qu'il a faim, mais il a décidé de prendre son petit 
déjeuner dans un grand établissement moderne, sur une de ces places 
ou avenues qui doivent, comme partout, constituer le coeur de la ville. 
(Without deviating from his path or slowing his pace, Wallas keeps 
walking. In front of him, a woman crosses the street. An old man 
drags an empty garbage can, left at the curb, toward a porte-cochere. 
Behind a window, three rows of rectangular trays are stacked contain­
ing all sorts of marinated anchovies, smoked sprat, herring, rolled and 
unrolled, salted, seasoned, raw or cooked, kippered, fried, preserved, 
fileted and chopped. A bit farther on, a gentleman in a black overcoat 
and hat comes out of a house and heads toward him; middle-aged, 
comfortable income, frequent digestive trouble; he takes only a few 
steps and turns at once into a most hygienic-looking café, certainly a 
more inviting spot than that other one where he himself spent the 
night. Wallas remembers that he is hungry, but he has made up his 
mind to have breakfast in a big modern establishment, on one of those 
squares or avenues which must, like everywhere else, make up the 
heart of town.) 
The conventional third-person narrator is obviously speaking here from 
within Wallas s mind, reporting to us whatever comes up on that interior 
viewscreen, including Wallas's judgments, and thus himself disappearing, 
replaced by the characters mental images. Wallas operates in the present 
cognitive for the first four sentences: awareness of the constancy of his own 
direction and speed, consciousness of others in the street, detailed percep­
tion of the contents of a delicatessen window. The fifth sentence, about the 
man in the black overcoat, slips into the realm of hypothesis: clothing, 
facial features, and expression (present cognitive) lead Wallas to infer the 
man's general age, his economic status, and the unfortunate condition of his 
digestive tract (present hypothetical). This is an example of intermodal 
causation, for perception is a contributing cause and condition for the 
inferences. The judgments passed on the café ("hygienic-looking," "invit­
ing") also contain hypothetical elements: if it looks clean and friendly, I will 
probably be safe from disease and unpleasantness there. There is perhaps a 
further, unstated hypothesis: if the neighborhood dyspeptic, who could 
afford to eat anywhere, will have a meal in the place, it must be safe; this 
would exemplify intramodal causality, for it involves hypotheses arising 
from other hypotheses. With the comparison to the café over which Wallas 
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had rented a sleeping room, memory also intervenes in the judgment. But 
when our hero "remembers" that he is hungry, memory is not really in­
volved: the hunger pangs are present. The memory word merely evokes the 
notion that the hunger, although generally subliminal, has been present for 
some time; perhaps the memory of leaving "that other" café too early for 
breakfast calls to Wallas s attention the length of the fast. The paragraph 
has now reached its critical point, where the text could deviate from its 
consistent direction and speed. The detective could turn into the apparently 
hygienic café, taking his mental representations, and thus the text and us, 
with him. Detailed awareness of food has prepared Wallas (and us readers) 
for the choice, raising subliminal hunger to the level of present perception; 
hypotheses have led to the conclusion that this café is a satisfactory place to 
assuage it. The decision will be determined by intramodal and intermodal 
comparisons. 
Beside the present temptation exists a project (future cognitive): 
Wallas s image of breakfasting in a large, modern restaurant, located on a 
wide avenue or city square. The existence of such squares or avenues in this 
city is present hypothetical ("doivent"): Wallas has never been here before. 
The hypothesis springs from the memory of other downtowns, from which 
a general law has been derived ("comme partout"): if downtown, then 
avenues and squares. Whence a further, implied hypothesis: if avenues, 
then large, modern restaurants. These hypotheses, while not linearly causal 
(downtowns do not cause avenues, nor avenues "big modern establish­
ments"), arise from an underlying causal assumption: that the same socio­
economic forces that produce wide-avenued downtowns also lead to the 
establishment of a particular kind of restaurant in these areas. Wallas has 
enough confidence in this assumption to predict that he can safely take the 
text past the door of the clean, inviting café. But it is more than confidence; 
Wallas s future-cognitive image (his prior firm decision—what certain crit­
ics might call "desire") is stronger than present perception of hunger and 
of a potential, satisfactory means of relief. Thus, on the causal basis of a 
character's mental images, in which perception, memory, hypothesis, and 
project combine, the text will avoid diversion. 
The imaginary mode appears in Les Gommes with respect to Garinati 
and to Wallas, notably in the latter's fantasies about his boss, the legendary 
Fabius, detective extraordinaire and master of disguise. Glimpsing (for 
example) a face in a window across the street from the scene of the crime, 
Wallas infers that it may belong to a habitual busybody, who might have 
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caught sight, while keeping an eye on the neighborhood, of the "assassin" 
entering or leaving the area. Perhaps, he speculates, her attention was 
attracted by "a scream, an abnormal noise, or anything at all" (II, 3, 
p. 108). With this past-hypothetical sentence, the paragraph ends; the next 
paragraph begins: 
Fabius, ayant refermé la porte du jardin, inspecte les alentours; mais il 
n'en laisse rien paraître: il est un paisible agent d'assurances qui sort de 
chez un client et regarde le ciel à droite et à gauche, pour savoir d'où 
vient le vent. . . . Tout de suite il remarque un personnage louche qui 
l'épie derrière ses rideaux, à la croisée d'un second étage. 
(Fabius, having closed the garden gate again, inspects the surround­
ings; but he does so unnoticeably: he's just a peaceful insurance agent 
leaving a customers house and looking at the sky, right and left, to see 
which way the wind's blowing. . . . Right away, he spots a suspicious 
character spying on him from behind the curtains, at a third-floor 
window. ) 
Now Fabius, according to the fictional reality of the novel, is elsewhere, 
and, even if he were to show up now at the scene of the crime, Wallas would 
surely approach him and speak to him; this is therefore not a fictionally 
"real" event but a mental representation in the imaginary mode: Wallas 
imagines what Fabius would do under the circumstances in which Wallas 
finds himself. In the rest of the passage, he pictures Fabius returning under 
the guise of an awning salesman, obtaining authorization on these grounds 
from the concierge of the apartment block across the street to call on all the 
south-side tenants (including of course the busybody), and thus gaining 
admittance to question a potential witness, without alerting the concierge 
to his identity as a detective. After the successful exchange of conversation 
between Fabius and the building superintendent, we read: "Wallas sourit à 
cette pensée" (p. 109); "Wallas smiles at this thought." Thus we return 
from the imaginary mode to present cognitive, wherein Wallas will adopt a 
different and even more promising ploy to dupe the concierge and to 
interrogate the busybody. 
Until the word "pensée" just cited, the four-paragraph mental repre­
sentation is never tagged as such; absence of the standard markers (such as 
"Wallas drifts into a daydream" or "Wallas can imagine Fabius . . .") not 
only makes the mental-representation status of the passage a matter of 
reader inference on first reading, but it also diminishes the role of the 
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narrator, as explainer of the tale, almost to the vanishing point. The reader 
is here essentially in direct contact with the histoire, of which this mental 
representation is an element. And indeed the Fabius fantasy fits into the 
causal chain of the histoire just as if it were a physically perceivable "event": 
arising from Wallass reverence for Fabius and his methods and from a 
project or "desire" to interview the busybody without disclosing his own 
identity, it leads Wallas to discover the parameters of a successful ruse in 
this circumstance. Mental representations, although relatively closed and 
static blocks or Gestalten, can have causes and effects, even when they are 
imaginations or dreams.5 Although this reverie has the superficial earmarks 
of the counterfactual mode ("If Fabius were here, he would . . ."), Fabius 
does not qualify as an "absent cause": it is Wallas who invents Fabius s ruse, 
and who will profit from the experience to find a still better one. Only if we 
read it as in the imaginary mode can it here take its place in the causal chain 
of the histoire: imagination leads to project (future cognitive), which imme­
diately becomes present cognitive as our hero acts. 
Furthermore, the eclipse or ellipsis of the narrator (the words éclipse 
and ellipse play a significant role in the story: III, 4, p. 170) places the reader 
in immediate contact with the mental representations that are "events" in 
the novel. The words of the text seem less a coded communication from a 
narrator to us readers than the verbal transcript of characters' thought 
processes. The "voice" of the text for the reader, while by definition indi­
rect, thus shifts toward the experiential and the direct, toward the supreme 
form of narrator-absent fiction, which is theater. Much has been written on 
the use of theater vocabulary in Les Gommes, often to suggest a relationship 
between its plot and Sophocles s tragedy, Oedipus Rex, a subject to which I 
shall return. But the theater connection also turns on the shift toward direct 
voice, a device common to much "new" fiction. At the theater, spectators 
observe most of the histoire without the intervention of a narrative voice and 
the causal connectives it can supply; narratorial tags ("she exclaimed," "he 
said," etc.) disappear, as we experience "directly" the source and interrela­
tionship of acts and utterances: the récit is largely "mimed." Les Gommes has, 
in this sense, aspects of a play performed in the theater of characters' minds, 
as readers experience the mental representations of a number of charac-
ters—Wallas, Garinati, Laurent, the patron of the café. Mental representa­
tions pass from mode to mode, from tense to tense, for causes which the 
reader infers. 
Whatever it is for readers, the Fabius fantasy is direct voice for Wallas. 
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But indirect voice, on the level of the characters, can lead to inference as 
well, as Wallas discovers when he asks directions of the woman with the 
broom (I, 2, pp. 54— 56). The inferences she draws from his verbal commu­
nication nearly suffice to unmask his subterfuge, intended to conceal his 
police connections. Her inferences arise from causal questions: why is he 
looking for a post office, and why does he insist upon going all the way to 
the main post office, when there is a substation nearby? Her detective work 
mirrors the causal structure of a major portion of the text, which is in the 
hypothetical mode. 
Indeed, the primary conflict of the novel is between the hypothetical 
and the cognitive modes. Wallas pounds the pavement in search of the 
realities of the crime. He is the eyes of the investigation and represents the 
cognitive mode. Laurent, the local police commissioner, remains in his 
office, where he receives information and hypothesizes. To be sure, Wallas 
creates hypotheses, as we have seen (often about the modalities of observa­
tion), and Laurent perceives and remembers. But Wallas s method is obser­
vation, while Laurent's is inference. The commissioner conjures up a series 
of hypothetical scenarios: Dupont committed suicide, was killed by his ex-
wife or by his housekeeper, or by Wallas, or died of a heart attack, or was 
shot by his illegitimate son. He tests each scenario against the known facts, 
eliminating those contrary to the data. Since reports and testimony are his 
sole source of knowledge, he makes inferences about the relative validity 
of these. Operating almost entirely in the hypothetical mode, he solves 
the crime, just as Wallas "solves" it on the more pragmatic, cogni­
tive level. 
Dupont, the supposed victim, is, as previously noted, not dead. 
While Wallas is reinspecting the "murder" room, some twenty-four hours 
after the crime, Dupont slips back into his house in search of certain papers. 
Fearing that the murderer is again waiting for him in his little upstairs 
study (a hypothesis based on a door Wallas left unlocked downstairs when 
he came in), Dupont bursts into the study, revolver in hand. Expecting the 
murderers return himself (an unfortunate hypothesis), and seeing a gun 
aimed in his direction, Wallas shoots Dupont dead. The fact that "the 
detective did it" makes a delightful parody of standard crime fiction. But 
when Wallas surmises at last (anagnorisis!) the identity of his victim, now 
truly dead, he phones Laurent at headquarters, only to hear the commis­
sioner announce the results of his hypothetical analyses: "J'ai fait une 
découverte—vous ne devineriez jamais! Daniel Dupont! Il n'est pas mort 
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du tout!" (V, 6, p. 254); "I've made a discovery—you'd never guess! Daniel 
Dupont! He isn't dead at all!" 
Wallas s fatal assumptions—that, if someone enters the house fur­
tively, it is the murderer, that the gun pointed at him will fire (readers know 
that it cannot), are untested hypotheses arising directly from cognitive 
perceptions: quietly approaching footsteps, a door that bursts open, a light 
that flashes on, a gun. Wallas, moving about in "reality," must operate very 
close to the cognitive mode, his perceptions producing projects, which are 
thwarted or abetted by the causation of random circumstance, or side­
tracked by the "halo of error and doubt" that surrounds objects and sepa­
rates the perceived from the comprehended. Yet he discovers Dupont alive 
and standing before him at approximately the same moment when Laurent 
reaches his correct conclusion; Wallas perceives but does not comprehend. 
Shut away in his office, Laurent is less affected by immediate causation and 
more able to grasp a causal function. Thus it is that Laurent can compre­
hend but not perceive. The lesson to be derived from the double "error" 
seems not unoptimistic. Laurent is not faced with psychological questions 
like the premeditation problem facing Meursault s prosecutor, but he does 
better with "the facts" than Denizet. Despite the divorce between psyche 
and reality, it would seem that the mind can formulate on occasion rela­
tively valid hypotheses about its own perception of the real. We must, 
however, be willing to accept and evaluate new data, and be flexible enough 
to reformulate even our most cherished hypotheses when the information 
requires it. With patience and care, successive hypotheses will, like an 
asymptote, approach ever nearer to the truth. It is unlikely (perhaps tech­
nically impossible) that the hypothetical mode will ever attain the truth, 
however, for, by the time one comprehends reality, it has changed. "He isn't 
dead at all!" is the solution to the problem, but it comes too late to be 
"true," to stay Wallas's finger on the trigger. Wallas would have to perceive 
and comprehend at the same time to avoid the killing. The time between 
perception and comprehension is too long to provide for useful reactions. 
But the hypothetical mode holds some promise in securely stable situa­
tions, or with highly predictable processes. Laurent, because he does not 
"see," errs in treating the transitory as static. Still, he would have hit the 
bull's eye, had not the target moved. 
Like Laurent, readers of the novel receive their information in indirect 
voice and, in order to understand, create hypotheses about it. Perhaps the 
best known, brilliantly put forward by Bruce Morrissette,6 holds that the 
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text is a reworking of the Oedipus myth, and thus that Dupont is Wallas s 
long-lost father. The twisted causal chain that leads Wallas to the fatal 
encounter with Dupont would be, in that case, an example of the ironic 
mythical causation evoked in chapter eight above. As Morrissette demon­
strates, the novel is awash with mythical allusions, references to Thebes, 
the Corinth road, the riddling Sphynx, killed, rescued, and ungrateful 
children, etc. It is also replete with examples of textual reworking (for one 
example among many, Wallas "reworks" the Fabius fantasy to interview the 
busybody), the process of mythic fiction. Is Morrissette s hypothesis "cor­
rect"? It fits all the mythic details, but what of the other information? The 
problem is perhaps perceptible in the headlines of a newspaper Wallas scans 
in an idle moment (I, 3, pp. 64—65). They read: (1) "Grave accident de la 
circulation sur la route de Delf " ("Serious traffic accident on the Delf road"); 
(2) "Le Conseil se réunira demain pour l'élection d'un nouveau maire" 
("Council meets tomorrow to elect new mayor"); (3) "La voyante abusait ses 
clients" ("Fortuneteller abuses her customers"); (4) "La production des 
pommes de terre a dépassé celle des meilleures années" ("Potato production 
exceeds previous annual records"); (5) "Décès d'un de nos concitoyens" 
("Local man dies"). Thefifth article is the official announcement of Dupont s 
"murder": it is myth-related only if he is a Lai us figure. The first three can 
all be read to suggest events in the myth, thus tending to confirm the 
mythic character of number five. But the fourth headline? Prior to anag­
norisis and atonement, according to Sophocles s version of the myth, famine 
rather than plenty characterized Theban agriculture. Should astute readers 
allow one apparently out-of-place detail to destroy a hypothesis that fits the 
other four? This is precisely the sort of question faced by the intradiegetic 
Laurent; the smallest crack—"la plus petite faille"—as the text reminds us 
with mock sententiousness on several occasions, can destroy an otherwise 
perfect project. In fact, the narration appears to be producing a récit with 
sufficient causes to encourage the Oedipal interpretation, but with enough 
contrary and irrelevant information to prevent absolute confirmation. If so, 
despite the static character of the text, the hypothesis remains an interest­
ing inference, separate from the novel's reality, a comprehension that cannot 
perceive all the details, such as headline number four. 
The narration suggests in many ways that the hypothetical mode 
produces problematic results for characters and readers alike. To enjoy the 
phenomenon, one need only sketch, while reading, a map of the city in 
which the crime occurs, showing Wallas's peregrinations. Enough details 
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are provided for relatively accurate depiction of the principal streets and 
landmarks, with compass bearings and an approximation of scale, for we 
know how fast Wallas walks the first morning, and for how long. Still, the 
order in which the information is given will oblige amateur cartographers 
to work in pencil, with frequent recourse to the item that holds the title 
role, as natural but erroneous assumptions need to be erased in favor of ever 
more nearly accurate hypotheses. Likewise, bits of our own reading must, at 
times, be effaced and replaced, when the voice of the narrator, who might 
have told us how to read, has been eclipsed or ellipsed or erased. One can 
read, for example, the first sentence of the Fabius fantasy as straightforward 
narrative (cognitive mode, indirect voice), until the clues that Wallas is 
imagining this tale sink in. The entire initial passage of chapter III 
(pp. 141—43) can be attributed to the narrator; not until "Ici Laurent 
s'arrête" ("Here Laurent stops") are we aware whose mental representations 
we are reading. Unless a clever guess was made early on, readers will need to 
"erase" and reformulate the "point" of this passage, its role in the novel, 
after reading it through. The source of the passage, its "first cause"—a 
narrator recounting, a character thinking, etc.—is fundamental to readers' 
hypotheses about its meaning. The foregrounding of the hypothetical mode 
in this novel points to the importance of causal hypotheses in reading and in 
daily life, and to their problematical nature. Our other "detective stories," 
La Bête humaine and L'Etranger, also evoked the problems with hypothesiz­
ing and privileged the "eyewitness" account (of the narrator, of Meursault) 
over the hypothetical reconstructions (of Denizet, of the prosecutor); Les 
Gommes suggests that eyewitnesses, with inadequate grasp of causal chains, 
are at least as apt as the hypothesizers to make incorrect decisions.7 
Like hypotheses, counterfactuals have a causal structure, but they are 
rare in Les Gommes. Wallas s final regrets are an example: "Dans son extrême 
fatigue, des bribes de sa journée perdue viennent encore le tourmenter: 
'. . . et si, à ce moment-là, j'avais pensé à . .  . et si j'avais . . .'" (Epi­
logue, p. 259; "In his extreme fatigue, bits and pieces of his wasted day 
return to torment him: '. . . and if, right then, I had thought of. . . and if 
I had . . .'"). The grammatical structures suffice to evoke the mode, which 
is itself the substance of our hero's thought; the ellipses eclipse the useless 
absent causes, now absent from the text as well as from Wallas's reality. 
Causal vocabulary functions within mental representations (particu­
larly in the hypothetical mode) and between them (notably to designate the 
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origin of a cognitive representation), just as in more traditional novels. It 
abounds in Les Gommes, although much of it is of the less obvious variety 
(e.g., "c'est très rare qu'un cambrioleur . .  . se trouble, à la vue du pro­
priétaire, au point de se croire obligé de le tuer" [I, 5, p. 80; emphasis 
mine]). According to Allott and Tremewan,8 parce que occurs only eight 
times in the novel, and car only thirty-four times, most often in Laurent's 
meditations, where the word cause (twenty occurrences) seems at its most 
frequent. Par recurs more than three hundred times, often to express agency 
(e.g., "réveillé par ses cris," [Prologue, p. 29]), but not always ("Par où 
était-il passé?" [Prologue, p. 28}). Agents here, of course, are more often 
hypothetical ones than in traditional fiction, and the verbs devoir and pouvoir 
return with relative frequency to mark the hypothetical mode (e.g., "La 
balle a dû dévier," [III, 5, p. 172]; "On a pu lui raconter souvent cette 
journée," [II, 6, p. 137}), although hypotheses are quite often stated as fact 
(e.g., "II a eu peur, surtout," [I, 5, p. 80, for "II a dû avoir peur"]). Of the 
obvious causal vocabulary, pour is the most common term, expressing 
intention (e.g., "pour masquer son énervement—et le maîtriser en par-
tie—il se force à cette modération exagérée," [IV, 6, p. 216]); pour occurs 
over five hundred times, and, although it is not always causal, its frequency 
(averaging twice per page) suggests the importance of prediction and 
project in the novel. Projects may be either cognitive or hypothetical 
(inferring the intentions of another), but there subsists a framework 
of fictional "reality" to which most hypotheses in Les Gommes can be 
compared. 
To summarize, then, causal reasoning is the motive force of mental 
representation in the hypothetical and counterfactual modes. When such 
representations are imitated in a text, the text advances by means of ex­
pressed or inferable causation. In the cognitive mode, cause is present at its 
origin, and its nature differs by tense. Memory is stimulated by perception, 
imagination, or by other memories. Perception is (presumably) stimulated 
by an exterior "object"—light, sound, etc. Prediction arises from desire 
(project) or from fear, and from understanding resulting from combinations 
of perception, memory, and hypothesis. The imaginary mode, internally 
free of logical causation, may spring from memory, perception, desire, fear, 
or from no precise stimulus at all. With the exception of texts composed 
entirely in the imaginary mode (of which we will examine an example), 
causal language {récit) and causal inferences {histoire) connect mental repre­
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sentations in the "new" French fiction just as they did events in the more 
traditional texts; they now allude more frequently to conditions than to the 
determining causes of traditional fiction, however. 
Mental-representation fiction tends to reproduce, by different modali­
ties, the fundamental causal structures we have seen before. Les Gommes 
produces a parodie form of mythic structure, with, as its myth, the tra­
ditional detective story (crime and solution), of which Oedipus Rex serves 
as the partial prototype. Simons La Route des Flandres has elements of 
Proustian structure, liberating readers within the space of the text. The 
most common pattern is doubtless the "fragmented" or "broken-line" 
model, suggesting kinship between much mental-representation fiction 
and its existentialist predecessors. 
Daphne Patai9 has carefully charted the interplay of tenses in the 
cognitive mode in Butors La Modification—perception, memory, and 
project, with the final intervention of the imaginary mode in Leon's "fan-
tasy"—noting that, within the novel, "Butor has utilized a traditional 
(temporally sequential) form as well as a new fragmented one." The fixed 
train route from Paris to Rome and the processes of the modification provide 
the linear substratum, while the alternating and increasingly conflictual 
interaction of perception- and memory-stimulated recollections and both 
general and specific projects fragments the sequence of mental representa­
tions, as well as Leon's identity. 
In Les Fruits d'or (1963), Nathalie Sarraute creates a series of literary 
conversations at Parisian parties, all of which concern a fictive novel called 
"Les Fruits d'or. " The famous Sarrautian subconversations—interior mono­
logues sparked within a character by a verbal encounter and usually simul­
taneous with it—transform the conversations into mental representations, 
perceptions giving rise to more voluminous hypotheses and imaginations. 
Causation is thus at work in microcosm, as the spoken words engender 
subjective images in the unidentified conversationalists themselves or in 
witnesses to the discussions. The subconversations are most often meta­
phoric in character, expressing the sensation that what is happening in the 
verbal exchange is comparable to another sort of activity. As I have argued 
elsewhere,10 the subconversational metaphors in this text most often evoke 
elements of what has been called "animal" behavior: dominance-and-
submission games, territoriality, peck order, and herd psychology. For 
these salon or cocktail-party conversations are only ostensibly concerned 
with the artistic merit of "Les Fruits d'or"; they are at bottom the personal 
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power ploys of a would-be intellectual élite, using literary conversation as a 
means to demonstrate superiority. The psychological effects of their calcu­
lated utterances, on themselves and on others, emerge in the subconversa­
tional metaphors: X dominates Y, or Z joins Y s "harem." With one or two 
exceptions, it is impossible to determine the identity of speakers or lis­
teners; it is even probable that nearly every chapter has an entirely new cast 
of characters. Such fragmentation makes impossible any objective deter­
mination that the discussions are presented in chronological order. 
Yet, in the early chapters, "Les Fruits d'or" is virtually unknown; 
further along, it is admired by the intellectual élite, which is imposing its 
judgment upon others; still later, the book is the talk of Paris, "all the 
rage," while at the end it drops into nearly universal indifference. This 
progression itself suggests linear, chronological development. And the text 
reveals that, despite fragmentation, a kind of double causal law is at work 
on this larger scale: the first part of the law suggests that one's power is 
measured by the number of intelligent people upon whom one can impose 
ones opinions; the second part holds that superiority resides in difference, 
in one's ability to distinguish oneself from the masses. Thus a following is 
good, but a nearly all-inclusive following is undesirable. The popularity of 
"Les Fruits d'or" is dependent upon the operation of this double law: 
passing favorable judgment upon the novel is, at first, a sign of rallying (or 
submitting) to the leaders, while later on, when everyone has rallied, the 
opinion makers no longer wish to be associated with it. This two-part 
causation produces the curve of the book's rapid rise to popularity and its 
still more rapid decline, reproducing, from the level of animal behavior, the 
"K extinction curve," by which population biologists describe the "crash" 
that follows too sudden an increase in population in animal and insect 
colonies.n The functioning of this curve in the novel is, of course, based on 
a causal principle; a law of increase with an upper threshold that triggers an 
immediate decrease is a causal matrix providing a high degree of predict­
ability. Thus, despite the fragmented mental representations that make up 
the text, traditional causation, reinstated at the metaphorical level, gives 
the novel a linear ("broken-line") structure. 
A series of fragmented mental images conjoin in linear progression in 
Robbe-Grillet's La Jalousie (1957)1 2 as well, as the narrator evolves from 
suspicion to jealous frenzy. The best-remembered marker of progression is 
the mental representation of the centipede: finger length on page 62, it 
"grows" to the size of a dinner plate, page 163. That jealousy is the cause of 
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these mental transformations is inferable from the obsessive memories 
always uniting A. . . and Franck, while separating the Other, who is 
obviously A. . . s husband and the narrator. The growing jealousy feeds 
upon a succession of disconnected memories: A. . . talking to Franck about 
a book they are reading; the crackle of a comb through A. . . s thick, long 
hair; A. . . perhaps passing a note to Franck; A. . . s chair placed closer to 
Franck s than to her husbands; Franck, in a virile and protective gesture, 
killing the centipede that frightens A. . .; A. . .'s day in town with 
Franck, an absence prolonged unexpectedly until the next morning, and so 
on. These memories generate the hypotheses which cause the linear sub­
stratum; that A. . . and Franck are engaged in a love affair, that the trip to 
town was really a tryst, despite the explanation of car trouble the pair offers 
upon return. Linear progression is there in time (marked by the changed 
position of the pillars shadow upon the porch where the narrator ruminates) 
as well as in the rising jealous passion; the multiple memories, and the 
imaginations they inspire, produce the linear histoire, a line of progression 
which in turn infuses the distinct mental representations of the récit with 
ever more violent imagery. 
As these examples indicate, the continuous, causal, linear vectors 
and curves come into being as constituents of the histoire (or of the narra­
tionllecture in the case of Les Gommes), as a creation of readers' inferences. 
These inferences (readers' hypothetical mode) are conditioned by lexical 
data in the récit (e.g., metaphors in Les Fruits d'or, contrast of comparable 
items early and late in La Modification and La Jalousie). Once the linear 
hypothesis is formulated by readers, it creates an expectation (project) 
which bears upon our perception of subsequent data in the récit, for we are 
no longer "open-minded," but in search of confirmation in each new ele­
ment of the récit for our linear hypothesis. Thus, as we advance, we tend 
increasingly to foreground confirming details and to background the 
others, a mechanism we observed ex post facto in the Oedipal reading of Les 
Gommes. Such closedmindedness, which would be ill-advised in scientific 
observation, is not necessarily undesirable in the reading of fiction, or even 
in criticism, for reasons I will indicate in the conclusion. 
In mental-representation fiction however, causality is not solely a 
matter for reader inference. It can also exist within the récit, linking mental 
representations explicitly to one another by means of triggers {déclencheurs) 
and shifters {embrayeurs) which function intermodally and intramodally. 
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Certain triggers operate intervocalically for readers, as well as intramodally 
for characters. Thus, so long as we are not entirely in the imaginary mode, a 
causation of sorts remains alive and well in the récit itself. But such causality 
exists as a condition of passage from one mental representation to another, 
rather than as a force entailing the shift; it therefore provides,as we have 
noted, virtually no predictive capacity, although it helps to explain after the 
fact. Causal functions in mental-representation récits are well illustrated in 
La Jalousie and in Simons La Route des Flandres. 
The narrator of La Jalousie loses his openmindedness in a manner akin 
to that ascribed to readers above. As he broods, for example, upon A. . . s 
failure to return home after the day in town with Franck (perhaps he is 
recalling the anguished night spent in her absence), he catches sight of the 
stain on the dining room wall, left by the crushed centipede. This percep­
tion triggers the memory of Franck s manly gesture, using his napkin 
{serviette) to smash the little beast, crushing its fallen body again on the 
floor. But this time, instead of squashing it on the tiles {carrelage) of the 
dining room floor as in the previous obsessive accounts of this memory, he 
tramples the myriapod on "le plancher de la chambre" (p. 166; "the bed­
room floor"). His serviette now designates a hand towel, which he hangs up 
near the wash stand: imagination has transferred Franck from dining room 
to hotel room. A. . . s presence there is suppressed, but someone is waiting 
for Franck in bed, clutching the sheets, as A. . . had clutched her knife 
when she glimpsed the centipede. Drawing the mosquito netting around 
them, Franck climbs into bed; then, in his haste to reach his goal, we are 
told, he accelerates the pace, and the jolts become more violent. A sex 
scene? Obviously. But with the shifter "jolts" {cahots), we slip into another 
mental image, of Franck driving his car home on the rutted dirt road at 
night (presumably with A. . . ?), hitting a sinkhole at top speed, crashing 
into an embankment: "Aussitôt des flammes jaillissent" (p. 167; "Imme­
diately flames spring up"). Two hypotheses explaining why A. . . has not 
returned (hotel room tryst, serious accident on the road) fuse together 
through the common language of a shifter phrase, just as Franck-killing-
the-centipede became Franck-the-hotel-room-adulterer. At this point, 
however, they are more than hypotheses, for the logical connections have 
disappeared between images, replaced by associations, which are the causal 
connectors either of memory (but the narrator could not "remember" these 
scenes) or of imagination, the basic mode of the passage. 
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The causal chain which conditions the development of the text passes 
from present cognitive (wall stain) to past cognitive (scene that caused the 
stain), to a past hypothetical quickly colored by the vivid images and 
illogical connectors of the imaginary mode. Movements of this kind from 
perception to imagination, through words each belonging to two semantic 
fields {serviette, cahots), are not, however, ends in themselves: the emotion 
involved in the imaginary mode returns to the point of departure, coloring 
the narrator's perception of reality; it is this sort of effect that increases, for 
example, the apparent size of the stain left by the centipede. 
Imagination is an even more powerful contaminant of memory, which 
often lacks objective confirmation. Toward the end, the narrator, unable to 
confirm or to confound his hypothesis of an adulterous affair between A. . . 
and Franck, recalls their animated conversation about a novel they have 
both read but which he has not. His memory of the conversation (p. 216) is 
a confused jumble of contradictory sentences. Since it is extremely unlikely 
that A. . . and Franck could be in such utter disagreement about the histoire 
of a conventional novel, we must lay the contradictions at the door of the 
narrators imagination. As it is a question of a financially sound (or shaky) 
corporation, and of predecessors and successors, honest or dishonest, in the 
corporate management, one may hypothesize that the narrator is associat­
ing randomly the books plot with his own marriage. The half-remembered 
snatches of conversation are now contaminated by imagination, as the 
imaginary mode impinges upon the cognitive, which triggered it. The 
narrators conditioned trajectories, from memory to hypothesis and imagi­
nation, and thence back to memory or perception, parallel the succession of 
mental states in a reader involved in constituting a fictional text. 
In La Route des Flandres, the only perceptions of the narrator (Georges) 
are those of the bedroom in which he is spending a night of love with 
Corinne. The rest is, superficially at least, reminiscence: memories of de­
feat, capture, transport to and life in a Nazi prison camp; memories of 
memories, things remembered as a prisoner about his former French com­
manding officer, Captain de Reixach, a distant relative, and about the 
captains wife, Corinne, with whom Georges now lies; memories of family 
legends and stories associated with the bedroom, which the narrator has 
only heard in indirect voice. The novel begins in the past cognitive, and 
only gradually do we become aware of the narrator's intradiegetic identity 
and present situation, and of the relationship of that situation to the flood of 
reminiscences which make up the novel. Readers' hypotheses about the text 
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slowly approach and finally grasp the kernel of perceived reality at the 
center of the construction. 
But the linear text itself advances through remembrances, by a series 
of associations, which are the "causal" structure of memory. Here again, 
shifters represent the passage from one remembrance to the next. Doubtless 
the most evident of these are related to virginity. De Reixach, very "old 
nobility" and "old cavalry," had died on horseback, leading his decimated 
mounted unit against the invading Panzers. Georges, a surviving member 
of the unit, has a clear mental image of his captains glorious final pose, 
horse rearing, sabre aloft: 
. .  . un instant l'éblouissant reflet du soleil accroché ou plutôt con­
densé, comme s'il avait capté attiré à lui pour une fraction de seconde 
toute la lumière et la gloire, sur l'acier virginal . . . Seulement, 
vierge, il y avait belle lurette qu'elle ne l'était plus, mais je suppose 
que ce n'était pas cela qu'il lui demandait espérait d'elle le jour où il 
avait décidé de l'épouser. . . . (P. 13) 
(. . . for an instant the dazzling reflection of the sun caught or rather 
condensed, as if he had captured drawn unto himself for a fraction of a 
second all the light and the glory, on the virgin steel . . . Only, a 
virgin, it had been ages since she had been one of those, but I suppose 
that wasn't what he asked of her expected from her the day he decided 
to marry her. . . .) 
Thus the association virginal-vierge conditions the shift from the captain's 
heroic death to his marriage to Corinne. Later, we will recognize as the 
prime cause of all the "Corinne" memories, and of the erotic images which 
seep as if by osmosis into other recollections of other times, the presence of 
Corinne in his bed: present perception is also facilitating the glide from one 
memory into the next. 
However, the memory of the early years of de Reixach s marriage is 
not, we soon discover, in direct voice. Georges has learned about them from 
Iglésia, a fellow member of the cavalry unit and fellow prisoner during the 
war, who had been the jockey for de Reixach s string of race horses, and who 
had had no qualms about cuckolding his future captain, in the horse barns, 
with the ever-eager Corinne. Yet the detailed images derived from such 
accounts (pp. 2 2 - 2 5  , 5 1 - 5 4  , 1 3 7 - 5 4  , 1 6 6 - 6 9  , 174-83  ) go far beyond 
the general comments of Iglésia in the narrator's actual memory (pp. 4 9  ­
51, for example). Thus, "Et cette fois Georges put les voir, exactement 
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comme si lui-même avait été là" (p. 144; "And this time Georges could see 
them, exactly as if he had been there himself") represents a transition from 
memory, the remembered words of an account of a competition between 
Iglésia and de Reixach, to imagination. Georges's mental representation 
includes color, clothing descriptions, facial expressions, attitudes, bits of 
conversation, representing what it might have been like to be present the 
day de Reixach took his jockeys place, riding in a race, as his jockey had 
replaced him, "riding" Corinne. But the associations remain operative 
(e.g., mounting a horse, mounting a sexual partner), interconnecting 
memory, present perception, and imagination, so that the imagination is 
constrained by a kind of causal probability: these people, in this situation, 
would have doubtless behaved in this way. Accounts of events, and the 
narrators acquaintance with all the participants, prohibit wild flights of 
fancy: Georges is approaching a hypothesis. For, in a sense, these imagin­
ings are to form the basis for the justification of one of a series of hypotheses 
formulated early in the text: when de Reixach assumed his statuelike pose in 
the face of enemy fire, he was perhaps (a) enjoying a noble, heroic death, or 
maybe (b) seeking to draw enemy fire toward his unit, hoping that Iglésia 
would be killed—a cuckold s revenge—or, more probably (c) drawing fire 
upon himself, committing suicide (pp. 14-17)  . Other hypotheses in the 
text concern possible reasons for suicide on his part, and for other sui-
cides—ancestral, political, national—and the relationship of sexual satis­
faction and dissatisfaction to the death wish and to the general entropie 
disaggregation reaching culmination in World War II. 
These hypotheses develop discontinuous thematic strata within the 
text, which the readers memory can collect into at least four themes: the 
suicide of a nineteenth-century ancestor, de Reixach s death, the fall of 
France in 1940, and the accompanying disintegration of European culture. 
As these thematic strands are connected by association in the narrator's 
mind, the text itself begins to cause or condition reader reaction to its 
structure in two primary ways. 
First, in almost Proustian fashion (de Reixach falls in battle into an 
intertext, as it were, smack in front of a "perfumed, springtime hedge of 
hawthorns," [p. 314}), mental images trigger other mental images, caus­
ing the text to advance. As readers assimilate the system of associations, 
they may begin to move about in the space of the text, as with Proust, 
whenever later images (such as that of the less-than-virginal Virginie) 
trigger their own memories of themselves mentally creating earlier ones 
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(such as the glint of the sun on the sabres "acier virginal"). In a stricter 
sense, of course, when we collect bits of text to constitute a "theme," or 
associate similar images, we are moving about, not in the space of the text, 
but in that of our memory of it. This is, then, an example of intervocalic 
shift, when present reading (indirect voice) triggers our memories (direct 
voice) of assimilation, of our imagination fleshing out a spare linguistic 
tale, as the narrator had vivified in imagination Iglesias accounts. 
Second, as readers become aware of the spatial nature of the text, they 
recognize that there is indeed no movement, except perhaps the rhythm, 
the repeated (and therefore "static") movements of Georges s copulations 
with Corinne. The microcosmic triggers that advance the text from one 
mental representation to the next are not creating a space but exploring 
a preexisting space. The awareness that imagination penetrates our per­
ception of all accounts of the past, indeed infuses human memory (is any 
narrator "reliable"?), invalidates them as grounds for the justification of 
our inferences. We may constrain imagination sufficiently to formulate 
memory-based hypotheses, but not enough to justify them. For the truth 
value of hypotheses depends upon the soundness of objective, logical causa­
tion, which can coexist only with movement. The text rarely tells us which 
details are remembered and which imagined; it is likely the narrator has no 
greater certainty about such things than do the readers. Indeed the novel 
ends on this uncertainty, as Georges again recalls de Reixachs (mock?) 
heroic posture just before he was killed: 
Mais l'ai-je vraiment vu ou cru le voir ou tout simplement imaginé 
après coup ou encore rêvé, peut-être dormais-je n'avais-je cessé de 
dormir les yeux grands ouverts en plein jour bercé par le martèlement 
monotone des sabots des cinq chevaux piétinant leurs ombres ne 
marchant pas exactement à la même cadence de sorte que c'était 
comme un crépitement alternant se rattrapant se superposant se con-
fondant par moments comme s'il n'y avait plus qu'un seul cheval, puis 
se dissociant de nouveau, se désagrégeant recommençant semblait-il à 
se courir après et cela ainsi de suite. . . . (P. 314) 
(But I did really see it or believe I saw it or simply imagine it after the 
fact or even dream it, maybe I was sleeping had never stopped sleeping 
with my eyes wide open in broad daylight rocked by the monotonous 
pounding of the five horses' hoofs stomping their shadows not advanc­
ing exactly in the same cadence so that it was like an alternating 
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ratatatat catching up superimposing blending at times as if there were 
now but a single horse, then separating once again, disintegrating 
starting it seemed to chase each other again and so on like that. . . .) 
Hypotheses, memory, and imagination blend, like the shadows of the 
horses, and their hoofbeats, as punctuation falls away, allowing each phrase 
to melt into its successor. Like the precious Leipzig library, the carefully 
collected and preserved record of expanding human wisdom which proved 
powerless against the bombs that destroyed it (pp. 222—25), memory, 
infused with imagination, is unable to act or guide action, useless as a tool 
for explanation, prediction, or project. 
Of the two oft-noted tendencies that structure this novel, aggregative 
and disaggregative, the former (by means of which, for example, we com­
pare the Leipzig library to Georges s memory) relies solely on the principles 
of comparison and psychological association. Having lost its modal purity, 
memory cannot serve as the basis for hypothetical reason, in which the 
causal assumption forms the ground of movement and action. Readers can 
construct in memory four main "themes" in parallel lines (as Marcel's 
memory did the Combray walks), so that a note struck on any one of them 
resonates on all the others. But with causation limited to the little triggers 
of psychological association, only the récit can advance: the histoire is static. 
Belief in the potential validity of the causal assumption, and therefore 
of the hypothetical mode for readers, at least, if not for characters as well, 
appears a necessary condition for an histoire that advances, that moves with 
direction. The histoire of La Jalousie can be said to move forward insofar as 
causality is at work: suspicion generates imagination, which provokes even 
wilder imagination, whence frenetic jealousy, and so on. One cannot ad­
vance along La Route des Flandres as histoire, only rise higher above it, for an 
ever broader view of its preexisting totality. 
More recent mental-representation novels have tended to exclude the 
cognitive and hypothetical modes and to dwell almost entirely in the 
imaginary. One thinks of the later novels of Marguerite Duras, beginning 
approximately with Le Ravissement de Loi V. Stein (1964)—with the ex­
ception of her presumably autobiographical L'Amant (1984), in which 
inference returns in force. In Dans le labyrinthe (1959), with its famous 
multiple beginning (Outside it's raining . .  . ; Outside it's sunny . .  . ; 
Outside it's snowing . . .), Robbe-Grillet situates us in the freely associat­
ing mind of an inferred narrator-author, who tests out meteorological 
Mental-Representation Fiction « 1 9  9 
settings until one is found to generate the desired (by whom?) thematics. 
The famous loop in his La Maison de rendez-vous^ in which the image of a 
person in a printed picture leaves the frame and eventually finds herself in 
position to become a potential observer of the picture, typifies the sort of 
implausibility that is the hallmark of imaginary-mode fiction. Even though 
the vocabulary remains quite referential (one can of course visualize clearly 
each phase of the loop), the temporal relationship among the elements 
displays a certain "real-world impossibility": it is causality that is out 
of joint. 
As a mental-representation text composed entirely in the imaginary 
mode, Robbe-Grillets Souvenirs du triangle d'or (1978)1 4 will serve to ex­
emplify the exclusion of traditional causation from the novel. Some meager 
grounds remain, as we shall see, for causal inferences about the narration on 
the part of readers, but the absence or implausibility of causation in the récit 
precludes the constitution in readers' minds of a meaningful histoire. An 
"histoire" subsists, in that one can visualize or reconstitute each of the 
"scenes" described, but the absence of inferable causal relationships among 
them precludes the kind of meaningfulness of which we have been speak­
ing. There are no narratorial perceptions to cause memories (the word 
souvenirs—"memories"—in the title, in the absence of plausible relation­
ships, seems an ironic reference to the contamination of memory by imagi­
nation) or to stimulate projects, no valid hypotheses, no facts on which to 
base counterfactuals. We read simply a series of mental images, a number of 
which are neurotically erotic, violent, or sadistic—almost always with 
women as victims. A text made up entirely of imaginary-mode representa­
tions gains certain attributes lacking in works with reality-referential ele­
ments, but it also loses interesting characteristics found in novels in which 
cause and effect play a role. Since the absence of a structuring device may 
often be as informative as its presence, a survey of the "losses" and "gains" in 
this apparently extreme sort of fictional structure will provide an instructive 
conclusion to this chapter. What major narrative concepts are lost in 
mental-representation fiction limited to the imaginary mode? 
1. The identity of the narrator. When a narrative consists of causally 
interrelated or interrelatable events, or of causally associated mental repre­
sentations, readers are justified in presuming that the narrative voice retains 
a consistent identity. While the narrator may undergo change within cer­
tain parameters {La Nausée, La Jalousie), we expect her or him to be the 
"same" person. When the text presents simply a series of implausible 
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imaginings, none of which have consequences in any of the others, there is 
no reason, beyond our traditional habits, to suppose that a single, con­
stantly identical narrator is speaking to us from the printed page. True 
enough, there is sufficient parodie (or pseudoparodic—without objective 
standards, one cannot tell) pornography in Souvenirs du triangle d'or, it seems 
to me, to lead one to posit a narrator of obsessive tendencies. But there is 
quite enough material of other kinds—scenes of incarceration and escape, 
of exploration and investigation, of bouncing balls and pearls bouncing on a 
mirror—to leave that hypothesis unconfirmed. As if to reinforce our 
doubts, the "narrators" name seems to change as well. On page 46, he 
appears to be "Franck" (later known as the police official "Franck V. 
Francis," a.k.a. "Francis Lever," a.k.a. "Francisco Franco"); on page 91, 
however, the narratorial "I" meets Franck, although we will be told on page 
101 that Franck V. Francis is indeed "le narrateur." Later, a female "charac­
ter" ("Lady Caroline") narrates a segment (pp. 154—68) in which she has 
some of the experiences previously attributed to a male identity, until she 
becomes again a "third person," at which point all the characters we meet, 
including Franck, are presented in "third person" for a time. One narrative 
voice splits into two before our eyes as he criticizes his own "narrative" act 
("Ne me faites pas rire," [p. 198}; "Don't make me laugh"). When nar­
rators do remain "themselves" throughout a text, there is a presumed cause 
for it, as I suggested earlier with respect to the surrealist novels; in these 
shifting sands, where causation cannot be presumed, constant narratorial 
identity cannot be presumed either. 
2. The concept of character. Characters have traditionally been defined 
either in terms of "traits" (whether these are named in the récit or inferable 
from their recounted actions) or as functions of plot structure called octants.15 
Without causality, there can be no "plot," no actions of consequence; as a 
result, the linguistic imitations of persons which inhabit texts like Souvenirs 
can scarcely be analyzed as actants. One might see the narrator as consequen­
tially active and construe an histoire which would be: "The narrator imag­
ines . . .  " followed by the text of the novel. But, if the narrator is not 
necessarily the "same" person, such an histoire is meaningless and the 
"narrator(s)" undefinable as "character(s)." The concept of character "traits" 
presupposes a certain essence or constancy of identity of dubious validity in 
Souvenirs. Gender does appear to remain consistent throughout (a notion 
which gains increased significance because of the shifting, causeless struc­
ture); men are men and women, women; but sex alone defines categories 
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rather than individuals. One would be hard put to find the complex or 
paradigm of traits required for the depiction of an individual character, 
beyond the attributes of gender. Imagination is free, and there is therefore 
no cause for a human entity to retain any constant set of traits, even 
contradictory ones, in the imaginary mode. 
3. The notion offictional reality. The causal implausibility of "events" 
that marks Souvenirs as a text in the imaginary mode also deprives it of the 
benchmark of reality. For example, the "narrator" supposedly sees, from his 
seat in a seaside café, a naked adolescent girl on horseback, riding up the 
beach at waters edge. When she has passed behind him, a triad of hunters 
arrives in the same direction. As soon as they too are behind the "narrator," 
a shot rings out, followed by screams, which a second shot silences, and by 
the sound of some sort of "body" falling into the water (pp. 10—12). One 
may infer causation, that the hunters have shot the girl, but the "narrator" 
fails to turn his head, so as to be able to provide an eyewitness account, and 
the "event," if it is one, has no further consequences in the novel. Im­
plausibility itself does not destroy fictional reality, so long as the "laws" of 
causality are not tampered with. A science fiction text may be implausible, 
but it will provide causes and effects consistent with its own system. In fairy 
tales, a pumpkin may become a coach, but only according to the rules: fairy 
godmothers may cause such things, but no one else can; an internally 
consistent causal system still functions. In Souvenirs, causes remain absent. 
Why did the hunters fire? Why did the narrator refrain from looking? 
What were the results of the supposed murder? In a world in which people 
can sometimes pass Alice-like16 through a looking glass (pp. 112-13), 
readers have no use for their common sense and life experience in making 
the inferences essential to the constitution of a meaningful histoire. 
4. The concept of time. Souvenirs du triangle d'or is composed, like much 
mental-representation fiction, largely in the present tense, which wavers 
often ambiguously between description and narration. With no causes and 
effects to order the mental images, readers are at sea in the question of 
chronology. Did the scene on the beach occur before or after the imprison­
ment? (Which scene on the beach? Whose imprisonment?) Logic, in the 
absence of causal connectives, cannot distinguish "before" from "after." 
Interrogators ask the imprisoned male, near the end of the novel, to provide 
a chronological summary, thus pointing ironically to the meaninglessness 
of time in the text. The prisoner obliges, spreading the contradictory 
"events" of thefiction (and a few new ones) over a period of eight hours and 
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thirty-six minutes, divided into twelve-minute segments. This imposition 
of a temporal "order" on incongruous "events" in the present tense endows 
them with the stasis of stop-action photography, to which I have alluded, 
but it does nothing to connect or organize them, or to render them plau­
sible: it merely derides the concept of temporality. The time in which the 
"events" may be said to have taken place is the time it took to imagine 
them. But who imagined them, if not the reader? Fictional time and 
reading time are no longer distinct concepts. 
5. The notion of predictability. Without reality-based causation, we 
obviously have no capacity for predicting what might or might not happen 
in coming segments of the récit. Curiosity (desire to know what will turn 
out to have happened), and suspense (desire to know what will happen)17 
must therefore also remain inoperative in such texts as Souvenirs. Predict­
ability allows us to determine that a character is in danger, or that a 
revelation about the past is forthcoming. Lack of knowledge, which is the 
basis for both curiosity and suspense, is a prime attribute of this text, but 
knowledge here is not simply deferred but absent. So, in the knowledge 
that we will not acquire knowledge, we perceive curiosity and suspense 
as idle. 
6. The notion ofexplicability. Having perused all the words of the text, 
readers cannot connect the "events" {qua events) in any order which will 
render them comprehensible in relation to one another. Thus, if we have 
continued to read out of a belief that all would eventually come clear, we 
have erred. 
7. Traditional narrative units. Narratologists distinguish in tradi­
tional novels certain crucial events, which determine by causation the 
direction of the text (they are called noyaux or "kernels"), and those lesser, 
though enriching, events that could be eliminated "without disturbing the 
logic of the plot," and which are termed catalyses or "satellites."18 The 
absence of causation eliminates all notion of "plot" in Forster's sense by 
definition, and with it the distinction between noyaux and catalyses. Since 
movement and change are present in Souvenirs, it remains possible to speak 
of "events" (or "imagined events") in the text. Few of them, however, can 
be said to have "consequences," although most of them are potentially 
consequential. As a result, at first reading, it remains difficult to determine 
when an event ends, for its potential effect hangs fire. Likewise, beginnings 
of events are difficult to pinpoint, since one tends to suspect that unstated 
antecedent reasons for them must exist. Thus, there is "no telling" what the 
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boundaries of events might be, for in a sense there is "no telling" in the 
novel at all. 
8. The notion of importance. At one point in the narrative, young 
Angelica, operating on orders from Lady Caroline, has gotten herself ar­
rested by a person purporting to be a police inspector named Franck. But is 
he really with the police? 
Dans la Cadillac noire qui l'emmène à vive allure, Angelica essaie en 
vain de résoudre cette grave question. Par instant le coeur lui manque, 
en brusques bouffées brûlantes, à la pensée qu'elle vient de commettre 
une faute impardonnable: si ce prétendu inspecteur était en réalité le 
faux médecin? (P. 171) 
(In the black Cadillac that is speeding away with her, Angelica tries in 
vain to resolve this grave question. At times, her heart falters for an 
instant, in sudden burning bursts, at the thought that she has just 
committed an impardonable sin: what if this self-styled inspector were 
in reality the false doctor?) 
In the absence of causal connectives, nothing can be of consequence; no 
questions are therefore "grave," and there are no "impardonable sins"— 
indeed, no sins at all, since judgment would reinstitute causation in the 
text. As figments of the imagination, little Angelica and her burning 
palpitations remain unimportant. Words like "grave," "impardonable," 
and especially "en réalité," in this realm of shifting "character" identity, 
acquire a special irony unattainable in cognitive-mode texts. Perhaps the 
most amusing example of it occurs when the narrator of the moment 
is instructed, in preparing his final chronology, to leave out "useless de­
tails" (p. 225). 
In addition to this peculiar irony, Souvenirs du triangle d'or gains, as an 
imaginary-mode text, other distinctive characteristics. Since no continuous 
histoire can be constituted, readers' hunger for structure drives them mer­
cilessly toward the narration. Internal repetitions and intertexts attain in­
creased significance as the only remaining clues to potential order. Among 
the internal repetitions are the limited number of settings, which perforce 
recur. Indeed, each time the décor changes, we appear to be in a new mental 
representation, so that series of potentially comparable narrative units can 
be envisaged on the basis of setting: beach, prison, temple of the secret 
society, and so on. Recurring images, of bouncing white spheroids, for 
example, and of triangles, provide further ground for comparison. Tri­
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angles emerge in the title, in the image of the pediment of a Greek-style 
temple, in the references to the upper front of a woman's pointed shoe, in 
images of the exposed pubic hair of females, and in the name of the "Société 
du Triangle d'or" ("Society of the Golden Triangle"), accused, in imagina­
tion at least, of sponsoring sadistic orgies. All occurrences are at least 
distantly sex-related. Even the pediment contains as a frieze an inverted 
equilateral triangle with an eye in it, set on end on the vertical axis; little 
imagination is required of readers to see in the frieze a schematic representa­
tion of the female genitalia. The recurrence of erotic and voyeuristic imag­
ery might suggest the periodic return of desire, here employed as a structur­
ing device. 
The intertexts also attain exceptional significance as indices of order: 
allusions to Robbe-Grillet's own early fiction (Les Gommes, Le Voyeur, La 
Jalousie), as well as to Alice through the Looking Glass and to Valéry s Cimetière 
marin (quoted on p. 112). Since the girl "character," who, at this point, 
passes through the "peau de panthère et chlamyde trouée" which is the 
surface of a mirror, bears the name "Temple," it is tempting to undertake a 
reading of the text as a dark-side parody of the famous poem. The occasional 
sea imagery, and the "temple" headquarters of the secret society provide 
further encouragement. "Cruel Zeno's" paradoxes about stasis and move­
ment are inherent here in the present-tense conflict between narration and 
description, between the successive fantasies and the final imposed "chro­
nology." If Valéry s poem traces an evolution from belief in eternal, rational 
order governing human existence to the understanding that life is an inter­
play of irrational, dynamic, and mortal forces, his imagined "Temple du 
Temps, qu'un seul soupir résume," is "dead in the water" before the end of 
the poem. But instead of finding, like Valéry, beneath the surface of the 
soul, in the fear of death, an emotional and quasiexistential reason for 
attempting to live and act, Robbe-Grillet's text uncovers in introspection 
the hideous dynamic of sadistic desire (which one might associate with the 
"panther") and the masochism relatable to the pilgrim wearers of the ragged 
"chlamyde." The inactivity of neurotic imagination would replace, in such 
a reading, existential choice and action. 
The golden triangle of the title might also refer to the Pythagorean 
mysteries, to the secret order of the universe, or perhaps to the logical 
structure of abstraction or of the syllogism. Symmetries in triangles, trajec­
tories, and mirror images also suggest structural order, or the before-and-
after of Pythagorean metempsychosis. Psychoanalytical readings are disap­
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pointingly easy, the "ego" having bothered little with censorship; and if 
this is the text of a dream, whose dream is it (cf. Alices problem with the 
Red King)? Since the inferred author is free, in the imaginary mode, to 
present any images in any order, the narration need not represent a consis­
tent intent: readers are equally free to attribute significance to any aspect of 
repeated images or of intertexts and to structure them all at will in a lecture. 
We are left, in the virtual absence of a syntagmatic axis, with the 
pseudotask of constituting an unverifiable paradigmatic one. And gone is 
the pleasure to be derived from the discovery of an authors skill in creating 
entities that combine temporal and eternal functions in a text. In its place 
remains the readers free but inconsequential creation. 
One escape from such futility is to read the text as text, remaining 
as close as possible to syntax and signifiers and restraining the imagina­
tion from embroidering on the signifieds. The evil experiments of the 
scurrilous Dr. Morgan may be described as "expériences sur les comporte­
ments oniriques tertiaires" (p. 184); "experiments on tertiary (REM) 
oneiric behavior"—but they are also "textual experiments" (p. 155; "expé­
riences textuelles"). While in context readers can scarcely fail to note the 
potential substitution of the near-rhyme "sexuelles" for "textuelles," the 
book is not only a succession of separate dreams, like separate pearls bounc­
ing off a mirror (described as an "experiment in structural organization," 
[p. 103]), but an experiment in the texture, in the weaving together, of 
words. So it is, for example, that the "narrator" in his jail cell perceives a 
yellow object and a red one, which, we are told, would produce "une 
orange, qui ne saurait donc tarder à paraître" (p. 149; "an orange, which 
can therefore not be long in making its appearance"). Sure enough, in the 
next fantasy, Lady Caroline finds, in her bathing cabin at the beach, "a 
large, perfectly spherical orange" (p. 151; "une grosse orange parfaitement 
sphérique"). Words generate words on the level of individual signifiers, 
independently of a generalized meaning of the text. Such generation would 
appear caused only if one could infer the inferred author's intent. 
Novels of mental representation continue to make use of causal ele­
ments for unifying and structuring purposes, for the constitution of a 
definable syntagmatic axis, so long as the mental representations involve 
the cognitive or the hypothetical mode. In the former, a series of unrelated 
perceptions is conceivable, but in practice, characters' memories begin to 
connect them by associations, which will become the causes of later recall. 
In the future cognitive, the inherent perceived inevitability is causal in 
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nature. The hypothetical mode, the domain of inference, uses causation as 
its essential logic. 
But the imaginary mode, the realm of fantasy and dreams, escapes 
internal causation, and with it not only a major structural armature, but 
primary tools of meaning production. As the basis for explanation and for 
inferable intent, causation has served as a source of métonymie understand­
ing, as a fundamental determiner of meaning in fiction. It is precisely this 
linear, "narrative" notion of meaning that imaginary-mode texts undertake 
to subvert. Their intent, if we can infer it, is to revitalize fiction on other, 
nonnarrative grounds, free at last from causal chains. 
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ence from Souvenirs du triangle d'or. 
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Conclusion 
Les séquences proaïrétiques vont bientôt toutes se fermer, le récit mourra. 
Que savons-nous d'elles? 
(Soon the proaïretic sequences will close; the tale will die. What do we 
know about them?) 
ROLAND BARTHES 
. . . c'est parce que nous savons l'irréversibilité du devenir que nous pou­
vons reconnaître le mouvement réversible, le changement simple, réduc­
tible à une équivalence réversible entre cause et effet. 
(. . . it is because we know the irreversibility of becoming that we can 
recognize reversible movement, simple change, reducible to a reversible 
equivalency between cause and effect.) 
PRIGOGINE AND STENGERS 
Temporal plurality, inherent in the new physics,1 finds its echo, of course, in our insertion of cause and effect into the levels of nar­rative. This heuristic device has revealed the fundamental notions 
of plausibility and connectedness as dependent upon readers' relationship to 
the text, suggesting the usefulness of describing additional levels. 
The distinction among traditional levels should be nowhere more 
apparent than in the closing pages of the preceding chapter. All fiction is by 
definition, for the narration, imaginary; imaginary-mode fiction does not 
begin, however, until the récit undertakes to imitate the process of imagin­
ing. It does so by multiplying implausibilities. Now, as our readings of 
texts indicate, the implausible does not reside in the names of entities: 
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speech is not implausible, nor are white rabbits. But when Alices white 
rabbit begins to produce speech, a serious implausibility arises; it is not the 
entities but the relationships among them that may be implausible. Even 
then, one would be hard put to prove that any relationship is inherently 
implausible; relationships become implausible only in comparison to some 
standard, which is usually life experience (although, in science fiction, it 
might be an imaginary system, such as the peculiar physics of the planet 
Xyron). Relationships among entities, if they occur across time, invariably 
presuppose a causal element or its absence; passing through a mirror (Sou­
venirs du triangle d'or) or recovering completely from a four-story fall (UAs­
sommoir) seems to presuppose the obliteration of the constraints of physics as 
they apply to human anatomy. And the standard of plausibility, as a compo­
nent of the condition of inference, therefore also functions causally. 
We may conclude, then, that the causal assumption is critical to 
the perception of plausibility/implausibility in texts. We may also con­
clude that the causal hypothesis is the mode of insertion of the verisimilar 
into the temporality of narrative. Even though readers may recognize as 
familiar the entities of a text, unless causal predictability or explicability 
defines the relationship among entities, the story will appear to deviate 
from the realistic. 
In addition to "incorrect" causality (the implausible), our device also 
uncovers disconnectedness among temporally related fictional phenomena. 
It is only apparent when we assume that causal relationships are to be 
expected; once again, comparison with life or literary experience is 
operative. There is potential misunderstanding involved in pointing out (as 
in the last chapter) gaps and disconnectedness in imaginary-mode texts, 
through comparison to standards of narrative that are inapplicable to them; 
the aim there, of course, was not understanding but demonstration of 
difference. But in texts that do not mimic imagination, that include, even 
minimally, elements of the cognitive or hypothetical modes, comparison 
with a standard is invited, for these modes presuppose the existence of a 
fictional "reality." When the récit imitates these modes (remembering, 
perceiving, projecting, hypothesizing), the fundamental existence of the 
"real" is implied, and thus "real" temporal relationships: causation. It was 
obvious, for example, that the narrator of La Jalousie could not be remem­
bering certain scenes and must therefore be imagining them; despite the 
emphasis on imagination in that work, enough cognitive data surface to 
make causal assumptions possible in interpretation. Like plausibility/ 
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implausibility, perception of connectedness/disconnectedness in temporal 
narratives is dependent upon readerly causal hypotheses. 
Reading for causality thus also clearly demonstrates the creative im­
portance of readers to texts. The choice of the standards of connectedness 
and plausibility against which narratives are measured is entirely the 
readers. Readerly inference, based on individual life experience, gauges the 
implausible and fills the gaps. Texts do not create their readers, nor readers 
texts: making a story is a cooperative enterprise. It is time to agree, as the 
physical scientists have done, that we are, in studying texts, both actors and 
observers in the production of meaning, partially creators of the texts we 
describe.2 
Now that analysis of unmediated mental representations in recent 
texts has led (see chapter ten) to their categorization by voice, mode, and 
tense, I am equipped to return to my initial description of causation in 
narrative levels and to expand it in terms of the mental representations of 
readers. For, as the foregoing analyses suggest, a novel, as it is read, comes 
to exist on at least five levels: 
Indexic author Narration 
Real author Inferred author Histoire (i) 
Narrator/Reader Récit 
Real reader Inferred reader Histoire (2) 
Indexic reader Lecture 
In this light, narrator and reader share the récit, united in the encoding-
decoding relationship, which already implies for the reader an active, 
interpreting role. The histoire acquires its true double nature, both as a 
series of events provided by the inferred author, and as a series of events 
existing as a mental representation of a reader, with inferred causal connec­
tions filling, where possible, any gaps. Histoire (1) precedes (theoretically, 
but not really, as we shall see) and is a condition of the account given by the 
narrator, while histoire (2) arises later, as a result of that account. The levels 
of narration and lecture stand in symmetry, on either side of the commu­
nicative act. While readers may ask questions of the narration (for example, 
"Why am I being told this?"), they obviously need direct none to the 
lecture. Indeed, readers may well infer that it is rather the author who infers 
the (prospective) reader and is curious about his or her (future) lecture. We 
might assume that the author has asked, "Why is this being read?" or 
"Why is this being read in this way?" Although some answers to these 
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questions surely lie outside the text, in the needs and propensities of real, 
individual readers, the inference that authors inform their stories with an 
eye to predetermining the answers as much as possible by means of the text 
is an interesting one. 
Adoption of a causal bias obviously tends to privilege "authors" as 
prime movers and first causes. That is not to say, however, that they deserve 
(or desire) this distinction. The name on the title page can be read to 
designate the funnel through which pass the multiple ideological, cultural, 
and psychological codes inherent in language. Diachronic comparisons that 
point to an increasingly definitive divorce between psyche and the material 
world can be read quite ideologically. Both middle-class individualism, for 
example, which propounds each persons ability to create her or his own 
destiny, and collectivist theories, which seek to predict the inevitable 
outcome of the social and economic struggle, share some common causal 
assumptions; both must now admit of increased uncertainty. Explicability 
and predictability, as components of ideology on the right and the left, can 
be fruitfully explored through literary texts seen as artifacts,3 but the 
apparently growing impetus to weed out trustworthy causal inferences from 
novels, despite the procausal bias inherent in language, seems to be a part of 
a more general development; Heisenberg s uncertainty principle appears at 
work not only in physics but in anthropology and elsewhere. If the fictional 
shift is part of a broadly based cultural phenomenon, then the concept of 
"author" must be taken to represent the influence of major social and 
scientific principles. 
Still, whether authors really infer reader reaction, or whether cultural 
codes inherent in fiction merely imitate such inferences, texts work as if 
authors of traditional novels were correctly inferring that causation in 
histoire (2) would operate in the same direction as that in histoire (1), that is 
to say chronologically, cause before effect. But causation in the lecture 
functions both chronologically, with respect to the text, and antichrono­
logically. Since the lecture may induce causation operating in both directions 
at once, it differs from the récit, which may present causes and effects either 
in one order or the other, but not in both simultaneously. A phrase in the 
text may impel readers backward, to reexperience or reevaluate a past-
cognitive mental representation that arose in response to preceding pages. 
So it is with Proust's "Mort à jamais?" or with "Ici Laurent s'arrête," which, 
in Les Gommes, makes us reconstitute the source and sense of the preceding 
passage; so it is even with the second term of a metaphor. Lexical data may 
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likewise lead readers to form, hypothetically, a mental image of what is yet 
to happen in the histoire (the revelations of Jacques Lantier's homicidal 
mania, for example, or Michel's pronouncement that Marceline was, in his 
eyes, "damaged goods"). Once readers believe they understand what is 
afoot in the narration, they may impose a general interpretation upon a text 
as they read, so that it colors both their memories of what has been read and 
their reading of what is to come. Reference, in Les Gommes to a sketch of a 
Greek temple in a stationer's window may impel readers to bring together 
their memories of past references to ancient Greece in the text, and, on that 
basis, having hypothesized an Oedipus connection, to read ahead with the 
Theban king in mind, foregrounding details useful to the mythic reading 
and backgrounding the rest. Thus a single reference may plunge readers at 
once into the past and the future cognitive, the hypothesis having become 
for them a "sure thing." 
When readers' hypotheses about the narration become projects, read­
ers are, as we have noted, "closed-minded," and the récit undergoes reduc­
tion in the lecture. This is not of itself an evil, but a process of narrowing 
inherent in reading. N o one remembers a récit; many of us recall in detail a 
few histoires; and most can give in a few sentences the general purpose— 
intent of narration—of a great number of novels. Having inferred the 
tendency toward closedmindedness in readers, authors can structure their 
texts to use it or to circumvent it. It is natural that, given Lantier's sex-
related murderous impulses, readers will expect the engineer to do Séverine 
in. The text works, for a time, to thwart that expectation, as the lovers 
spend night after night together in relatively uneventful bliss. A long and 
satisfying affair is required to reopen readers' eyes to other possibilities, so 
that the timing of the murder, at least, will produce a degree of essential 
shock and surprise. In its lexical data, Les Gommes encourages a certain 
closedmindedness about the Oedipus legend as matrix; since the central 
conflict of the histoire reveals, however, the importance of remaining open-
minded and flexible in the formulation of hypotheses, it is reasonable to 
expect that the inducement of a closedminded reading should also serve to 
unmask the inherent weakness in such a lecture. And indeed there is much in 
the text to discourage an Oedipal lecture, from the fact that the murder 
comes during the investigation and not before, to the extreme "stretching" 
of evidence necessary to conclude that Dupont is Wallas's father. Play with 
the closedminded expectations of readers is evident as well in the techniques 
of causal surprise we have uncovered in Zola and which are common in 
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traditional fiction: cumulative causation, interference of series, reversals 
(Virginie and Gervaise; Roubaud jealous, then not jealous). These all pre­
suppose readerly inferences that will be at least partly erroneous. In this 
game of mirrors, of hypotheses about hypotheses, the critic must be a 
closedminded reader too, so as to experience the effects of authors' inferred 
inferences about the inferences of potential readers. In order to construct the 
five-line diagram of narrative levels (that is to say, in order to exist outside 
it), the critic must once have dwelt within it, taking cognizance at first 
hand of each level. 
Operating from the perspective of poetics, and without considering 
the inferential mechanisms of a level of lecture, Tzvetan Todorov shrouds a 
vital insight in what appears to be a false causal paradox.4 Noting the 
transitive nature of causality, he remarks that causation can operate in both 
directions when psychological causes of physical action are involved. Do 
actions serve to reveal the psychological traits of characters (the view of 
Henry James in The Art of Fiction), or do the traits exist merely to prepare 
and explain the actions? In the paradigm X kills Y, is the focus on the 
subject ( Jamesian stance) or on the predicate? Todorov begins by admitting 
both possibilities as distinct, calling the subject-focus mediated causal­
ity ("causalité médiatisée"), and the predicate-focus immediate causality 
("causalité immédiate"). When the subject is in focus, the action is simply 
exemplary of a character trait; when the predicate dominates, the character 
trait arises rather as a modality to allow for or to explain the action. So far, so 
good. Then Todorov raises the paradox: 
Un trait de caractère n'est pas simplement la cause d'une action, 
ni simplement son effet: il est les deux à la fois, tout comme l'action. 
X tue sa femme parce qu'il est cruel; mais il est cruel parce qu'il tue sa 
femme. L'analyse causale du récit ne renvoie pas à une origine, pre­
mière et immuable, qui serait le sens et la loi des images ultérieures; 
autrement dit, à l'état pur, il faut pouvoir saisir cette causalité hors du 
temps linéaire. La cause n'est pas un avant primordial, elle n'est qu'un 
des éléments du couple "cause-effet" sans que l'un soit par là-même 
supérieur à l'autre. (Pp. 8 0 - 8 1  ) 
(A character trait is not simply the cause of an action, nor simply its 
effect: it is both of them at once, just as with action. X kills his wife 
because he is cruel, but he is cruel because he kills his wife. Causal 
analysis of stories does not look backward toward some first and 
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immutable origin, which would be the meaning and the law of all the 
subsequent images; in other words, ideally, we must be able to lay 
hold of this causality outside of linear time. A cause is not a primordial 
before; it is merely one of the elements of the "cause-effect" couple, 
without one being for this reason superior to the other.) 
This analysis reduces virtually to zero the "mediated/immediate" distinc­
tion of the earlier argument and thereby opens doors to causal problems we 
have been trying to solve. 
Todorovs conclusion contains an essential insight. On the lecture level, 
cause and effect come into being at the same instant, because the reader 
discovers not two things but one: a relationship. For, as I have stressed, 
neither a cause nor an effect can be perceived as such until a reader has 
identified the other partner in its "couple." But this simultaneity is not 
obtained through a special perceptive effort ("we must be able"); it is a sine 
qua non of causal reading. It holds true for all categories of such relation­
ships: for physical causes of physical effects (e.g., Coupeau is injured, in 
L'Assommoir, because he falls from a rooftop); for physical causes of psycho­
logical effects (Michel's attitude toward life is changed in L'Immoraliste, for 
example, as a result of a tubercular infection); for psychological causes of 
physical effects—Todorovs specific instance (in La Bête humaine, Lantier 
murders Séverine because he is deranged, and Denizet has Cabuche and 
Roubaud falsely convicted because of arrogance, pride, and a closedminded 
refusal to accept Roubauds confession); and for psychological causes of 
psychological effects (e.g., the narrators imaginings in La Jalousie make 
him more jealous, as his increased jealousy reciprocally spurs his imagina­
tion). While readers are always aware of the condition or event that will 
become a cause (or an effect) before they are conscious of the other "half" of 
the causal couple, it is only at the moment when they infer a connection that 
cause and effect acquire their identity as such in the lecture. 
Yet despite the inevitable unity of the causal couple on this level, the 
notion of anteriority tends to persist in histoires (i) and (2). The unitary 
relationship of the lecture is usually by nature one of temporal priority and 
directional movement: A produces (is a condition of, contributes to the 
production of ) B. Ability to lead readers to infer the direction of transitivity 
is a major communicative tool on the author's workbench—or among the 
potentialities of texts. Leaving aside the logical nonessentials of Todorov's 
paradox (one can be cruel without killing one's spouse, or kill one's spouse 
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without being cruel—accident, euthanasia, etc.), it can be of fundamental 
importance to a text that readers infer correctly (from the authors point of 
view) whether a murder produces or exemplifies a character trait. The very 
"point" of L'Etranger hinges on it. Imagine a reader who, after perusing the 
account of the funeral and the following days swim and date with Marie, 
determines that Meursault is inherently cruel (or "pathologically insen­
sitive" or "lacking in regard for human life"). The murder of the Arab will, 
for that reader, appear to be caused by an inherent trait: it provides only one 
more example of the characters preexisting cruelty. But such a reader, if he 
or she existed, would have adopted the prosecutors view before the text 
revealed it, thus destroying the ironic problematics inherent in the clash of 
opposing versions of events. For the text to reveal its irony, one must 
perceive, not that Meursault kills because he is cruel, but that he becomes 
cruel, in the eyes of the prosecutor and the jurors, because he kills. The text 
requires that this be, in part I, an example of causalité immédiate: temporal 
priority and direction of derivativeness are crucial. So it is with Proust's 
Marcel: if his involuntary memories are viewed primarily as results of an 
inherent character trait, then individual readers may presume that they lack 
it, and that they cannot know themselves the joys of such epiphanies. The 
text would thus lose its expansiveness, which arises from causal direc­
tionality. Marcel becomes a rememberer because he remembers, because he 
happens upon the keys to remembrance; in this direction, discovery is open 
to us all. 
Perception of mediated causality (the opposite direction), where it 
exists, is equally essential. The "testing events" we observed in L'lmmora-
liste and La Porte étroite serve to reflect the degree of change, if any, in the 
traits of characters. The traits exist first, having accomplished their relative 
changes, and they determine events, which exemplify them. Likewise, 
Michel "kills" Marceline because he is (has become) cruel. The death crowns 
the list of Michel's heedless and egocentric actions; it puts the spotlight on 
him, not on her, and prompts a moral revaluation of his "liberation." Only 
when we learn of her demise can we perceive the causal couple, but when we 
do so, the derivativeness is inherent in it: cruelty —> death. Mediated 
causality is the essence of Le Paysan de Paris and ofNadja as well, where each 
"event" is the result of a preexisting trait in the narrator: "Breton's" uncon­
scious creates Les Détraquées in Nadja, just as "Aragons" creates the Parc des 
Buttes-Chaumont. To infer the opposite would be to attribute magic prop­
erties to places and events, which is delightful, but also to leave the 
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narratorial voices neutral and uninteresting, which is to miss the point. 
When causality is mediated, as in these examples, it provides a measure of 
what I have been calling predictability, when causation is immediate, it 
yields rather explicability. 
This is not to say that causal direction is never ambivalent in the 
histoire. But it only becomes so as a result of tactics of the narration embod­
ied in the récit. Whether memory feeds imagination, or imagination mem­
ory, is a moot point in La Jalousie. Do the qualities of otherness in the 
pebble impart the sensation of nausea to Roquentin's hand, or does the 
feeling of nausea create the perception of otherness in the pebble? These are 
examples of interaction, with derivativeness flowing both ways. A text can 
choose such ambivalence, but it is not a condition of causal expression, even 
when the psychological and the physical interact. The ambivalence, when it 
is perceived, is not "outside of linear time": it is grasped as a simultaneous 
interaction occurring at a point, or over a period, on the timeline of the 
histoire. And when it is grasped, the comprehension takes place in the 
lecture, a developing interpretation of the novel, which has a timeline and a 
causality of its own. The narration, "inferring" reader reaction, selects 
ambivalence or unidirectionality in order to cause (so we may infer) a 
specific lecture. 
The preceding analysis is based on inferred authorial hypothesis: A ^ 
Critic (B ^  Author [C => Reader (X -» Y)}). C is a necessary condition— 
causal vocabulary, an easily bridgeable gap in the histoire, etc.—for the 
readers inference of the derivation of Y from X. B is the necessary condi-
tion—an element of the authors experience—for authorial inference of the 
reader's hypothesis, if the reader perceives C. But, if there is to be a critic, 
she or he must function as a reader, with a readers tools; thus A is identical 
with C, but it leads to a different inference. The difference depends on the 
fact that the "reader" is here transforming histoire (i) into histoire (2), 
working across the single level of the récit, while the "critic" is at a further 
remove, constituting a hypothetical narration from the level of lecture. This 
summarizes the argument for the derivation of the levels. The interplay of 
mirrors appears when we realize that C (and therefore A) derive(s) from B, 
which includes an understanding of readers and their hypothetical mode. 
Thus, if causation most often functions unidirectionally along the horizoa­
tal timeline of the histoire, it acquires reflexive characteristics when it 
operates vertically, across the levels of narrativity. This is so even for the 
"reader" in our algorithm, for the inference that X - • Y is derived from 
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C, and C is derived from inferred authorial desire to create the inference 
X-»Y . 
Yet C has a double derivation. Our conditions for inferences about the 
stories we read are derived from our individual life experience, as well as 
from strategies embodied in the texts. Readerly experience—including 
reading, as a subset of it—provides the standards for plausibility and 
connectedness, for verisimilitude and credibility. Cultural codes are not the 
exclusive property of the coded text; they enter into the decoding as well, 
for textual strategies are not the sole determiners of the inferences readers 
will make. The reader, armed with prior knowledge and acquired assump­
tions, conscious or unconscious, breaks the cycle of the inferential game of 
mirrors, giving them something to reflect. The experiential component of 
each condition for inference is thus remarkably "important," in the special 
sense this study has been giving to the term. 
If I have foregrounded the readers hypothetical mode, it is because it is 
our means for apprehending causal relationships in novels. But the imagi­
nary mode is by far the most useful and creative tool readers have for 
appreciating stories; theories of reading wisely focus on its operation. Left 
to its own devices, imagination is free. Narrative fiction both inspires and 
restricts it, tightening the tension between liberty and constraint. Along 
with precise and detailed descriptions, causation provides a primary con­
straint to the imagination, usually unidirectional in character, helping to 
channel our imaginations along a specific path. 
Yet unlike precise description (indirect voice, cognitive mode), causal 
relationships involve at least a degree of imaginative freedom, because we 
perceive them in the hypothetical mode, a step closer to the imaginary. 
Should a narrator tell us the heroines blouse was rose-beige, readers would 
be obliged to believe and never suggest that it was, in fact, aqua. But if the 
narrator adds that she wore it to please her mother, readers may decide to 
accept or reject this interpretation, thus forming hypotheses about the 
insight and reliability of the narrator. Even the heroine's own causal state­
ments are open to readerly doubt. While readers' hypotheses are restricted 
by the text, they are nonetheless a step removed from the cognitive, which 
is heavily constrained by the incontrovertible Ding-an-Sichheit of fictional 
reality. Hypotheses are by definition unproved and therefore supplantable 
in the light of further information, which may come from the text or arise in 
our imagination. 
My few, brief statistical forays into the realm of causal vocabulary 
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suggest that it is unreliable as a measure of the text's domination over the 
unifying activity of readerly inference. Part I of L'Etranger abounds in 
obvious causal terms, yet critics find almost unanimously that causal con­
nections are lacking in the series of events it depicts. The fact is that, since 
causality is a function of readerly inference, horizontal (story line) causality 
achieves definitive "existence" only in histoire (2). Causality in the récit, as 
an expression of the narrators inferences (or lies, or misconceptions) is a 
measure of narratorial reliability rather than of functioning causation. Since 
causality is an interpretive mental grid, characteristic of the hypothetical 
and counterfactual modes, no causal statement is inherently true; readers 
must judge the conditions for inference and weigh that judgment against 
the import of the causal vocabulary. Despite the fact that Michel is only 
slightly more explicit about causation than Jérôme, La Porte étroite supports 
far more diverse causal readings than does L'Immoraliste: the complex tex­
tual components of the conditions of readerly inference are at the basis of the 
difference. While readers may indeed be influenced by (their interpretation 
of) what characters or narrators say about causes and effects, they retain a 
curiosity about the "real" causes lurking behind the words—as Foucault so 
skillfully puts it in another context: 
. . . par delà les énoncés eux-mêmes l'intention du sujet parlant, son 
activité consciente, ce qu'il a voulu dire, ou encore le jeu inconscient 
qui s'est fait jour malgré lui dans ce qu'il a dit ou dans la presque 
imperceptible cassure de ses paroles manifestes. . . .5 
(. . . behind the utterances themselves, the intention of the speaking 
subject, his conscious activity, what he meant to say, or also the 
subconscious interplay that came to light in spite of him in what he 
said or in the almost imperceptible crack in his actual words. . . .) 
What then occurs in the transformation of histoire (1) to histoire (2)? An­
swers obviously vary from one real reader to the next. It appears likely, 
however, that each reader imagines events in his or her own way, perhaps 
"hearing" voice timbre and intonations in conversations, "seeing" facial 
expressions, clothing, gestures, actions performed, fleshing out the lin­
guistic bones of the récit. Then, to constitute the text, readers conjoin these 
images, by "substitution" (mental assembling of images in which the same 
characters, actions, or settings participate), by comparison (mental uniting 
of lexically and thematically related elements), and by causal inference. In 
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traditional stories, such inferences are drawn virtually by instinct, as we 
reach for a familiar light switch, out of assumption of need for an explicable 
world, in which our predictions have a better than average chance of suc­
cess. Indeed, we are normally conscious of hypothesizing, of imposing a 
causal grid upon fictional events, only when two conditions apply: (1) our 
involvement with the characters' predicaments is such that we feel a need 
to predict, and (2) we are hesitant about our hypotheses. In part I of 
L'Etranger y for example, the second condition applies (it is hard to know 
what is coming next), but the first does not: foresight and understanding 
never seem required to "save" our hero, who appears at no real risk at all 
until his final meeting with the Arab beneath the relentless sun. In more 
traditional texts, such as most Zola novels, the first condition often obtains, 
while the second does not. Readily explainable events in verisimilar set­
tings leave readers confident of their immediate inferences. And realistic 
fiction, following the "rule of prepared consequentially," normally avoids 
contradicting these inferences. 
Indeed, it is far more difficult for a text to prevent the application of 
causal connectives to a series of fictional events, if the text is grounded in the 
cognitive or hypothetical modes. To this end, a series of causally unrelated 
happenings must be devised, or at least, if they are all causally related to an 
underlying condition, they must not cause each other. This is what we have 
observed in A rebours and La Nausée, where blockers mark the end of each 
development, followed by a shift to a different situation. Causal constraints 
(such as the credible, explicit denial of any causal connection between 
events, as in Nadja) may deter the readers penchant to infer causality. The 
farther we roam from the familiar (A rebours, perhaps) or toward the imagi­
nary mode (Souvenirs du triangle d'or), the less likely readers will probably be 
to impose automatic causal assumptions. Texts often manage, by clever 
manipulation of readers' desire for causal comprehension, to create curiosity 
and suspense, anticipation and fear (which are, after all, functions of pre­
dictability) in readers, to create a "reasonable" or an "absurd" world, and to 
determine which events will be perceived as more or less important. Or, by 
making causal comprehension impossible (Souvenirs), an inferred author 
may eliminate such traditional attributes from a text. Successful manipula­
tion of inferred readers' hypothetical mode on the level of the histoire is a 
prime determinant of what we call "novel structure," and of the esthetic 
effects texts produce. 
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Creating the textual conditions for inference, by leaving more or less 
easily filled gaps between events, is the principal means of "expressing" 
causation in the histoire. But whether or not texts undertake to "express" 
causation on the level of narration is a different matter. The manipulation of 
which I have just spoken, for example, forms apart of the narration: do texts 
expect us to be aware of it? Fictional conventions seem to presuppose such 
awareness. Certain texts, through the depiction of a gloomy, rainy day, 
create foreboding, based in part upon the conventional understanding 
(understanding, therefore, of the intent of narration) that dire events hap­
pen, in fiction, in such weather. Often, however, for creation of curiosity, 
irony, or surprise, the narration needs to conceal its manipulations, as 
L'Assommoir screens Virginies evil purposes (and thus the narrations es­
thetic ones) until the ironic reversal springs shut like a trap upon the 
unwary reader. As with the creation of an histoire(2), the development of a 
lecture is accomplished by inference; indeed, a lecture is the inference of 
finalité, of a causal principle, inherent in a narration. Here again, the readers 
penchant is to hypothesize, and the motivation is the desire to comprehend 
the reason for telling a tale, for telling it in a particular manner, or for 
inventing specific events in its histoire. Creation of implausible or unex­
plainable events, as we have seen, is a dependable means of encouraging 
narration-level inference by the reader. Proust, by creating for readers a role 
parallel to that "lived" by his author-narrator, by taking advantage of the 
intervocalic shift (as does Simon later on), actually manages to reproduce in 
us the experience of the intent of narration. In mythic texts, the myth is 
itself a prime factor in the purpose of narration, and "authors" of such works 
must desire that a specific lecture be achieved. A degree of causal im­
plausibility or improbability at the level of the histoire {La Faute de l'abbé 
Mouret or Regain, for example) can encourage readers to develop, in the 
lecture, the allegorical elements "concealed" in the narration. Devices inspir­
ing readers to generalize from specific instances (such as providing partial 
generalizations in characters' statements—old Gisors's philosophical con­
clusions in La Condition humaine, the insightful conversations between 
Tarrou and Rieux in La Peste) serve to stimulate exploration of the narration 
for creation of a mythic lecture. In general, reader discovery of the "secrets" 
of the narration appears essential both for mythic texts and for texts of 
philosophical pretensions. The intent of L'Etranger includes a proper lecture; 
so does that of La Nausée, even though such a lecture uncovers the paradox 
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which invalidates the ending of the histoire. Of course, La Paysan de Paris 
and Nadja are virtually meaningless in their histoires alone; only on the 
lecture level can possible links be forged to point to underlying meaning. 
Narrative meanings need not be conclusive; Les Gommes appears to 
mean, for example, that its status as a mythic text must remain problemati­
cal; La Porte étroite and L'Etranger, along with many other modern French 
texts, encourage plural readings, a multivalent lecture. But in any case 
lectures expand novels from the world in which their characters live into our 
world. Certain texts encourage this expansion; others do not (although our 
hypothesizing minds usually expand them anyway, despite all). Causal 
inference is the basic means of the expansion: even when we read them as 
récits speculates, when our lecture makes spatial comparisons along elements 
of the text on the principle of the matrix, we sense an intent to con-
ceal/reveal the comparability of the elements, on the part of some narra­
tional authority, who wages intellectual battle with us, from whose narra­
tion we wrest our lecture.6 
The existence of narrative levels creates the conditions for causal ironies 
between levels. We have seen them at work in mythic stories, where the 
eternal and immutable causation of mythic destiny {narration) makes sport 
of the petty, specific pseudocauses of characters' reality {histoire). The unreli­
able narrator is also a source of causal irony {e.g., La Porte étroite), where the 
explanations given {récit) are at odds with a likely histoire. Causality can be 
a theme as well as a structuring device; we have focused on this duality in 
La Bête humaine and L'Etranger, but it is almost a constant in traditional 
fiction. It can create ironic distance between causality as concept in the 
histoire and expressed cause and effect in the récit. Ironic distinctions can 
arise as well between the récit and the narration, as we have noted in La 
Nausée (Roquentins "possession" of the Absurd, born of his ability to name 
it, contradicts the inferred authors representation of absurdity), and in 
Souvenirs du triangle d'or, when the discourse calls for the elimination of 
"useless detail" in its own "summary" {récit fails to understand—and there­
fore must understand—the intent of narration). Irony exists between his­
toire (1) and histoire (2) only when a character, not the narrator, says or 
thinks something the reader does not believe. Each of these ironies is 
recovered in a lecture. But the lecture itself seldom appears to stand in ironic 
relationship to other levels, since few readers stand apart from their lec­
ture (therefore on still another level: métalecture?) sufficiently to see it as 
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ironic difference. Yet this irony too exists in potential. The construction/ 
deconstruction of the Oedipal reading in Les Gommes can place Oedipal 
closedmindedness {lecture) in ironic disjunction with the narration, as this 
latter reveals the weakness of the reading it fosters. Definition of such 
interlevel irony should be a feature of causal analysis. 
It would create an amusing symmetry if I could argue that my five-line 
diagram of levels depicted a real temporal and causal sequence. In the 
beginning, then, would be the narration, an idea-intent, which would give 
rise to an histoire, which would engender the récit to tell it; the récit would 
generate an histoire (2) in the mind of a reader, which would lead in turn to a 
lecture. But that is an obvious counterfactual. Novels can without question 
begin as histoires and generate their narrations concurrently with their récits. 
It is quite feasible also to start with the récit, as Nadja does: "Two, two 
what? Two women. What do they look like?" etc., allowing the récit to 
bring the histoire to light, in which the author may discover at last a 
narration in his or her own lecture. In one sense, the récit precedes and causes 
histoire (2). But, from another viewpoint, the récit as read is concurrent with 
the generation of imagined events and their interpretation in readers' 
minds. In mid-novel, already a sizable portion of the histoire exists for 
readers, while a large segment of the récit is still "inexistent," unknown to 
them. The histoire which exists for us at the midpoint ofa novel is, of course, 
still fluid, subject to revision as we alter our hypotheses on the basis of later 
data. But all our efforts will be bent toward making it congeal, and to that 
end we will be building a lecture, also fluid, hypothetical, aimed at grasping 
the purposes behind the histoire. The lecture is thus expanding concurrently 
with the generation of histoire (2) and interacting with it. To be sure, the 
lecture needs the data from histoire (2) to exist, but it does not require all the 
data and may begin growing from a few early events. As it begins to 
solidify, making the reader "closed-minded," it influences the mental elab­
oration of the histoire. So it is that, as readers recognize the Gervaise-
Virginie reversal in L'Assommoir as an element of esthetic intent, they may 
foreground in their histoire (2) aspects of symmetry in the two events, losing 
sight of the great quantities of unsymmetrical detail. While a lecture is 
necessarily indexic of an histoire (2), and not vice versa, a specific histoire (2) 
may be informed by a connate lecture. 
So, despite our assumption for purposes of inference that each of the 
levels has causal priority over those below it in the diagram, such priority is 
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not necessarily temporal in practice. This again points to the radical simul­
taneity of the causal relationship, perceived as a unit, with directional 
derivativeness inherent in it. Thus, even if we "know" by external means 
that a given récit preceded its narration in its authors mind, the causal 
assumption impels us to presume the narrations préexistence, somewhere in 
the authorial subconscious. Such presumption may be unwarranted, and 
the causal assumption therefore unjustified in the vertical dimension. But 
just as the imposition of the causal grid is indeed warranted in the horizon­
tal dimension in those texts that provide receptors for it, it seems to me that 
those texts that mimic convincingly an authorial presence (through a rela­
tively obvious intent of narration, and through selection of causal options in 
récit and histoire) incite readerly collaboration in creation of the author, 
as well. 
Rarely are lectures complete at the end of a first reading; they may 
continue to harden, like the arteries of the venerable, through several 
readings of a text. But when final solidification sets in on a readers lecture 
level, the text is dead for that reader. 
Admittedly, a text is considerably stiffened when its structure has 
been satisfactorily described. But as structures themselves are a product of 
posthypothetical closedmindedness, hope remains for new readers and new 
hypotheses: generalized rigor mortis among all readers of a well-drawn text is 
fortunately rare. For the impulsion toward causal hypothesizing is a dy­
namic, the essential constituent of narrative continuity. 
Causal dynamics provide, however, but one view of narrative struc­
ture, one whose peculiar traits are movement, directionality, inferential 
incompleteness, and linearity. But lines can espouse many forms. My ex­
amples have uncovered the following principal types, which can exist, of 
course, in combination. 
1. Rectilinear causation: the long, easily inferable causal chains of tradi­
tional fiction. 
2. Explicitly branching structures: dead-end sidetracks leading off from a 
causal "main line," as in Huysmans.7 
3. Implicitly branching structures: the "main line" effaced, with the 
branches alone remaining, as indicators of absence (Aragon, Breton). 
4. Curviform causation: Proust's self-referential "Môbius strip," which is 
also partly brachiate. 
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5. Parallel causal structures: the ironic parallel of narration and récit typical 
of mythic narrative read as allegory, including portrayal of allegory as 
problematical (Les Gommes). 
6. Fragmented structure: Sartre, Camus, and the "broken line"; Sarraute; 
Robbe-Grillet's La Jalousie. 
7. Nonlinear structure: absence of causation in the essentially nonnarrative 
fiction of total immersion in the imaginary mode (Robbe-Grillet's Sou­
venirs du triangle a"or). 
Types two through six, associated with "modernist" fiction, tend to 
undermine readerly assurance about the validity of causal concatenations in 
narrative. They find ways to use language for the subversion of causation 
inherent in language. The more frequent selection of intradiegetic narrators 
leaves causal hypotheses in their récits increasingly more problematical, 
until, with the appearance of type seven, a perhaps postmodernist strategy, 
readers are limited to the sole noncausal mode of narratorial mental 
representation. 
If other types of causal structure can exist, they surely will, and 
probably do already. But causality remains a system, involving minimal 
rules of perceived relationship and directionality: the freedom of my sev­
enth type is a "causal structure" only in its decision to exist in the absence of 
causal strictures. The interest of this "canon" of standard structures will be, 
I hope, its potential for comparison, which can reveal deviant and/or com­
binatory structures in other texts. We have observed combination in Proust 
and in L'Etranger; La Route des Flandres reveals elements of the brachiate 
track-and-sidetrack structure, in Proustian parallel, although the side­
tracks are themselves segmented and redistributed, according to the prin­
ciples of association, along the wandering timeline of mental representa­
tions in conditioned sequence. 
If there is anything seminal in this volume—that is to say, anything 
that might cause others to think in causal terms in their reading and 
research—it should therefore lie in what turns out to be absent, or perhaps 
implausible, in these pages. The essential is always in the gaps, generative 
in criticism and in theory as in fiction and in life of fertile hypotheses. Each 
inference requires as its cause a Lacanian "desire," a conatus to know, which 
surfaces in the intervals between segments of the métonymie chain, and & 
condition or conditions for belief. As the condition approaches proof, 
hypothesis becomes project, then solidified knowledge. The delight in 
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literature, as in other aspects of living, resides in the penchant for solidity, a 
desire that can survive only in the presence of generative doubt. The line of 
lecture and of life continues only so long as there are gaps in the histoire or in 
the narration, cracks to be bridged, only so long as one cannot yet cry, with 
Balzac's moribund Balthazar: "EUREKA! " 
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Appendix A 
Relative Frequency of Causal 
Vocabulary in Gide s Llmmoraliste 
and La Porte étroite 
The survey of causal vocabulary in the two novels is based on a sampling of pages. 
Each text fills 104 pages of the Pléiade edition of Gide s Romans, récits et soties, 
oeuvres lyriques (Paris: Galimard, 1958). For analysis, 10 pages were selected at 
random from the first 52 pages of each work and 10 more from the second 52 to 
constitute the 40-page sample. In the second 10 sample pages from La Porte étroite, 
4 were intentionally chosen at random from pp. 581-98 , to insure proportional 
inclusion of Alissas diary. The sample consists, then, of these pages: L'lmmoraliste, 
PP- 376, 381, 386, 392, 395, 396, 397, 407, 412, 416, 421, 434, 437, 441 , 
444,445,450,460, 471, 472; La Porte étroite, pp. 514, 515, 519, 521, 526, 528, 
534, 542, 543, 545, 547, 548, 550, 557, 562, 566, 586, 592, 595, 598. The 
findings may be summarized as follows, with the understanding that the numbers 
of occurrences, given the potential for stylistic variation from page to page, are 
useful for drawing only the most general conclusions. 
Typology of Causal Expression 
1. "METALANGUAGE" OF CAUSALITY: à cause de, causer, cause (IM, 2; PE, 3). 
2. CAUSAL CONJUNCTIONS: parce que, car, puisque, comme (when causal), pour 
que, de sorte que, [c'est} que, [d'autantplus} que (IM, 9; PE, 17). 
3. CAUSAL PREPOSITIONS: par, de (when causal, and en in replacement), à 
(when causal, and là in replacement), pour plus cause, pour plus intent, pour plus 
resuit, en . . .-ant (expressing means), à la faveur de, à force de, selon (causal) (IM, 
105; PE, 73). Illustrative examples: (Causal de) "la gêne de sentir accrochées l'une à 
l'autre nos mains moites," p. 557; {de expressing agency) "Charles . .  . le calmait 
de la parole," p. 416; {en in replacement) "la joie qu'elle en eut, " p. 395. (Causal à) 
"peut-être quelque ressentiment gênait-il mon affection pour ma tante, à la voir 
manifester pour la cadette de ses nièces une prédilection très marquée," p. 514. 
{Pourplus intent, causal when the intention bears fruit) "je me couche au milieu du 
jour pour tromper la longueur morne des journées," p. 471. Frequency in major 
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subcategories: par(\U, 15; PE, 15); de (en), (IM, 42; PE, 25); à(là)(lM, 10; PE, 
7); pour (IM, 33; PE, 22). 
4. VERBS OF TRANSITIVITY: all transitive, nonreflexive verbs designating a 
modification (IM, 214; PE, 225). 
5. SPECIAL CAUSAL VERBS: causal faire (faire plus infinitive, faire [en sorte} 
que); verbs of volition that achieve a result (vouloir, se décider à, cherchera, obeyed 
imperatives); verbs of obligation (devoir expressing obligation, falloir, forcer); verbs 
of transformation (faire or rendre plus adjective); verbs of permission when a modi­
fication is thereby effected (laisser, permettre) (IM, 59; PE, 52). Frequency of causal 
faire: IM, 15; PE, 9. 
6. PRESENT PARTICIPLES AND OTHER ADJECTIVES designating the cause of a 
specified effect (IM, 25; PE, 18). Illustrative examples: "voyant sa détresse, 
j'ajoutai moins brutalement, 'Tu m'aideras'," p. 386; "Désoeuvré, plein d'angoisse 
et d'impatience, après avoir laissé Abel, pour tromper mon attente, je me lançai 
dans une longue course," p. 534. 
7. NOUNS designating the cause of a specified effect (IM, 11 ; PE, 1). 
8. ADVERBS OF LOGICAL CONCLUSION: donc, ainsi, alors, aussi (when causal) 
(IM, 13; PE, 8). 
9. EXPRESSIONS OF DEGREE evoking causality: tant; si. . . que; tel. . . que; 
à ce point que, etc. (IM, 14; PE, 18). Illustrative examples: Pity, says Michel, 
"m'emplit si violemment, que je ne pus retenir mes larmes," p. 376; Jérôme, 
speaking of Alissa, declares, "O Juliette! la vie avec elle m'apparaît tellement belle 
que je n'ose pas . .  . comprends-tu cela? que je n'ose pas lui en parler," p. 519. 
(Such expressions evoke a threshold of causation, below which the consequences— 
here, Michel's tears, Jerome's feeling of interdiction—would have been lesser or 
nonexistent, but which, when reached, allows a specific event to be triggered.) 
10. TEMPORAL EXPRESSIONS evoking cause (IM, 10; PE, 15). Illustrative 
example: Jérôme, referring to Aunt Félicie, says, "Dès qu'elle fut partie, la maison 
put se recueillir," p. 514. (Jérôme indicates that her absence is a necessary condi­
tion for the household's tranquillity.) 
11. SPATIAL EXPRESSIONS evoking cause (IM, 12; PE, 9). 
12. EXPRESSIONS OF PUTATIVE CAUSALITY: mettre sur le compte de, sembler venir 
de, soit que . . . soit que . . . (IM, 4; PE, 1). 
13. STANDARD PARATAXIS: implied causality between events juxtaposed in 
the récit (IM, 41; PE, 29). Illustrative examples: (same sentence) "Inutile d'aller 
plus loin, dit Marceline; ces vergers se ressemblent tous," p. 392; (succeeding 
sentences) "Arrachez-moi d'ici; je ne puis le faire moi-même. Quelque chose en ma 
volonté s'est brisé," p. 471; (within three sentences) Marceline staggers, p. 460* 
and two sentences later Michel hastens to her side. (Although causation may be 
inferred across a still greater interval than two or three sentences—e.g., Lucile's 
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flight, p. 504, may be causally related to Alissas apparent fear of her heredity and 
of physical passion, pp. 585-86—causation can scarcely be seen as implied by the 
récit without juxtaposition, which suggests "intent to imply." 
14. CONVERSATIONAL PARATAXIS: implied causal relationships in reported 
conversations between one characters speech and another's response (IM, 12; 
PE, 40). 
TOTALS (IM, 531; PE, 509): 1040. 
Appendix B 
Comparison of Causal Vocabulary in 
Zola's L'Assommoir and in Gide s 
L'Immoraliste and La Porte étroite 
Relative frequency of causal vocabulary in Zola's L'Assommoir is based on a sample of 
pages from the Oeuvres complètes edition, volume 3 (Paris: Cercle du Livre Précieux, 
1967). The sample was selected by dividing the novel into 7 49-page segments. 
Three pages were selected at random from each segment; 1 page was eliminated at 
random from the pages thus designated to form the 20-page sample. It consists of 
the following pages: 615, 640, 647, 658, 663, 667, 724, 731, 746, 755, 762, 
783, 805, 809, 870, 879, 880, 895, 901, 929. 
Figures given for Gide refer to the number of occurrences in the total sample 
for both L'Immoraliste and La Porte étroite shown in appendix A; figures in paren­
theses indicate the percentage of the total number of occurrences in each sample to 
be found in each category. 
Comparative Typology of Causal Expressions 
GIDE ZOLA 
No. of Oc- Per- No. of Oc- Per-
currences centage currences centage 
1. "Metalanguage" of causality 5 (0.5%) 8 (1%) 
2. Causal conjunctions 26 (3%) 45 (7%) 
3. Causal prepositions 178 (17%) "  3 (18%) 
4, 5. Causal verbs 55O (53%) 232 (38%) 
6. Causal participles, adjectives 43 (4%) 28 (5%) 
7. Causal nouns 1  2 (1%) 7 (1%) 
8. Adverbs of logical conclusion 2  1 (2%) 13 (2%) 
9. Causal expressions of degree 32 (3%) 17 (3%) 
10. Causal temporal expressions 25 (2%) 23 (4%) 
11. Causal spatial expressions 2  1 (2%) 1  0 (2%\ 
12. Expressions of putative cause 5 (0.5%) 1 (0%) 
13. Standard parataxis 7 0 (7%) 66 (11%) 
14. Conversational parataxis 52 (5%) 50 (8%) 
Totals 1040 (100% ) 613 (100%) 
230 
Appendix B • 231 
Two causal expressions in L'Assommoir are particularly worthy of note, the first 
because it is totally absent from the Gide sample (appendix A), and the second 
because it returns with some frequency in the Zola text. The first is histoire de (e.g., 
"Puis, un soir, ayant de la monnaie, ils s'attablèrent et burent un saladier de vin à la 
française, histoire de se raffraichir," [p. 895}; "Then one evening, since they had a 
little change in their pockets, they sat down at a table and drank a bowl of wine the 
French way, just to cool off"). This particularly colloquial term expressing motiva­
tion exemplifies the working-classflavor of the narrator's diction and seems at odds 
with the very "literary" verb tenses (past definite) of the récit, in a way that Gide's 
lexicon would seldom permit. It may signal a "lapse" into (almost) free indirect 
discourse, as if the portion of the sentence containing it came from the mind of the 
characters (Gervaise and Coupeau in the example given): this is the pretext they 
give for drinking, not the true cause. Such shoddy causal logic is not uncommon 
among L'Assommoir s characters. 
And Zola's narrator seems especially fond of the construction: ne . . . 
plus . . . sans. The ne . . . plus indicates a change, points out an "effect." The sans 
implies the nature of the change (from "not always" to "always"), but no cause is 
given (e.g., "Elle ne passa plus devant la porte d'un bal sans entrer," {p. 895]; 
"now she never passed a dance hall door without going in"; here, Gervaise is 
seeking her daughter, but for deeper motivations—alcohol is available in dance 
halls—readers are thrown back upon the histoire to infer them.) Ne . . . plus . . . 
sans evokes a "now always" state of affairs, akin to the "static," "described" scenes 
that abound in the novel (the Assommoir Tavern, Gervaise in her laundry, Gouget 
at his forge, the saints-day banquet, Gervaise scrubbing floors, attempting pros­
titution in the streets, etc.), which come into existence without clear causal links to 
the past at the level of the récit. Relatively common in L'Assommoir, this construc­
tion tends to fragment the causal chains, sending us to the histoire to infer 
causation. 
Causes of
inconsequential 
effects 
"Evasive"
explanations 
Inferences
Speculations
Substantial
causes 
Consequential
explanations of 
Meursaults 
psychic states 
Text-referential
causes 
Causal judg­
ments by other 
characters 
(direct or 
indirect 
discourse) 
Totals 
Appendix C 
Functions of Causal Vocabulary 
in L'Etranger 
NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES 
c'est 
à pour 
parce causal cause cela causal par Per-
que comme de puisque car que ainsi donc suite Totals centage 
 25 40 37 
 12 20 19 
2 4 4 
o 7 6 
6 15 14 
3 
6 0 1  0 0  0 8 7 
7 1  0 9 
61 14 6 3 1 108 100 
(Summary: analysis of data in Ignace Feuerlicht, "Camus's L'Etranger Revisited, " PMLA 
78, 5 [Dec. 1963], 612.) 
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xix, xxv, 197; of author, 213; of charac­
ter, 83, 120, 165, 168, 181, 182, 185, 
189, 192-94, 196, 198, 200, 224, 
232; of critic, 122, 145, 163, 186-87; 
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Imaginary mode, 178, 179-80, 183, 189, 
190, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198-205, 
206, 208, 209, 217, 224. See also Men­
tal representation 
Implausibility, 11, 34, 48, 60, 68, 74, 84, 
85, 89, 90, 140-44, 199, 201-2, 
208-10, 220 
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170, 210. See also Author; Inferred 
author 
Inertia, 84, 91, 106, 168-69, 186, 200 
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211, 212, 214, 219,221,224 
Russell, Bertrand, xxi-xxiii 
San-Antonio (pseud, for Frédéric Dard), 
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Signified, 7, 13, 131, 134, 137, 139, 140, 
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